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ABSTRACT 
CONFISCATION ORDER: PROCEDURES AGAINST DRUG 
TRAFFICKING OFFENCES 
Taking the profit out of crime' has been considered as one of the effective 
countermeasures to drug traffickers in the last decade. A growing interest 
in various approaches taken to secure the confiscation of the proceeds of 
drug trafficking offences in order to combat drug trafficking more 
effectively has resulted in the development of different national and 
international perspectives. Despite the acknowledgement of the United 
Nations of the provisions and proceedings for confiscation in late 1980s, 
some countries have adopted enforcement provisions and powers which 
are extraordinary wide, considered as either draconian and trespassing 
with the rights of citizens. At the other end some regard them as weak, 
inefficient, and lacking effective strength. 
Unlike many developed countries, Britain has a specific confiscation 
system for drug trafficking offences (DTA 1994). Some of the provisions of 
the British confiscation proceedings have been seen as invading 
individual freedoms and rights. Therefore, the thesis is devoted to 
examining the British concept and values of confiscation order, 
highlighting the principles and critiques accompanying its various 
provisions' development at different stages of the British political, 
juridical and law enforcement systems. 
The thesis advances and assesses the similarities and dissimilarities 
among different systems of confiscation beyond the borders of English and 
Wales. The aim is to determine the definitions, limitations, credibility and 
legality of principles, application and practices of confiscation laws 
perceived by different systems. The American, the Kuwaiti and the 
Egyptian systems are also chosen as relevant points of variability with 
respect to the British system. 
It is within this framework, that the British confiscation system is 
scrutinised. There is an attempt to expose the strains existing in the system 
and also finding the best way forward. The current oscillation between 
either reparation or punishment which seems to occur regularly is 
believed to be a critical stake and a crucial problem for producing a better 
understanding of the implications of confiscation orders. 
Interviews conducted in England and Wales, United States (Washington 
DC), Kuwait and Egypt have provided a background to confiscation 
enforcement, revealing the extent of powers, restrictions and difficulties 
in implementing the order in line with its current principles. 
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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis there are two main aims. The first is to determine the 
manner in which the British confiscation system provided under the 
Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (hereafter DTA) developed and the second is to 
determine how* the system operates by law enforcement agencies. The 
study is approached through the sociology of law by examining not just 
how law is constructed but how it is operates. That is how it is 
conditioned, developed, conceptualised, perceived and implemented. 
Certain important questions exist within the British confiscation 
proceedings. Questions about the nature of the system as punitive or 
reparative, or as a way of redressing the wrongdoing of drug traffickers are 
cases in point. There is also the problem of the enforcement of 
confiscation order. Who does it? How are decisions made in accordance 
with the order? These questions will be examined throughout, and in 
particular in chapters 3 and 4. 
BACKGROUND 
Every legal system would accept as axiomatic that an offender should not 
be able to enjoy the profits of his criminal activities. In earlier centuries 
the theory of confiscation in Britain for example, was based upon English 
law which contained penalties of general forfeiture of estate and blood. 
There were several forms of crime-based confiscation systems existing at 
that level of common law. The prime law was attainder, a mechanism 
whereby a capital felon lost the use of his land and he and his heirs lost 
their rights of inheritance and title. Attainder and other common law 
forms of confiscation were eventually abolished by statute, mainly by 
reason of the 'stark injustice' they could and did inflict upon defendants 
and their relatives (Fisse, 1989). Scott (1996) indicated that the 
unpopularity of these laws, which were sometimes used against political 
prisoners and dissenters, caused the virtual disappearance of criminal 
asset forfeiture legislation for more than two centuries. 
In early 1970s, asset-confiscation law was resurrected in the United States, 
and as described by Hyde (1995), was to be the main weapon in the fight 
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Introduction 
against drug trafficking offences. Fears of a 'frankenstein monster's 
resurrection' boiled to the surface in various legal, political and public 
circles. The history of past injustices involved in forfeiture laws loomed 
over the debates which were about introducing new property or asset- 
confiscation laws. Interestingly, no sooner had drug trafficking became an 
issue of public alarm, than there was an emergence of powers to trace, 
seize and confiscate assets of crime that contributed to these fears. A more 
active form of government intervention was required for executing the 
'war on drugs' strategy. The full flowering of civil asset forfeiture in 
America has become a tool in the war to banish the so-called "controlled 
dangerous substances" which has been made illegal by Acts of Congress or 
state legislatures. 
Since 1980's, the 'war on drugs' witnessed an upshot in penal measures 
and a synchronisation among various American legal, political and 
governmental institutions as a weapon in the arsenal of the drug war. 
Today, these exist over 100 diffe. -ent federal forfeiture statutes, addressing 
a wide range of matters both criminal and civil. The direction, extent and 
speed that this war on drugs has taken have signalled a cautious responses 
from those who were considered that this war would produce a series of 
frontal attacks on the basic American constitutional guarantees- including 
due process, the presumption of innocence, and the right to won and 
enjoy private property. In light of the development of such a strategy, the 
war on drugs has been able to keep question about a granted constitutional 
rights in the background because it has given the impression that there 
has to be 'something done'. 
Apparently, the pressures to have 'something done' have not been 
restricted to the American national scene. Drug trafficking has come to be 
an international phenomena where trafficking has cut across national 
systems and borders. These developments have prompted an increase of 
'ebbs and tides' relations among the nations to draw out efficient 
measures and to abolish the 'open possibilities' which the drug trafficking 
networks are already exploiting and investing. 
It is important to mention at this stage that the key circumstances which 
conditioned the content of the international developments among the 
nations against drug trafficking largely a response to the American system 
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and needs. These pressures are not considered in this thesis as a simple 
cause and effect. They are rather a matter of relations of forces which 
assumably impose themselves on various historical , circumstantial, and 
allocative aspects. Within such a perspective, the various critiques made 
by different writers, for example, Oppenheimer, G (1993, p 194-225) , and 
Dorn, N et al (1992,63-77), are clear indications of the influence that the 
United States has had not only on international conferences and agencies 
but also on national policies in an attempt to police cross-national drug 
trafficking, and dealing with offshore money -an important adjunct to its 
internal policy of narcotics prohibition and enforced drug abstinence. In 
retrospect, it seems as if the United States has aimed to impose its 
narcotics policy as standard, if not universal on all counries as a solution 
to its 'international loophole'. 
The most significant representation of such a momentum to take curb 
offenders of drug trafficking across the borders was the United Nations 
Conventions against Illicit Drugs and Psychotropic substances signed in 
Vienna in December 1988. This was an agreement heralding the collective 
responsibility of all the countries which have to apply a co-ordinated 
action within the framework of international co-operation. Accordingly, 
the participating States are expected to commit themselves to a wide range 
of measures against drug trafficking. 
Actually, there was preceding local legislation to take action against the 
illicit proceeds at the European stage. In the early 1980's, influenced by the 
American concept of 'taking the profit out of crime', several European 
countries (Italy, France and others) deployed asset confiscation as the most 
effective strategy against drug trafficking and organised crime. 
It is no coincidence to realise that these aggregate developments at the 
international level have not kept Britain away from their influences. 
There are various indications, which the thesis will illustrate, that the 
legislators and the members of the British Parliament were swept by an 
acknowledgement of the international measurements that should be 
taken against drug trafficking. 
Key aspects of the American forfeiture concept have received the approval 
and admiration of two committees: the Hodgson committee (1984) and the 
3 
Introduction 
Home Affairs Committee (1995), who then recommended asset tracing, 
seizing and confiscating powers for the government. Accordingly, the 
British government rushed into the drafting of an integrative confiscation 
system that included certain recommended measures and provisions that 
were thought to be competent enough to deal with drug trafficking 
problems at both national and international levels. 
In 1986, Parliament enacted a new confiscation system which covered the 
loopholes of the existing forfeiture law and enabled law enforcement 
agencies to deal with new international developments in fighting 
organised drug trafficking offences. The reach and scope of the provisions 
of the British confiscation system provided first under the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act 1986, as will be seen later in this thesis, were 
described as 'striking', 'extraordinary wide' and 'draconian'. 
Mr. Corbett (MP), for example, commented on the powers provided under 
this Act by saying; 
The powers proposed by this amendment are in terms of civil 
liberties, quite draconian' (2/7/1986, HC, col. 1137). 
Lord Lane C. J. at p. 167 in Dickens' case (1990) indicated: 
'It is plain that the object of the Act is to ensure, so far as possible, 
that the convicted drug trafficker is parted from the proceeds of any 
drug trafficking which he has carried out. The provisions are 
intentionally draconian (1990,2 W. L. R. 1384). 
DS Porazinski from Gwent Constabulary and DS Michael Gagg from 
South Yorkshire Police asserted that the application of the confiscation 
proceedings has, in general, a very powerful and draconian consequences 
(pers. communication, 1995). 
These attitudes fuelled expectations regarding the efficiency and 
comprehensibility of confiscation legislation. Their application produced a 
variety of responses. Many case-laws, for example: 'Peters, re' case in 1988, 
'R. v Dickens' case in 1990, 'Re 0' case (1991), 'Comisky' case in 1991, 
'Ilsemann' case in 1991, 'Saunders' case in 1991, 'Redboicrne' case in 1993, 
and 'Sirnons' case in 1993 have exposed defects which put a halt to the 
execution of certain provisions, as well as raising a degree of scepticism 
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around some of the main principles of the confiscation system (e. g. the 
nature and purposes of confiscation and its status in the sentence). 
In this respect, D. A. Thomas (1993) says: 
'the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 in its original form cannot be 
considered to be a particularly successful piece of legislation. It was 
burden by many difficult technicalities and unnecessary 
complications, and failed to prove an adequate procedural structure 
for decision-making' (p. 93). 
The Lord Chief Justice Lane said of the DTOA; 
The grounds of appeal advanced ... raise a number of points under 
the Act which we understand have caused trouble to courts up and 
down the country and it may be of assistance if we try to deal with 
the structure and import of the Act in general before turning to the 
specific points which arise in this appeal' (R v Dickens. ([19901 2 
WLR 1384). 
The above responses, along with others suggested that the confiscation 
system would not escape fierce doctrinal and political debates which 
would raise doubts about its usefulness, its ability to preserve rights, and 
conversely its beneficial effects proportional to any sacrifices. 
The subsequent amendments which were consolidated in the DTA 1994 
and which dealt with certain provisions of the original Act (the DTOA 
1986) did not manage to resolve these concerns. There was a very severe 
problem that accompanied the exigencies of the confiscation amendments. 
Nine judges at the Strasbourg Court (the European Court of Human 
Rights) ruled unanimously in 1995 that a British court acted unlawfully in 
trying to confiscate £59,000 of Peter Welch's drug profits after he was 
convicted of a plot to smuggle £4 million of cannabis. Accordingly, 
although the confiscation order has not been enforced because of Welch's 
plea to Strasbourg, Britain was ordered to pay him nearly £ 14,000 in costs 
for penalising him under a law which had not come into force when his 
crimes were committed (The Times, Feb. 10,1995). 
This is perhaps -one of the stark events which reveal the critical 
consequence of a confiscation system which exists within the current 
climate of confusion concerning its nature and purposes. Ben Emmerson, 
5 
Introduction 
the barrister representing the convicted drug trafficker in this case, 
summarised the situation by saying: 
'Despite warnings before the legislation was introduced that it 
would breach the convention, the Home Office has buried its head 
in the sand and built an entire legislative framework that these 
confiscation orders are not criminal penalties. It was that myth that 
the court exposed' (Ibid. ). 
Since that case, the need for clear explanations about the actual nature of 
confiscation, not only the nature of the 'confiscation order' but the nature 
of the confiscation system itself provided under the DTA 1994, and the 
social justifications underpinning it, were never scrutinised in depth. The 
punitive or reparative feature of the system are not clear when set within 
the government's determination to underpin asset-confiscation as being 
merely reparative with no punitive element. Ironically, this 
determination repeats the same problem that has faced the American 
system. The American government attempted to bypass this problem of 
'double jeopardy' by introducing a new classification system by classifying 
forfeiture as an administrative remedy rather than as punishment. In 
doing so, it was thought that it had removed all confusion by providing a 
more suitable framework altogether. 
The problematic situation in which the confiscation system has found 
itself have not been accompanied by serious socio-legal research. The 
absence of such research has been a serious defect. This thesis will show 
that this absence has caused many problems to persist so that easy and 
transparent answers are given to complex problems under the burden of 
appearing to 'do something'. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS (THE MAIN FOCUS) 
Given the problematic developments, relations, cases and contexts 
accompanying the confiscation system, this thesis will examine a number 
of aspects that have contributed to the various dilemmas currently facing 
the British confiscation system. This means that the main focus of this 
thesis is the British system. However, an examination of the American, 
the Kuwaiti and the Egyptian confiscation systems will also be considered 
to assist with any subsequent analysis. Inevitably the American system has 
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had a great impact on the British one, so it is necessary to understand how 
that system operates too. 
With regard to the Kuwaiti system, the choice was more pragmatic; that i3, 
it reflects the researcher's national concerns. As it happens, this approach 
is consistent with a critical perspective in the sociology of law. 
Confiscation system can help determine the limits of the former in 
relation to the latter. In other words, the aim is to create a critical 
understanding of one's own position in order to understand the other. 
This helps to establishes a greater awareness of the differences between the 
two. 
The Egyptian confiscation system was chosen because it helped determine 
the Kuwaiti system. So, the same principle applies for selecting the 
American laws as a necessary element in studying British confiscation as 
with the Egyptian and the Kuwaiti systems. In both these cases, it was 
crucial to examine the effects of the former on the latter in order to 
understand the form in which these legal systems would emerge. 
AIMS OF THE THESIS: 
As said above there are two main aims. First to determine the manner in 
which the British confiscation system developed, and second to determine 
how it operates under the DTA 1994. These aims can be broken down into 
other aims, and further subdivided into subaims where necessary. 
For main aim I, i. e. to determine the manner in which the British system 
developed there are the following aims: 
(1) To determine the historical and background under which the 
British confiscation system emerged. 
(2) To determine the philosophical justification of the 
confiscation system. 
(3) To determine the distinctive elements of the British 
confiscation legislation with particular reference to the DTA 
1994; and the strategies of enforcement and organisation. 
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(4) To determine the link between the American system and the 
development of the British confiscation system. 
(5) To examine the Kuwaiti and the Egyptian asset confiscation 
systems and locate any convergences and discrepancies with 
the British system. 
For main aim II i. e. to determine how the British confiscation system 
operates, there are the following aims: 
(1) to determine the perceptions of the police financial 
investigators about the nature of the confiscation system 
provided under the DTA 1994; 
(2) to determine the perceptions of the police financial 
investigators about the main principles and features of the 
confiscation legislation; 
(3) to determine whether or not the chosen enforcement 
strategies are consistent with the directions, conditions and 
demands of the main provisions of the system; 
(4) to determine the major defects and problems which may 
prevent the system from being enforced and those which 
could prevent the involved practitioners from achieving the 
full potential of the powers and provisions against illegal 
proceeds and profits. This also include the nature and extent 
of cooperation of other law enforcement agencies; 
(5) to determine whether the confiscation system is efficient and 
useful or not; and 
(6) to determine the level of resources, funding and support 
dedicated by government and local forces for the system. 
In regard to the main objectives of the research, it is an attempt to provide 
an insight into the advantages and the disadvantages of a unique asset- 
confiscation system. The uniqueness of the British confiscation system 
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lies, actually, in the adoption of a so called 'value-based system'. This is a 
system where the definition and application of confiscation is different 
from others. For the British confiscation order is an order to a convicted 
drug trafficker to pay a sum of money, in cash, not a deprivation of certain 
illegal proceeds which is the most common and traditional kind of 
procedure. 
As said above the objective is also to determine how the British system of 
confiscation corresponds with the Kuwaiti constitutional and criminal 
systems and in particular, to see how it would fit into Kuwait and other 
international asset-confiscation systems. 
THESIS DESIGN 
This thesis will include six chapters excluding the introduction and the 
conclusion. The first four chapters deal with the historical and 
philosophical context, review of relevant literature, the extent of powers, 
the structure of the law enforcement organisation concerning the British 
confiscation system and the perceptions of the British police practitioners 
regarding the confiscation system provided under the DTA 1994. The 
remaining two chapters will include an examination of the American, the 
Kuwaiti and the Egyptian confiscation systems as a necessary step for 
knowing the conditions surrounding the adoption of asset-confiscation 
powers and as an outside sphere to examine and judge the British 
confiscation system. 
Chapter one examines the British concept of confiscation through its 
historical background and context. It will also emphasise contemporary 
political concerns over confiscation legislation in the British system. It 
then concludes with an examination of some of the problems related to 
the theory of confiscation. 
Chapter two offers a detailed description of existing literature drawn from 
legal manuals, law articles, professional accounts and academic works on 
the subject of confiscation procedures. It explores the manner in which a 
single, inflexible perspective on confiscation theory has been developed. It 
begins to examine the possible lines of criticism of such a restrictive 
framework. 
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Chapter three include two sections. The first section contain an 
examination of the distinctive elements of the British confiscation 
legislation provided under the consolidated DTA 1994 and clarify the 
features and extent of the main amended powers and provisions under 
the consolidated DTA 1994. This section also includes an examination of 
certain relevant provisions in the confiscation proceedings which have 
raised fundamental questions about civil liberties and of the erosion of 
individual rights. It draws on various positions, to reveal the limitations 
and the extent of the potential powers of the system and shows some of 
the weaknesses embedded in the legislation. The criticism unfolds in such 
a way so bring forth the importance of an in-depth analysis regarding the 
confiscation problem. The second section focuses on the operational side 
of the confiscation provisions. It includes a review of law enforcement 
organisation involved in the execution of the confiscation system. The 
discussion also highlights the strategies of the government, the 
Association of the Chief Police Officers (ACPO), and some of the local 
police forces in approaching the confiscation legislation. 
The purpose of chapter four is to present the views and perceptions of the 
police financial investigators and other relevant practitioners in England 
and Wales in regard to the text of the law and the applications, policies 
and strategies of enforcement adopted by the police forces. It embraces the 
data collected using the questionnaire and the follow-up interviews with 
senior police officers, and prosecutors. At the end of the chapter, the most 
important findings are summarised. 
Chapter five provides comparative accounts of definitions, extent of 
powers and applications of different confiscation systems. It attempts to 
develop a broader understanding of the British treatment approach from 
different perspectives in different countries. This chapter embraces two 
functions; the first section highlights, in brief, the usefulness of 
comparative studies in general, and how they can serve to determine the 
definitions, limitations, credibility and legitimacy of the confiscation laws 
perceived by different systems. The second provides a comparison with 
the American system in terms of principles, applications and practices. 
Chapter six deals with the Kuwaiti and the Egyptian confiscation laws as 
they have developed over recent decades. It begins by examining the 
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Kuwaiti criminal confiscation system and recent relevant developments, 
and provides a description of the Egyptian sequestration system. The study 
also shows how the two systems look at the nature and theory of 
confiscation. Unlike the British and the American perspectives, the 
Egyptian and the Kuwaiti systems have classified confiscations according 
to certain applications; that is to say the applications show whether 
confiscation is a pre-cautionary procedure or one of pure punishment. 
The conclusion hopes to establish a clear picture of the actual reality of the 
British confiscation system by examining its explicit and implicit 
philosophy and its distinctive principles. It is hoped that the present 
research may contribute to a better understanding of the . British 
confiscation system. The conclusion will also include a determination of 
legal and policy implications, suggestions for future research and the 
propriety of its main principles and distinctive provisions with the 
Kuwaiti constitutional and legal system. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE BRITISH CONCEPT OF CONFISCATION 
(HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY) 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the British concept of confiscation in the light of 
main aim I which is to determine the manner in which the British system 
developed. This chapter also looks at the historical and philosophical 
background under which the legislation emerged. These are examined 
through a variety of provisions and the philosophical justification of the 
confiscation system is also determined. The analysis is confined to 
confiscation proceedings defined under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 
1986. The subsequent amendments to the Act which were consolidated by 
the DTA 1994 are also taken into account to determine the mode in which 
the confiscation process has established its widespread legitimacy. In the 
course of setting out the historical conditions of the confiscation system, 
close attention will be paid to those features that show the difficulties 
accompanying such confiscation proceedings. For example, an attempt is 
made to locate the social philosophy underpinning confiscation 
legislation in order to determine the consistency and credibility of any 
subsequent argument and critique. 
The argument in the chapter is set out in two sections. The first section 
considers the historical background, by means of the documents that have 
contributed to the development of confiscation. In particular conditions 
relating to its political and legal currency are examined. There is also an 
attempt to trace the lines and links between the existing laws regarding 
drug trafficking prior to the introduction of confiscation law, and the 
developing political debate surrounding confiscation especially that which 
defines and subordinates the profits of crime to the state's right of action. 
The second section discusses the social philosophy of confiscation paying 
attention to that which provides the means of establishing a legitimating 
definition and an application of the confiscation system. There will be an 
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overview of the various philosophical positions that constitute the 
frameworks of justification, signalling the intentions and scope of usage. 
1.2. AIM 1: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
CONTEXT 
The current confiscation order introduced by the DTOA 1986 has little 
meaning unless the particular circumstances and developments 
surrounding its enactment, are put into focus. Bazell (1989) indicates that 
'confiscation as a term and a concept was used for the first time in the 
British Criminal Justice System under the DTOA 1986' (p. 349). However, 
this concept exists alongside earlier provisions for forfeiture of crime- 
related property. Actually, forfeiture is the only term which has been used 
and survived since the Forfeiture Act 18701 which abolished deodand, 
escheat, attainder, corruption of the blood as a consequence of felony or 
treason, and also the obsolete punishment of forfeiture of property 
(Liverpool, 1983, p. 21). Bugueroux (1996) pointed out that 'early English 
law contained penalties of general forfeiture of estate and blood. As a 
result of abuses in the use of those laws, they were abolished until recent 
times'2. 
There is no intention to draw upon the circumstances surrounding the 
development of forfeiture and the rationale or the causes behind the 
enactment of the Forfeiture Act 1870. However, what is important is to 
mention the nature of the powers of state, the ownership, the rights and 
obligations, and the functions which have all played a part in providing 
the content of the Forfeiture Act 1870. The dominance of monarchy, the 
existence of an absolutist ownership, the underdeveloped status of the 
public rights, and the confinement of forfeiture function in between 
1The term 'forfeiture' is an ancient one going back in the British system hundreds of years. 
Feldman (1991) indicated that it has its origins in the feudal arrangements of Anglo- 
Norman law (p. 25). In feudal time when a person was convicted of a felony all his property 
was forfeited and his family were deprived of all rights of inheritance over the property. 
The Medieval law also had the concept of 'deodand' under which the court had the power 
to order the taking of. any object. By the nineteenth century, forfeiture and deodand had 
become anachronistic. Deodand was abolished in 1846, and forfeiture as a consequence of 
felony or treason was abolished by the forfeiture Act 1870 (see in this regard Zander, 1989, 
Chatterjee, 1983). 
2This passage is quoted from an article found on the internet information service 
(http: //www. ssc. msu. edu/cj/cp/forfeitu. html): Forfeiture: A potent and potentially 
dangerous new tool. 
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punishment and a guarantor of obedience (loyalty and allegiance)... etc., 
have all attributed to a process of development in conditions and 
functions that would require a different form of forfeiture3. 
In securing a better means of depriving offenders of the fruits of crime, the 
functions of the powers of forfeiture available to courts since the 
Forfeiture Act 1870 and until the enactment date of the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986, were the only options available for courts in England 
and Wales4. The continuation of forfeiture as a procedure, confined to 
offences which breach the common law, reflects a system that differs from 
what has made the later confiscation order functional. It seems that the 
application of the concept has moved towards a means of particularising 
the power in which forfeiture is used. There are many conditions and 
developments which have played a major part in making the necessary 
changes to the way forfeiture has developed. 
The Hodgson Committee of 1984 in their report 'Profits of Crime and 
Their Recovery' attributed the origin of the concept of confiscation to the 
government White Paper of 1959 'Penal Practice in a Changing Society; 
Aspects of Futtere Development', and also to two subsequent reports by 
the Advisory Council on the Penal System (p. 8). The government White 
Paper suggested that personal reparation would have to be considered in 
the context of a fundamental re-examination of penal philosophy and 
practice (paragraph. 25-7). The two reports of the Advisory Council were 
presented to the Home Secretary in 1970. The first report 'Note-Ciustodial 
And Seini-Custodial Penalties' recommended that the courts should be 
given a general power to order forfeiture of property if this appeared 
desirable for the prevention of crime (p. 50, para 148). The second report 
'Reparation by the offender' furthered the impetus towards securing a 
better means of depriving offenders of the fruits of their crime and 
considered how the principle of personal reparation might be given a 
more prominent place in the penal system (p. v& 59). 
3More detailed information concerning this issue is found in W. S. Holdsworth, A History 
of English Law, (London, Methuen, 1925), vol. VII. 
4There are various statutes under which forfeiture of particular property results or, as 
mentioned by the Advisory Council on the Penal System (1970), may result, from the 
conviction of an offender (e. g. The Prevention of Crime Act 1953; The Dangerous Drugs Act 
1965; Firearms Act 1968 ... etc. ). 
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The Committee pointed out that the government had adopted the 
recommendation provided by the first report of the Advisory Council that 
post-conviction forfeiture powers should be generalised. This 
recommendation is currently contained in section 43 of the Powers of 
Criminal Courts Act (PCCA 1973) which provides that: 
(1) Where a person is convicted of an offence punishable on 
indictment with imprisonment for a term of two years or more 
and the court by or before which he is convicted is satisfied 
that any property which was in his possession or under his 
control at the time of his apprehension: 
(a) has been used for the purpose of committing, or 
facilitating the commission of, any offence; or 
(b) was intended by him to be used for that purpose; 
(2) Facilitating the commission of an offence shall be taken... to 
include the taking of any steps after it has been committed for 
the purpose of disposing of any property to which it relates or 
of avoiding apprehension or detention and references... to an 
offence punishable with imprisonment shall be construed 
without regard to any prohibition or restriction imposed by 
any enactment on the imprisonment of young offenders; 
(3) An order under this section shall operate to deprive the 
offender of his rights, .f any, in the property to which it 
relates, and the property shall (if not already in their 
possession) be taken into the possession of the police. 
Accordingly, a trafficker's working capital can be forfeited on the grounds 
that he or she intended to use it for the purposes of committing further 
criminal acts. However, this still leaves the defendant the freedom to 
enjoy the profits of his criminal enterprise (Talbot, 1991). Section 11 of the 
Courts Act 1971, effectively imposes a time-limit within which the 
forfeiture power under section 43 can be exercised (Chatterjee, 1983). In R. 
v. Menocal5, for example, the Courts Act imposes a time-limit of twenty- 
eight days on the power of a court to vary a sentence after it has been 
pronounced, but the order was in this case made more than twenty-eight 
days after conviction. The House of Lords had no hesitation in holding 
that there was no jurisdiction to make the order. Liverpool (1983) 
suggested, on this particular case, that this decision of the House of Lords 
clearly strengthens the submission that confiscation orders could be used 
to supplement forfeiture orders where the court was unable to make up its 
mind at the time of conviction whether or not to order forfeiture (p. 30). 
5An order for forfeiture was made in respect of a sum of money which was found with the 
defendant. As the accused admitted, the sum of money she possessed was for the purpose of 
being handed over for the payment of illegally imported drugs (R. versus Menocal, in The 
All England Law Reports, 1979 (London, Butterworths), vol. II, p. 510). 
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Lovell White Durrant6 in their report 'Money Laundering in Etigland and 
Wales' (1994), pointed out that the power of forfeiture under section 43 is 
confined only to the 'instrumentalities' of crime, that is the physical 
instruments actually involved in the preparation of crime, and did not 
provide for the forfeiture of financial proceeds of an offence (p. 3). 
In following the development of the law of forfeiture in relation to drug- 
related offences in particular, Chatterji (1983) asserted that it was 
unknown to Common Law. He pointed out that 'despite the fact that the 
concept of forfeiture was known in early English law, forfeiture in relation 
to drug-related offences cannot be based on the early experiences, because 
it is a primarily statute-based law' (p. 7). 
Alongside the above mentioned statute-based Act (PCCA 1973), specific 
powers to order forfeiture of goods and gains connected with drug offences 
are contained in more than one statute. The most important statutes in 
this regard are: (a) Police (Property) Act 1897; (b) Theft Act 1968; (c) Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971; and (d) Criminal Justice Act 19727. Section 27 (1) of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA 1971), in particular, had played a major role in 
making the confiscation concept functional. It allowed a much wider 
power of forfeiture. It provided that: 
The court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence under 
this Act may order anything shown to the satisfaction of the court to 
relate to the offence to be forfeited'. 
Under this Act, the power of the British courts to order forfeiture of 
matters relating to an offence was discretionary. They could order the 
forfeiture of anything shown 'to relate to the offence'. This means that 
forfeiture was not limited to that which was found in the possession of 
the convicted person. This particular subsection gave the court the 
authority to forfeit a house or money or any other property which might 
have been used in relation to the offence. One can also find that the 
function of this wider power of forfeiture was indistinguishable from the 
general power of forfeiture in section 43 of the 1973 Act; there was 
6Lovell White Durrant is one of the largest law firms in Europe. It serves business clients in 
the UK and overseas from its base in the city of London. 7The application of section 23 of the Criminal justice Act 1972 which empowers the courts 
to deprive a person of property used or intended for use for the purpose of crime (in general), 
has been restricted by the Police (Property) Act 1897 (section 23 (3) (a) and (b) of the latter 
Act). 
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however a loophole in this Act (the MDA 1971). The forfeiture power 
provided under this Act could not be used against defendants convicted of 
conspiracy to commit certain offences. 
The judicial pronouncement in R. v. Cutlibertson (1980) was the most 
important decision in the development of forfeiture and confiscation law. 
This was one of those drug trafficking cases known as the 'Operation Julie' 
case8 which attracted a great deal of public attention and gained some 
notoriety in 1980 (Nicol, 1987). Those convicted at the trial had over a 
number of years manufactured and sold LSD9. The offenders were 
sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. In addition, the judge made an 
order, confirmed by the Court of Appeal, for the forfeiture of certain assets 
in their hands, exercising a power given by section 27(1) of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971. Huge profits had been made, and the prosecution was able 
to trace some £750,000 of those profits to the assets of the offenders10. The 
power given to the court under the Act was to 'order anything shown to 
the satisfaction of the Court to relate to the offence to be forfeited'. A 
further appeal was made to the House of Lords against the orders for 
forfeiture, and the Lords 'with considerable regret' found itself compelled 
to allow the appeals. 
Among the reasons given, the Lords held that Parliament had never 
intended orders of forfeiture to 'serve as a means of stripping the drug 
traffickers of the total profits of their unlawful enterprises'. The power 
could only be used where it was 'possible to identify something tangible 
that can fairly be said to relate to any such transaction such as the drugs 
involved, the apparatus for making them, the vehicles used for 
transporting them or the cash ready to be or having just been handed over 
for them'. The House of Lords also held that an English court has no 
jurisdiction to make an order for the transfer of property situated abroad; 
and that no order could be made under section 27(1) of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971 because the defendants were charged not with offences 
8After one of the policewoman involved in the investigation. The case R. v Cuthberson 
[19811 was tried in the Crown Court at Bristol. 
9LSD is a hallucinogenic drug lysergic acid. 
10These assets included cash, cars, deposits of money and securities at bank accounts in 
Switzerland and France, rights and interests in a Post Office savings account, a debt due to 
one of the gang, paintings and electrical equipment. 
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under this Act, but with conspiracy to commit themll (Hodgson' report, 
1984). 
The apparent inability of the Court to deprive an offender of the profits of 
his offending seems to be one of the main factors which caused substantial 
public concern (Ibid. ). The decision of the House of Lords in Cuthbertson's 
case was greeted by a chorus of disapproval from the press, and calls for 
the gap to be closed (Burton, 1989). The Times, for example, declared that 
`... the decision will understandably result in feelings of outrage' (The 
Times, 13th June, 1980), particularly when it was realised that there were 
many other criminal activities where huge profits were made and the 
Court's powers were similarly restricted. 
It seems that the decision of the House of Lords troubled the Howard 
League for Penal Reform12. The League believed that an examination of 
the law with a view to its reform in regard to forfeiture powers would 
involve complex issues which deserved review in the context of the 
whole armoury of the court's powers to make monetary and proprietary 
orders. Therefore, under its auspices, considered by some to be an 
independent body, a Committee was formed chaired by Derek Hodgson to 
examine the law relating to the forfeiture of property associated with 
crime, in the light of the House of Lords' judgement in R. v. Ctithbertson 
and others (Nicol, 1989). 
The Committee produced its report in 1984, 'Profits of Crime and Their 
Recovery'. It recommended, inter alia, that powers be vested in Criminal 
Courts to confiscate the benefit accruing to a defendant as a direct 
consequence of committing an offence of which he is convicted. The 
committee explained that the general application of such a power in 
respect of all offences would be wasteful in relation to minor 
contraventions and, in some cases, possibly unjust; it might result in a 
substantial and unacceptable increase in penalties; a list of offences in 
respect of which confiscation was appropriate would be wholly 
impracticable; limiting confiscation to 'serious crime', defined perhaps as 
offences carrying a possible prison sentence, would exclude many 
profitable regulatory offences (the terms of reference of the Committee 
11R. v. Cuthbertson [1981] A. C. 470. 
12A research and pressure group for reform of sentencing and penal policy. 
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went beyond drug cases alone). An upper limit could. be safely left to the 
discretion of the judge (pp. 150-156). 
The terms of reference of Hodgson's Committee required it to consider 
wider issues than simply the profits of drug trafficking. It was concerned 
with all types of criminal activities, and also with restitution of goods to 
their rightful owner and with compensation to victims. The report 
presented a sufficient examination of the historical developments in 
English law regarding forfeiture and the powers of the civil courts which 
are analogous to the powers of the criminal courts. It is worth mentioning 
that this report was the only available study to determine the situation 
and problems of confiscating the proceeds of wrongdoing during the 
period prior to the enactment of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. It 
is also considered to be one of the few sources which looked at the theory 
and application of a confiscation scheme. 
The Hodgson committee also mentioned that, excluding crimes of 
violence where imprisonment may be the only way in which society can 
be protected, there are three broad categories of illegal conduct from which 
substantial gains can be made. These are 'victim' crimes, the paradigms of 
which are fraud and theft; 'non-victim' crimes, which refer to drug and 
pornography rackets, unlawful gaming, the transportation of illegal 
immigrants and the corruption of officials; and the third category are 
those regulatory offences that involve less obvious criminality. 
The report asserted that, with one exception, no serious attempts were 
made to redress the harm done and the profit made by the second and 
third categories of offending. The exceptions are procedures adopted by the 
Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise which provide, in effect, for the 
confiscation of the gains of offenders guilty of offences of immediately 
recognisable criminality. The Committee clarified that when there is no 
identifiable victim who can be compensated, the criminal law provides no 
direct means of confiscating the proceeds of crime, although sometimes a 
fine can be calculated so as to achieve the same result. The problem with 
fines is that instead of forfeiting the proceeds in specie, the trial judge 
could have imposed a fine equivalent to their value, that is to say there is 
no upper limit on the amount of a fine which a Crown Court judge can 
impose. Non-payment of a fine, however, can, at most, lead to 
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imprisonment. For defendants receiving long sentences concurrently with 
a fine, this sanction then becomes a wholly ineffective incentive to pay. 
Moreover, given the growing sophistication of drug trafficking networks, 
and of the financial systems, it was not difficult for the proceeds of drug 
trafficking to be moved rapidly from the jurisdiction in which the 
trafficker was being prosecuted, making even with the levying of heavy 
fines a system which was effectively counter-productive. 
In relation to civil powers, Talbot & Hinton (1991) added 'that in cases 
where there is a victim, there are some remedies in civil courts that have 
the effect of confiscating the proceeds of wrongdoing, such as account of 
profits from using another's intellectual property, account of profits from 
abuse of trust, waiver of tort, and exemplary damages. All these remedies 
have the effect and the impact of confiscating the proceeds of 
wrongdoing. ' 
In this respect, the Hodgson Committee did not think that the problem of 
confiscating the proceeds of crime should be solved by expanding these 
civil remedies, which in fact reflect penal sanctions and as such are 
thought by some to sit uncomfortably in the civil law system. It found that 
this concept of quasi-criminal forfeiture is 'troubling' for it could too 
easily be used 'as a way of penalising criminal conduct without the 
safeguards of the ordinary criminal process'. The committee, therefore, 
believed that their experience was useful in several respects in considering 
the nature and extent of the powers that might be given to the criminal 
courts. The report concluded by recommending that criminal courts 
should have the power to order the confiscation of proceeds of an offence 
of which the defendant has been convicted or asked to be taken into 
consideration (p. 151). The Committee also distinguished between 
'forfeiture' and 'confiscation' by providing the following definitions: 
(1984): 
'Forfeiture is the power of the Court to take property that is 
immediately connected with an offence'. 
and 
'Confiscation is the depriving of an offender of the proceeds or the 
profits of crime' (p. 5). 
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1.2.1. Social and Political Concerns 
Parallel to these legal developments and consequences, there were others 
of equal significance. During the early 1980s, the issue of illegal drug use 
gave rise to social and political concerns that had been dormant since the 
1960s (Goodsir, in Bean, 1993, p. 131). This was most likely due to the 
assumption underlying the British drug policies in the 1960s and 1970s, 
which were rooted in a medical model of response to drug problems. This 
principle was implicit in the Rolleston Report of 192613 and was explicitly 
stated by the two Brain Committees of 1961 and 196514. Goodsir asserted 
that illegal drugs and the management of drug problems became a matter 
of general interest. The fear of the consequences of rising levels of illegal 
use, and later, with evidence of strong links between injecting drugs using 
sharing needles and HIV infection, there were serious concerns which led 
to changes in drug policy (p. 132). 
Feldman (1988) says that in 1985, a wave of public concern about drug 
addiction swept across the country. Young people saw pop stars suffering 
and dying from sniffing, smoking and injecting drugs. Consequently, the 
then Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, committed the government to take 
urgent steps to combat the problem (p. 4). Moreover, there were 
numerous political discourses aimed at shifting drug policies towards the 
supply side. On the other hand, a consensus emerged among politicians 
and judiciary during the early 1980s that drugs sentencing had become too 
soft. Goodsir (1993) attributed that to the feeling that a comprehensive 
'crackdown' on drug suppliers was necessary. Goodsir exemplifies this by 
saying that in 1983, Lord Lane, C. J. asserted that; 
'Anything which courts of this country can do by way of deterrent 
sentences on those found guilty of crimes involving Class A drugs 
should be done. ' (Goodsir, 1993, p. 138) 
"'The Ministry of Health set up a Departmental Committee under the chairmanship of Sir 
Humphrey Rolleston. This Committee accepted a disease model of addiction, regarding it 
as a medical problem rather than as a vice to be dealt with entirely by their criminal law 
(D'Orban, 1986, p. 221). 
14The first Brain Report of 1961 recommended that addiction should be regarded as 'an 
expression of mental disorder rather than a form of criminal behaviour'. It did not 
recommended any change in the law (Ibid., p. 222). The second Brain report of 1965 
recommended that a system of compulsory notification should be introduced. Special 
treatment centres should be established and that the right to prescribe heroin and cocaine 
to addicts should be limited to doctors working at those centres. It is worth mentioning here 
that the recommendations of the later report were implemented in the Dangerous Drugs Act 
1967. 
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The then Home Office Secretary Leon Brittan in a speech to the London 
Diplomatic association in 1983, expressing the government's concern 
about drug abuse stated; 
'Drug abuse is a disease from which no country and no section of 
modern society seems immune. Stamping it out will be slow and 
painful. It requires co-operation between Governments, law 
enforcement agencies, professionals, schools and families. The 
rewards are great if we succeed and the price of ultimate failure is 
unthinkable' (Home Office, 1985, p. 3) 
Mr. Greg Knight (MP), in 1986 said that it is not often that there is such 
consensus in the House and he hoped that all Members would agree with 
the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, who on 9 August the previous 
year (1985), addressed her remarks to drug traffickers by saying; 
'We are after you. The pursuit will be relentless. The effort will get 
greater and greater until we have beaten you. The penalty will be 
long prison sentences. The penalty will be confiscation of everything 
you have ever gotten from drug smuggling'. (Hansard's 
Parliamentary Debates 21 /1/ 86, Col. 273) 
In addition to that, the Home Affairs Committee has used even stronger 
language in their Interim Report on the Misuse of Hard Drugs (Home 
Affairs Committee, 1985). The Committee described the prospect of South 
American cocaine exporters targeting the British market as 'the most 
serious peacetime threat to our national well-being' (p. iii). 
Feldman (1991) asserted that Britain's legislation to deprive offenders of 
the proceeds of crime was a response to the increase in the quantity of 
drugs being trafficked inside and outside the country (p. 25). The actual 
extent of illegal drug use and the quantity of illegal drugs in England and 
Wales was unknown. Different statistics provided a series of indicators 
and evidence which may provide an explanation for the new trends in 
policies and strategies. In 1978, the quantity of cannabis (herbal, plants, 
resin and liquid) seized, for example, was 15,163.3 kilograms. In 1985, the 
quantity has sharply risen to 68,630.6 kg. The number of persons found 
guilty, cautioned or dealt with by compounding for drugs offences by 
police force and other authorities (HM Customs and Excise and British 
Transport Police) has also risen from 13,684 in 1978 to 26,958 in 1985 (near 
100% increase). The number of seizures of controlled drugs by police or 
other organisations show a marked increase, from 13,454 seizures in 1978 
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to 30,466 in 1985 (more than 1001/'ß, increase) (Home Office Statistical 
Bulletin, 1989, Sept., Table 1.1). 
Table (1.1) Seizures of controlled drugs 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
13,454 16,056 17,617 19,428 21,636 26,216 28,466 30,466 30,478 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
30,690 38,235 52,131 60,859 69,807 72,065 87,485 107,629 114,539 
Table (1.2) Persons found guilty, cautioned or dealt with by compounding from 1978 
to 1995 (this shows the continuous increase in the number of cases even after the 
enactment of the recommended confiscation system). 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Posse , lion 11,771 12,153 14,030 14,850 17,425 20,286 21,399 22,569 20,052 
Trafficking 1,934 2,059 2,496 2,865 2,907 3,403 4,315 5,244 4,679 
Total 13,604 14,339 17,158 17,921 20,356 23,442 25,240 26,958 23,905 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Po' ,e iun 22,017 20,372 33,207 39,350 42,575 43,492 60,482 76,127 82,796 
Trafficking 5,077 5,019 6,108 6,680 6,329 6,678 9,170 9,906 15.852 
Total 26,278 30,515 38,415 44,922 47,616 48,927 68,480 85,693 93,631 
Source: Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 1989, Sept. Table 1.1) 
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Figure (1.1) A graphical chart of the rise in unlawful possession and trafficking cases 
from 1978 - 1995. Source: Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 1989, Sept. Table 1.1) 
Stimson (1987) pointed out that the drugs problem has become a 
politicised issue, attracting a political consensus which persisted until 
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quite recently (p. 275). Drug trafficking offences, in particular, were 
described as the fastest growing area of international crime. Virtually, they 
have been at the forefront of stimulating developments in terms of 
legislation and the organisation of law enforcement (Dorn 1994, p. ix). 
Several cross-party Parliamentary Committees (e. g. Social Services 
Committee 1984-5; Home affairs Select Committee 1985) were in 
agreement, warning of the dangers facing Britain from heroin and cocaine 
trafficking (South, 1995, p. 30). 
The search for new ways of containment and treatment was the main 
concern of the public and politicians. Therefore, 'taking the profits out of 
crime', the subject of this research, is one of the legislative developments 
that has accompanied the growth of drug trafficking offences. It has 
become an important rhetorical motif in the English-speaking developed 
world for the past decade (Levi & Osofsky, 1995), and has recently become 
live in many other countries largely in the context of the huge profits 
made through drugs. 
The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Home Office, and 
Chairman of the Interdepartmental Ministerial Group on Drug Misuse, 
then Mr. David Mellor, invited the Home Affairs Committee, who had 
been concerned for many years about the misuse of drugs, to make 
recommendations as a matter of urgency to help the government decide 
on early legislation to meet the approaching threat of increased drug 
trafficking. The Home Affairs Committee in their interim report stated 
four basic objectives for dealing with the growing threat of international 
drug trafficking; 
(1) Stopping as far as possible the importation of drugs by; 
(a) physical interception of supplies; 
(b) prosecution and punishment; and 
(c) elimination of drug crops. 
(2) Attacking the profits of the traffickers. 
(3) Stopping the disposal of drug profits through the 
'laundering' of money; and 
(4) Reducing the long term demand by education. 
On the basis of its conclusions, the committee stated that it shares the 
American's belief that the ruthlessness of big drug dealers must be met by 
equally ruthless penalties once they are caught, tried and convicted. These 
penalties must be of such a character that no major drug dealer will risk 
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taking on the United Kingdom market because of the penalties that will be 
imposed. It recommended, therefore, to give the courts draconian powers 
in both civil and criminal law to strip drug dealers of all the assets 
acquired from their dealings in drugs, in accordance with American 
practice. Drug dealers must be made to lose everything; their homes, their 
money and all that they possess which can be attributed to their profits 
from selling drugs (House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, 
session 1984-85). 
The Government responded by introducing such powers in several Acts. 
The first was in the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 which was 
considered to be an important precedent for further statutes (Home Affairs 
Committee, Seventh Report, session 1988-89). Powers to trace, freeze and 
confiscate the proceeds of drug trafficking in Scotland are contained in the 
Criminal Justice Act (Scotland) 1987. Powers to recover the proceeds of 
other serious profitable crimes are contained in Part VI of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988, while the prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1989 enabled the confiscation of terrorist related funds. It 
is quite obvious that confiscation provisions which are contained in all 
these specific Acts are based upon the recommendations of the Home 
Affairs Committee and the Hodgson's Committee. Moreover, it has 
incorporated elements drawn from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984, the law of receivership, the common law injunctions freezing 
suspected proceeds of crime, and criminal law and sentencing (Feldman, 
1988). 
1.3. AIM 2: THE PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION 
Close inspection of the historical and the socio-political development of 
the confiscation system, leads one to notice that the social justification for 
seeking confiscation of all the proceeds and the use of powerful 
procedures for tracing, seizing and then confiscating the suspected illegal 
gains from a convicted person was never questioned. Yet confiscation 
requires justification; rather the principle was implicitly accepted that 
confiscation should follow conviction as a matter of course (Talbot, 1991 
and Mitchell et al, 1992). Levi & Osofsky (1995) asserted that confiscation 
25 
Chapter One The British Concept of Confiscation 
and forfeiture have received very limited attention from English 
philosophers of punishment (p. 12). 
The act of confiscation itself involves taking goods and service away from 
people. To search for justification, one has to begin with its character and 
effects. In this regard, Hassan (1997) indicates that confiscation systems 
undergo variable fluctuations which result mainly from the 
developments and changes of certain ideologies and theories of its various 
schools of thought (e. g. the classical school, the neo-classical school, the 
positive school, the social defence school and other subsequent 
reconciliatory schools). In Britain, the confiscation system is also bound up 
with a contention about its character and effects. 
Many theories or rather different socio-legal approaches have presented a 
variety of perspectives which justify certain moral reactions and measures 
in dealing with particular behaviours or acts. The development of 
philosophies of punishment, theories of penology, the sociology of 
punishment, theories of sentencing, and restorative theories all represent 
the inevitable demand and search for a clear rationale. However, the 
extent of theorisation developed in those various disciplines with regard 
to confiscation appear to be scarce. This might be due to the novelty of the 
concept for the criminal justice systems. Feldman (1988) notes that 'the 
concept was unknown to the law prior to the enactment of the DTOA 
1986'. More seriously, the lack of theoretical development has produced 
some doubt about the Act's rationale. It is still strange to see an assertion 
that even the social justification of forfeiture law has never been 
questioned. This latter statement has been repeated several times by some 
writers and practitioners. (see Talbot & Hinton, (1991) and Mitchell et al 
(1992)) and it seems as if citing this statement would somehow facilitate 
the writers' task in establishing the basis of their discussion and help 
classify and justify the subject they are dealing with. 
The arguments dealing with the character of the British confiscation 
system seem to be influenced by two underpinning perspectives; the first 
is a belief that a confiscation order is an act of punishment, while the 
second is that confiscation is to be seen as a reparative act that aims merely 
at restoring the statics quo of the drug trafficker. 
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The Hodgson Committee indicates that compensation, restitution, 
forfeiture, and confiscation orders discharge or reduce a defendant's civil 
liability or eliminate an advantage which he previously had over honest 
citizens. They try to restore the status quo ; they do not punish. The 
Committee, contrary to the confiscation legislation adopted by Parliament, 
stipulates that to achieve a restorative type of confiscation, it should be 
confined only to the net profits from the offence. The Committee explains 
that if confiscation includes the gross proceeds of all involved expenses 
and payments for suppliers, then confiscation would go further than 
would be necessary to put it in the same position as if the offenders had 
not offended (Hodgson's Report, p. 133; s. 4 (1) DTA 199415). This means 
confiscation is no longer considered as an aspect of mere restoration for 
the status quo anymore. 
The original provisions of the 1986 Act, and even the subsequent 
amendments under the DTA 1994, does not allow a deduction for 
expenses, legitimate or otherwise as recommended by Hodgson's 
committee. The Act refers to confiscation of 'proceeds' not 'profits'. 
Zander (1989) considers this an extraordinarily wide confiscation power. It 
can be enforced, he says, against all of the property of the accused 
regardless of whether or not that property was itself the proceeds of drug 
trafficking. Moreover, if the accused has kept the proceeds of his drug 
trafficking abroad beyond the reach of the English courts, the courts are 
empowered to recover through confiscation order the sale of property of 
equivalent value which is within this country. 
What the Hodgson report advocated seems to be overlooked by adopting 
such provisions. Moreover, punitive presuppositions have managed to 
sneak through. e. g. the use of the word 'draconian' by Mitchell et al and 
previously by the Home Affairs Committee (Fifth Report, 19844-85) and by 
Mr. Mellor the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, who asserts the need for more than the available punitive 
procedures (notably imprisonment). Mr. Mellor pointed out that sending 
drug traffickers to prison is not a sufficient deterrent and the scale of the 
15Section 4 (1) of the DTA 1994 provides that "any payment or other rewards received by a 
person at any time (whether before or after the commencement of this Act) in connection 
with drug trafficking carried on by him or another person are his proceeds of drug 
trafficking; and the value of his proceeds of drug trafficking is the aggregate of the values 
of the payments or other rewards". 
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international problem posed by major drug traffickers merits 
extraordinary procedures which one can call 'draconian' (Hansard, 1985). 
This term has been used by many judges. Law reports reveal that many 
judges see the provisions of the DTA as draconian (see R. v Chrastny (no 2) 
1991; R. v Dickens, 1990; R. v Redboiurfte, 1992; R. v Robson, 1991 and R. v 
Saunders, 1991). When 'draconian' means extraordinary procedures that 
goes beyond the limited impact of imprisonment, this no doubt reflects a 
punitive trend. Mr. Hurd (the then Secretary of State for the Home 
Department) stated: 
This Bill offers us a sharp new weapon in the fight against drugs... 
we have to tackle both supply and demand. On the supply side, the 
key tasks are international co-operation, effective enforcement and 
deterrence... our determination to strengthen deterrence is 
exemplified in the Bill (Hansard, 1986). ' 
Mitchell et al (1992) when they discuss whether a defendant can elect not 
to pay a confiscation order state that: 
'the original provisions of the DTOA 1986 provides that where the 
Crown Court makes a confiscation order it must fix a term of 
imprisonment to be served in case of default (s. 6). Consequently, 
confiscation orders are framed in terms that appear to grant the 
defendant the right to choose whether to pay such an order or to 
serve the further period of imprisonment stated therein. But is that 
in fact the case? If it were, confiscation would devolve into being a 
punitive measure which could not be justified. That is, the state 
would now punish the defendant not only for his transgression of the 
law but potentially, should the defendant elect not to pay a 
confiscation order, for his successful transgression of the law as 
measured in terms of financial gain: the 'successful' criminal thereby 
being awarded a more severe sentence than his unsuccessful co- 
offender. Suddenly confiscation loses its flavour of reparativeness, 
of righting the balance, and assumes the guise of a penal measure, 
something the legislation specifically seeks to avoid. To prevent 
such an outcome, the defendant must be compelled to pay the 
confiscation order; should he not be so compelled, the objective of the 
legislation would not be achieved. Prima facie, therefore, the 
defendant must be denied the right to choose whether to satisfy a 
confiscation order or not'. 
This statement can be considered as clear evidence of the punitive 
character of the confiscation system. Mitchell and his colleagues say that if 
the DTOA 1986 provides that the defendant is granted the right to choose 
to pay or to serve a further period of imprisonment, then confiscation 
would devolve into being a punitive measure which could not be 
justified. The state would punish the defendant not only for his 
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transgression of the law but for other matters too; a fact which Mitchell 
and his colleagues did not explain is that the DTOA has indeed granted 
the defendant that right. This means that what Mitchell and his colleagues 
think are the consequences are in fact the actual character of the 
confiscation system provided by the DTOA 1986. 
Attempts to avoid introducing a penal measure have not been successful. 
In fact, the legislation does not provide a clear description of the 
confiscation provisions. On the contrary Parliament's intention seems to 
be to use the toughest and most uncompromising means and powers 
against drug trafficking offences (by increasing the prison sentences, 
confiscation, forfeiture, fines, and no reduction in prison sentences). 
The statement concludes 'defendants must be compelled to pay the 
confiscation orders'. Of course, this would not prevent or repeal any 
punitive feature of the legislation. There is built into it a determination to 
chase and claim the proceeds, even after the defendants have served the 
default sentences - and these will only confirm how extraordinary and 
punitive the system is. 
Martin Hinton (1992) in 'Are Drug Trafficking Confiscation Orders 
Punitive? ' argues that orders under the DTOA 1986 are reparative not 
penal. He thinks that the principle underpinning the purpose of the 
confiscation order is centred on the idea that confiscation is to compensate 
society for the loss it sustains as a result of drug trafficking. Where society 
is the victim, it is only right therefore, that society be compensated (p. 
1264). To lay stress on the reparative aspect of the system is to make an 
amount equal to the defendant's benefit or the amount that he may 
realise, i. e. the amount he can pay, whichever is the lesser. Hinton adds 
that the legislation permits the defendant to seek a reduction in a 
confiscation order to account for a proportionate reduction in the value of 
his realisable property. Hinton points out that in this respect confiscation 
is tantamount to the doctrine of unjust enrichment. What is confiscated is 
no more than the amount that remains within the defendant's possession 
or control and represents his enrichment via illegal means. The defendant 
in this case is returned to that financial position he enjoyed prior to his 
conduct of drug trafficking. The advantages that accrue to a trafficker as a 
consequence of drug trafficking are denied the law abiding citizen. Thus 
29 
Chapter One The British Concept of Confiscation 
the making of a confiscation order sees the balance righted with the 
making of reparation (p. 1265). 
Moreover, Hinton has linked the reparative aspect of the system to the 
adoption of a value-based system. He states that: 
'the legislature has purposely favoured 'value confiscation' as 
opposed to confiscation per se, for the latter has a more profound 
effect upon the bank balances of traffickers, an effect the former 
could not have without contravening the European Convention on 
Human Rights, in particular article 6, by not attempting to override 
the defendant's proprietary rights in any specific property. Rather 
it seeks to value the financial defendant as a consequence of his 
illegal activities. This advantage the defendant has no right to, 
due to its illegal origin. If the defendant has no right to this 
advantage, then it follows that in confiscating the same no right can 
be breached by the state. Equally if it is an advantage accruing to 
the defendant that he has no right to that which is confiscated, 
then confiscation cannot be said to prejudice that defendant nor 
penalise him'(p. 1264). 
Hinton's argument still appears to be insufficient and inconclusive. The 
evidence he is referring to is not quite so sound. Saying, for example, that 
the imposition of a confiscation order depends upon whether the 
defendant can pay it or not and that the defendant can seek reduction is 
not persuasive for three main reasons: First, the property-based system 
which has been enforced by the majority of countries in the world, and the 
majority of European countries in particular, and its legality which has 
been approved by many international circles like the United Nations and 
some National and Regional Councils, is in itself strong evidence of a 
legitimacy which entails consideration and respect for the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Second, the property-based system is by no 
means a new phenomena. It is almost similar to the British forfeiture 
order which operates in rem (i. e. the goods forfeited are tainted and 
thereby the defendant's proprietary rights in them is denied). This has 
been acknowledged by the British legislator himself without questioning 
the social justifications. If a property-based system has an effect which 
contravenes with the European Convention on Human Rights, then what 
will the government think about the general power of forfeiture provided 
under section 43 of PCCA 1973. 
The third reason relies on the decision of the Strasbourg Court. As said 
earlier, nine judges at that Court rule unanimously that a British court 
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acted unlawfully in trying to confiscate £59,000 of Peter Welch's drug 
profits after he was convicted of a plot to smuggle £4 million of cannabis 
to UK. Ben Emmerson, the barrister representing the convicted drug 
trafficker in this case, says that despite warnings before the legislation was 
introduced that it would breach the convention, 'the Home Office has 
buried its head in the sand and built an entire legislative framework that 
these confiscation orders are not criminal penalties. It was that myth that 
the court exposed'. 
One must notice that confiscation legislation is not just about an 
additional ancillary order but a system which includes different 
procedures and provisions. Each of these procedures has its own effects 
and consequences. Entering and searching a property of a person who was 
not suspected of being a drug trafficker or without any early notice or 
conviction; the confiscation of properties 'assumed' to be proceeds of a 
timeworn crime(s) just because the defendant does not have proof to 
disproof the court's allegation; preventing a person from contacting his 
relatives or even his lawyer and some other provisions, all raise some 
fundamental questions about individual and property rights. Many 
believe that infringing such rights without a solid criminal standard of 
proof is unacceptable. 
Sue Taylor16 in an interview with Crania Langdon-Down (Independent, 
1st Nov. 1995) states that: 
'If a criminal was said to have made £100,000 from crime but had 
squandered all the money, then the order must be paid from the sale 
of other assets, legitimately owned or not, even if that means, for 
example, making his family homeless'. 
She also added: 
'I call it the 'but for' rule; but for the proceeds of the crime the person 
wouldn't have the house or the business or affluent lifestyle. 
Confiscation orders can make even bankruptcy seem generous as a 
receiver acting under the DTA or Proceeds of Crime Act can take 
every single asset, down to the clothes the person is wearing. While 
criminals may roll over quietly and accept a prison sentence, they 
will fight tooth and nail to keep their lifestyle sweet for their 
release'. 
16Sue Taylor is the Head of the Central Confiscation Branch-London and co-editor with 
Mitchell et at., Confiscation. 
31 
Chapter One The British Concept of Confiscation 
These two statements clearly expose the character of the system and show 
to what extent it is punitive. Not only will the defendants suffer but so too 
will their families who will be liable to face unusual consequences such as 
losing their properties and being deprived of their facilities. 
Levi & Osofsky (1995) further confuse the character of the system. On one 
hand, they seem to be advocating a reparation point of view and, on the 
other, they display sentiments of those offenders who view the proceeds 
of crime as their 'entitlement'. Removing this presumed entitlement 
would naturally cause resentment and be seen as punitive (p. 12). The 
authors here do not question the character of confiscation but they are led 
to this view because they accepted what Ashworth has said about the 
principle and justification of confiscation which says that confiscation is 
not part of the punitive component of the sentence and does not mitigate 
or aggravate it. This means that Levi & Osofsky are not sure about the 
actual character of confiscation or it was not one of their concerns for their 
1995 study. In another study 'Regulating Fraud' (1987) Levi shows that the 
sanction of asset-confiscation means different things to different people 'It 
may be viewed as a general or individual deterrent, as retribution, 
and...... as incapacitation' (quoted in Fisse , 1989, p. 374). 
1.4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter has attempted to produce an historical perspective to the 
various conditions which have given the confiscation order its current 
shape. One of the most important developments was the operation 'Julie 
case' but even before that, it is clear that Parliament was concerned to 
secure better means of depriving offenders of the fruits of crime by 
considering how the principle of personal reparation by the offender 
might be given a more prominent place in the penal system (the Advisory 
Council Report 'Reparation by the offender' in 1970). The famous drug 
trafficking case (Julie case) attracted a great deal of public attention in 1980 
and moved things further along. The judgement in this particular case 
was greeted by a chorus of disapproval from the public and press because it 
disclosed the inability of the British courts to deprive effectively an 
offender of the profits of his offending. It also exposed certain 
contradictions, ambiguities and defects not only in the available forfeiture 
32 
Chapter One The British Concept of Confiscation 
laws but in the clarity of definitions, principles and interpretations by law 
enforcement agencies (Crown Court, Court of Appeal, and the House of 
Lords). 
This situation has led Parliament to search for new alternatives and new 
solutions. Two committees were established. The common aspects 
between them they were non-governmental committees (one was a 
Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee and the other was a private 
committee). Both committees recommended that courts must be 
empowered with a new confiscation system to permit law enforcement 
agencies to trace, seize and confiscate the proceeds and profits of drug 
trafficking offences. 
However, the starting point of both committees was different. The 
Parliamentary Committee aimed at confronting the ruthlessness of drug 
traffickers with equally ruthless punishments, while the Hodgson's 
Committee recommended a conditioned confiscation system. The latter 
committee suggested certain safeguards and conditions for adopting the 
recommended confiscation order to redress, for example, the harm done 
and profits made by non-victim crimes within the safeguards of the 
ordinary criminal process. 
In addition, the adoption of a new confiscation system reflected an 
awareness of the development of drug trafficking which has led to a 
change in the governmental policies and strategies. The discussions and 
arguments about the dangers of drug trafficking offences have progressed 
in such a way that there has been more awareness that confiscation might 
be the main weapon in the fight against drug trafficking offences. One can 
observe here how the concept of drug 'dealing', as Dorn et al (1992) 
mentioned, metamorphosed into that of drug 'trafficking' which aims at 
accumulation and the investment by laundering illegal proceeds and the 
shift from minor local dealings to national and international organised 
networks. Certainly this financial aspect has produced new and important 
dimensions leading to even more difficulties about defining the spheres 
and modes of confiscation proceedings, and the related functions of the 
law enforcement agencies. A drug trafficking offence has now begun to 
appear as a legitimate reason for confiscating benefits and proceeds from 
that offence; benefits which are now classified as illegal gains. 
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This chapter has shown that it is important to focus on the various social 
and political concerns that gives momentum to a confiscation order 
which has made them into an issue of contemporary importance. The 
essential point is that the shift in discourse from drugs as a social and 
national problem to a regional and international problem is a crucial 
condition for arguing that confiscation should be seen as a solution. 
The chapter also revealed that there is a lack of extensive social 
theorisation in regard to the British confiscation legislation. The 
philosophical justifications have been considered. These show that there 
has been little theorising about confiscation. It is true that there are efforts 
to establish individual perspectives, seeking to sustain credibility and 
legitimacy in illustrating the principle and terms of application of such 
legislation. Nevertheless, the final results of such efforts remain 
restrictive. They mostly contribute to a simplification of the law, of which 
the practitioners often feel necessary. That the academic discussion has 
also been restricted, is a matter in regret. Perhaps this is due to the 
domination of other concerns which have reduced the opportunity for a 
critical understanding and analysis of the social principles and premises 
involved in confiscation. 
A close look to the differences between the recommended confiscation 
system by the Hodgson's Committee and the current adopted legislation 
will determine the actual character of the system. This system is planned 
to be reparative, but the actual provisions and applications provided 
under the current legislation overlook this original principle. What is 
unusual and odd about the present practice is that allegations of the 
government and many of their followers define that the legislation is a 
mere reparative system and devoid of any punitive element. 
In justifying confiscation, one can infer that it could embody elements of 
all theories and perspectives discussed in this chapter. In courts, 
justifications depend mostly upon the conditions of each case, for 
example, the backgrounds of the judges, quality of argument and the 
clarity of evidences. Some judges can be faced with different demands, 
some are dictated by law, while others are dictated by conventions 
appropriate to their offices. The judge, for instance, may sentence the first 
person for retributive reasons, the second person for deterrence and third 
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for reform, believing that his duty in the latter case is. to help the offender 
rather than (say) to protect society. This is indeed more close to the actual 
fact of the current application of the British confiscation system. 
Such applications will always produce inconsistencies. Philip Bean (1981) 
clarifies that such inconsistencies are accepted as a feature of modern life. 
This means that attempts to define or identify the characters of 
confiscation, must refer not to general constitutional principles and 
guidelines but to certain judgements by different courts which are rarely 
theoretically pure or which themselves are devoted to only one theory to 
the exclusion of others. Accordingly, if Parliament as the main legislative 
authority in this country did not intervene and explain its intentions and 
the theoretical bases for such unusual provisions, the disparity between 
interpretations and practices will continue until it is faced again with 
unsolvable problems like that of the Welch case. 
Lastly, and as will be shown later the available literature about the 
historical and philosophical development of the confiscation system 
shows very limited analysis of this new concept of confiscation as a way of 
redress and compensation. This chapter shows also that there are no 
elaborate or exhaustive socio-legal studies which explain in detail the 
rationale and expectations of introducing new precedents in the criminal 
justice system (confiscation order). The following chapter, therefore, will 
review the most relevant literature concerning the British confiscation 
system. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The new law of confiscation has not generated an extensive literature. 
That which is available can be divided into three groups. The first and 
largest, includes Parliamentary reports, government guides and manuals, 
law review articles, and innumerable reported judicial decisions. The 
second group contains professional writings mainly by practitioners 
involved in the enforcement of the legislation. The third includes some 
academic participations focusing upon 'good practice' in the enforcement 
of the system, legal interpretations, and comparative accounts with the 
American forfeiture system. There is little or nothing by way of research. 
This chapter will examine those studies which are included mainly in the 
last two groups. The first has been excluded, since other chapters if this 
thesis have already looked into the relevant government guides and 
manuals alongside some of the reported judicial decisions that provide an 
insight concerning certain legislative provisions (see chapter one and 
three). 
It is important to mention that a great part of the literature is repetitive 
covering selected aspects of the confiscation system and providing a 
critique of some of the provisions of the DTOA 1986, which as said above 
has now been resolved by the latest consolidated DTA 1994. Accordingly, 
the literature examined in this chapter is selective, centring around the 
principles, aims, objectives, extent of application and the aspects of the 
system which distinguish it from other confiscation systems. 
The studies to be included here are examined under two main headings. 
The first covers all the comprehensive studies of which confiscation is the 
main subject (books, special reports and studies). The second includes the 
most important articles which have looked at relevant aspects and 
provided a distinctive perspective, worthy to be accounted in the 
arguments about the work done on confiscation orders. 
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The selected literature is dealt with in chronological order to help 
determine the development of relevant arguments and interests which 
have accompanied the confiscation system before and after its enactment. 
The review of the selected literature will be approached from three 
theoretical perspectives: 
a. locating the positions occupied by the subject of the 
discourses in the literature; 
h clarifying the modes that the subjects have relied upon; and 
c. pointing out the themes and perspectives in the circulated 
discourse. 
After demonstrating the criteria behind the selection of certain literature, 
the value of these criteria are expressed in a series of questions. Some of 
the most important questions are: 
Q. 1- In what way does the contributions of the current studies and 
research suit and meet the changes and amendments that 
overtook the forfeiture laws? 
Q. 2- Have the social rationales and justifications of the 
confiscation system attracted considerable attention and 
concerns from the researchers? How far is the established 
satisfaction about the necessity of these rationales and 
justification sustained? 
Q. 3- Do the studies examine the relationship between the 
rationales, objectives and means of the confiscation system? 
Q. 4- To what extent is the nature of enforcement, both in terms of 
support and defects, dealt with by the studies? Have the 
studies taken into account the value and impact of powers 
vested to judicial and law enforcement agencies? 
Q. 5- Are there any arguments addressed to tackle the 
shortcomings of the confiscation system? Are the solutions 
provided (if any) sufficient to promote additional legislative 
amendments? 
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Q. 6- What is the extent of awareness of systems currently in 
different countries? Do the studies take them as instructive 
models to support their arguments, and tackle the 
shortcomings and avoidance of any inconsistencies? 
2.2. REVIEW OF INFLUENTIAL LITERATURE 
The Hodgson's report'The Profits of Crime and their Recovery'(1984) 17 is 
not only the main source and the starting point in the debate about the 
origins of confiscation legislation, but also an important and valid 
reference for any examination of the principles and some of the main 
practices of the confiscation system. As explained in a preceding chapter, it 
is well-documented that the Hodgson's Report and the Interim Report of 
the Home Affairs Committee (1985) are the main two sources for the 
current British confiscation system. The main reason for considering the 
former in this study is that it provides not merely a list of 
recommendations, as is the case with the latter interim report, but a full 
inspection of the historical background of the available forfeiture laws, 
analogous civil and criminal provisions, review of relevant laws in other 
countries, and new practical innovations concerning relevant criminal 
pre- and post-proceedings. It has been widely referred to as a valuable 
reference in this study and particularly in the first two chapters. 
As expected, the report reflects the views and backgrounds of the majority 
of the Committee members dealing heavily with jurisprudential 
questions. It is also an essential part in the current legal perspective which 
reflects the theory of confiscation; it discusses potential principles and 
some subsequent effects. The focus here is not to repeat what already has 
been discussed in a preceding chapter, but to illustrate the nature of any 
inconsistencies between a recommended model of confiscation based 
17This Report was presented by a committee formed and financed mainly by the Howard 
League for Penal reform. This League, as Andrew Nicol (1983) had put it, is a 'research and 
pressure group' for reform of sentencing and penal policy. In addition to the well-known 
methods of law reform (Parliament, the Judiciary, the law commission and some Advisory 
Committees) there is also substantial and constant pressure by independent pressure groups 
like Justice, Liberty, the Howard League for Penal Reform, the Statute Law Reform Society 
and the legal Action Group (Darbyshire, 1992). The Committee consisted of two High Court 
Judges, a Queen's Counsel, a solicitor, a barrister, an accountant, a senior police officer, a 
member of Parliament, a former probation officer and one criminologist (Professor Nigel 
Walker). 
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upon fixed principles, aims and objectives, and the current governmental 
theory and applications for confiscation provided under the DTA 1994. 
The report has provided a list of innovatory procedures and powers to be 
included as essential elements in any recommended model of 
confiscation. These procedures are: pre-trial restraint, powers for searching 
premises, compulsory disclosure of whereabouts of assets, the 
appointment of a receiver, the assessment of means, the interest of the 
third parties and the application of monies or properties received... etc. The 
importance of these procedures lies in the subsequent consideration and 
adoption by the government. 
With regard to the theory that underlies the committee's 
recommendation whereby the courts have power of confiscation, the 
committee illustrates that society and its law require that the 'criminal 
should pay'. To accommodate this simple philosophy every reasonable 
effort needs to be made to require the offender to make amends and to 
recognise that victims should not suffer financial loss. The committee 
believes that imprisonment as a response to serious crime should no 
longer be the automatic reaction of the criminal justice system. In addition 
to overloading the prison system, the committee declared further that it 
had less confidence in deprivation of liberty as a general deterrent and as a 
means of reform. It argued that the belief that the deprivation of liberty in 
some way 'improves' a human being has been heavily eroded in recent 
times. 
In the introduction to the report the committee indicates that they are in 
agreement with the utilitarian views in the writings of Jeremy Bentham. 
'Compensation', wrote Bentham, 'will answer the purpose of 
punishment but punishment will not answer the purpose of 
compensation'. In 'Principles of legislation' Bentham declared 
'punishment that went beyond the limit of necessity was a pure evil' (p. 
284). This means that any resort to imprisonment can be justified only to 
the extent that the exaction of pecuniary penalties in the form either of 
victim redress or the confiscation of the fruits of crime is inadequate. As 
Bentham himself put it 'the value of the punishment must not be less in 
any case than what is efficient to outweigh that of the profits of the 
offence'. The Committee asserted that the aim must be to construct a 
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system of redress that is adequate to obviate, as much as possible, the 
necessity to resort to imprisonment (p. 7). The Committee also clarified 
that there is nothing new in the concept of redress by an offender, either 
for the loss or damage he has caused to his victim, or for the profit he has 
made. What is comparatively new is the intensified search for appropriate 
methods of achieving the laudable social objective which redress the 
crime. 
Though the Committee, at the end of their report, recommended that 
criminal courts should have the power to order confiscation of proceeds of 
an offence and that certain procedures must be followed in doing so, it 
also recommended that certain conditions should exist for the application 
of these powers. For instance, the Committee believed that the defendant 
had to be convicted first; there should be a prescribed minimum amount 
below which no confiscation order could be made; the object of a 
confiscation order would be to restore the status quo ante and, therefore, 
to reach only the net profit made by the defendant. (only expenses actually 
paid would, however, be deductible); the burden of proof should be on the 
Crown; and lastly, the judge might take account of the defendant's co- 
operation or lack of co-operation by reducing the period of imprisonment 
(p. 151). 
A note of dissent, by Andrew Nicol and Clive Soleyl s, objected to the 
proposed retrospective aspect (the sample counts) of the recommended 
confiscation proceedings. This meant that a person could have an order 
made against him for offences which were presumed, but not proven to 
have been committed. 
In short, the note of dissent was merely about two aspects: the 'sample 
counts' and the so called 'clear case' requirement. The latter, is not related 
to these current discussion about confiscation, whereas the former is, and 
was the subject of prolonged debates. Andrew Nicol and Clive Soley 
simply rejected the idea that defendants should be ordered to pay a 
confiscation order in relation to offences for which they have (a) not been 
charged; (b) not been convicted and (c) not admitted to. The majority of 
the members of the committee, however, believed otherwise, so that 
1 Two members of Hodgson Committee. Andrew Nicol is a barrister, and Clive Soley is a 
former Labour MP for Hammersmith. 
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where the defendant has been convicted of other counts the prosecution 
submissions would demonstrate a continuing course of wrong-doing. 
This meant that a conviction on the sample charges would justify 
ordering confiscation. 
On the other hand, the dissenters thought that it was contrary to the basic 
principle of the British Criminal Justice System to sentence a person for an 
offence that has not been proved or admitted. Further, they indicate that 
defendants are entitled to have allegations of serious criminality resolved 
not by a judge, but a jury, and they did not see why the defendants should 
lose that right because they have been convicted of other offences. 
The other members of the committee suggested that the defendant should 
also be asked about the other offences. The dissenters, however, pointed 
out that to do so would be contrary to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Article 6 (2) which states: 
'everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law'. 
Moreover, the court of Appeal approved in R. v. Price (1979) of the trial 
judge basing his sentence on what is called the 'reality of the situation', a 
phrase which other members of the Committee invoked. The dissenters 
however, believed that this phrase advanced the argument no further: it 
only begs the question 'what reality? ' The sentence of the court, they said, 
should be confined to the jury's verdict or the defendant's admissions in 
asking for other offences to be taken into consideration. Finally, they 
endorsed the opinion of D. A. Thomas (1979) that it is wrong, in principle, 
to base a sentence on uncharged or unadmitted offences. 
In a subsequent study, Andrew Nicol (1987) criticised several features of 
the confiscation system provided under the DTOA 1986. Nicol pointed out 
that the relevant provisions of DTOA 1986 are not confined to the 
conditions and limitations provided by Hodgson's Report. Where the 
majority of the Hodgson Committee would have agreed to place the 
burden on the defendant to show where his assets came from if he had 
been convicted of wholesale supply of class A or B drugs with a street 
value of £100,000, they stipulated that the burden would only relate to 
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property acquired after the date of the first proven offence (Nicol, 1987, p. 
78, see also Hodgson Report, 1984, pp. 82-84). 
Nicol asserted that none of these limitations appear in the 1986 Act. He 
explained that a person convicted of possession with intent to supply say, 
one gram of cannabis in 1987 may be presumed to have paid for the house 
which he bought in 1981 with the proceeds of drug trafficking. Nicol 
described that as an extreme case (p. 78). In short, the basis of his objection 
was that the proof that a person has committed one offence gave no 
grounds for assuming that he committed another, and that the reversal of 
the burden of proof depends on that fallacious reasoning. 
Lastly, Nicol found the lengths to which Parliament has gone in working 
out the confiscation system to be 'profoundly disturbing. ' He stated: 
'In its zealous desire to ensure that not one unlawful penny is left 
unseized, Parliament has brushed aside several major tenets of 
criminal law procedure'. 19 
In addition to Nicol's comments, Derek Hodgson, the chairman of the 
Committee himself, provided clear views about confiscation provisions 
provided under the DTOA 1986 in the 'Forward' of the Mitchell et al's text 
on 'Confiscation' (1992). A detailed examination of his views will be 
highlighted later in this chapter. 
A full legal examination of the definitions, provisions and relevant laws 
and rules of the confiscation legislation introduced by the DTOA 1986 are 
conducted by three major works: Feldman's (1988) 'Criminal Confiscation 
Orders', Fortson's (1992) 'The Law on The Misuse of Dritgs and Drug 
Trafficking Offences', and Mitchell et al's (1992) 'Confiscation'. These 
provide detailed analyses of the legislative provisions including collecting 
information and restraint through the making of orders in the Crown 
Court and other courts. In what follows is a review of the most distinctive 
aspects of each of these three works. 
19The author criticised in particular the method for calculating the amounts of benefits, 
the reversal of the burden of proof, the repeal of the right to silence, the required 
presumptions, the retrospective effect, the discretionary power vested to judges, and the 
sentencing policy. There will be an examination of the arguments concerning these 
provisions in later stage of this chapter. 
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Professor David Feldman (1988) in his work 'Criminal Confiscation 
Orders: The New Laws' was the first to examine the provisions of the new 
confiscation legislation provided under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 
1986. This book provides a comprehensive but practical account of the 
powers accompanying the confiscation proceedings given to the law 
enforcement agencies. It is mainly a personal response to a suggestion by 
two officers of the Regional Drugs Squads, that there was a need for an 
explanation of the powers under the confiscation legislation. It provides 
also a systematic explanation of most of the powers and orders that 
incorporate this legislation. However, the subsequent amendments and 
the major alterations to some of the confiscation provisions necessarily 
entail updating the contents of this study. But even so, it is widely 
considered by some practitioners and police officers as a sound reference 
beside the work of Mitchell et al (1993). 
Feldman has approached his study by providing some insights about the 
background and the legal conditions before the enactment of DTOA 1986. 
He attributes, for instance, the grounds for the adoption of confiscation 
powers by the government to a wave of public concern in 1985 about drug 
addiction which swept across the country. He indicates that the 
government's strategy for law enforcement in combating the problem of 
drug abuse in the 1980's is to strike at the big suppliers by creating extra 
powers for investigators and ensuring that anyone who is caught 
supplying drugs will find that the business is unprofitable. This point 
repeats a previous statement which provided that the 1980's has indeed 
witnessed rapid developments in high level drug enforcement and that 
there are also new laws, new penalties and new Customs and police 
strategies against those trafficking in large consignments of drugs (see 
preceding chapter). 
Feldman pointed out his concerns about the theory of confiscation. He 
thought that confiscation orders were to be a deterrent means in the hands 
of the government against drug traffickers. But as things turn out it seems 
the object of the order is not penal, because it merely deprives the 
defendant of what is not rightfully his. Feldman believes that the court 
views each case individually and will vary decisions on the basis that the 
legislation is very punitive, especially when it comes to assessing the 
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proceeds of or benefit from offences, and where the phrase 'in connection' 
is very wide (Feldman, 1988, p. 102). 
A great part of Feldman's study is confined to a detailed review of the 
confiscation proceedings of the DTOA 1986. This includes determining the 
definitions of most of the terms in the legislation, clarifying some unclear 
provisions, highlighting the differences with the confiscation system 
provided under the Criminal Justice Act CJA 1988 and examining the 
powers which facilitate the enforcement of the confiscation proceedings 
(from different laws and rules). 
The remaining part of the study consists of miscellaneous matters relating 
to reimbursement and compensation. This is mainly about the receivers' 
immunity from liability and their rights to remuneration and 
reimbursement, immunity of informants from liability in contact, and 
compensation for the defendant. 
During his examination on the practical account concerning the 
enforcement of certain provisions, Feldman appeals to the government to 
reconsider the importance of incentives for the law enforcement agencies. 
Here, he is referring to the use made of seized assets. He notices, or 
perhaps is made to notice, that this matter is a continuing bone of 
contention between the government and the police. He indicates that the 
police want the recovered proceeds or the payments of the confiscation 
orders to be sent back to the forces which track down the traffickers and 
their assets as is the practice in the United States (p. 7). After he explains 
that the police have had to work with additional financial pressures 
because of the expense of implementing the new legislation, and that they 
have nothing to show for their achievement, he then appeals to the 
government to reconsider the importance of that as an incentive for 
efficiency (para 1.14). 
A major contribution of this study is that it was considered to be an 
important reference (for more than four years since the date of the 
enactment of the Legislation (the DTOA 1986)). In short, the study offers 
three main features: (a) a systematic review and explanations of the 
confiscation provisions under the DTOA 1986 and CJA 1988; (b) some 
comments concerning certain practical implications of some of the 
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legislative provisions; and (c) an appeal to the government to support the 
law enforcement agencies and in particular the police by allowing the 
return of the recovered confiscation orders to the force(s) which initiated 
and worked on relevant cases. In fact, such an appeal did not succeed 
because it was not supported by sufficient evidence, i. e. it did not include a 
detailed explanation of the actual losses and expenses, or applications for 
confiscation proceedings, and a variety of other minor matters that might 
have led to more tangible results. 
Rudi Fortson20 (second edition, 1992) devotes a chapter in his work 'The 
Law on The Misuse of Drugs and Drug Trafficking Offences' to the 
provisions of DTOA 1986, while other chapters are concerned with drug 
control and classification; legislations regarding crime related drugs 
(possession, supply, importation, exportation, manufacture and 
production of controlled drugs); some provisions of MDA 1971; powers of 
police and Customs officers; provisions related to conspiracy and 
evidences and powers of forfeiture and sentencing. 
The study consists of a comprehensive examination of the most 
important drug-related laws and powers provided for the courts and other 
law enforcement agencies in the 1970's and late 1980's in England and 
Wales. Fortson considers the introduction of the DTOA 1986 by 
Parliament as providing a sweeping and radical change in the law which 
enables courts to recover the proceeds of drug trafficking (p. 201). He also 
indicates that the legislation is enacted to meet certain weaknesses of 
earlier legislation. The imposition of a substantial fine, on the accused 
coupled, as an example, with an order to pay the costs of the trial (either 
wholly or in part) is, he says, a crude method of recouping drug profits and 
rightly regarded as bad sentencing policy, being a 'back-door' approach (p. 
201). 
Fortson believes that the DTOA is a draconian piece of legislation and was 
intended to be so. He thinks that the required assumptions and the burden 
of proof are the core elements of such a description. He points out that the 
method by which a court may assess the value of the proceeds of drug 
trafficking is one of the most controversial features of the DTOA 1986. 
Moreover, the Act creates the assumption that there are provisions to deal 
20Rudi Fortson is a barrister, Middle Temple, London. 
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with any lack of evidence likely to prove that the property received over a 
period of years represents the proceeds of drug trafficking (p. 201). 
The rest of the chapter provides a summary of the mechanics of the 
confiscation proceedings of the DTOA 1986 and some subsequent 
amendments provided under the Criminal Justice Act 1987, Criminal 
Justice Act 1988, and Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 
1990. Fortson's examination of confiscation provisions is similar to that of 
Feldman's and Mitchell et al's works in terms of content, method of 
analysis and, strangely enough, in missing the most important subsequent 
amendments of the CJA 1993. The work is or could be considered to be a 
valuable classification of the various types of controlled drugs, types of 
drug-related offences, and all relevant penalties up to the enactment of the 
DTOA 1986. It is however necessary to update such a review. 
The work of Andrew Mitchell, Martin Hinton, and Susan Taylor21 (1992) 
'Confiscation' can be described as the second post-analytical study of 
confiscation legislation. The work presents a similar examination and 
interpretation provided by Feldman (1988). The only difference is that this 
work is a little more valid in terms of some of the comments that are 
relevant to the subsequent amendments provided under the CJA 1993. In 
an interview with Kennedy Talbot22 a Principal Crown Prosecutor (CCB, 
1994), whilst praising this work pointed out that it is the only important 
interpretative reference for financial investigators, prosecutors, clerks, 
analysts, researchers, accountants, Customs officers, and anyone involved 
in confiscation matters whether in theory or in practice. 
The authors indicate that the main purpose of this work is 'an effort to 
encourage practitioners both in the Crown Court and the High Court to 
adopt a more positive attitude to this growing area of the law' (p. xi). They 
notice that there is a problem in practising confiscation proceedings by 
some law enforcement agencies which they mainly attribute to a 
misunderstanding or an unwillingness to enforce the legislation. They 
state: 
2lThis is a study that was conducted by three barristers: Andrew Mitchell is a member of 
the Irish Bar, Martin Hinton works for the Supreme Court of South Australia and the 
Supreme Court of England & Wales, and Susan Taylor is the Head of the Central 
Confiscation Branch (CCB) in London. 
22In 1994, Talbot Kennedy was a Principal Crown Prosecutor at the Central Confiscation 
Branch, Crown Prosecution Service Headquarters, London. - 
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'the procedures to be followed in the Crown Court to seek to identify 
and then confiscate the unjust gains of the convicted drug trafficker 
under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 are sometimes ignored, 
it is merely to pay lip service to the Act rather than to enter into the 
spirit of the legislation' (p. xi). 
Their theory of confiscation is according to those authors not a form of 
extra punishment for a convicted person, but rather the taking away of 
unjust profits, and ensuring that there will be no pot of gold awaiting the 
trafficker once punishment has been served. They consider confiscation 
law as the civil consequence of criminal wrong doing, and in so doing take 
away the raison d'etre for the criminal. They believe that the power given 
to the courts to confiscate the proceeds of crime is an essential weapon in 
society's battle with drug traffickers. Moreover, they indicate that with the 
prisons over-flowing and the steady reduction in sentences being passed, it 
becomes increasingly necessary to ensure that the profits of crime are not 
available to convicted persons when they return to society (p. xi-xiii). 
It is quite obvious that they justify confiscation orders according to 
reparative purposes and to the doctrine of unjust enrichment23. In 
confirming that confiscation is not punitive, they say that: 
'where a defendant benefits as a consequence of his commission of an 
act contrary to the law, he should not be permitted to retain such 
profits, he should be compelled to make good the loss he has caused, 
he should redress24 the harm, compensate the victim, right the 
balance' (p. 1). 
They pointed out that such a school of thought is by no means unknown 
to the criminal law prior to the enactment of these statutes. Moreover, 
this school of thought forms the basis of the law of tort and contract, and is 
the justification for many other remedies available to complainants in the 
civil jurisdiction (p. 1). They state: 
'where legal philosophers have explained the purpose of the 
criminal law as the avenue by which society may impose sanctions 
on those individuals that act in contravention of the inherent social 
23A collective rubric'unjust enrichment' was described by Hodgson Committee as analogous 
to the recommended confiscation order. One someone has wrongfully deprived another of 
his property the law entitles the wronged individual to recover that property or its value. 
A wrongdoer can be deprived by law of the profit he has made, and the remedy provided 
effectively penalises the wrong committed (for more details see Hodgson' Report, 1984 or 
Birks. P, 1982). 
24'redress' a term which has been used by Hodgson Committee, p. 6. 
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contract; that is, each and every citizen inherently contracts with 
his fellow citizens to behave in a manner acceptable to society as a 
whole. Should a particular citizen behave in a manner unacceptable 
to society, he acts in breach of the terms of the social contract and is 
liable to be punished for such breach by society. Where his 
behaviour has caused loss to a specific citizen, that citizen should be 
compensated. Where his behaviour damages society as a whole, 
society should be compensated. To this extent, confiscation serving to 
compensate society as a whole, and compensation for the individual 
victim, are mutually exclusive. The judiciary's concern is to seek 
compensation on behalf of society for the benefit the defendant has 
accrued at society's expense. Where the defendant has benefited 
from crime he is to be denied such benefit irrespective of the sentence 
he is to receive for his commission of the crime. As it is recompense 
for a crime against society as a whole that is sought, the court of 
trial is in the best position to assess the amount to be recovered' (p. 
2). 
The final decisions in some confiscation cases reveal that appellate judges 
have not always followed the logic of this consistently25. Mitchell & 
Hinton (1990), in a previous work, 'Confiscation Inquiries: What the 
Dickens', have come to a conclusion that the confiscation law is in a state 
of confusion from which only the Court of Appeal can rescue it (p. 208). 
This means that the government was aware of certain defects in the 
system. The writers, as mentioned above, reflect a clear government 
perspective in regard to the consistency of the legislation, the changing of 
intentions and policies and their reaction to the differences in the 
implementation of the legislation by the law enforcement agencies. Some 
of the odd differences in interpreting certain provisions and features of 
confiscation will be examined in the following chapter but a brief 
explanation of how the government changed its perspective toward the 
principles of confiscation law is important to examine here. 
The change of government perspective, or of some jurists, does not 
necessarily mean that the old perspective was wrong. The Home Affairs 
Committee whom it was asked by the government to provide 
recommendations about the best ways to combat drug traffickers indicated 
that the penalty for drug traffickers should be no less than the penalty for 
premeditated murder (see the Fifth Report from the Home Affairs 
Committee, session 1984-85). This means that the confiscation of assets 
and the profits of drug traffickers, as an additional measure to 
imprisonment, can produce an effect no less than the effect of the penalty 
25R v Dickens; Rv Redbourne; Rv Thomas; and Rv Atkinson 
48 
Chapter Two Review of Relevant Literature 
of premeditated murder. Moreover, in a Law Report by Evans, R (The 
Times, 30/ 7/ 95) it was indicated that 'the tough new measures, to be 
introduced by Mr Leon Brittan, the Home Secretary, will reflect the 
recommendations of the Common's Home Affairs Committee which 
gave warning in May that Britain would inherit America's drug crisis 
within five years unless there was immediate action'. He continued 
saying that 'Mr David Mellor, who is masterminding the Government's 
offensive against hard drugs, told The Times that the new legislative 
measures would amount to: 
'a comprehensive, effective and tough package. If one really 
believes in a policy of deterrent against those ruthlessly involved in 
a large-scale drug trafficking you have to have a two-edged 
approach: prison and seizure of assets'. 
These two statements and many others besides i. e. those mentioned 
earlier in chapter one, strongly support the views of those who believe in 
the punitive feature of the confiscation system. It looks as if those who 
represent the government have begun to take the government's 
perspective for granted. An examination of the effects of certain powers, 
provisions and certain court's decisions in an earlier chapter, and 
particularly the so called 'presumption power', the standard of proof, the 
retrospective effect, the Welch case, the comment by Mr. Dewer (MP), and 
many others, shows clearly that there is a strong belief that the powers of 
confiscation are punitive. Hodgson who has written the 'Forward' for the 
Confiscation book by Mitchell et al commented on the use of the word 
'draconian' by the authors, when they wanted to describe the new powers 
given to the courts, he said: 
'it is a correct description and the legislation in some ways goes 
further than was contemplated even by the majority of the 
Committee' (p. vii). 
Hodgson says that he was disappointed by some of the provisions of the 
confiscation legislation. As said earlier he explains that his Committee 
considered, almost as a matter of course and an unobjectionable issue, that 
the co-operation of an offender in tracing and seizing of ill-gotten gains 
and a plea of guilt should be reflected as a matter of mitigation in any 
sentence of imprisonment passed upon an offender. Pleas of guilt cannot, 
retrospectively, alter the criminality of the offending, but that a sentence 
of imprisonment must be reduced below its 'tariff' level in any case where 
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there is a plea of guilt. This applies even when the evidence is virtually 
conclusive of guilt, and is now a settled principle in sentencing. Hodgson 
indicates that if a judge does not give a discount or sufficient discount for 
a plea of guilt then the Court of Appeal will invariably allow an appeal 
and reduce the sentence as it considers appropriate. He concludes by saying 
that the only logical reason for reducing a sentence because of a plea of 
guilt is that it shows an acceptance of guilt and perhaps a measure of 
contrition - and anyway it will save the court time by avoiding a trial (p. 
vii-viii). 
Hodgson believes that in providing section 2 (5) (c) of the DTA 1994 
(formerly section 1 (5) (c) of the DTOA 1986) the legislature has set itself 
against this philosophy; a philosophy which was supposed to be adopted 
as the main justification for the recommendation for a new confiscation 
order by Hodgson's report. This means that to add new provisions like 
confiscation orders with its attached proceedings to the principal penalty 
(imprisonment) without considering the size of the principal penalty, 
makes the addition of confiscation provisions a punitive act. This means 
that the government has clearly favoured a strict punitive perspective. 
It is interesting that in both the work of Mitchell and his colleagues and 
that of Feldman (1988) there is a similar detailed examination of 
provisions and powers. Although Mitchell et al have rushed in order to 
present their work prior to the enactment of the most important 
amendments to the DTOA 1986, their examination of certain amended 
provisions show their awareness of the proposed changes. They indicate 
that they are aware of most of these amendments which are provided as 
recommendations by the two reports, Home Office Working Group (1991 
Report (DTOA 1986) & 1992 Report (CJA 1988)). Nine out of ten chapters 
are devoted to legal and professional interpretations of the confiscation 
provisions provided under the DTOA 1986 and the CJA 1988. They have 
indeed attempted to address some of the suggested amendments whilst 
discussing relevant provisions. They referred to the amendments 
provided under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1993 like for example, the 
Act which empowered the court to confiscate the proceeds of drug 
trafficking in certain cases where the trafficker has died or absconded; the 
repealing of the mandatory power provided under section 1 of the DTOA 
1986; and the new provision concerning the default sentence where the 
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default sentence will not expunge the confiscation order which will 
continue to be susceptible to enforcement by other means. 
2.3. OTHER ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
There are two important studies which examined different aspects in the 
confiscation system. Michael Zander (1989) presented a valuable 
comparative account with the American forfeiture system, and Levi & 
Osofsky (1995) have examined the implementation of the system by law 
enforcement agencies. The most important issues and the main findings 
of these are as follows: 
Professor Michael Zander (1989) has provided, for the first time in 
England, a useful comparative review and critique of the English and the 
American laws on the confiscation and forfeiture of assets26. The study 
'Confiscation and Forfeiture Law: English and American Comparisons' 
consists of four main sections: the first section examines the confiscation 
system provided under the British DTOA 1986; the second highlights 
relevant international actions; the third describes the American criminal 
and civil forfeiture systems; and the last is devoted to a discussion which 
mainly includes an argument about the similarities and the dissimilarities 
between the two systems with some significant comments and 
recommendations. 
Zander believes in the proportionality of punishment. He indicates that 
forfeiture should be proportionate to the offence, so that seizing assets 
which are not proceeds of crime is objectionable since it is 
disproportionate (p. 43). He also thinks that forfeiture or confiscation of 
valuable assets involved in the drug business is aimed at discouraging 
drug trafficking. This, he says, is a punitive procedure which may have a 
deterrent effect: 
'if it does not discourage those concerned, it punishes them by taking 
away the ill-gotten gains of their activity. It also, incidentally, 
makes society feel better' (p. 44). 
26Unlike the British 'confiscation and forfeiture systems', the American legal system uses 
only the term 'forfeiture' in the laws that deal with illegal proceeds of crime. More 
explanations provided in Chapter Six. 
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Besides the importance of this as a comparative study, Zander provides 
some responses to certain significant inquiries concerning several 
legislative and practical issues about the American system. In brief, two 
important parts of his study are worth mentioning here: (a) the main 
findings concerning the American system, and whether there are any 
aspects that Britain should consider copying; and (b) the main legislative 
changes or additions for the British confiscation system. 
With regard to the first issue, Zander concluded that copying the powers 
available under the American laws, would be a serious mistake (p. 2). He 
reveals that the US law with regard to forfeiture and confiscation is greatly 
excessive. He says it goes considerably further than the British law in 
permitting confiscation/ forfeiture without any hearing, but operates 
simply by administrative action: 
'to take away the profits of crime is one thing; to seize assets that 
have no connection with crime is quite another' (p. 43). 
(A more detailed examination of the powers, definitions, scope of 
enforcement and the similarities and differences of both systems is the 
main concern of subsequent part of this thesis (see chapter five)). 
In respect to the suggested legislative provisions, Zander indicates that the 
British government should rather follow the Australian and the 
Canadian legislation. He recommends that the police should be permitted 
to ask a judge for an order to allow them to obtain information regarding 
the drug trafficker's affairs from the Inland Revenue as operates in 
Canada. Zander attributes the problems of the recovery of confiscation 
orders shown by Home Office Research and Statistics Department, to the 
mandatory powers of the courts in imposing confiscation orders. He 
suggests that it might be better to abolish those powers. 
The particular importance of Zander's report is that, as it turns out, most 
of the suggestions have been adopted by the government. The mandatory 
power of courts to impose a confiscation order in every individual drug 
trafficking offence, for example, has been abolished. The DTA 1994 also 
include new provisions that deals with absconded and deceased drug 
traffickers. 
52 
Chapter Two Review of Relevant Literature 
Lastly, Zander raises a controversial issue which has also been discussed by 
Feldman (1988). It is about the use of assets recovered from convicted drug 
traffickers. While Feldman has appealed from the interest of the police 
who claim these assets, Zander disagrees. He says: 
'a closer inspection to the American approach of sharing the fruits of 
confiscation with law enforcement agencies is important, because 
many people in England are attracted to this particular American 
provision. Such approach has an obvious advantage in providing a 
tangible incentive to the police by making them more effective in 
their pursuit of criminals, and that the more effective they are the 
greater the resources will be available to them. However, there is a 
serious danger that such incentives will distort law enforcement. 
Some investigators may hoard the information rather than sharing 
it for fear that their organisation might otherwise have to share 
the ultimate spoils of success. Furthermore, some units may opt to 
suffer pressure to make bigger and bigger seizures to ease other 
financial burdens within the organisation. This can lead to hurried 
investigations, poorly prepared prosecutions and unjustified 
acquittals' (p. 48). 
Instead, Zander recommends the setting up of a national fund which 
would take a proportion of the proceeds of confiscation. He adds that the 
central administration for such a fund would improve co-ordination of 
major investigations, and could additionally be used to strengthen the 
hand of the ACPO Crime Committee, the National Drugs Intelligence 
Unit and the Regional Crime Squads' central organisation, assisting them 
in their capacity to cope with the drugs problem both on the national and 
the international front (p. 49). Yet despite this, it is quite surprising then to 
find that the Police Foundation misunderstood Zander's position. The 
Police Foundation said that Zander wanted the government to: 
'follow the United States practice of using assets seized from drug 
traffickers to help finance law enforcement. That is the conclusion of 
Professor Michael Zander of the London School of Economics, whose 
report Confiscation and Forfeiture Law: English and American 
Comparison is published today by the Police Foundation' (Zander, 
1989, Introduction by The Police Foundation). 
Perhaps one of the reasons the Police Foundation appeared to 
misunderstand Zander was as a latent yet unsuccessful second27 attempt 
by the police to help in their plea to the government about the use made 
of the seized assets. That is to say that by introducing Zander's report in 
27Feldman's study was also prompted by some police officers of one of the RCSs (Feldman, 
1988, p. ) 
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such a way it became an attempt to cover any unexpected findings that 
may appear. 28 
The Work of Professor Michael Levi & Lisa Osofsky29 (1995) Investigating, 
Seizing and Confiscating the Proceeds of Crime, which was commissioned 
by the Home Office Police Research Group (PRG)30, is the most recent to 
include theoretical and empirical research on the British confiscation 
system provided under the DTOA 1986 and the CJA 1988. It is also the first 
study of a confiscation system jointly conducted by a non-jurist academic. 
This work comprises two core elements: (a) to identify 'good practice' in 
the enforcement of the confiscation proceedings, and (b) to review the 
impact of confiscation upon offenders and upon the organisation of crime 
(p. 1). I. M. Burns, the Deputy Under Secretary of State31, in the 'Forward' 
to this work, says 'the authors suggest that a number of factors have 
mitigated against the effective use of the provisions related to the 
confiscation proceedings, in attempting to investigate, seize and confiscate 
the proceeds of crime. Whilst identifying the difficulties that exist, the 
research describes how the new legislative provisions will ease the 
situation in the courts, and makes some practical suggestions about how 
the police and other enforcement agencies might improve their 
procedures in order to make financial investigation and confiscation more 
effective in future' (p. iii). 
With regard to the theory and the rationale of a confiscation procedure, 
the researchers did not provide a clear opinion. Instead they explain that 
in England and Wales, the theory underlying confiscation relieves the 
criminal of financial gain from unacceptable social behaviour. In 
determining the nature of confiscation, they refer to the theories of 
28The Police Foundation indicates that Zander has recommended setting up a national 
fund, but in the same time they declared that Zander recommended that the British 
government should follow the American approach in dealing with the proceeds of crime 
which is obviously not what Zander said. Such a declaration may lead the readers to 
misunderstand Zander's perspective in such a particular issue. 
29Michael Levi is a professor in criminology and the Director of White-Collar and 
Organised Crime Research Unit at the University of Wales College of Cardiff. He has 
published many studies on matters of fraud, money laundry, policing and perceptions of 
crime seriousness, while Lisa Osofsky works for the US Attorney's Office in Chicago. 
30PRG was formed in 1992 to carry out and manage research relevant to the work of the 
police service. The terms of reference for the Group include the requirement to identify and 
disseminate good police practice. 
31Deputy Under Secretary of State, Home Office, Police Department, May, 1995. 
54 
Chapter Two Review of Relevant Literature 
Ashworth (1992) and Mitchell et al (1992) in which confiscation is 'not part 
of the punitive component of the sentence and does not mitigate or 
aggravate it'. However, they point out that those involved in 
investigating the proceeds of crime view confiscation as 'an attack that 
truly hurts the criminal by depriving him of the monetary benefits that he 
covets most, and undermining his credibility as a criminal' (p. 12). 
The researchers also refer to a philosophical justification for confiscation 
stating that confiscation has a possible 'deterrent value'. This philosophy 
is based upon the belief that if criminals are convinced that 'crime does 
not pay', and that if caught they will be unable to retain their ill-gotten 
gains, then, presumably, at least some criminals will be deterred from 
committing certain crimes. The researchers reveal that one of their 
findings from interviewing offenders suggests that many offenders view 
the proceeds of crime as their 'entitlement' and by removing this would 
naturally cause resentment and be seen as punishment. They think that 
there seems no reason to expect that confiscation will lead such offenders 
to abstain from crime in future, but it might simply lead to greater 
determination to 'get their just deserts'. They provide an example of the 
snake and ladder game, which means that the offenders may find it hard 
to get back to where they were before. However, the researchers conclude 
their work by indicating that determining whether or not confiscation 
legislation is a deterrent is somehow speculative, and might depend 
mainly upon to whom and how it is being enforced (p. 12). 
The report comprises eight sections. These sections discuss the extent of 
application of confiscation provisions, provide a brief comparison with 
US yields from similar systems, discuss the impact of confiscation on 
individuals and on criminal investigation, provide also some relevant 
proceedings (e. g. restraint order), give details of the organisation of 
financial investigation within the police service, examine the 
relationships between the police and some other agencies, and present 
some practical difficulties encountered by the police. The last section 
provides suggestions for ways forward for a 'good practice' approach by the 
financial investigation system. 
In general, Levi & Osofsky believe that the confiscation system 'in its 
contemporary state cannot be successful'. They provide a list of identified 
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difficulties (p. vi). Four out of the nine difficulties in this list are merely 
comments concerning old confiscation proceedings already amended by 
the CJA 1993. The other five are mainly concerned with the lack of 
organisational incentives for those involved in the enforcement of the 
confiscation system, the dispersal of confiscation cases among counsel and 
judges, the high costs of receivers and accountants compared with the 
level of cases, problems encountered in enforcement by magistrates' 
courts, and the costs and difficulties involved in assessing realisable assets 
of defendants. 
With regard to the major problem of the British confiscation system 
concerning the deficiency in recovering confiscation orders, Levi and 
Osofsky say there is no pattern which could be discerned to ensure 
successful results for confiscation purposes. They think that the extent to 
which judges, prosecuting counsel, and Crown prosecutors are well- 
versed in the relevant law and the co-operation of defendants are obvious 
factors in improving the yield from confiscation. This study is an essential 
reference for law enforcement agencies. It highlights several legislative 
and technical shortcomings which need to be resolved in order for law 
enforcement agencies to be able to achieve the desired 'good practice'. 
In contrast with Zander's (1989) work, and particularly when Levi and 
Osofsky discuss confiscation in making police investigation financially 
self-sufficient, Levi and Osofsky provide a similar perspective to that of 
Zander. They suggest avoiding a narrow focus to the financial cost-benefit 
of each individual investigation which might frustrate some of the 
broader reparative and deterrent/ incapacitative purposes of the 
legislation. Moreover, they believe that comparisons with the American 
forfeiture system might be misleading (p. 8). 
In addition to these two main academic literature, there are also other 
important studies which discussed confiscation as a secondary focus. 
These studies concern for example, certain principles in the criminal 
justice system, the strategies of enforcement, and some other relevant 
issues. 
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Andrew Ashworth32 (1992) in 'Sentencing & Criminal jrustice' views the 
matter of depriving offenders of the profits of their crime as a complicated 
process. But on the other hand, he thinks that 'it is quite wrong that 
offenders should be allowed to keep any profits from their offending' (p. 
74). Ashworth believes that confiscation legislation is a consequence of 
over zealous concern by politicians. He states that: 
'political pressures to 'combat' organised crime lead too easily to 
provisions which are over zealous and which trample on what are 
ordinarily considered to be defendant's rights' (p. 74). 
Moreover, he asks two questions: Does the legislation create presumptions 
against offenders which, in effect, require them to make a case for keeping 
their property? If so, is this a sufficient justification? Or is it simply that 
normal rights are swept aside by a tide of moral panic? He explains that 
these two questions have been answered by the European Court of 
Human Rights, which has declared the original provisions of the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act 1986 to be contrary to Article 7 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This is in regard to a British court's 
decision which includes a retrospective effect in relation to events which 
have been committed before the enactment of the DTOA 1986 (referring to 
a specific case 'Welch v United Kingdom' mentioned earlier). 
Accordingly, the European Court's judgement classifies confiscation 
orders as punishment. 
Ashworth has linked this decision to another relevant issue concerning 
the proportionality of the overall sentence. He thinks that regarding 
confiscation as a punishment means that the deprivations imposed ought 
to be taken into account when determining whether the overall penalty is 
proportionate to the seriousness of the offence. The British Court of 
Appeal seems to reach the same conclusion but on pragmatic grounds. It 
provides that such an order may have a severe financial effect on a 
defendant subject to it, and must therefore be taken into account in 
deciding 'the overall penalty' (R. v Dickens [1990]). 
32Andrew Ashworth has been the leading English writer on the law of sentencing for a 
decade. He is editor of the Criminal Law Review and was chairman of the Council of 
Europe's Select Committee of Experts on Sentencing (1989-92). In 1993 he worked for the 
School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey, USA. 
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Ashworth here, relating part of the theory of a confiscation system to its 
application, as all previous writers have done, states that 'what should be 
avoided, in all instances, is a disparity of result which means that an 
offender who can readily discharge obligations under the confiscation 
order receives a lower sentence, especially a lower prison sentence, than 
one who cannot'. Ashworth then, operating according to a long-standing 
principle, advocated that a wealthy offender should not be allowed to 'buy 
a way out of prison'. Lastly, he declared that even if courts do take account 
of the onerous effects of a confiscation order, they should bear in mind the 
principle of equality before the law, and consider whether the order really 
is an additional penalty or merely an attempt to remove an unfair 
advantage gained from the crime by restoring the status quo (p. 76). 
It seems that even Ashworth, who was expected to give a clear picture of 
the theory underpinning the current confiscation legislation, mentions so 
little about it and is left to conclude his argument with a question. This 
would, therefore, lead us to assume that attempts to classify confiscation 
in terms of punishment is difficult only because it requires a parallel 
attempt to disentangle that which underlies philosophical theories of 
punishment. 
Nickolas Dorn33, Karim Murji34 and Nigel South35 have conducted 
several important studies concerning drug trafficking offences and law 
enforcement strategies. In Traffickers: Drug Markets and Law Enforcement 
(1992), a chapter has been devoted to the development of the financial 
penalties entitled 'The punishment illusion: your money and your life'. 
The authors pointed out that asset confiscation, as originally 
recommended by the Hodgson Committee, is intended to be a just but 
humane penalty. However, they say, this aspect was overlooked by the 
then current government who announced that maximum terms of 
imprisonment for drug trafficking are to be increased due to the excitable 
anti-trafficker climate of the 1980's (p. 176). This means that the authors 
believe that the current application of the confiscation system is a strict 
penalty. 
331t is important for this study to identify the speciality of the major writers about the 
confiscation system. Here, Dorn is a Development Director at the Institute for the Study of 
Drug Dependence. 
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The authors reveal that it was not until the 1980's that the concept of drug 
'dealing' metamorphosed into that of drug 'trafficking'. During the 1970's, 
most people referred to drug 'pushers' or drug 'dealers'. Anyone who 
referred to 'trafficking' would have been regarded as rather quaint, and 
the term seeming to hark back to nineteenth-century concerns with 
slavery. By the end of the 1980's, however, the term 'drug trafficking' had 
come into common usage, in the context of increased penalties and 
images of violence. And it is clear that 'trafficking' has similar, albeit, 
more extreme connotations, carrying definite implications of dangerous 
foreigners and a need for severe punishment (pp. 178-179). 
Their work exposes the diversity of drug trafficking offences, and provides 
an account of how police operations work. It includes: (a) accounts of the 
development of drug markets from the 1960's to the 1990's; (b) a 
discussion of the evolution of new policing methods; (c) insider views on 
the development of a national detective agency for Britain; and (d) a 
challenging look at the processing and sentencing of drug traffickers; and 
(e) extended extracts from then unpublished and confidential report from 
the ACPO. 
The authors indicate that during the initial years of operation of the 
DTOA, some police officers voiced concern that the courts were failing to 
follow the full requirement of the Act, especially in relation to relatively 
minor trafficking offences. It is felt that traffickers who do small deals over 
an extended period of time, generate considerable cash-flows (p. 182). On 
the other hand, the authors explain that the financial cost, in terms of 
police investigation and court time, of enforcing the confiscation order is 
unknown. 
They identified seven different and important sorts of drug trafficking 
offences. These types are: 
-Trading Charities: enterprises involved in the drug business 
because of ideological commitments to drugs, with profit as a 
secondary motive; 
34Murji is a senior lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Social Policy-Roehampton 
Institute. 
35South is a senior lecturer at the department of Sociology-University of Essex. 
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-Mutual Societies: friendship networks of user-dealers who 
support each other and sell or exchange drugs amongst 
themselves in a reciprocal fashion; 
-Sideliners: the licit business enterprise that begins to trade in 
drugs as a 'sideline'; 
-Criminal Diversifiers: the existing criminal enterprise that 
diversifies its operations to include drugs; 
-Opportunistic Irregulars: individuals or small groups who get 
involved in a variety of activities in the 'irregular economy', 
including drugs; 
-Retail Specialists: enterprises with a manager employing people 
in a variety of specialist roles to distribute drugs to users (an 
increasingly common 'street dealing' format); and 
-State-sponsored Traders: enterprises that result from 
collaboration between control agents and others; for example, 
collaboration between police undercover agents and their 
informants who may be allowed to continue to trade; or 'buy bust' 
covert operations (p. xiii) 
Dorn & South (1990) in 'Drtcg Markets and Law Enforcement', indicate 
that the police should revise their anti-trafficking strategies to better attack 
the different types of traffickers. They suggest that the way forward for the 
police is to identify the different types of enterprises, find out how 
permanent they are, discover their financial operations and security, and 
exploit their weaknesses. They also believe that asset confiscation does not 
work for all drug trafficking types. Not, for instance, for those people who 
are identified as opportunistic irregular, because they form and dissolve in 
response to short-term projects (p. 186, see also Boothroyd, 1989, p. 334). 
Dorn & Murji (1992) in 'Low level Drug Entforcementt', point out that the 
1980's saw rapid developments in high level drug enforcement aiming at 
major manufacturers and importers, yet, during the 1990's, the area of 
greatest innovation and progress is likely to be low level drug 
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enforcement (p. 160). If this is correct, then one expects subsequent changes 
in the enforcement strategies and policies, not only in police forces but 
also in government. The CCB, as a government's supervisory team for the 
enforcement of confiscation by police, stipulates a minimum threshold 
policy for those who are seeking restraint or charging orders from High 
Court. If this Branch continues to operate this policy, then most of the 
confiscation cases of low level drug enforcement (the focus of law 
enforcement agencies in 1990s) will face a dead end. 
Jane Goodsir (in Bean, 1993) questions the civil rights and civil liberties 
surrounding the use of confiscation proceedings. She indicates that rights 
and civil liberties in the UK have been described as a state of mind, rather 
than a set of rules, relying on institutions and formal procedures, rather 
than a character or written constitution. She also explains that there is no 
overriding principle from which 'rights' are derived. Instead, she 
recommends that jurists have to look at a web of different legal cases, 
Home Office guidelines, and official procedures to determine what 
freedoms people enjoy as citizens (p. 130). In regard to confiscation 
proceedings, Goodsir believes that it raises some fundamental questions 
about general freedom and the right to privacy. She concludes by stating 
that: 
'our collective sacrifice of freedom and privacy may be seen as a 
futile gesture in support of unenforceable panic measures' (p. 144). 
Stephen Gilchrist (1993) in 'Crime Reporter', discusses human rights in 
relation to retrospective legislation and points out that this has long been 
an anathema to English constitutionalists and lawyers. Retrospective 
legislation occurs infrequently in criminal law as one might expect. So 
that to be prosecuted for an act which is not an offence at the time it is 
committed, will indeed raise a storm of protest. The issue is addressed by 
the Court of Appeal in R. v Barretto (The Times, 26 October 1993), when a 
receiver is appointed to collect out-standing sums (due from Barretto in 
1992). The receiver argues that the wider provisions of the 1990 Act should 
be allowed to have retrospective effect to Barretto's conviction three years 
earlier. He claims that Parliament's intention about confiscation is not a 
penal proceeding, but a procedure designed to ensure that drug traffickers 
do not profit from their crime. The Court of Appeal, however, has taken 
the view that the consequences of a confiscation order are broadly penal 
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rather than an administrative procedure for recovery of monies, to which 
the defendant in this case is not entitled. Gilchrist concludes that to the 
authorities, the application of the 1990 law would subject the defendant to 
a substantial disadvantage in respect of events which had occurred well 
before the change and, in the court's view, the defendant is not to be 
substantially prejudiced in such a way unless Parliament's intention was 
to that effect (pp. 1124-1125). 
While John O'Connor (1993) in 'Out of Control', reveals that more than 
70% of all prosecutions and drug seizures in Britain occur within the 
boundaries of the Metropolitan Police (Met), he adds that the 
Metropolitan Police has no written strategy for dealing with the criminal 
misuse of drugs. 
Sara Dayman (1994) in 'Squeezing Their Assets', indicates that although 
the DTA 1994 has strengthened the confiscation powers, without bilateral 
confiscation agreements the legislation is virtually useless. She concludes 
that 'targeting the massive rewards of this shadowy trade is certainly one 
of the most powerful weapons in the war against the drug traffickers' (pp. 
22-23). On the other hand, Keith Potter (1995) in 'Lost Assets', reviews 
police perceptions concerning the recovered assets and finds that new 
legislation is required to enable police forces to retain a proportion of 
seized assets for training and drug education. He indicates that Parliament 
appears to be unmoved by efforts to change legislation. D/Supt Derek 
O'Connell, head of Merseyside Drugs Squad, believes that unless those 
changes are made, the trade will continue to be 'a cancerous corruption of 
society as a whole'. 
'We are not asking to keep all of the assets we seize. But we feel 
that if we could obtain a proportion of what we confiscate to support 
our enforcement, education and prevention initiatives, it would be 
more beneficial, and would relieve the Government and the tax- 
payers of the cost of tackling the whole issue'. 
Potter indicates that the assets in form of cash are diverted directly to 
central funds at the Treasury. Under the MDA 1971, assets are forfeited, 
but police could request that a forfeiture order is made out to the force 
involved. In most cases the request is approved, and provides a lucrative 
source of funding for training and drug education programmes. But such 
forfeiture funding has disappeared. He reveals that 'to make the matters 
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worse, where large amounts of cash but no drugs are recovered from a 
search, forces can only use the difficult and outdated legislation of the 
Police Property Act 1897 to retain the money, but only to cover property 
expenses or for charitable purposes'. Certainly this is a very frustrating 
situation, while D/Supt O'Connell comments that it seems ridiculous to 
use 'an antiquated Act' to deal with 1995 problems. O'Connell also says 
that unless extra funding is forthcoming, the progress made so far on 
Merseyside could suffer a major setback. However, the then Home Office 
Minister David Maclean in a recent response to a relevant question in the 
House of Common states: 'I have no plans to change existing 
arrangements under which confiscated money is treated in the same way 
as fine revenue and paid directly into the consolidated fund from which 
Government expenditure generally, including substantial support for 
drug-related work, is financed' (pp. 26-27). This clearly illustrates that the 
Minister is not convinced about this issue. 
Alison Jamieson (1992) in 'Drug Trafficking After 1992: A Special Report', 
provides an outcome of a long term study of the security and response 
implications of Drug Trafficking for the Single European Market. It deals 
with money laundering legislation as 'the spearhead of any successful 
attack on the business of drug trafficking' with particular reference to 
Britain and Italy. The writer indicates that Italian laws of confiscation were 
introduced as a weapon against organised Mafia, while in Britain, there. is 
no concept of 'Mafia association', and confiscation proceedings deals only 
with those suspected to benefit from drug trafficking (p. 30). Jamieson 
exposes three legal difficulties in the British system: (a) the difficulty of 
establishing the defendant's benefit to a criminal standard of proof; (b) the 
problem with enforcing the system if the accused either dies or absconds; 
and (c) the difficulty of recovering the confiscation orders. Two of these 
are resolved already by the new amended provisions, while the third is 
still the subject of persistent debates about the system. 
Several other writings have focused upon legal interpretations of some 
disputable provisions of the system, like for example the restraint order, 
the retrospective effect, and the variation of the confiscation orders. Some 
of the writings are already covered or referred to during an examination of 
the confiscation provisions in chapter three, while others have only 
repeated what is known about certain parts of the system. There are also 
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some important critiques which have been widely considered by the new 
amended legislation (the DTA 1994). 
2.4. SUMMARY 
This chapter presents a brief review and critical appraisal of the main 
literature on confiscation theory that have been produced during the last 
fifteen years. This review is largely intended to determine the distinctive 
features of the confiscation system which have attracted the attention of 
the writers, and to find out whether the writers have covered the main 
aspects of concern in this research. 
Having presented the main argument about the confiscation system in 
this chapter, one can clearly observe that the majority of the literature has 
reflected the concerns and the dominance of one single school of thought, 
the juristic perspective. The major part of the literature has been 
presented by jurists, practitioners and legal academics. It is then axiomatic 
to find that the majority of the literature is mainly focusing upon 
interpreting the provisions of the legislation and criticising certain legal 
and technical loopholes and shortcomings. 
Some of the studies have highlighted the historical background, the 
underpinning philosophy, the justifications of confiscation, and provided 
a practical account of the powers and their applications. Some writers 
believed that the current confiscation system is a clear example of 'the end 
justifies the means' policy. They think that the political pressures upon 
Parliament had brushed aside several major tenets of criminal law 
procedure under the auspice to ensure that not even one unlawful penny 
is left unseized. 
Others have explained that one of the important reasons is the 
misunderstanding or the inability to recognise the spirit of the legislation 
which has caused unwillingness to enforce it by some practitioners. Some 
writers believe the system to be draconian where rights have been 
intentionally abolished. 
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As has been mentioned earlier the majority of literature represents one 
school of thought (juristic perspective) which almost dominates the 
debate about the theory and practice of a confiscation system. However, 
there have been some differences in the views of some of the writers 
(holding same perspective) which have led some of them (like Mitchell et 
a1,1992) to declare that the law of confiscation is in a state of confusion. 
Derek Hodgson, the chairman of the Hodgson Committee, points out that 
the legislation has disappointed the committee because it brushed aside 
settled principles in sentencing. Fortson asserted that by indicating that 
certain provisions are causing controversial decisions among courts (e. g. 
decisions about assessing the realisable property, burden of proof and 
about setting the required assumptions) (Mitchell, 1992). 
The works of Zander (1989) and Levi & Osofsky (1995) provide valuable 
information. Zander has compared the British confiscation system with 
the American forfeiture systems (criminal and civil forfeitures). The study 
has indeed covered the exigency for a detailed examination of analogous 
experiences elsewhere in the world to support the debate and the 
argument about having a national confiscation system. Levi & Osofsky 
provide a practical examination of the confiscation proceedings which are 
experienced by the law enforcement agencies. The examination include 
some indications concerning the value and impact of the powers vested to 
courts and the police. It also presents a determination of the factors which 
have mitigated against the effective use of the system. Levi & Osofsky 
have identified certain essential difficulties and shortcomings that exist 
and provide practical suggestions for improvement. Accordingly, these 
two studies have covered most of the aspects of questions 4,5 and 6 stated 
in the introduction of this chapter. 
No doubt some of the views, comments, and critiques that came after the 
enactment of the DTOA 1986 have been considered for subsequent 
legislative amendments. This means that the current consolidated 
legislation (DTA 1994) included some of the proposals and suggestions 
which were originally raised by those studies mentioned in this chapter. 
There have been issues raised in two of the research questions (2 & 3) with 
regard to the availability of justifications for the underpinning social 
rationale, conviction about legality, and the availability of studies which 
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examine the relationship and the differences between the rationale, 
justifications, objectives and aims of the system and the outcomes of 
applications. These still lack a thorough inspection and detailed 
appreciation of the nature of confiscation, despite some writers having 
highlighted aspects of some of these issues. 
The studies which have been examined in this chapter did not provide, 
for example, enough coverage of the legality in granting extended powers 
to the police. Mitchell et al (1992) indicate that the social justification for 
seeking forfeiture of proceeds of crime was never questioned; rather, it 
was implicitly accepted which should, in principle, follow conviction as a 
matter of course (para. 1.07). The point here is that such social justification 
which could determine legality is still missing. Garland (1994) explains 
that the system and even the public are used to taking things for granted 
(p. 3). Goodsir (1993) indicates that the rights and civil liberties in the UK 
have been described as a state of mind, rather than a set of rules, relying 
on institutions and formal procedures, not on a character or written 
constitution (p. 130). She also says that the confiscation system was passed 
with relatively little opposition, although it raises some fundamental 
questions about general freedom and the right to privacy (p. 134). In fact it 
raises an important question about the role of sociologists and the 
criminologists in this country. Why those specialising in the sociology of 
law and socio-legal studies did not provide in-depth studies or at least 
explanations of all the surrounding conditions and difficulties? The only 
available answer to this question is by Garland who says 'we are led to 
discuss penal policy in ways which assume the current institutional 
framework, rather than question it, as when we consider how best to run 
prisons, organise probation, or enforce fines, rather than question why 
these measures are used in the first place' (p. 3). 
The literature here has shown that most of the writings about confiscation 
legislation, have been confined to an examination of the textual 
provisions, the difficulties in interpreting certain terms and conditions, 
and determining the shortages and obstacles in enforcing the confiscation 
system as experienced by law enforcement agencies (courts, prosecution, 
police, etc. ). 
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This also applies, for example, to the work of Levi & Osofsky (1995). This 
work is considered to be the first study about the confiscation system 
which is partly done by a social scientist (Levi), but it did not attempt to 
question the actual underpinning principles and legality. It seems, as 
Garland indicated, social scientist and even criminologists are led to serve 
certain purposes which are far from their professional speciality. Levi & 
Osofsky were indeed asked to focus on certain applications and to provide 
recommendations, not about why there is confiscation in first place, but to 
look at some practical issues and certain mechanisms which need to be 
improved. 
Lastly, the ready-made answers provided by the government are not 
sufficient in justifying the powerful provisions of the confiscation system 
which lead to a deprivation of certain individual and property rights. 
What is needed are comprehensive socio-legal studies and researches 
which could intervene or mediate in looking for solutions originating 
from basic social understanding of the nature of the relationships between 
the individuals and the state. This is a crucial element in confiscation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE BRITISH CONFISCATION SYSTEM 
(LAW AND ENFORCEMENT) 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In chapter one the rationale behind the confiscation system was discussed. 
In this chapter some of the distinctive elements of the British confiscation 
legislation provided under the consolidated DTA 1994 (DTA) are 
examined. In this chapter aim 3 of main aim I is to be realised which is to 
determine the distinctive elements of the British confiscation system with 
particular reference to the DTA 1994. 
This legislation has created substantial powers to obtain information 
about where suspected criminals have invested their assets, to freeze 
assets with restraint and charging orders, and to confiscate them from 
convicted defendants. Most of the powers have already begun to affect 
criminal investigations since the enactment of the original DTOA 1986. 
Accordingly, this study will proceed more specifically to examine the 
features and extent of the main amended powers and provisions under 
the consolidated DTA 1994. In order to achieve that, a three-stage approach 
is adopted. This approach is used to help in determining the basic 
elements and aspects of asset confiscation provided by the DTA and some 
other relevant legislations36. The three-stage approach includes: the pre- 
trial stage, trial stage, and post-trial stage. 
This chapter includes also an examination of certain provisions in the 
system which have raised some fundamental questions about their 
unusual nature, difficulty in application, consistency, fairness and the 
36Unlike the DTOA 1986, DTA 1994 provides a clear definitions of 'drug trafficking' and 
'drug trafficking offence' (Part I, Introductory, s. 1 (1) (2) (3), DTA 1994). The legislation 
also provides a list of particular drug trafficking offences which the provisions of this Act 
cover(s. 1). The legislation provides that it works jointly with other relevant statutes, like 
for example, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, 
the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, the Criminal Law Act 1977, and 
the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. 
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extent of the state's rights in relation to the liberties of individuals and 
institutions. It represents a combination of various positions: the 
legislation, the critiques addressed to some provisions of this legislation, 
and the impressions and inferences one can possibly reach. These critiques 
unfold in such a way that they brings forth the importance of an in-depth 
analysis of the main elements of confiscation. 
3.2. THE DRUG TRAFFICKING ACT 1994 
This Act shows that the recovery of illegal gains begins by a 'confiscation 
order'. The trial and conviction are two main pre-conditions for the 
imposition of the order in 'clear cases'37 (s. 1). The confiscation system has 
been in force since the enactment of the DTOA 1986 in January 1987, and 
the courts accordingly, have been imposing this order alongside the use of 
imprisonment, fine, forfeiture orders, and deprivation orders. As with all 
new laws, their practical operation often exposes difficulties and faults. 
The original DTOA 1986 has indeed exposed some criticisms and some 
major practical difficulties which have led practitioners and reviewers to 
believe that the Act in its original form cannot be considered a successful 
piece of legislation. 
Sallon and Bedingfield (1993) for instance, emphasised that many of those 
who practise in this area find the DTOA 1986 illogically conceived and 
consequently impossible to apply in any coherent or reasonable manner. 
Both authors seem to believe the problems are at the level of definition 
and application. However, Thomas (1993) wants to marginalise such 
criticisms by focusing on its many difficult technicalities and unnecessary 
complications, pointing out that the Act failed to provide an adequate 
procedural structure for decision-making. 
Such criticisms experienced by law enforcement agencies have led the 
government to adopt recommendations based on two reports of the Home 
Office Working Group on Confiscation which suggested radical changes to 
the way in which confiscation orders are made and enforced. However, it 
seems that the amendments contained in several different Acts have 
37Section 19 of the DTA 1994 gives the High Court the power, in certain circumstances, to 
make confiscation orders against defendants who abscond at any time after proceedings 
have been instituted, whether before or after conviction. 
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caused even more confusion and burdened the practitioners and others 
who are involved in this process. Consequently, the government decided 
to consolidate the DTA which received the Royal Assent on the third of 
November 1994 and came into force on the third of February 1995. This 
Act consolidates the DTOA 1986 and its subsequent amendments. 
Therefore examining confiscation as a whole necessarily involves 
referring to the new revised provisions as well as the old ones. It must be 
said here that the amended provisions of the Act will apply only to 
offences committed after the commencement date of each relevant 
provision. This restriction, as Thomas (1993) has indicated, is thought to 
be in deference to the principle against retroactive criminal legislation. 
The DTOA 1986 made no concession to this principle. It applied to 
proceedings began after the commencement date, irrespective of the date 
of commission of the offences concerned. Thomas also described this 
restriction as 'a recipe for chaos in cases involving drug trafficking'. 
Consequently, it seems that the old and the new provisions of the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act 1986 will in effect continue to exist side by side, 
possibly for many years to come, at least until all offences committed 
before the commencement date of the amendment have passed through 
the system. 
3.2.1. Confiscation Proceedings (Practice And Procedure) 
Section 2 of the DTA 1994, says that the court is obliged to make a 
confiscation order only when the prosecutor asks it to do so. Where the 
prosecution does not make a request, the court is empowered to proceed 
only where it considers it appropriate to do so. Previously, the court was 
obliged to have a confiscation hearing following a conviction for a drug 
trafficking offence in every case. This point will be discussed at a later stage 
in this chapter. 
The application of confiscation legislation to a particular matter as it 
proceeds through the Criminal Justice System is immediate and enduring 
until such time as a confiscation order is either paid or the defendant 
acquitted (Mitchell et al, 1992). 'Criminal Confiscation Orders' by David 
Feldman (1988), and 'Confiscation' by Andrew Mitchell et al., (1992) 
suggest the breaking up of the confiscation proceedings into three main 
stages (the three-stage approach), namely (i) pre-trial stage, (ii) trial 
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proceedings stage and (iii) post-trial procedures (enforcement of the 
confiscation order). It was suggested that such a division would help in 
determining the. extent and limitations of the confiscation legislation. 
Hence, this study has adopted the same approach. 
The two latter studies have also highlighted some of the relevant court's 
rules, orders and regulations which had been essential in backing up the 
drive to identify and secure the proceeds of drug trafficking offences. It is 
important to indicate that this study is confined to the confiscation 
provisions of the DTA 1994 and any new amendments which may be 
introduced after the enactment of the DTA 1994 will not be considered 
here. It must also be said that all the aspects of the legislation and all the 
relevant rules and regulations are beyond the scope of this study38. It is 
essential therefore, to note that this section is devoted only to the main 
aspects of British confiscation proceedings. Once this has been done, the 
most controversial matters will be examined including the organisational 
changes required by the law enforcement agencies. 
3.2.1.1. Pre-trial Procedures (Powers And Features) 
The powers vested to police and courts in the pre-trial stage have been 
described by Goodsir as unusual (Goodsir, 1993, p. 130). The pre-trial 
proceedings incorporate elements of criminal law and sentencing, law of 
receivership, and common law injunctions freezing suspected proceeds of 
crime. Presumably Goodsir regards these powers as unusual because they 
were new to the criminal justice system. For example, the police were 
empowered, for the first time, to conduct searches of premises where the 
occupiers were not suspected of crime (DTA, s. 55 (1)). It may also be due to 
the impact or consequences the pre-trial powers inflict upon detainees or 
suspects. Goodsir (Ibid. ) explained that the powers embrace intrusive 
measures that threaten individual freedoms. She pointed out that judges 
3&The DTA 1994 also provides an important supplementary provision about for example, 
reconsideration of a case where the court has not proceeded under section 2, re-assessment of 
whether the defendant has benefited from drug trafficking, inadequacy of realisable 
property, bankruptcy, winding up of company holding realisable property, protection for 
insolvency officers, enforcement of orders made outside England and Wales, offences in 
connection with proceeds of drug trafficking (money laundry) and lastly the repealing 
proceedings. However, the focus of the study is toward the basic elements of the 
confiscation proceedings which represent the British confiscation approach in dealing 
with assets of drug traffickers. 
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considered the consequences of imposing the pre-trial powers 'a striking 
and extraordinary consequence of the Act' (p. 134). 
Pre-trial procedures concern the period which starts with the criminal 
investigation of the defendant and concludes with the return of a verdict 
guilty or otherwise. Here, investigating officers (police financial 
investigators or officers from the HM Customs & Excise) are required to 
trace the proceeds of a drug trafficker early on, if possible even before 
making an arrest. However, such work needs to be supported by some 
specific powers, and indeed most of these powers are now contained in the 
DTA 1994. However, to achieve the maximum or effective confiscation 
proceedings the law enforcement agencies need to apply some of the 
powers provided by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The powers available for any confiscation 
case under the DTA 1994 are categorised under two main groups: (1) 
powers during early investigations (warrants to search for evidence, 
production orders, warrants to enter premises, delay allowing a person in 
custody to receive legal advice or to inform his relatives for up to 36 
hours, and to detain without chatge for over 24 hours, and (2) powers 
once proceedings are instituted (restraint and charging orders). 
Mr. Corbett (MP) commented on these powers by saying; 
'The powers proposed by this amendment are in terms of civil 
liberties, quite draconian. The Bill gives the police power to delay 
notification of the arrest and detention of somebody for up to 36 
hours for reasons which, I quickly add are wholly justified in the 
circumstances. When saying that in some circumstances this kind of 
intrusion into civil liberties is justified we have to be careful. I want 
to remind the Minister that the reason why we have gone along 
with this is that we are determined, as are the Government, to use 
every weapon in our armoury to deal effectively with people who 
not only make vast fortunes out of drug trafficking, which is bad 
enough, but do it by ruining young lives. In many ways this is a 
historic Bill (referring to the DTOA 1986), and it is regrettable in 
the sense that there is a need for it' (Parliamentary Debates, 
Common, 2/ 7/86, Col. 1137). 
Goodsir indicates that the power to defer access to legal assistance for up to 
thirty six hours is applicable only when investigating serious offences 
such as drug trafficking (Goodsir, 1993, p. 136). This power affects the 
capacity of the detainee to exercise the right to silence, which is a 
72 
Chapter Three The British Confiscation System 
significant individual liberty. However, admissions by suspects to the 
police have great evidential value. 
Restraint and Charging Orders 
Here legislation is concerned with the preservation of the defendant's 
assets from dissipation or depreciation with a view to their application 
toward the satisfaction of a confiscation order. To achieve this purpose the 
legislation makes provision to obtain a restraint order or charging order 
over the property of a defendant. Broadly speaking, these orders serve to 
hold in abeyance all dealings with certain assets in which the defendant 
holds an interest pending resolution of the criminal charges against him. 
Once issued, both orders may remain in effect until the defendant is 
acquitted or a confiscation order is made and satisfied. The DTA allowed 
the High Court to make a restraint or charging order, and it may make 
them before or after a confiscation order has been made; such an order as 
it is listed under the pre-trial powers can even be made before the 
defendant is charged with an offence. If the pre-charged restraint order is 
granted the court will discharge the order if proceedings for the offence are 
not instituted within such time as the court considers reasonable (s. 25 (5) 
of the DTA 1994). 
Sections 25-28 of the Act deal with cases in which restraint orders and 
charging orders may be made and the effects of those two orders. The High 
Court may, by the restraint order, prohibit any person from dealing with 
any realisable property39. It applies to all realisable property i. e., any 
property held by the defendant, and any property held by a person to 
whom the defendant has directly or indirectly made a gift caught by this 
39S. 6 (2) of the Act provides that in this Act "realisable property" means any property 
held by the defendant; and any property held by a person to whom the defendant has 
directly or indirectly made a gift caught by this Act. However, property is not realisable 
property if there is in force in respect of it an order under s. 27 of the MDA 1971; s. 43 of the 
PCCA 1973; s. 223 or 436 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975; and s. 13 (2), (3) or 
(4) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. 
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Act40. It also applies to realisable property held by a specified person, being 
property transferred to him after the making of the order41. 
The broad scheme involved in making protective orders is to prevent a 
person (not just the defendant) from rendering any confiscation order 
nugatory by disposing of his assets prior to conviction (Fortson, 1992). On 
the other hand, the restraint order is subject to some conditions and 
exceptions specified in the Act (s. 26). It may be made only on an 
application by the prosecutor, and may be made on an ex parte application 
to a judge in chambers. As the practice has evolved, all such applications 
made by the Crown Prosecution Services (CPS) are submitted and 
reviewed in the Central Confiscation Branch in London (Talbot, 1994). 
The application consists of an originating motion and a supporting 
statement or a so-called 'affidavit' (Appendix III) which sets forth the 
grounds for believing that the defendant has benefited from drug 
/ 
trafficking to which the confiscation provisions apply (Rules of the 
Supreme Court Order 115). 
Where the High Court has made a restraint order the court may at any 
time appoint a receiver to take possession of any realisable property and to 
manage or otherwise deal with any property in respect of which he is 
appointed. Restraint orders may apply to property that is located outside 
the jurisdiction of the High Court. Whilst the orders have no effect on 
financial institutions located outside UK, a restrained defendant within 
the country may be liable to contempt if he deals with property located 
beyond its borders. 
Lastly, the restraint order can be varied or discharged by the High Court in 
relation to any property, and must be discharged when proceedings for the 
offences are concluded. 
40A gift means a transfer of property made by the defendant at any time since the beginning 
of the period of six years ending when the proceedings were instituted against him or a 
transfer made at any time which was a gift of property which directly or indirectly 
represented property received by him in connection with drug trafficking, and for which 
there is no, or no proper, consideration (s. 8 (1)). 
41The application of the gift provision is where the legislature intended to abandoned one 
of two main legal characteristics of any procedure in the penal system which is the 
personal liability. 
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To make the disposal of property more difficult, the Act empowers the 
High Court to make a charging order on realisable property for securing 
payment to the Crown. It should be noted, however, that an application 
for a restraint order cannot be made in relation to property subject to a 
charging order made under sections 25-28. The reason for this is that the 
powers of the High Court, and the receiver appointed by the Court to 
manage or otherwise deal with the property are extensive. 
In contrast, a charging order applies to interests in specified property. This 
property may include any beneficial interest that the defendant owns in 
land, securities, such as government or other stock, and units of any unit 
trust, if such property is in the jurisdiction of England or Wales. A 
charging order is especially well-suited to a situation in which the 
defendant owns a portion of an asset in which there are multiple interests. 
The charging order secures the Crown's potential interest in the property 
and will be discharged when the payment of the confiscation order is paid 
or because of acquittal. 
Moreover, charging orders provide proceedings with a mechanism to 
monitor and support the prohibition against dealing with assets embodied 
in restraint orders. The mere existence of the restraint order does not 
prevent a defendant dissipating his assets, and breaching the order may 
amount to an act of contempt of the High Court and is punishable by 
imprisonment (see Mitchell et al., 1992). Charging orders aim to relieve 
the prosecution from having to take any further steps to monitor 
compliance beyond ensuring that the charge is entered as an encumbrance 
on the central register of title relevant to the type of assets charged. The 
registry in this case will inform the prosecution of any attempt to sell the 
charged assets. This means that the defendant will not be able to change 
the name of the owner or the title unless the burden of the charging order 
is removed from the register. This kind of utility of the charging order 
may help to restrain assets which were unknown to the prosecution. 
In short, the purpose of the restraint and charging orders is to help and 
facilitate the work of the financial investigators and prosecution to fulfil a 
statement which is required by section 11 of the DTA 1994 (formerly 
section 3 in DTOA 1986), and referred to as a 'prosecutor's statement'. This 
statement is considered to be important machinery for ascertaining 
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matters relevant to the court's determination of the amount to be paid 
under a confiscation order. Therefore, it is very important to law 
enforcement agencies (police and prosecution) to make full use of all pre- 
trial powers and procedures if they are willing to achieve the desired aims 
of the legislation. 
3.2.1.2. Confiscation Procedures During Trial 
As said earlier, where the defendant appears to be sentenced before the 
Crown Court for a drug trafficking offence, the court is obliged to make a 
confiscation order only when the prosecutor asks it to do so. Where the 
prosecution does not make such a request, the court is empowered to 
proceed where it considers it appropriate to do so (s. 2 (1) of the DTA 1994). 
The court must go through a four-step process: (a) to decide whether or 
not the defendant has benefited from drug trafficking; (b) and if he has, the 
court must assess the value of the defendant's proceeds from drug 
trafficking; (c) the court must determine the amount to be recovered (this 
includes a determination that property is in fact available for realisation 
(realisable property) (s. 2 (2-5)); and (d) the court can then make a 
confiscation order in the amount of the defendant's benefit or the amount 
of his realisable property if this is less than the benefit held to have been 
received by the defendant. 
In assessing the amount of the proceeds, the court after conviction shall 
make assumptions called in the Act 'required assumptions' to determine 
issues relating to benefit from drug trafficking and assessing the value of 
the proceeds. The application of these assumptions are mandatory except 
where they are shown to be incorrect in the defendant's case, or where the 
court is satisfied that there would be a serious risk of injustice if they were 
made (s. 4 (4)). 
Section 2 (8) of the- DTA 1994 shows very clearly that a standard of proof is 
required to determine any question arising under this Act as to whether a 
person has benefited from drug trafficking, or the amount to be recovered 
is applicable in civil proceedings (proof on the balance of probabilities)42. 
42The rules of evidence in civil and criminal proceedings differ. In criminal cases the 
burden of proof is more difficult to discharge than in a civil case. A presumption of notice, 
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(a) Assumptions Required for Restoring Confiscation's Proof 
The DTA provides that the court in order to assist in deciding the question 
of benefit and the issue of the defendant's proceeds of drug trafficking, 
shall make the so-called 'required assumptions' (see section 4 (3) of DTA 
1994, Appendix III). This section does not allow a deduction of expenses, 
legitimate or otherwise which were recommended by the Hodgson 
Committee (p. 151). Quite likely this could be another reason to support 
those who described this Act as having extraordinary wide and draconian 
powers. 
In practice, when the prosecutor asks the court to proceed under section 2 
to consider a confiscation order, he/she shall give the court a statement 
(Affidavit, see Appendix III) clarifying his assessment of the value of the 
defendant's proceeds (s. 11, DTA 1994). This statement should always 
include two accounts; the assessment of all the defendant's proceeds43 
which include also the amounts of benefits from drug trafficking 
offence(s), and an assessment of the realisable property (any property held 
by the defendant or by a person to whom the defendant has directly or 
indirectly made a gift). The latter account refers to the available property 
held by the defendant. The main purpose of such statement is to simplify 
the determination proceedings by providing written a statements to be 
tendered by the Crown. 
The court after stating the assumptions shall: (a) order the defendant to 
pay the amount of the confiscation order; and (b) take account of the order 
before: (i) imposing any fine on him; (ii) making any order involving any 
payment by him; or (iii) making any order under section 27 of the Misuse 
of Drug Act 1971 (forfeiture orders) or section 43 of the Powers of Criminal 
Courts Act 1973 (deprivation orders) (s. 2 (5) DTA). 
Subsection (c) of section 2 of this Act means that the court must leave the 
confiscation order out of any decision when determining the appropriate 
for example, under civil law is no proof of actual knowledge in criminal law (more details 
concerning this matter see Kiralfy. A, 1990). 
43Section 4 (1) of the DTA provides that any payments or other rewards received by a 
person at any time (whether before or after the commencement of this Act) in connection 
with drug trafficking carried on by him or another person are his proceeds of drug 
trafficking; and subsection (2) provides that the value of his proceeds of drug trafficking is 
the aggregate of the values of the payments or other rewards. 
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sentence. This statement does not give a clear indication as to whether a 
confiscation order is part of the sentence or not. If, for example, a fine is 
considered because it is part of the punitive component of the sentence 
and dealing with the questions of fines or deprivation orders requires 
taking confiscation orders into account then, this may indicate that the 
confiscation order is also part of the whole sentence and could not be left 
out in determining the 'appropriate' sentence. More detailed analysis of 
this matter will be discussed later in this chapter. 
If the court is satisfied that the amount that might be realised is less than 
the amount the court assesses to be the value of the proceeds, the amount 
to be recovered therefore is the amount appearing to the court to be the 
amount that might be so realised; or a nominal amount where it appears 
to the court that the amount that might be so realised is nil (s. 5(3)). It 
seems that the reason for including this is that the court's power to 
increase orders under section 16 only applies when an order has been 
made; if no such order had been made there would be no jurisdiction to 
order an increase (see Millington, 1995). 
Subsection (8) of section 11 of the DTA provides that if the defendant fails 
in any respect to comply with a requirement to indicate to the court 
within such a period as it may direct, the extent to which he accepts each 
allegation in the statement (the assumption), he may be treated for the 
purposes of this section as accepting every allegation in the prosecutor's 
statement in question. This means that the right to silence has been 
abolished. This issue has been the subject of widespread civil libertarian 
concern. Levi & Osofsky (1995) added that the proof of connection between 
the assets held by the defendant or his associates and the offence(s) is often 
a matter of dispute (p. 25). These issues will also be examined later. 
(b) Postponed determinations 
Prior to the enactment of the amended provisions provided by the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA), which came into force on the 3 February 
1995, the Crown Courts must issue confiscation orders after conviction 
and before imposing sentence. This provision, as indicted by those 
suggested the amendments, impose a great pressure time-wise on police, 
defence and courts. The new amendments under CJA 1993 allowed the 
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courts to postpone their determination of confiscation related issues but 
pronounce sentence without delay. 
This provision merely provides a statutory basis for a practice which has 
been adopted by the court for some time, that of granting adjournments in 
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction (Millington, 1995). Except where there 
are exceptional circumstances, any postponements granted may not exceed 
six months. Section 3(7) of the CJA 1993 remedies a much criticised 
provision in the 1986 Act whereby the court could not impose sentence 
until the financial enquiry had been completed. This resulted in 
defendants being kept in suspense for many months before knowing their 
fate, but now the court may proceed to sentence for the substantive 
offence, notwithstanding that the confiscation enquiry is to be postponed. 
3.2.1.3. Confiscation order after sentencing (enforcement) 
The last stage in the confiscation system is where a confiscation order is 
recovered by a Magistrate Court. Section 9 (1) of the Act shows that where 
the Crown Court orders the defendant to pay any amount under section 2 
of this Act, sections 31 (1) to (3C) and 32 (1) and (2) of the PCCA 1973 shall 
have effect as if it were a fine imposed on him by the Crown Court. There 
are two methods by which a confiscation order may be enforced. The first 
is by treating such an order as a fine, as (s. 9) of the DTA provides: a 
defendant who is tempted not to pay the fine faces the prospect of a 
consecutive sentence of imprisonment in default. The second method is 
by the appointment of a 'receiver' who will, if necessary, seize, realise and 
manage the defendant's realisable property. The Criminal justice Act 
(CJA) 1993, however, introduced a new concept into section 6 of the DTOA 
1986 which is now under section 9 (5) of the DTA. This provides that 
where the defendant serves a term of imprisonment or detention in 
default of paying any amount under the order, serving that term does not 
prevent the confiscation order from continuing to have effect. The section 
states: 
'Where the defendant serves a term of imprisonment or detention in 
default of paying any amount due under a confiscation order, his 
serving that term does not prevent the confiscation order from 
continuing to have effect, so far as any other method of enforcement 
is concern'. (s. 9 (5), DTA 1994). 
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By virtue of the implementation of section 32 (1) of the Powers of 
Criminal Courts Act 1973, the responsibility for the enforcement of 
confiscation order falls upon a different court, the Magistrate's Court. 
Where the Crown Court makes a confiscation order, it should, as part of 
that order, direct that payment be made to the Clerk to the justices of a 
stated Magistrate's Court. It is important that the enforcing Magistrate's 
Court be notified quickly of its duty so as to prevent any delay in the 
enforcement process. This court is at liberty to explore each and every 
option that would be available to it to secure the payment of the 
confiscation order. The new provisions in the DTA 1994, as Levi & 
Osofsky (1995) indicate are designed to ensure that the Magistrate's Courts 
should consider or try all measures to enforce payment before issuing a 
warrant of commitment. Fortson (1992) indicates that the purpose of the 
DTOA is that a person convicted of a drug trafficking offence should be 
deprived of the proceeds to the extent that they were realisable. 
Committing a defendant to prison by way of a warrant of commitment is a 
course of last resort (p. 252). 
Section 139 of the Magistrate's Court Act 1980, directs that priority in 
payment be given to certain types of financial order. Confiscation orders, 
which that section does not refer to, are to be afforded priority in payment 
over all other punitive financial orders (s. 2 (5) of the DTA 1994). Mitchell 
and others in their book on Confiscation (1992), stated that the reasons for 
that is that where the Crown Court has determined the defendant's 
benefit from his criminality and proceeds to assess his realisable property, 
the court must deduct any sum due in respect of any financial order made 
in the past upon the conviction of the defendant, i. e. any fine or order for 
costs or compensation made upon conviction for a criminal offence (DTA, 
s. 6 (4) (a)). Furthermore, the Crown Court may consider confiscation 
before sentence and thus must satisfy itself that confiscation is appropriate 
and can be paid before considering the imposition of any other financial 
order in addition to a confiscation order. Whilst it cannot take into 
account the existence of the confiscation order in determining the severity 
of such penalty, it will undoubtedly have in the back of its mind the 
defendant's ability to pay both orders. (p. 140) 
As has been mentioned above, one of the most important aspects of 
legislation is that confiscation orders operate in personam and not in rein 
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warrants, so that a defendant may be permitted the choice of which of his 
resources he shall resort to in order to effect payment and time in which 
to exercise that choice. This means that once the Crown Court sets the 
amount of the confiscation order the defendant is faced with a choice. 
Nothing in the order dictates what property must be used to satisfy the 
order. Instead, it is up to the defendant to make this determination (Levi 
& Osofsky, p. 24). 
3.2.1.3.1. Treating the Confiscation Order as a Fine (Magistrate's . Court) 
Section 9 (1) of the DTA clearly sets out the general principles to be 
applied: 
'Where the Crown Court orders the defendant to pay any amount 
under section 2 of this Act, sections 31 (1) to (3C) and 32(1) and (2) of 
the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (powers of the Crown Court 
in relation to fines and enforcement of Crown Court fines) shall have 
effect as if that amount were a fine imposed on him by the Crown 
Court'. 
Table (3.1) indicates how the legislator has measured the size of the 
penalties to be imposed in default to reflect the amount of the confiscation 
order. 
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Table (3.1) Size of penalties imposed upon defaulters. 
Amount Sentence 
Not exceeding £50 5 days 
Exceeding £50 but not exceeding £100 7 days 
Exceeding £ 100 but not exceeding £400 14 days 
Exceeding ;E 400 but not exceeding £ 1000 30 days 
Exceeding £ 1000 but not exceeding £ 2000 45 days 
Exceeding ;C 2000 but not exceeding £ 5000 3 months 
Exceeding ;C 5000 but not exceeding £ 10 000 6 months 
Exceeding ;E 10 000 but not exceeding f 20 000 12 months 
Exceeding £ 20 000 but not exceeding 50 000 18 months 
Exceeding £ 50 000 but not exceeding ;E 100 000 2 years 
Exceeding £ 100 000 but not exceeding £250 000 3 years 
Exceeding ;C 250 000 but not exceeding ;E 1m 5 years 
Exceeding £ 1m 10 years 
Source: PCCA 1973, s. 31. 
It is quite apparent from the above table that the size of the default 
sentence is based upon the amount of the confiscation order. Hinton et al 
(1992) clarified that when DTOA 1986, first has come into force, the default 
sentences of (s. 31) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act (PCCA) 1973 were 
thought to be an inadequate reflection of the Parliament's attitude toward 
those who deal in drugs for profit (p. 132). Consequently, section 6 (1) (b) 
was included in the DTOA 1986 raising the default sentences to be 
imposed beyond that which could be set in s. 31 of the PCCA, when a drug 
trafficker failed to satisfy a confiscation order. Afterwards the provision in 
DTOA altered s. 31 of the PCCA, but it seems that the draftsman of the Act 
was satisfied. This table appears only in the PCCA and is not included in 
the consolidated DTA 1994. 
3.2.1.3.2. Appointment and Powers of a Receiver 
In brief, once a confiscation order has been made which is not subject to 
appeal and which has not been satisfied, the High Court or a County Court 
are empowered that they may, on the application of the prosecutor, 
appoint a receiver to realise any realisable property (s. 29 - s. 31). The 
material powers conferred on a receiver are set out in section 29 (see 
Appendix III). 
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Subsection (5) provides that if the realisable property considered as illegal 
gains and drug-related proceeds are not available or their value is less 
than the amount of the confiscation order then the appointed receiver is 
empowered to realise any other property in 'such a manner as the court 
direct'. This means that it could also cover or realise any other legally 
obtained property. Moreover, subsection (8) of this section provides that a 
reasonable opportunity must be given for persons holding any interest in 
the property to make representations to the court. Fortson (1992) 
concludes by saying that the principal object of the provisions under this 
section is to satisfy the confiscation order notwithstanding any obligation 
which the defendant or the recipient may have which conflicts with the 
satisfaction of the order (p. 255). 
3.2.1.3.3. The Application of Proceeds of Realisation 
The application of proceeds of realisation and other sums is explained in 
section 30 of the DTA. Subsections (2) and (6) provide that before satisfying 
the confiscation order by depositing the payment into the Treasury the 
court shall pay the expenses of an insolvency practitioner or the receiver's 
remuneration and expenses. 
Set out below is a chart of the proceedings relevant to this thesis which is 
aimed at clarifying some of the complex procedures: 
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Figure (3.1) shows the steps and powers granted to the police and court to trace, seize and 
confiscate the proceeds as provided under the DTA 1994. 
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3.2.2. Safeguards and Compensation 
The DTA stipulates certain conditions and restrictions for the 
enforcement of some of its powers which are vested in the law 
enforcement agencies. It also provides some protections and 
compensations for the defendants and third parties who may suffer 
substantial loss from a serious default on part of the prosecution. 
The application for a production order, for example, provides that there 
are some important conditions needing to be satisfied. The judge may 
make such an order only if he is satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds to do so (see section 55(4), Appendix III). 
Section 2 of the Act also provides an important condition for the 
imposition of a confiscation order. The section provides that where a 
defendant appears before the Crown Court to be sentenced in respect of 
one or more drug trafficking offences, he must not previously have been 
sentenced or otherwise dealt with in respect of his conviction for the 
offence or, as the case may be, any of the offences concerned. This is to 
avoid double jeopardy, and notice too that judges must be aware of 
previous sentences. 
Section 4 (4) of the DTA provide that the court shall not make any of the 
required assumptions in relation to any particular property or expenditure 
if such an assumption is shown to be incorrect or the court is satisfied that 
there would be a serious risk of injustice in the defendant's case if the 
assumption were to be made. 
Section 4 (6) also provides that for the purpose of assessing the value of 
the defendant's proceeds of drug trafficking, in a case where a confiscation 
order has previously been made against him, the court shall leave out of 
account any of his proceeds of drug trafficking that are shown to the court 
to have been taken into account in determining the amount to be 
recovered under that order. This provision is to protect the defendant 
from being ordered to find a sum twice over for one benefit, and thereby 
not having the available proceeds. 
Section 18 of the DTA 1994 provides that if the defendant is acquitted, or 
his conviction quashed on appeal, or he is subsequently pardoned, the 
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High Court may order compensation to be paid to the defendant, if there 
has been some serious default on the part of the prosecution and the 
defendant has suffered substantial loss. 
With regard to the innocent third party, section 31 (4) of the Act provides 
that the court can allow him or her to retain or recover the value of any 
property held by him or her. This means, he or she is protected. However, 
he or she may find that the confiscation order encompasses their property. 
A third party may come under suspension of criminal involvement with 
the defendant, e. g. though some form of association. If so, he or she may 
have to prove his or her innocence and the innocent entitlement to the 
property, or to prove his or her right to the return of money when the 
property is confiscated and sold, if at some stage it has passed through the 
hands of the defendant. So the third party may expect some anxious times 
(Samuels. A, 1986). The law enforcement agencies (courts and police) 
expect that the third party should keep for instance, all the ownership 
records for at least six years. 
The new provision of section 3 (3) of DTA 1994 provides that unless it is 
satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, the court shall not 
specify a period of postponement under this section which exceeds six 
months beginning with the date of conviction. If there is an appeal, 
subsection (6) provides that unless the court is satisfied that there are 
exceptional circumstances, any postponement or extension shall not 
exceed the period ending three months after the date on which the appeal 
is determined or otherwise disposed of. 
Lastly, the defendant is allowed also to apply for the variation or discharge 
of the production order, the restraint order and even the confiscation 
order (ss. 55,26,21). 
3.2.3. Complementary Provisions 
The above examination presents the most distinctive elements of the 
confiscation proceedings in the British system related to drug trafficking 
offences. The DTA 1994 and in particular the Powers of Criminal Courts 
Act (1973) provides other important complementary provisions which 
support confiscation proceedings, including powers of variation of the 
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order, power to discharge the order, provision for defaulters (instalments 
process), interest on sums unpaid, provisions about revising the 
assessments of the realisable property, powers where the defendant- has 
absconded or died, and some other points that are related to confiscation 
proceedings in a drug trafficking offence. Moreover, the Act has defined 
five new offences in connection with proceeds of drug trafficking. These 
are; concealing or transferring the proceeds; assisting another person to 
retain the benefit of the drug trafficking; acquisition and possession or use 
of the proceeds; failing to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money 
laundering; and lastly the offence of tipping-off the defendant. Most of 
these provisions are important and support law enforcement agencies, 
and even the defence in some cases where enforcement is faced with 
difficult developments. Some of these provisions will be discussed later 
when examining the debates on the system, including the perceptions of 
some of the practitioners. 
It must be mentioned that confiscation legislation applies to England and 
Wales only. It does not apply to Scotland and Northern Ireland but orders 
made in England or Wales may be registered in Scotland. The 
International Criminal Policy Division of Home Office indicated that 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own confiscation legislation 
(Home Office, 1994). 
3.2.4. Practical Difficulties and Domains of Disputes 
The law is extremely complex in respect to the actual making of an 
order and its enforcement. It is likely that this will result in many 
Court of Appeal cases dealing with the interpretation of these 
provisions' (Bazell, 1989, p. 352). 
'The DTOA 1986 in its original form cannot be considered to be a 
particularly successful piece of legislation. It was burdened by many 
difficult technicalities and unnecessary complications, and failed to 
provide an adequate procedural structure for decision-making 
(Thomas, A. 1993, p. 93). 
The practical implementation of confiscation provisions according to their 
context under the DTOA 1986 at the preliminary period (which extend 
from the date of commencement on the 1 January 1987 up to 1993) has 
exposed a number of difficulties, whether experienced by the law 
enforcement agencies or by some academics. The Home Office Working 
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Group on Confiscation44 (1991) acknowledged that the provisions under 
the DTOA were innovatory and their practical operation has exposed a 
number of difficulties (p. 1). Accordingly, the recommendations listed in 
the Report of the Home Affairs Committee on Drugs Trafficking and 
related Serious Crime (1989)45 and the Report of the Home Office 
Working Group on Confiscation (1991), which were originally extracted 
from several important studies by some of those interested practitioners 
and academics46, had led to some new amendments provided under 
subsequent legislation (Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 
1990 and CJA 1993). 
Most of the important recommendations, later changed not only the rules 
of law enforcement but the perspectives and the theory of the system. 
These did not find their way into the system until the actual date of 
enactment (CJ(IC)A 1990 and CJA 1993). These new provisions were 
introduced by means of the DTA 1994 which came into force on 3 February 
1995. It took more than eight years for most of the new provisions to be 
operationalised. Presumably if the recommendations were suggested by 
those involved who experienced defects and unnecessary complications to 
the system and the delays in putting these suggestions and 
recommendations into force is the government responsibility, then the 
subsequent contradictions and conflicts in the enforcement of the system 
are understood. 
Before listing the areas of disputes, it has been noticed that the legislation 
is written in language which seems to be designed to obscure more than to 
clarify. An example of this is section 59 (2) which provides: 
The power to make an order under subsection (1) above is exercisable 
if: (a) the powers conferred on the court by sections 26 (1) and 27 (1) 
of this Act are exercisable by virtue of subsection (1) of section 25 of 
this Act, or (b) those powers are exercisable by virtue of subsection 
(3) of that section and the court has made a restraint or charging 
order which has not been discharged; but where the power to make 
an order under subsection (1) above is exercisable by virtue only of 
44Report on the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, May 1991. The Home Office convened 
the first meeting of the Working Group in May 1990, attended by representatives of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers, the Crown Prosecution Service, HM Customs and 
Excise and the National Drugs Intelligence Unit. 
45rhe seventh Report of Session 1988-89 on Drug Trafficking and Related Serious Crime 
(HC 370) 
46Some of these valuable writings are, for example, David Feldman (1988), Michael 
Zander (1989), Mitchell et al (1992), Thomas. A (1993), and Sallon et at (1993). 
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paragraph (b) above, subsection (4) of section 25 of this Act shall 
apply for the purposes of this section as it applies for the purposes 
of section 26 and 27 of this Act'. 
In addition, this part of the section examines the measures which are 
central to the disputes about the British confiscation legislation provided 
under the consolidated DTA 1994. They will be discussed according to 
their status and according to the three stages of proceedings (pre-trial, the 
trial, and post-trial proceedings). 
3.2.4.1. Pre-trial Measures 
The impacts of the four main provisions have been described as 
extraordinary wide and draconian. These provisions are provided under 
Part I (s. 25 to s. 28) and Part IV (s. 55 to s. 59) of the DTA 1994. The latter 
Part embraces two main powers which are vested in the law enforcement 
agencies: a production order under section 55 (order to make material 
available) and a warrant order (authority for search). The former Part 
include restraint orders and charging orders (s. 26 and s. 27). In addition to 
what has been stated in the review of the relevant literature (Chapter 
Two) concerning these procedures, the following selected statements 
would describe the perceptions of those interesting in the system in regard 
to the nature, extent, and the defects of the system. 
3.2.4.1.1. Production and Warrant Orders 
Mitchell et al (1992) indicate that the powers available to investigators into 
drug trafficking are extensive (p. 11). For example, section 55 (1) of the 
DTA 1994 states that 'a constable may for the purpose of an investigation 
into drug trafficking apply to a Circuit judge for a production order'47. 
The term 'for the purpose of an investigation into drug trafficking' is 
deliberately wide (Ibid., p. 11). It permits the judge to exercise his powers at 
every stage of a drug trafficking enquiry so that the investigator can use 
production orders: (a) as an intelligence-gathering tool, (b) to identify area 
of evidence for a prosecution, (c) to gather evidence for contempt hearings 
for breach of High Court orders, and (d) for the financial investigation into 
47The section exactly provides that 'A constable may for the purpose of an investigation 
into drug trafficking, apply to a Circuit Judge for an order under subsection (2) of this section 
in relation to particular material or material of a particular description'. 
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the benefit derived by a defendant from drug trafficking. This means that 
the investigators can apply for such an order at any time if it is for the 
purpose of an investigation into drug trafficking. 
Though there are certain conditions needed to be satisfied, these 
important matters are not declared in the legislation, presumably because 
they may provoke unnecessary disputes among practitioners about the 
actual intention of the legislature. Moreover, the legislation does not 
provide guidelines on the procedure to be adopted for the making, 
variation and discharge of the production orders. Mitchell et at pointed 
out that guidelines were given by Stuart-Smith L. J. (1989) who stated 
'It is unfortunate that no rules have yet been made under paragraph 
4 (1) of the Schedule (Schedule 7 of the POT (TP) A 1989) in their 
absence we have been asked to give guidance to those involved in 
such applications as these. We do so, but we must emphasise that 
these are not intended to be hard and fast rules, since much will 
depend upon the judge's discretion as to how information should be 
disclosed and at what stage' (p. 12). 
'Material' is not defined in the 1994 Act, but it seems to cover any material 
whatever (Feldman, 1988, p. 38). The Act provides that the applicant must 
satisfy the judge that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the 
material does not consist of items subject to legal privilege (s. 55 (4) (b) (ii)). 
Feldman pointed out that there is no lawful procedure in English law by 
which people can be coerced into producing or giving access to privileged 
items. But s. 10 (2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 
provides that the privilege does not apply if material is held with the 
intention of furthering a criminal purpose. This means that there is 
nothing to prevent access to any kind of drug trafficking related material. 
It seems too that injudicious use of the material itself is to be expected, i. e. 
the power to enter and search the premises to obtain access to the material 
(s. 55 (5) and s. 56 (1) (2)) by police or other law enforcement agencies even 
where the Act would provide a compensation to be awarded to the victim 
or the one who had been harmed. It may, if it happened, affect deeply the 
relationship, trust and creditability of the public in the police. This could 
lead the police to lose the most important source of information and 
support. It also could weaken or destroy respect from the financial 
institutions and law firms, where they are considered to be the main 
source for disclosures of suspicious transactions. This means not only that 
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the persons or institutions who are in possession of the material are 
affected by such powers, but also the law enforcement agencies themselves 
are also at risk of losing their credibility. In this matter, one can see why 
these procedures were described as far-reaching both in their potential 
intrusion upon the rights of individuals and the overt intrusion into the 
confidentiality of the adviser/ client relationship even if such 
confidentiality is not protected by legal privilege (Ibid., p. 15). 
Section 56 of DTA provides that a constable may, for the purpose of an 
investigation apply to a Circuit Judge for a warrant under this section in 
relation to specified premises. This would empower a constable to enter 
and search the premises where the occupiers are not necessarily suspected 
of any crime. The conditions referred to in section 56 provide that there 
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a specified person has carried 
on or has benefited from drug trafficking (s. 56 (3) (a)), but it is not 
necessarily that the specified person is the occupier of the premises. 
Goodsir (1993) indicates that in one instance, a solicitor's office was 
searched for documents relating to property transactions undertaken on 
behalf of a suspected trafficker (p. 140). 
There are other dimensions too. Assume a solicitor for instance, comes 
into conflict with section 50 of the DTA 1994 (i. e. assisting another person 
to retain the benefit of drug trafficking) when he is acting for a client in a 
transaction involving substantial sums of money and becomes suspicious 
about the source of the funds. If he wishes to allay his fears he must 
question the client but this could bring him in breach of section 58 (offence 
of prejudicing investigation). If his suspicion as a result of section 55 
(orders to make material available), he will not be able to continue to act 
for his client because this could result in him being prosecuted under 
section 50. However, simply ceasing to act without giving a reason to the 
client may not provide sufficient protection unless he also discloses his 
suspicions to the police. Burton (1989) pointed out that even if the police 
give their consent for the solicitor to continue to act, he must consider 
carefully whether or not he can continue to do so because, in effect, he has 
become an agent of the police. On the other side, the firm's professional 
reputation would also suffer if it became known that the material 
belonging to their clients had been handed over. 
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3.2.4.1.2. Restraint and Charging Orders 
It seems that one of the reasons the DTOA 1986 is called 'innovatory' is 
that it borrowed a number of powers already existing in the civil law and 
applied them for the first time to the criminal law. Most of the disputes 
about the restraining system provided under this legislation centre 
around four main issues. The first is related to the extent of the order. 
Section 26 (1) of the DTA 1994, provides that the High Court may by order 
prohibit any person from dealing with any realisable property, subject to 
such conditions and exceptions as may be specified in the order. 
Subsection (2) (a) provides that a restraint order may apply to all realisable 
property held by a specified person, whether the property is described in 
the order or not. The system provides that even legitimate property will 
be subject to a restraint order, unlike that of the restraint order concerned 
with other types of offences where the totality of the defendant's realisable 
property will not need to be restrained to enable payment of any 
confiscation order which may be made (see CJA 1988). Or in a case where 
the police may be allowed to search for and seize material held by parties 
not suspected of any offence; or in a case where a restraint order covers 
properties of more value than actual proceeds of the offence. 
In this regard, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Home Office 
then Mr. David Mellor in 18/2/86 (Parliamentary debate, Col. 197,198) 
stated that; 
'... it is a serious infringement of individual rights that property 
should be so restrained. This power cannot be given lightly because 
it is an interference with the liberty of the subject. Because this is a 
serious matter, we have given the power to a High Court judge, not 
to lesser judges. It will require the judge to take a balanced view as 
to whether it would be proper to make the order. Plainly, the only 
basis on which he can determine that it would be proper is if he is 
satisfied, on the merits, that there is evidence that the individual 
concerned has been involved in drug trafficking and has benefited 
from it'. 
Levi & Osofsky (1995) indicate that the British legislature has deliberately 
broadened the extent of the restraint order in an attempt to ensure 
ultimate satisfaction for the confiscation order (p. 19). But is this 
permissible and fair at the expense of the innocent parties? Edward D. Re 
(1951) pointed out that the Magna Carta, in England and in countries 
whose jurisprudence is based upon the heritage of the common law, the 
concept of due process is firmly embedded in municipal law to tolerate 
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any appropriation of private property without adequate compensation. 
This kind of application needs to be carefully examined to see whether it is 
consistent with the main objectives and principles of a confiscation 
system. 
The second issue is about the Central Confiscation Branch (CCB). To 
obtain a restraint or charging order, a prosecutor is suppose to file an ex 
parte application in the chambers of a High Court judge. In practice, all 
such applications made by the prosecutors are submitted and reviewed by 
the CCB in London, where assigned business is dealt with. To proceed 
with the application the CCB requires a minimum threshold of £10,000. 
This means that if the application for a restraint order to a property with a 
value is less than that the application will be rejected. This issue may lead 
to dissatisfaction and complaints by police who are obliged to deal with the 
CCB. Levi & Osofsky pointed out that this minimum threshold of the CCB 
has prevented them from confiscating the working capital of street-level 
dealers, which they view as an important objective, irrespective of 
whether or not it is financially cost-effective to make and enforce the 
order (p. 10). 
The third issue relates to variations in the restraint order. Restraint orders 
can be varied by any person affected by them. The most common reasons 
for varying the order include allowing the defendant's funds to cover 
'reasonable' legal fees or permitting additional living expenses. This has 
become a source of complaint from the police who believe that the benefit 
from crime is often dissipated in this process. This means that some police 
question the appropriateness of allowing the defendant or his family to 
take out monies that should go to central funds. 
The last issue is related to disclosure order. Restraint orders are normally 
coupled with such orders as a means of identifying and ascertaining the 
whereabouts and value of assets affected by the restraint order. Nothing is 
expressly stated in the DTA 1994 which empowers the High Court to 
compel a defendant to swear on affidavit disclosing the nature, 
whereabouts and value of assets held by persons affected by the restraint 
order. However, section 49 of the DTA provides that a person is guilty of 
an offence if he conceals or disguises any property or converts or transfers 
that property, or removes it from the jurisdiction, being the property 
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which in whole or in part represents the proceeds of drug trafficking for 
the purpose of avoiding, niter alia, the making or enforcement of a 
confiscation order. The legislature was aware of the common law rule 
against self-incrimination which provides that no man shall be compelled 
to comply with an order which might incriminate him. So an appropriate 
condition was provided at section 11 (11). The subsection provides that 
'No acceptance by the defendant under this section that any 
payment or other reward was received by him in connection with 
drug trafficking carried on by him or another person shall be 
admissible in evidence in any proceedings for an offence'. 
In addition to restraint orders, the High Court is also empowered to grant 
a charging order. This order reveals another extraordinary aspect of the 
system where it applies to interests in a specified property. This property 
may include any beneficial interest that the defendant owns in land, 
securities, stocks, and units of any unit trust. The order secures the 
Crown's potential interest in the property and will be discharged when the 
payment which is secured by the charge is paid into court. 
Broadly speaking, these two orders serve to hold in abeyance all dealings 
with those assets in which the defendant holds an interest pending 
resolution of the criminal charges against him. Once issued, these orders 
may remain in effect until the defendant is acquitted or a confiscation 
order is made and satisfied. The jeopardy lies because these two orders can 
be issued long before criminal conviction. Under the DTA, the High Court 
may issue them as soon as a defendant is arrested for a crime covered by 
the confiscation laws, or even earlier when the Crown is able to establish 
that a charge will be forthcoming 'within a reasonable time'. The 
legislation here does not explain what 'within a reasonable time' means, 
or what is the maximum time which is expected for establishing a charge 
against a person whose property is restrained or who is restrained from 
dealing with his own property and businesses. These kind of procedures 
would lead to an inquiry about the attitude of human right societies. It 
seems that accepting such a situation as a course of action which would be 
vested in such cases (drug trafficking offences) or taking things for granted 
is not a sufficient answer. Providing that 'the court shall discharge the 
restraint order if proceedings in respect of the offence are not instituted 
within such time as the court considers reasonable' (s. 25 (5)) will irritate 
the proponents of human rights and offend individual freedoms. 
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3.2.4.2. Confiscation Proceedings in Trial 
3.2.4.2.1. The Burden of Proof (the erosion of the right to silence) 
Section 11 (5) of the DTA 1994 provides that the court may require the 
defendant to indicate to it, within such a period as it may direct, the extent 
to which he accepts the allegations of prosecution in regard to the value of 
his proceeds of drug trafficking and to give particulars of any matters on 
which he proposes to rely in case he does not accept any of the 
prosecutor's allegations. This section clearly provides that the defendant is 
obliged to co-operate and the right of silence does not protect him in any 
confiscation proceedings. 
The 'right to silence' has continued to be a matter of some controversy, 
not least in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Levi & Osofsky, 1995, p. 55). Andrew Nicol and Clive Soley (Hodgson 
Committee, 1984) rejected such provision which was originally 
recommended by the majority of the Hodgson Committee on the basis 
that reversal of burden of proof would contravene the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Article 6 (2) of the Convention states that 
'Everyone charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law'. 
The common law rule against self-incrimination, as previously 
mentioned, clearly provides that no one shall be compelled to comply 
with an order which might incriminate him. The point here is that 
abolishing the right to silence in spite of all the justifications provided by 
the government, continues to be a matter of controversy within law 
enforcement agencies. There are some courts or judges, for example, as 
indicated by DI David Hickman (pers. communication, West Midlands 
Police) who would rather not breach the common law rules regarding 
this. This reveals that some courts suspect that the new provision 
contradicts common law rules. Following common rules by some courts is 
more safe than adopting new and unprecedented provisions. Human 
rights, individual freedoms and liberty are the main underpinning 
reasons for the reluctance or hesitation of judges to compel defendants to 
disclose any information. Some judges still believe that it is the function 
of the prosecution to find evidence to support allegations against the 
defendant. Goodsir (1993) indicated that was so in 1988 when the 
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government proposed to abolish the right to silence. It was said that major 
criminals were getting away with crimes because they knew how to 
'operate the system'. By keeping quiet, and refusing to answer questions, 
detainees were able to avoid self-incrimination. A committee set up with 
the responsibility of coming up with practical proposals for the abolition 
of the right of silence failed to report publicly (p. 136). This suggests that 
there are some practitioners who still do not agree with the new provision 
in the DTA 1994 (s. (11) (5)). 
Fortson (1992) has examined several confiscation cases during 1990 and 
199148 and found out that none of the cases has made clear the standard of 
proof which the defendant must discharge, but it is plain that the standard 
is the civil standard. He also observed that not one authority has suggested 
a contrary proposition. He concluded by saying that it is not clear whether 
the prosecution or the defendant has the burden of proof concerning the 
correct value of the property. He thinks that if the defendant contends that 
the amount that might be realised under s. 4 (3) of the DTOA 1986 is less 
than the value of property alleged by the prosecution, then it seems that it 
is for the defendant to prove the lower valuation (p. 235). 
3.2.4.2.2. The Standard of Proof 
Since the enactment of the DTOA 1986 the courts were confused about the 
standard of the proof. Different and contradicted decisions were made. 
Section 2 (8) of the DTA 1994 came afterwards (after more than seven 
years), to deal with these contradicting arguments and the decisions which 
had emerged from ambiguous provisions regarding the standard of proof. 
This section makes it clear that the standard of proof required to 
determine any question arising under the Act shall be applicable in civil 
proceedings, which is or the 'balance of probabilities'. This means that the 
courts are no more obliged to present evidence which is beyond 
reasonable doubt about the amount of benefits of drug trafficking offence 
(s). 
Prior to the enactment of section 2 of the DTA 1994, and since the 
commencement date of the DTOA 1986, the situation was ambiguous. 
48I11semann 1990,12 Cr. App. R. (S. ) 398; Comisky 1990,12 Cr. App. R. (S. ) 562; and Carroll 
1991, Crim. L. R. 720. 
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This caused trouble to the courts up and down the country 
notwithstanding the warnings and the related debates accompanying the 
examination of the 1986 Act in the two Houses of Parliament and in some 
academic circles. The DTOA 1986 did not define the standard of proof. 
Differences, therefore, have occurred in the interpretation of the related 
provisions in the DTOA, particularly in those (the assumptions, the 
burden of proof, and the standard of proof) in confiscation proceedings. 
The legislative context has become very complex, affecting its purpose and 
the final outcome. In the last six years since the date of the 
commencement of the DTOA 1986 up to the day just before the 
commencement date of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 there have been 
extensive demands for more effective governmental intervention. It 
appears that this has been a major impetus to establish the final form of 
section 2 (8) of the DTA. 
It seems that the government never anticipated that such a problem may 
arise. The government was satisfied with the interpretation of some 
courts which believed that the provisions of the DTOA 1986 are 
constituting a punitive law which requires a criminal standard of proof. 
On the other hand, there were some others who adopted the civil 
standards for the purpose of the Act's provisions. This meant that 
defendants held the burden of proof. This was in contrast to the criminal 
standards which would require the prosecutions to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt. Raffan (1985) considered that the reverse of the standard 
is 'not a novel concept', for the reason that such fundamental change in 
the criminal justice system already exists in taxation matters 
(Parliamentary Debates, 1987). Lord Denning also asserted that it is already 
established in English law (Ibid. ). 
In the Court of Appeal in Dickens (1990), the Court held that the DTOA 
and confiscation orders made thereunder were punitive. It was decided 
then that the amount of a defendant's benefit, must be proven by the 
Crown to a criminal standard (i. e. beyond reasonable doubt). A similar 
decision was also given in R .v Chapman (1991) . In this case the Court of 
Appeal was faced with two equally valid methods of valuing a gift caught 
up by the DTOA 1986. One method favoured the defendant and would 
result in the reduction of the value ascribed to his realisable property, 
which in turn would result in a proportionate reduction of the 
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confiscation order made against him. The sentencer decided that as the 
DTOA was a 'penal statute'; it must be construed in favour of the 
defendant wherever ambiguity arose. Accordingly, the method of valuing 
a gift most favourable to the defendant was to be preferred. 
The guideline judgement of Lord Lane in Rv Dickens. ([1990] 2 WLR 
1384), may explain the rationale underpinning the adoption of the 
criminal standard of proof (proof beyond reasonable doubt). There the 
Lord Chief Justice said of the DTOA: 
The grounds of appeal advanced... raise a number of points under 
the Act which we understand have caused trouble to courts up and 
down the country and it may be of assistance if we try to deal with 
the structure and import of the Act in general before turning to the 
specific points which arise in this appeal'. 
Accordingly, the prosecution has the task of proving both the fact that the 
defendant has benefited from drug trafficking, and the amount of such 
benefit. It seems that the context of the Act and the nature of the penalties 
which are likely to be imposed, make it clear that the standard of proof 
required is - criminal standard, i. e. proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
Consequently, the Court of Appeal has in other cases, referred to the case 
of Dickens, considering themselves bound by the decision of Lord Lane. 
The Home Office responded at a very late stage by saying that this was not 
the original intention behind the legislation (Home Office, 1994). A spate 
of cases afterwards, Rv Thomas (1992), Rv Redboitrne (1992) and Rv 
Atkinson (1992) provide reason to challenge the wisdom of the decision in 
Dickens. In stark contrast to the Dickens decision lies the judgement of 
Leggatt L. J. in the case of Thomas there, his Lordship decided that 
compliance with an order requiring the defendant to disclose the full 
extent of his realisable property did not amount to self-incrimination (The 
Times, 19 May, 1992). The only adverse effect of the disclosure may be the 
making of a confiscation order greater in amount than would have been 
made had not the defendant disclosed. Leggatt L. J. said 'it is not self- 
incrimination because a person does not by making reparation incur 
punishment. ' In addition to that, Parker L. J. considered s. 3 of the DTOA 
to reveal; 
'a very clear Parliamentary intent, first, that a person convicted of a 
drug trafficking offence, in addition to being punished for that 
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offence, should be, not punished for other offences of a like nature, 
but deprived of the benefits of all his drug trafficking'. 
It is most likely that the Government decided not to refer to the civil 
proceedings of the Act and instead moved to the criminal proceedings for 
drug trafficking offence. The question here is not only whether it is right 
or wrong about which standards of proof to choose, but why the 
government and even the legislative authorities decided not to define in a 
clear statement a particular standard of proof, and why it let the courts 
enter in a controversial situation without any formal intervention. 
Finally, the question that is worth addressing is who is responsible for the 
many confiscation orders which were quashed or repealed due to the 
ambiguity that has led to the emergence of different understandings? 
3.2.4.2.3. The Value-based System 
Another distinctive feature of this legislation which is worth examining is 
the value-based aspect of the system. The confiscation order, generally 
speaking, is ultimately treated like a fine for enforcement purposes. 
Regardless of how reasonable underpinning justifications are, this 
approach does not reflect the original theory. The main concept of 
'confiscation' was to deprive the owner of the tainted property and the 
proceeds is defined for example, by the Hodgson's report (1984). Kennedy 
Talbot, a Principal Crown Prosecutor, at the Central Confiscation Branch, 
in an interview in 1994 (pers. communication, hereinafter (Talbot, 1994)) 
described the confiscation order as a misnomer; it confiscates or deprives 
nothing. 
When the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psycho Tropic Substances 1988 indicated that confiscation was 
of two types, either a property-based system or a value-based system, it 
seems it was obliged or bound to consider the already existing applications 
of a different member's states. The 1986 Act had already been in force in 
Britain when the 1988 United Nations Convention came into existence. 
There were other jurisdictions that rejected the value-based principle for 
confiscation. The French legal system for instance, refer to the value-based 
system as 'confiscation par equivalent'. This principle is rejected by the 
French system because it violates the particularity of the 'legalite', and 
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reverts to the era of judges' dominance and arbitrary discretion, leading to 
a transference from a specific confiscation to a general one49 (Hassan, 
1973). 
Hodgson's Committee (1984) referred to a similar issue. 'Consideration 
should be given to allow the defendant to pay a pecuniary penalty to the 
value of the goods instead of losing his property' (p. 130). Accordingly, 
they recommended that a change in the law would be desirable. The 
Committee gave the defendant another choice, whether to lose the 
property or to pay a sum of money equal to the value of the property. They 
justified this by saying that if a car is forfeited, expenses will be incurred in 
storing and selling it. Its value to the defendant in terms of convenience 
or sentiment maybe greater than what it would fetch at a public auction. 
There is an obvious difference between adding a new option to the 
original legislation and the complete substitution of the original system by 
adopting that option. What happened in British law is that the legislature 
considered this old option as the main mechanism of its confiscation 
system. It has been deemed as 'a revolutionary innovation'. (See Mr. J. 
Enoch Powel's statement, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard 1986). It is very 
difficult for the researcher to be able to assess the efficiency of a value- 
based system and to estimate its capacity to produce the desired results for 
two main reasons: (a) because a major part of the original legislation (the 
DTOA 1986) was amended and new provisions were added to it; (b) the 
time from the passing of the legislation (DTOA 1986 was amended and 
passed again in January 1995) to the completion of the thesis (January, 
1998) seems inadequate to study the full impact of a confiscation system 
provided under the DTA 1994. 
From what has been stated, it is evident that the confiscation system has 
always been encountering certain reservations and criticisms. Sallon and 
Bedingfield (1993), argued that DTOA 1986 was illogically conceived and 
consequently impossible to apply in any coherent or reasonable manner. 
Moreover, they assert that amendments to the Act will only increase the 
confusion. Regarding the value-based system, they indicate that one of its 
negative consequences is the accountancy exercises and relevant 
49General confiscation in the French terms meant to be a confiscation that requires no 
restriction whatsoever. (see Hassan, 1973) 
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speculations. Sallon and Bedingfield point out that entering into an 
accountancy exercises is one thing, but being involved in pure speculation 
is quite another. In the assessments made by the judges (Crown Courts) to 
establish the worth of a convicted drug trafficker's assets, they have to take 
'blind stabs in the dark'. They continue saying that the speculations 
involved in this exercise are openly acknowledged, and it is true that 
courts often say they are giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt. The 
fact remains however, that the defendants are being tried and sentenced to 
years in jail based on guesswork and not on evidence properly tested 
before a jury. 
This argument gives a hint of unfairness about the value-based system. 
The judge in Comiskey [1991], 93 Cr. App. R. 227 (C. A. ), according to the 
Court of Appeal: 
'took the view that the amounts suggested by the Crown for each 
importation were probably reasonable, but in view of the fact that it 
was impossible to be precise... etc. ' 
The application, therefore, of such an approach would demand great 
precision and reasonable grounds to believe that the proposed amount to 
be confiscated reflects the exact value of the tainted property of the 
defendant. This issue, as was mentioned earlier in this chapter, is the 
responsibility of the police to evaluate the property of the defendant and 
propose an equivalent value for the court. This means that the success of 
the system depends mostly upon the work of the police financial 
investigators. It is important then to examine the experience the police 
have in regard to this, whether of their accountancy, and financial 
acumen and comprehensive knowledge of the confiscation provisions 
under the DTA 1994. Restricting or allocating such functions to a non- 
professional agency is another matter which requires to be examined 
thoroughly. 
3.2.4.2.4. The Status of the Confiscation Order in the Sentence 
The status of the confiscation order within the sentence is not clear, not 
even in the new provisions under the DTA 1994. Most of the guides, 
manuals and the pamphlets published by the Home Office since the 
introduction of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, have asserted that 
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one of the most important features of the confiscation legislation is that 
the order is neither additional nor an alternative penalty, but simply a 
means of depriving the offender of the profits illegally acquired through 
drug trafficking (Hinton, 1992). It was also considered not to be part of the 
punitive component of the sentence and does not mitigate or aggravate it 
(c. f. Ashworth (1992) and Mitchell et al., 1992). The latter consideration is 
understandable, but the former assertion would lead only to a more 
undesirable confusion. 
Confiscation orders were classified as ancillary orders (see Criminal Law, 
Evidence and Procedure, Vol. 11 (1,2), para 1282, p. 1094,1990). The most 
recent definition for ancillary order is the one provided by Stone's 
Justice's Manual, (1996): 
'ancillary orders are available to a court when passing sentence. 
These orders do not stand alone, but may be made at the same time as 
other sentences are passed for the same offence. (a). Subject to certain 
exceptions, ancillary orders are deemed to form 12grt of the sentence 
for the purposes of any appeal against sentence to the Crown Court 
'(Para 3-519)50. 
Hinton (1992) said that confiscation is considered independent of the 
sentence and has no bearing upon it. But in the same paragraph he 
mentioned that confiscation forms part of the sentence (p. 1265, Solicitors 
Journal, 11 Dec. 1992) 
Under the 1986 Act, the Crown Court is required to make a confiscation 
order against every offender who appears before it following a conviction 
for a drug trafficking offence. Accordingly, sentencing the drug trafficker 
would be incomplete if a confiscation order is not issued, and this, in turn 
leads us to understand that a confiscation order is not only a part of the 
sentence but an essential part. Without the order being imposed, the court 
will never be able to proceed in sentencing the offenders. This does not 
mean that the order is not independent from the original sanction, but 
50Some other jurisdictions, like for instance the French or the Egyptian systems 
differentiate between three kind of sanctions (Original, Ancillary, and Complementary). 
The ancillary procedure is meant to be the first definite consequence that follows the 
committing of certain serious offences, like for example, the deprivation of the right to 
hold a public job, dismissal from job, invalidation of a contract with any governmental 
departments, depriving the right to be elected in any Council and general assemblies. The 
complementary procedure on the other hand, depends upon its pronouncement by a judge 
whether it is obligatory or discretionary (e. g. confiscation order, popularisation of the 
sentence, sealing off the shop, and deportation for foreigners) (Al-Ghamaz, 1985). 
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unlike what Ashworth and Hinton said above, it is an additional 
procedure in the sentence. Lord Widgery in Rv Johnson (1991) indicated 
that confiscation is part of the sentence because it is an order made by the 
court and an order contingent on there having been a conviction, and 
contingent on the person who has to pay being the person who has been 
convicted. He added that a confiscation order, must therefore be treated as 
part of the sentence and so subject to appeal under the Criminal Appeal 
Act 1968. 
After the Criminal Justice Act 1993 came into force, it introduced some 
important amendments to the DTOA 1986. One of the major amendments 
has been to repeal the mandatory power of the Crown Courts to impose 
the order in every drug trafficking case and to restrict the court's power 
with special conditions: 
'Where a defendant appears before the Crown Court to be sentenced 
in respect of one or more drug trafficking offence, then if the 
prosecutor asks the court to proceed under this provision, or if the 
courtconsiders that, even though the prosecutor has not asked it to 
do so, it is appropriate for it to proceed under this provision. ' (s. 2 
(1), 1994) 
In this case, a confiscation order does not necessarily become a part of the 
original sentence, and it is, therefore, up to the trial judge whether to 
consider it or not. Section 2 (5) (c) DTA 1994 clarified the issue when it 
stated that the court should leave the order out of account in determining 
the appropriate sentence. This does not mean that confiscation is 
completely independent of the sentence, because if a confiscation order is 
considered by the court, the final sentence then stands incomplete without 
the imposition and the completion of the order. However, if the judge did 
not announce the imposition of a confiscation order in the final verdict, 
the sentence will be legally intact. 
The Advisory Council on the Penal System in one of its reports 
'Reparation by the offender' (1970), recommended that reparation must be 
treated as part of the sentencing process. This means that those who 
alleged that confiscation is reparation, the committee asserts that 
reparation must be an integral part of sentencing in criminal proceedings 
(p. 53). The point here is to determine again why the legislature had 
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presented some provisions of the law in such a confusing and ambiguous 
form. 
3.2.4.2.5. Co-operation of the Offender 
In the foreword of the Mitchell et al., 1992, on Confiscation, Derek 
Hodgson, as said earlier, indicates that one of the areas of confiscation 
legislation which has disappointed him and the members of the 
Committee (referring to the Hodgson's Committee) is that the committee 
considered as a matter of course, the co-operation of an offender in tracing 
and seizing of his ill-gotten gains should be reflected as a matter of 
mitigation in any sentence of imprisonment passed upon him. He 
explains that the committee pointed out that this was unobjectionable and 
could be taken into account, in mitigation of penalty, a plea of guilt. He 
asserts that a sentence of imprisonment must be reduced below its 'tariff' 
level in any case where there is a plea of guilty. This applies even when 
the evidence is virtually conclusive of guilt, and has become a settled 
principle in sentencing. The only legal reason for reducing a sentence 
because of a plea of guilt is that it shows an acceptance of guilt and perhaps 
a measure of contrition. A practical reason, Hodgson claims, is no doubt to 
save the court's time by avoiding a trial. However, the provisions in the 
DTOA and even in the subsequent amendments have set their face 
against this philosophy. Section 2 (5) (c) of the DTA 1994 provides very 
clearly that the court shall leave the order out of account in determining 
the appropriate sentence. Hodgson suggests a procedure whereby, when 
the defendant has been sentenced to imprisonment, there would be a 
report back to the sentencing court so that it can consider whether there 
are mitigating circumstances in the conduct of the confiscation 
proceedings which would justify a reduction in the prison sentence. 
Dorn et al (1992) attributed the assertion of the government upon being 
tough with drug traffickers to the excitable anti-trafficker climate of the 
1980s. The Home Office, in the knowledge of the likely recommendation 
of the Hodgson Committee, and in spite of being concerned about 
Britain's growing prison population, nonetheless announced that 
maximum terms of imprisonment for drug trafficking were to be 
increased, and this was subsequently confirmed by the Controlled Drugs 
(Penalties) Act 1985, and supported by the Association of Chief Police 
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Officers' Broome Report (herein after ACPO, 1985). Dorn et al revealed 
that from judgements handed down by the courts in Britain it appears that 
a combination of a guilty plea and giving information on other traffickers 
may result in a reduction in sentence by about one-third. They considered 
the co-operation of the defendants as one of the main basis of sentencing. 
3.2.4.2.6. The Combination of Imprisonment, Confiscation Order, 
and Fine 
The DTA 1994 provides that if the court determines that the defendant has 
so benefited from committing one or more of the offences listed in s. 1, the 
court shall, before sentencing or otherwise dealing with him, determine 
the amount to be recovered by ordering the defendant to pay that amount 
and to take account of the order before imposing any fine, before making 
any order involving any payment, and before making any order under s. 
27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (forfeiture order) or s. 43 of the Powers 
of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (deprivation order) (s. 2 (4) (5) (a) (i) (ii) (iii)). 
However, these provisions include a discretionary power for courts to 
consider imposing a fine, forfeiture, and any other financial orders on top 
of the confiscation order. This means that the priority of the confiscation 
order shall not prevent the court from imposing more than one financial 
order. These provisions support the allegations of most of those who 
wrote about the system and described it as having an extraordinary wide 
and draconian powers. 
Mr. Dewer (MP), for example, has commented on these provisions by 
saying; 
'It seems remarkable that someone who has suffered the major 
penalties... should suddenly find himself the subject of a further 
fine. We are doing that confiscation legislation because it was said 
or at least clearly implied that the Government felt that a fine was 
not really an appropriate way of approaching the problem, if 
someone is going to prison, to add a punitive fine was something of a 
legal nonsense, and it would be much better to go for confiscation and 
forfeiture. The Under-Secretary gave an example in which a person 
accused and finally convicted of drug trafficking was given a 10- 
year sentence. We were to assume that his assets were £200,000 that 
there was consideration of a confiscation order, but that when it 
came to the point, the presumption was rebutted for some portion of 
those assets. Suppose that the drug trafficker could prove that 
£20,000 of shares that he held in company X had come to him 
indirectly from the will of his old aunt Euphemia, whose reputation 
in relation to drug trafficking was beyond reproach. He had 
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therefore clearly rebutted the presumption that all of his assets 
had come from drug trafficking, and the £20.000 could not therefore 
be the subject of a confiscation order. In such circumstances, the man 
would receive a 10- year prison sentence and £180,000 would be the 
subject of a confiscation order. However, his family would have 
saved from the wreck the £20,000, because they had been able to 
establish that it had nothing to do with his history of crime'. 
He also reported that 
The Minister said, I thought rather it would be possible to put such 
people in a catch 22 by using clause 44 and fining them £20,000. 
Although the offender had managed to use that tightly-drawn 
loophole, rebut the presumption and save some money from the 
confiscation order, he could then be told, 'Your endless ingenuity, my 
man, has done you no good. I hereby fine you £20,000". 
Mr. Dewar therefore, concluded by saying 
'If that is the theory on which we are being invited to put this 
power on the statute book, it does not seem to me to do much for the 
legal system or the courts. The more that I have thought about the 
matter, the more I have Lome to the conclusion that it would be 
better to do without it '. 
He then suggested leaving the courts, in cases relating to controlled drugs, 
with the power to impose fines. 
'I accept. and indeed support, the confiscation concept. I do not think 
that they should say, we will get you with a gaol sentence and hit 
you with a confiscation order, and when you manage to avoid some of 
the consequences quite properly by using the legal machinery on the 
statute book, we will finally get you with a catch-all fine provision. 
That seems to be going too far'. (Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 
12/5/87). 
Combining a fine with a confiscation order although technically possible, 
would be highly unusual because the confiscation order is the means by 
which the defendant is deprived of his assets. That sum may be 
sufficiently great to exhaust the defendant's means to pay a fine. 
3.2.4.2.7. The Retrospective Aspect of the Confiscation Proceedings 
Section 4 (3) of DTA provides that the court, for the purpose of this Act, 
shall make the required assumptions. Part of the required assumptions are 
any property appearing to the court: (i) to have been held by the defendant 
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at any time since his conviction, or (ii) to have been transferred to him at 
any time since the beginning of the period of six years ending when the 
proceedings were instituted against him; (iii) was received by him, at the 
earliest time at which he appears to the court to have held it, as a payment 
or reward in connection with drug trafficking carried by him. 
This sweeping statutory assumption provides that all property and money 
passing through the offenders hands over a six-year period is the fruit of 
drug trafficking unless the offender can prove otherwise. 
On 9 February 1995, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
found that there had been a violation by Britain of Article 7 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The ruling casts doubt on the 
validity of the above section. The Strasbourg Court declared that this 
provision is illegal because the powers of British Courts to order 
confiscation of drug profits could not be applied retrospectively to offences 
committed before the DTOA 1986 came into force on 12 January 1987. This 
means that no one convicted of a crime shall suffer a heavier penalty than 
one applicable at the time the offence was committed. Nine judges at the 
Strasbourg Court ruled unanimously that a British court acted unlawfully 
in trying to confiscate £59,000 of Peter Welch's drug profits after he was 
convicted of a plot to smuggle £4 million of cannabis51. Accordingly, 
although the confiscation order has not been enforced because of Welch's 
plea to Strasbourg, Britain was ordered to pay him nearly £14,000 in costs 
for penalising him under a law which had not come into force when his 
crimes were committed (The Times, Feb. 10,1995). 
This ruling, which Britain is forced to accept, angered politicians at 
Westminster. Mr. David Maclean, the Criminal Justice Minister, 
denounced the 'incorrectness and daftness' of the decision. He said: 
The whole Commons shares the indignation of the decision these 
jurists have reached. The decision is not the view of the 
Government. We have robustly defended our corner. We shall reflect 
on it, but we remain convinced that the laws we have are just and 
appropriate for dealing with drug dealers' (Ibid. ). 
51Peter Welch was arrested in November 1986 and charged with drug offences. He was 
found guilty in August 1988 and sentenced to 22 years' imprisonment. The judge made a 
confiscation order for £66,914 under the Act, which came into force in January 1987, two 
months after his arrest. 
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Ben Emmerson, the barrister representing the convicted drug trafficker in 
this case, said that despite warnings before the legislation was introduced 
that it would breach the convention, 'the Home Office has buried its head 
in the sand and built an entire legislative framework that these 
confiscation orders are not criminal penalties. It was that myth that the 
court exposed' (Ibid. ). The DTA 1994 (s. 4 (3) (a)) provided the same old 
provision which had led to the Strasbourg Court. But D. A. Thomas (1993) 
in his study of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 has pointed out that the 
amended provisions of the DTOA 1986 will apply, by virtue of Criminal 
Justice Act 1993, s. 78 (6), only to offences committed after the 
commencement date of the relevant provision. Thomas commented that 
this restriction is thought to be in deference to the principle against 
retrospective criminal legislation. This means that it applies to 
proceedings began after the commencement date, irrespective of the date 
of commission of the offences concerned and continues to authorise the 
confiscation of the proceeds of offences committed long before the Act was 
passed. He then pointed out that the restriction of the application of the 
amended version of the Act seems a recipe for chaos in cases involving 
drug trafficking. 
3.2.4.3. Post-trial Proceedings 
There are two issues concerning the post confiscation proceedings. The 
first concerns the dispersal of some of the most essential proceedings 
among different courts which hold different jurisdictions. It is clear from 
the previous detailed review of confiscation proceedings that the system 
depends upon a variety of different courts. When one considers that 
application for a production order is supposed to be obtained from a circuit 
judge, and an application for a restraint order must be from the High 
Court via the Central Confiscation Branch in London, and an application 
for the appointment of a receiver from either county court52 or High 
Court, and the enforcement or the responsibility for recovering payments 
of the orders is vested to the magistrate courts, and all the remaining 
proceedings suppose to be conducted at the Crown Court which could be 
extended to the Court of Appeal and even to the House of Lords, one may 
wonder whether the British Legislature is truly believing that this is the 
best practice for those intended draconian confiscation powers of the DTA 
52The new provisions in DTA empowered the county courts to appoint a receiver if the 
prosecution apply for it (s. 31 of DTA 1994). 
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1994. It is expected that the field work for this study will reveal the impact 
of such an approach. 
The second issue is relevant to the first. Some governmental resources 
revealed that the confiscation system, and in particular the recovery 
process, was suffering from a significant defect. Information from Home 
Office Committee53 (1989) revealed that there was a shortfall between the 
value of confiscation orders imposed by courts and the amount actually 
recovered. The Committee pointed out that despite the drugs trade giving 
rise to many millions of pounds of profits, where the estimation of 
NDIU54 that there is at least £1,800 million derived from drug trafficking 
in the UK, only £11 million was confiscated as a drug-related profits up to 
May 1989 (paragraph 74). The Home Office Statistical Bulletin provides 
also that the value of (8215) confiscation orders imposed from 1987 to 1995 
is £95.4 million (Table 3.2). 
Table (3.2) The number and the amount of the confiscation orders from 1987 to 1995. 
Year Number of Orders Value 
1987 203 1.2 
1988 539 8.1 
1989 802 7.9 
1990 871 10.1 
1991 1005 5.5 
1992 1002 9.1 
1993 983 9.7 
1994 1248 25.4 
1995 1562 18.4 
Source: Home Office Statistical Bulletin (Nov. 1996, Issue No. 25). 
However, the Home Office Annual Report 1996 show the Government's 
Expenditure Plans 1996-1997 to 1998-99, and provides that between January 
1987 and December 1994, around £77 million was ordered to be confiscated 
from 6,653 drug traffickers in England and Wales. During the same period, 
£25 million was actually realised and paid into the Consolidated Fund. 
This means there was a defect of £52 million, more than double the 
recovered amount. 
53House of Commons, Session 1988-89, Home Affairs Committee, Seventh Report, Drug 
Trafficking and Related Serious Crime, Vol. II. 
54The National Drug Intelligence Unit which were substituted by the current National 
Criminal Intelligence Services (NCIS). 
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The Home Office S3 Division also indicates that between April 1988 and 
March 1993, only £10,756,740.03 was either completed or written off (Table 
3.3)55. 
Table (3.3) The values of the confiscation orders (written off and completed from 
1/4/1988-31/3/1993) 
Year Brought 
forward 
New Orders Write-Offs Completed Carried 
Forward 
1988 - 89 17,444.00 493,323.10 2,746.25 98,124.81 411,940.04 
1989 - 90 4,973,648.06 7,196,045.28 26,489.57 963,547.25 9,462,582.43 
1990 - 91 2,696,941.75 6,809,197.27 206,008.71 1,151,170.69 8,301,706.63 
1991-92 19,042,051.94 5,144,333.37 169,939.83 1,737,598.34 18,072,696.03 
1992 - 93 21,119,384.82 11,909,894.60 1,270,757.41 5,132,357.17 25,804,143.09 
Total 47,849,470.57 31,552,79.. 62 1,673,941.77 9,082,798.26 62,052,968.22 
Source: Home Office, S3 Division. 
Despite the inconsistency and some contradiction among these figures and 
the ambiguities they produce between the values of the confiscation 
orders and the actual amounts recovered or completed, if we compare the 
amount recovered (declared by the Home Office Committee56) which is 
almost £11m with the value of the confiscation orders imposed for the 
same period and declared by the Home Office Statistical Bulletin which is 
£40.7m, we find that the difference is £29.7m. 
While the difference between the previous two sources revealed such a 
defect, information from NCIS shows that the value of the confiscation 
orders actually recovered between 1987 and 1995 is more than £119m57. 
55Levi & Osofsky referred to petty sessional divisions who suggests that from 1987 to May 
1993 only £14,885,415 was either obtained or written off as a result of offenders serving 
imprisonment in default (p. 3). The statistics concerning confiscation orders (properties and 
actual recovered properties is difficult to be obtained due to the wide inconsistency between 
the produced figures from different governmental departments, Parliamentary Committees, 
and NCIS (the National Criminal Intelligence Services). 
56Between 1988 and 1992. 
57`The data of NCIS was provided to the researcher by DS/John Leek, the Strategic & 
Specialist Intelligence Branch, NCIS (the National Criminal Intelligence Services). 
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Table (3.4) The value of confiscation orders recovered between 1987 and 1995 
compared to the values of the restrained properties. 
Year Restraint Confiscation No. of Cases 
1987-92 50,925,210 
1992 16,396,797 16,168,733 2,014 
1993 10,258,839 12,248,133 1,595 
1994 14,288,110 27,043,599 1799 
1995 10,452,401 13,715,843 1756 
Source: The National Criminal Intelligence Services (NCIS) 1996 
The figures need to be clarified, and the defects need to be justified 
especially when the legislation provides that in' assessing the realisable 
property of the defendant, the Crown Court has satisfied itself that the 
defendant can pay the confiscation order. This is also sufficient evidence 
to support the presumption that not only the defendants or the convicted 
drug traffickers are responsible for the cause of this defect. But even the 
provisions of the legislation itself and the enforcement policies and 
strategies of the government and the law enforcement agencies (police, 
prosecution and courts) are widely accountable. Mr. Kennedy Talbot from 
the Central Confiscation Branch (in an interview, 1994) stated: 
'I do not think the Magistrate's Courts are any good at enforcing 
confiscation orders at all, primarily because of the way there are 
funded. They are funded in their success in ensuring a confiscation 
order is complied with. The easiest way to be successful is to take a 
person to prison for default'. 
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A Normal Case Involving The Act's Main 
Provisions 
Bank makes suspicious transaction disclosure to NCIS / Police/ Customs 
0 
Police/ Customs apply for production order to obtain material about 
account (from the High Court) 
0 
After analysis of material, Police/Customs conduct investigation into drug 
trafficking 
0 
Restraint and/ or charging order obtained from High Court to prevent 
dealing in property 
0 
Proceedings instituted (Crown Court) 
V 
Conviction (Crown Court) 
0 
Confiscation order made by the Crown Court (if the prosecutor asks the 
court to do so, or if the court considers that, even though the prosecutor 
has not asked it to do so) 
0 
Confiscation order (if made) enforced by the Magistrate court 
Figure (3.2) Confiscation Proceedings 
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Admin 
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Property 
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not mix 
NO YeS sate or store 
courier 
Force Drug 208 
Squad for Copt of 
Contact DPC immediately for 
enquiry by interview urgent restraint order 
DPC Team 
Figure (3.3) shows the pro-trial confiscation proceedings conducted by West-Midlands police. 
Source: West Midlands Police, Drug Profit Confiscation Unit. 
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3.3. CONFISCATION SYSTEM IN PRACTICE 
In this section the second part of aim 3 is to be realised, i. e. to determine 
the distinctive elements of the British confiscation system with particular 
reference to...... strategies of enforcement and organisation. In order to 
deprive the illegal benefits and proceeds from drug traffickers, Parliament, 
as previously stated, has enabled the police and the courts to carry out this 
function through the powerful provisions contained under the DTA 1994 
accompanied by certain other relevant statutes and regulations. These 
laws and powers alone are not sufficient to create a proficient law 
enforcement system able to implement the provisions of the legislation 
without loopholes or defects. There must be a special operational strategy 
that can transform the provisions of the legislation into enforceable 
practices; that is there must be a strategy capable of co-ordinating the text of 
law and its practical implications with the capabilities of the law 
enforcement agencies. 
Accordingly, this section will : ocus mainly on the operational side of 
confiscation provisions. It examines the government policies and the 
strategies of law enforcement agencies concerning the execution of the 
confiscation system. The section will also review the role of the law 
enforcement agencies which form the operational organisation of the 
confiscation system provided under the DTA 1994. 
3.3 The Strategical and 
Financial Investigat 
Ianisational Development of the 
system 
The present form of organisation and strategies adopted for implementing 
a confiscation system is the result of developments from the April 1984 
National Drugs Conference. A recommendation was made that a working 
party was to be established to make proposals relating to the organisation 
and staffing response of the police service in England and Wales to drug 
related crime and drug abuse. This recommendation was accepted by the 
Association of Chief Police Officers' (ACPO) Crime Committee, and a 
Working Party (under the Chairmanship of Mr. R. F. Broome the Chief 
Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary) was established (ACPO, 
Report of the Working Party, 1985). 
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The final report of the Working Party on Drugs Related Crime 
recommends that police operational strategy should be based on a three 
tiered approach: Divisional, Local, and Regional levels (para. 3.2, p. 20). 
The report published in the latter half of 1985 still forms part of the 
Government's strategy on national response to drug misuse58. In 
November 1985, following consultation with the police, Customs and 
Excise and other related bodies, the government published its proposals 
for tracing and confiscating the proceeds of drug trafficking. Accordingly, 
the ACPO Crime Committee requested that the Broome Committee be 
reconvened to make recommendations relating to the implementation of 
the proposed confiscation system. To help in their deliberations a 'Project 
Team' was established comprising members of the Working Party (of the 
ACPO Crime Committee) and officers from the Home Office Police 
Requirements Support Unit. Their brief was to examine relevant systems 
which were actually operating or being developed in other countries. The 
Project Team felt that the work of the Working Party needed to be 
supplemented by details of actual experiences elsewhere in the world 
(ACPO, Crime Committee Report, 1986, p. 4). 
The Project Team decided, therefore, to examine, in particular, the 
experience of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the US Drugs 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) who were recognised as the most advanced systems in 
this particular area. In Part Two of the Report of the Working Party on the 
Implementation of the DTOA 1986, it indicated that the visit of the Project 
Team to Canada and USA enabled the Working Party to formulate 
definite recommendations. The Report presented thirty 
recommendations. It revealed how the Team admired the American DEA 
and the Canadian systems. It also stated that in the DEA, the tasks of 
investigating a suspect to identify assets and their subsequent forfeiture is 
combined in one body, the 'Divisional Asset Removal Teams' (DARTs). 
The most important recommendation called for setting up a network of 
Drug Profit Confiscation (DPC) teams. It suggested that a network of 
5&The government strategy for 1995-98 Tackling Drugs Together, stated that the 
Government aims to have in place effective investigation and prosecution arrangements to 
deter traffickers and dealers. The report asserts that police should act against the various 
levels of drug offending through street level policing, force level drug squads and regional 
crime squads (p. 7). 
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specially selected and trained officers should work in conjunction with 
officers engaged in drug trafficking investigations. The report indicated 
that DPC teams should concentrate on carrying out in depth financial 
investigations to elicit evidence in support of drug trafficking 
prosecutions, establishing and confiscating drug trafficking related assets 
by exercising the powers and procedures contained within the DTOA 1986 
and other relevant legislation. 
The report also recommends an 'advisory team' within the National 
Drugs Intelligence Unit (NDIU) to support the work of the DPC nation- 
wide. The remaining part of the report concentrates on the need to 
supplement the DPC with civilian experts, training and computerisation. 
The report indicated that the Divisional Asset Removal Teams' (DARTs) 
of the American DEA can call upon the services of civilian financial 
analysts to relieve them of the time consuming routine work associated 
with intelligence and the sifting of seized documents (p. 12). The Project 
Team believe that applying civilian financial analysts would merely 
extend the existing policy of some forces in England, leading to the 
enhancement of evidence which required professional interpretations and 
opinion. Accordingly, they recommended that civilian support is to be 
provided by a financial analyst and two clerical officers at each of the Drug 
Profit Confiscation teams. 
The American system of confiscation gained wide support from the 
Project Team. The Team recommended that most of the American 
strategies be adopted by the British law enforcement agencies. There was, 
for example, an emphasis that the British system should follow closely the 
principles and objectives established by the American DEA and the 
Canadian RCMP (para. 2.64). 
Before demonstrating the functions of the current law enforcement 
agencies, who are directly involved in the implementation of the 
confiscation system, it is important to begin by highlighting the 
underpinning basis of the financial investigations' strategies. The current 
financial investigations at the forty three police Constabularies in England 
and Wales vary in terms of resources and subordination. In most cases, 
the financial investigation system is part of the Drugs Squad or the Fraud 
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Squad. The three tier approach which dominates the strategies of most, if 
not all the Drug and Fraud squads in dealing with the drug trafficking 
offences, is also reflected in the enforcement of the attached financial 
investigations. How and to what extent the general strategy of the Drug 
Squad as reflected in the financial investigation system are examined in 
the following paragraphs. 
In advocating a 'three tier approach' the Broome Committee stated that: 
'When examining the drug problem it became apparent to the 
Working Party that the effort against drug abuse can effectively be 
structured on three levels. In many respects this already occurs, but 
in our view a clear strategy needs to be identified' (ACPO, 1985, p. 
19). 
Accordingly, the Committee identified a pyramid structure, with three 
tiers. The first consisted of a national intelligence unit (combining both 
police and Customs personnel under Home Office control), together with 
police Regional Crime Squads (RCS). The second comprised drug squads 
of county police forces, city drug squads in major cities, and the Area Drug 
Squads in London. The tier at the local level consist of some CIDs 
(Criminal Investigation Departments) and uniform branches (see Dorn et 
a1,1992). 
Each of these tiers was intended to target a corresponding level of the drug 
market. The first tier; intended for the 'big or major traffickers', the second 
tier; a middle-level response was to deal with the main in force' dealers 
and distributors who have evaded the first level of control, and the third 
tier was intended to target the retail level of the market and at drug users 
and the street dealers who have evaded the second level of control 
(Broome Report, 1985: para. 2.26). 
The Home Affairs Committee (1988) indicated that both, the Home Office 
and ACPO were convinced of the merits of the three tier system 
established after the Broome Report (para. 110). In May 1996, the ACPO 
declared that one of the main aims of the strategic direction of the police 
forces is that they should be rigorously enforcing the law in relation to the 
trafficking and supply of controlled drugs (ACPO Journal, May, 1996). 
More importantly, the recent White Paper of the Government's Strategy 
117 
Chapter Three The British Confiscation System 
for 1995-98 Tackling Drugs Together, 59 has clearly upheld the merits of the 
Broome's three tiers system as the main strategy for the law enforcement 
agencies (see Footnote (1) of the Paper). 
The West Midlands Police Drug Squad reveals in their booklet 'Policy 
Document' (1996) that, 'the Force follows Broome's recommendation in 
determining the strategy of the West Midlands Police in relation to the 
investigation of controlled drugs'. DI Hickman from the West Midlands 
Police states: 
Our confiscation strategy is mainly based on the national 
programme for the nation' (pers. communication, an interview, 1996) 
This statement has been repeated by several police officers who 
participated in the field work for this study. It gives an impression that 
there is a sort of mutual co-ordination and correspondence between the 
government' strategies and the police's policies represented by ACPO. 
Furthermore, DI Hickman asserts that 'there is an obligation on all police 
forces to adopt the national strategical policy stated in the government 
'Tackling Drugs Together' report. 
He continues by saying that: 
'this governmental policy made most police forces adopt similar 
strategies in combating drugs crime. They are basically the same. 
The way they go about collecting revenue may be different because it 
depends on the courts. But at the end of the day, it is a national 
policy which they should adhere to'. 
Another example, the Greater Manchester Police's Drug Misuse Strategic 
Action Plan which states that 'the drug law enforcement policy embraces 
the recommendations of the Broome report in relation to investigations 
into major drug dealers operating at international, national and regional 
levels, together with those who operate at force level'. 
Although in practice, the influential outline of the three-tier approach to 
the drugs market, through regional, local and divisional levels, created 
the structure of drugs enforcement which exists today, there is an 
59This White Paper is the Government's new drugs strategy for England. It is a revised 
version of the Green Paper, Tackling Drugs Together (a consultation document on a strategy 
for England 1995-1998, HMSO, 1994). 
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increasing challenge and criticism to this approach. Wright et a160 (1993) in 
their report 'Drugs Squads: Law Enforcement Strategies and Intelligence in 
England and Wales' conclude that the development and control of drug 
enforcement is a complex process which depends upon understanding the 
connection between values, resources, organisational factors and 
relationships (p. 109). The report explains that a connection needs to be 
made between the political and practical responses to the contemporary 
difficulties of drugs enforcement. The report reveals that at both levels, 
there are pressures from the public, from the increase in drug trafficking, 
from constraints upon resources and from differences in perceptions 
about priorities. 
Much of the evidence of this study shows, however, that what happens at 
the operational level does not result automatically from the 
implementation of policies, whether they are - decided within 
Government, Home Office, Drugs Intelligence Steering Group, ACPO or at 
a high level within police forces or the Regional Crime Squad. This means 
that the actual responses of the practitioners to perceived problems are 
determined by a range of factors, some of which are concerned with 
resources and organisational structures, others are concerned with the 
availability of information and the preferences and values of the 
practitioners themselves. The fact remains, as the report indicates, that the 
real power to achieve strategic and tactical ends is held by the practitioners. 
Each of the forty three police Constabularies, for example, is commanded 
by a Chief Constable who is the head of the police authority which 
comprises representatives of the area over which the force has 
jurisdiction. It is obvious that there are variations between police forces, 
depending upon the problems likely to be encountered in each police 
district; thus the concerns of the Chief Constable for Leicestershire or 
Devon and Cornwall are likely to be very different from those of the 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. 
The Wright et al's report clarifies that if there is a failure in policy 
implementation, it is because of the misalignment between the 
perceptions of the practitioners and the political intentions of the policy- 
makers. This is reflected not only in differences in resources and 
60Alan Wright (The University of Manchester), Alan Waymont (The Metropolitan Police) 
and Frank Gregory (The University of Southampton). This study is commissioned by The 
Police Foundation. 
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information, but also in the limited voice afforded to the practitioners 
who are nearest to the market realities, in the formulation of drugs policy 
and strategies (p. 108). 
The report criticises the three tier approach recommended by the Broome 
working party. It indicates, first that the development of drug law 
enforcement as part of an integrated drugs control strategy has been 
comparatively recent. Then it points out that the Broome Working Party's 
view of the drugs market was in essence qualitative, in the sense that it 
described the drug market in terms of the qualities of the offenders and 
investigators at each level, rather than in terms of the analysis and 
interrelation of quantities of activity or products. No substantial evidence, 
however, was cited as the basis for the adoption of this model. The 
reorganisation of police drugs enforcement was based upon the efficacy of 
the fit between the new enforcement arrangements and the supposedly 
tiered market. A reflection upon alternative ways of describing that 
market in the report, according to some findings and evidences shows that 
the fit has proved to be less than efficacious (p. 41). 
The report asserts that it is questionable whether the market actually has 
such a tiered structure. The need for a new approach to understand the 
complex inter-relationship between law enforcement strategies, the 
misuse of drugs and the market within which illicit trafficking takes place, 
was described by Dorn, Murji and South in their memorandum of 
evidence to the Home Affairs Committee in June 1989. They drew 
attention to the dynamics of the inter-relationship between law 
enforcement and the drugs market: 
'The market in illicit drugs is in a state of continuous interaction 
with law enforcement strategies and agencies. In the same way that 
law enforcement seeks to respond to drug distributors, so the 
distributors react to the forms of law enforcement. This means that 
law enforcement and drug distribution tend to'mirror' one another' 
(Home Affairs Committee, 1989). 
Dorn & South, as Wright's report indicates, have maintained that the 
market can not be characterised by a simple distribution pyramid. The 
actual market is more like a network, with individual dealers being 
described by virtue of their roles rather than through the level at which 
they operate. Accordingly, they assert that the Broome's pyramid is flawed 
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(cf. Dorn & South, 1990). The report in supporting Dorn and South's 
perspective, indicates that the drugs market exhibits a dynamism which 
entails a more or less constant interchange of players between these 
various categories. Concentrating upon specific categories of enterprise 
encourages strategic rather than tactical intervention by enforcement 
agencies. The study observed that the tiered perception was generally 
disregarded by RCS drug wings and force drug squads in the attempt to 
understand the dynamics of the networks, to identify the key players and 
systematically to gather evidence on their activities. 
Lastly, it is not clear whether a consistency exists between the theoretical 
strategies and the actual fronts in the drugs market. The experiences of the 
financial investigators and the Drug Squad's officers are the main 
determinants of the practical policies that surround the local drug market. 
Drug problems are not always of the same level in one area or between all 
districts. The drug strategies of each of the forty three forces in England 
and Wales are unique and at the same time are of a changing nature that 
reflect the continuing development of drug problems and drug markets in 
the same area. Accordingly, the priorities of each police force are different 
and the strategy and techniques of the attached drug squads are supposed 
to reflect the real understanding of the dynamism of local drug markets 
not of national strategies which may have no practical meaning to some 
forces. 
Dorn & Murji (1992), for example, point out that the 1980s saw rapid 
developments in high level drug enforcement. There were new laws, new 
penalties and new Customs and police strategies against drug trafficking 
offences and especially those trafficking in large consignments of drugs. 
Progress had been made, but it is generally acknowledged that little more 
can be done to reduce the manufacture and importation of illegal drugs. 
Middle level enforcement is considered by Dorn et al (1992) as the 
province of the specialist drug squads in each police force (p. 78). During 
the 1990s, however, Dorn & Murji asserted that the area of greatest 
innovation and progress was likely to be at the low level drug 
enforcement (p. 160) (see also Feldman, 1988). 
Table (3.5) below shows a clear evidence of the predominance of 
investigations involving low and middle-levels of drug trafficking cases 
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(street-level) rather than high-level cases (against wholesaler dealers) 
during the period 1988 to 1995. 
Table (3.5) Numbers of confiscation orders made by Crown Courts from 1988-1995. 
Amount & Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Orders made under £ 1,000 339 528 568 719 675 712 921 1,117 
£1,000 and under £3,000 98 133 149 121 164 126 160 224 
£3,000 and under £10,000 47 81 77 86 82 78 97 120 
£10,000 and under £30,000 18 36 48 39 43 37 29 56 
£30,000 and under £100,000 8 14 13 28 22 15 22 20 
£100,000 and under £300,000 21 7 10 11 13 7 9 12 
£300,000 and under £1 m 8 1 4 1 1 6 8 9 
£1 m and over 0 2 2 0 2 2 2 4 
Total 539 802 871 1005 1002 983 1248 1562 
Sum-total 8012 
Source: Judicial Co-operation Unit, Home Office and Criminal Statistics, 1996. 
It is important to mention that no clear benchmark has been set and 
agreed upon by the regional and local police financial investigators, to 
define the boundaries and the range of confiscation orders, and to describe 
cases of confiscation as high, middle, and low level cases. If hypothetically 
the £100,000 is considered as a benchmark for justifying the confiscation 
order enacted by the Regional Crime Squads, then just a few cases are 
entitled to be acted upon. As table 3.5 shows, 8012 confiscation orders were 
imposed during the period 1988-1995,7870 (98%) confiscation orders were 
under £100,000 and only 142 (2%) orders became ascribed to £100,000 and 
above. Out of the 98% of confiscation orders, 71% (5579 orders) were made 
under £1,000, and 29% (2291 orders) between £10,000 and less than 
£100,000 cases. These variations suggest that the majority of drug 
trafficking confiscation cases involves low level enforcement undertaken 
by local police forces and 2% can be described here as rare cases. This 
means that the confiscation system in drug trafficking is dominated by low 
and medium enforcement. It also indicates that despite the capability of 
the RCS, for instance, in dealing with threats which are perceived to be 
beyond the resources of each individual force, the majority of the financial 
investigations and subsequently the confiscation orders are dominated by 
local police which mostly work against street-level dealers and 
distributors. The increase in the number of confiscation cases of £30,000 
and less is a clear evidence that low level drug enforcement is indeed the 
focus of law enforcement agencies in 1990s (see Dorn & Murji, 1992, p. 
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160). This asserts the conclusion of Levi and Osofsky (1995) that few 'Mr 
Bigs' have been convicted and consequently few are available to have 
their assets confiscated (p. vi). 
Dorn et al (1992) assert that the RCSs are supposed to investigate only 
major crimes which cut across the boundaries of county forces, but in 
practice the RCSs in some 'quieter areas' is used as an adjunct to the work 
of a county force, investigating serious crime within the jurisdiction of a 
single force (p. 78). 
Dorn et al (1992) also pointed out that the organisation levels of tiers of 
enforcement do not correspond in any neat or easy way to distinctions in 
the market, and deciding which targets 'belong' to which enforcement 
level can be problematic (p. 78). Boothroyd (1989) mentioned that senior 
police officers are increasingly inclined to agree that the police must have 
a set of strategies to deal with different types of drug enterprises. Detective 
Sergeant Mike Lloyd, an Avon and Somerset officer who trains officers in 
techniques of financial investigation also advocates that, by saying, 'that as 
many as one in three suspected dealers 'who appear to have nothing' turn 
out to have benefited substantially from the sale of drugs'. If only the 
finances of bigger drug enterprises are investigated, he warns, smaller 
dealers will flourish. 'Since we began using the provisions of the DTOA in 
August 1986, we have literally been tripping over people involved in drug 
dealing who were totally unknown to us beforehand', he says. He gives 
the example of a tip-off which led to the arrest of a man selling drugs from 
a car outside a sports centre on the edge of Bristol. The man had no 
criminal record and police know nothing of him. He had a steady job as a 
labourer in a wood yard, lived with his parents, and had 'an air of 
respectability' and listed among his favourite pursuits 'going to bed early 
and listening to Radio 4'. He admitted having two bank accounts, one 
with £31 in it, another with about £35, but investigations revealed at least 
nine building society accounts and led to the confiscation of £25,000 in 
drug assets (Police Review, 1989). 
'Assets confiscation will work only against some enterprises', (Boothroyd, 
1989, p. 335). Boothroyd explains that if you have the type of enterprise 
which shifts its money around in suitcases then a highly sophisticated 
system of bank disclosure is not going to be much good to you'. 'It is 
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applicable to the old criminal firms that diversify into drugs. It is 
applicable to the legitimate businesses that 'sideline' but it is not 
applicable to family structures which base money transactions on trust, or 
to 'irregulars' people who engage in short term operations which don't 
require bank accounts' (p. 335). Dorn et al (1992) think that police should 
revise their anti-trafficking strategies to attack the different types of 
distributors. That is to say the way forward for the police is to identify the 
different types of enterprises, find out how permanent they are, discover 
their financial operations security and exploit their weaknesses. 
3.3.2. Law Enforcement Agencies 
The enforcement of the confiscation system is conducted by two groups of 
law enforcement agencies: the first includes police Financial Investigation 
Units (FIU) or the Drug Profit Confiscation teams (DPC) at the police 
forces, local prosecutors, the Central Confiscation Branch (CCB) and the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS). The second includes the 
enforcement of confiscation proceedings by a variety of courts (Crown 
Court, High Court, Magistrate Court, and County Court). The main 
relevant functions of the courts have been already discussed in the 
preceding chapter. A brief examination of the role of the law enforcement 
agencies that are involved at the first stage will-be the focus of this section. 
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Figure (3.4) This chart shows how the confiscation proceedings are processed between the 
financial institutions, NCIS, financial investigation units, Crown Prosecution Service, Central 
Confiscation Branch, and Courts. 
3.3.2.1. Regional Crime Squads (RCSs) 
The Home Affairs Committee in its seventh report (session 1988-89) 
points out that Regional Crime Squads have been in existence for 25 years. 
For the purposes of assigning geographical areas to these squads, England 
and Wales are divided into nine regions (para. 108, p. xxvi). In 1993, the 
nine region were also reduced into five regions: (i) the North East 
Regional Crime Squad; (b) the North West; (c) the Midlands; (d) South 
East; and (e) the South West Crime Squad (an interview with DS Cole, 
RCS, NE, dated 7 February 1995). 
The Committee indicates that the principal bodies engaged in police action 
against drug trafficking are the drug wings61 of the Regional Crime 
Squads. Each RCS have also a Drug Profit Confiscation team or, as many 
61The work of drug wings of the RCSs is quite similar to the work of the drug squads in the 
forty three police forces in regard to drug trafficking offences. 
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forces call it, a 'Financial Investigation Unit'62. This unit is linked to the 
work of the drug wings. The drug wings, according to the three tiers 
approach, form the top tier of enforcement, the other two tiers being the 
drug squads of each police force. and the enforcement by uniformed 
officers and detectives at the divisional and sub-divisional level. 
Scott (1996)63 indicates that Regional Crime Squads are capable of dealing 
with threats which were perceived to be beyond the resources of each 
individual force. They are also able to look at criminal activities and 
trends with a somewhat broader perspective than an individual police 
force, and to respond more effectively against them. The Home Office 
Report Tackling Drug Misuse: A summary of the government's strategy 
(1988) states: 
'Regional Crime Squads provide an integrated mobile network of 
experienced detectives able to investigate drug trafficking networks, 
often involving elements of national and international organised 
crime' (p. 16). 
These squads are under the control of an executive co-ordinator who is 
authorised to bring more than one RCS together for a large-scale operation 
(Hopkinson, 1989, p. 21). 
With regard to the similarities with the local financial investigation 
system, both the RCS and the FIU follow those proceedings, and both have 
similar duties and assignments. An examination concerning the 
differences will be highlighted in the following review of the role and 
function of the local Financial Investigation Units. 
3.3.2.2. Financial Investigation Units (FIUs) at Police 
Forces64 
Most local police forces have a Financial Investigation Unit (FIU), or at 
least, a financial investigation officer dedicated to make enquiries with a 
view to seizing the assets of drug traffickers. The main function of the 
FIUs is to identify assets of persons who have benefited from drug 
trafficking and to furnish the courts with financial statements for 
62Because the majority of the police forces call it the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) 
the study here will follow the same title hereinafter. 
63Internet information 
64Some forces call the financial investigation office the 'Drug Profit Confiscation (DPC)'. 
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consideration of confiscation orders. These statements are called 
'affidavits' (see Appendix IV, p. 395). 
Levi & Osofsky (1995) indicates that FIUs came into existence between 1989 
(in the Metropolitan Police) and 1993, when Dyfed-Powys and the City of 
London police created their first confiscation units and assigned a full- 
time detective sergeant and a detective constable respectively to those 
units (p. 31). 
Units are normally headed by detective sergeants or constables. Civilian 
employees with financial or administrative skills are normally integrated 
into the FIUs. Although the Project Team of 1985 strongly recommended 
that applying civilian financial analysts would lead to the enhancement of 
evidence which required professional interpretations and opinion, the 
majority of police forces had no full-time civilian employers. Levi & 
Osofsky (1995) assert that only five forces had one civilian employed full- 
time on asset confiscation duties (p. 29). The Bristol Police force is an 
exceptional case65. It has four full-time civilian and one police officer in 
their FIU. 
Moreover, not all forces or drug squads have an FIU. It depends upon the 
area, the FIU may be attached to a drug or to a fraud squad. Detective 
Sergeant Philip Marchbank, a financial investigator from Wakefield Fraud 
Squad (Operational Support Crime Division), points out that the reason 
some financial investigators remain attached to Fraud Squads is because 
they are also engaged to work on cases of fraud. 
The nature of the financial investigation system as a reception centre for 
information and inquiries for the subsequent application of confiscation 
proceedings makes it's performance reliant on the work of other 
institutions. The information and intelligence from the National 
Criminal Intelligence Services (NCIS), and the inquiries from local drug 
squads work as the main triggers for the financial investigations which 
may lead to the enforcement of the confiscation proceedings. The strategy 
and application of the financial investigation (under the RCSs or under 
local forces) follows the general policy and guidelines of the force and in 
651t is an exception in contrast with other forces. This explains also that police forces are 
independent, and Chief Constables have full right in forming their policies according to 
their experiences and resources. 
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particular the strategy of Drug or Fraud Squads. Accordingly, to determine 
the scope and status of the financial investigation system, one must 
examine this general strategy if only to find out the rules that direct the 
operations in the FIUs. 
In contrast with the RCSs, DI Hickman (pers. communication), 
emphasised that there is little difference in the structure and functions 
between the FIUs operating at police forces and the Regional FIUs. The 
only apparent difference is the extent of responsibility. The Regional 
Financial Investigation Unit is responsible for dealing with a broader area 
which embraces several districts, while the local unit is obliged only to 
abide by its own district. This does not necessarily mean that the local unit 
cannot trace assets or profits of a local offender extended to other areas or 
districts. DI Hickman asserts that the financial investigators with the 
powers available to them can trace the assets locally, regionally, nationally 
and even internationally, but co-operation with other law enforcement 
agencies like the regional squads and the National Criminal Intelligence 
Service (NCIS) is essential for successful confiscation proceedings. 
He further says, 'that although sometimes the statistics and the figures of 
confiscated orders may suggest or reflect an adoption of a particular 
strategy, they are in the actual fact not trusted'. He asserts that 'there is no 
difference between the FlU that works for the Squad in his force and the 
FIU that works for the Regional Crime Squad (RCS). Any differences such 
as there are reflect the priority and extent of attention the force is 
allocating for drug problems'. This means that drug trafficking offences is 
not the only or the major problem in all the forty three provinces. Some 
forces, for example, undertake a tremendous amount of work with drug 
crimes and in particular drug trafficking offences, while other forces 
consider drug crimes not to be a distinctive problem. Accordingly some 
other crimes occupy a higher priority. This may partly explain why some 
forces have no financial investigation unit at all, but instead entrust at 
least one of the drugs or fraud squad officer to do the financial 
investigations required for certain drug trafficking cases. 
In short, financial investigators are responsible for obtaining evidence on 
the benefit derived by offenders from the proceeds of drug trafficking 
crimes, they investigate the financial affairs of defendants for the purpose 
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of identifying realisable assets which may be made the subject of a restraint 
order. They also furnish the courts with financial statements for 
consideration of confiscation orders. They are vested with substantial 
powers to obtain information about where the suspects have invested 
their illegal proceeds and profits, to freeze assets with restraint and 
charging orders, and to confiscate them from convicted defendants. All 
these powers were examined in detail in the preceding Chapter. 
3.3.2.3. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)66 
This institution was created by the Prosecution Offences Act 1985. It 
became operational on the 1 October 1986, and it is headed by the Director 
of Public Prosecutions. There are thirty one CPS areas within England and 
Wales which correspond to the geographical boundaries of police forces, 
either individually or in pairs. Each CPS is managed by a Chief Crown 
Prosecutor. Each area has a number of branches, each of which is managed 
by a Branch Crown Prosecutor. 
When a case having the potential for asset confiscation arrives at the CPS 
for prosecution the local Chief Crown Prosecutor nominates a lawyer to 
handle the confiscation side of the case. This lawyer is referred to as the 
'Nominated Confiscation Lawyer (NCL)' . 
The NCL is required to put together the confiscation case. At first instance 
this is done by gathering as much information as possible from the 
prosecution brief and from the Police Financial Investigation Officer. In 
the event that the NCL considers the need for an application for a restraint 
order, the police affidavit and other police documents and evidence in 
support with the opinion of the NCL is sent off to the Central Confiscation 
Branch (CCB) which is at Headquarters of the CPS in London. The NCL 
will, if necessary, obtain the assistance of one of the CCB's accountants if 
the case is particularly complicated. And if the police financial investigator 
needs help to determine the amount by which a defendant benefited from 
his offence or to trace the defendant's realisable property. The other major 
responsibility of the NCL is to ensure that a statement under s. 11 of the 
66The information stated in this section is mostly extracted from an interview with a 
Crown Prosecutor/ Talbot Kennedy, from the Central Confiscation Branch (CCB), and also 
from A report of Clive Scott (an internet search, 1996). 
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DTA is prepared for presentation at the court upon the conviction of the 
defendant. 
3.3.2.4. Central Confiscation Branch (CCB) 
The CCB was set up in April 1989 as a unit within the Fraud Investigation 
Group at CPS Headquarters. It was called the Central Confiscation Unit 
(CCU), but in March 1996 the 'Unit' was substituted by 'Branch'. The 
stated objective of the Branch is to 'deprive drug traffickers from the 
benefit of their offences' (CPS Journal, September 1989, p. 8). The Fraud 
Investigation Group was considered to be the best location for the CCB as 
it was staffed by lawyers who had received experience in criminal 
bankruptcy cases which was considered useful in the confiscation area. 
The Branch also has accountants in its staff who are able to provide 
support in complex cases requiring financial analysis (Scott, 1996). 
This Branch controls one of the most important procedures in the 
confiscation system. In practi^e, CCB is involved in confiscation 
proceedings only when appearances in the High Court are necessary, and 
particularly when the Crown seeks restraint and charging orders from the 
High Court. 
The branch prosecutor (at the local areas), may choose to contact the CCB 
and follow its advice. He may also choose to allow the CCB to handle the 
case entirely or to retain control and prosecute the case without help. It is 
important to note that CCB is based at the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) headquarters in London. Most officers from the FIUs who have been 
interviewed asserted that they rarely needed to travel to London, but 
rather communicated with CCB by fax or by telephone for consultations. 
Lastly, CCB is available to assist only on the cases originating from the 
police forces. This means that CCB comes into the picture when the 
proceedings involve necessary appearances in the High Court. It has no 
power to intervene in any of the drug trafficking case under the police 
control, but it can - apply the minimum threshold policy to certain 
confiscation cases which requires restraint or charging orders. In contrast 
with the financial investigations of Customs & Excise, the latter operates 
under it own control. Obtaining restraint or charging orders via CCB (a 
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different organisation), may lead the police investigations to be described 
as a decentralised investigation (see Levi & Osofsky, 1995, p. 35). 
The existence of an Advisory Unit or Branch for confiscation cases is 
important and very healthy for successful confiscation proceedings. 
However, when this Branch stipulates inconsistent conditions for the 
application of certain provisions of the confiscation system, like for 
instance the threshold minimum policy for certain confiscation cases, the 
situation could be different. It is presumed that the legislator intended to 
disregard the minimum threshold in DTOA 1986. This is also confirmed 
by the subsequent amendments in the consolidated DTA 1994. Such 
intention is considered as one of the most distinctive aspect of the DTA 
1994 which distinguishes it from the confiscation legislation of the CJA 
1988. Moreover, the minimum threshold is clearly stated in the CJA 1988. 
This means that the legislator wanted the drug traffickers to be deprived of 
any benefits and proceeds irrespective of their volume and cost. 
Accordingly, the dominance of CCB upon all applications for restraint and 
charging orders and the decision of not permitting any order to be applied 
for from High Court somewhat goes against the main principles of the 
legislation itself. The perceptions of the police financial investigators 
concerning this matter will be examined in detail in the following chapter. 
3.3.2.5. The National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS)67 
Intelligence and information are the life blood of the Financial 
Investigation Units (Thony, 1996). NCIS is one of the most important 
sources for information and disclosures for FIUs. In addition to that all 
financial institutions are obliged to report to NCIS for any suspicious 
deposits or transfers that may involve a crime. NCIS deals with national 
and international information and intelligence. Although it describes 
itself as a law enforcement agency, the NCIS is not an investigative agency 
but purely an intelligence agency. Once sufficient information is gathered 
to prove or confirm suspicions arising from an operation or a newly 
configured network, the actual investigation of the case is entrusted by 
NCIS to the police and Customs services with territorial jurisdiction to 
deal with it. 
67Some of the information was collected from an interview with DS/John Leek at NCIS 
which was conducted in 1996. 
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Most of the aims and objectives of the Drugs Unit and the Financial 
Intelligence Unit at NCIS are originally derived from a former National 
Drugs Intelligence Unit (NDIU)68. The objectives of the two Units in 
regard to the financial investigation and for the confiscation proceedings 
are: 
(a) to be the focal point for the systematic collection, evaluation and 
collation of information/ intelligence relating to any trafficking at 
regional, national and international level; and 
(b) to provide a central point for the receipt of all disclosures made 
under the DTOA 1986; the Criminal Justice Act 1988; and the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989. Such disclosures are developed 
through the intelligence process and are disseminated to the 
appropriate agency of the police service or the Customs and Excise 
for further action. Also, where appropriate, to provide feedback to 
the disclosing body (Scott, 1996). 
NCIS provides an effective linking mechanism between the activities of 
the various UK police forces and Custom's & Excise's drugs investigation 
Organisation. DS John Leek from NCIS (1996) says that the former NDIU 
and the present NCIS aim at preventing any potentially disastrous effects 
of two different law enforcement agencies targeting the same criminal 
enterprises but with different approaches (referring to the police forces and 
Customs and Excise). Scott (1996) indicates that preventing such a problem 
by the former NDIU is achieved by means of agreements between the 
participating agencies. The first agency to notify the NDIU of an 
investigation into a particular target would retain control of that 
investigation. 
Another role of the NCIS is to be a focal point for the reporting of 
suspicious transactions by financial institutions. This is quite similar to 
the role played by FinCEN in US69. In April 1992, the links between Home 
68 The NCIS is established in 1992. It has been in existence in various forms since 1973 
when it was set up under the name of the Central Drugs and Illegal Immigration Unit. In 
1984, it was the Central Drugs Intelligence Unit, and in 1985 it turned to be the National 
Drugs Intelligence Unit (NDIU) (Saltmarsh, 1994). 
69The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) was established by the US. 
Department of the Treasury in 1990 as a multi-agency, multi-source financial intelligence 
and analytical network. The mission is to serve as the US. Government's central source for 
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Office and Treasury Department, via NDIU were formalised by the 
amalgamation of customs and police components into the current NCIS. 
This also means that in 1992 NCIS officially took over from the NDIU. 
The Economic Crimes Unit (ECU) and the Intelligence Co-ordination Unit 
(ICU) at NCIS deal with more specialised missions of handling financial 
information, having the function of centralising and filtering suspicious 
reports. They advise the Government and banks on the measures to be 
taken to prevent criminal use of the financial sector and have recently 
been developing a capacity for strategic analysis of money-laundering data. 
They are also in charge of training the professional staff and raising their 
level of awareness (NCIS Annual Report 1995 / 6, p. 8-17). 
DS John Leek reveals that there is no system in the United Kingdom for 
automatically reporting specific types of transactions or operations such as 
cash transactions or international transfers of capital. The only reporting 
requirement is the one applicable to operations that appear suspicious. But 
because this obligation is global and not confined to professionals in the 
banking and financial sector, the number of reports received by the NCIS 
have always been very large. From the figure of 400 reports registered 
when the DTOA 1986 was introduced in 1987, it reached the 2,000 mark in 
1990 and swelled to 4,000 in 1991. In 1993, an amendment of the Criminal 
Justice Act rendered 'failure to report any suspicious transactions or 
deposits' a punishable offence, at which point reports rocketed to 15,000 in 
1994 and 13,700 in 1995. 
the systematic identification, collation and analysis of financial crimes. The organisation 
accomplishes this mission by assisting in the detection and investigation of financial 
crimes as well as aiding in the formulation of enforcement and regulatory policy against 
such crimes (Annual Report of FinCEN, 1996). 
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Table (3.6) shows the number of discloses received by NCIS from financial institutions 
during the period 1987-1995 
Year Number 
1987 400 
1988 599 
1989 1,200 
1990 2,000 
1991 4,000 
1992 11,542 
1993 12,736 
1994 15,000 
1995 13,700 
Figure (3.5) Number of disclosures, source: NCIS Annual Report (1995/6). 
Lastly, although the confiscation system is been dealt by a number of law 
enforcement agencies (Crown Court, High Court, Magistrates' Court, CCB, 
RCS, local police force and NCIS), the country still lacks a national 
operational system which can deal with certain national and international 
confiscation cases. However, Thony (1996) points out that more than one 
regional crime squad can be put together to deal with large-scale 
operations. NCIS, as mentioned above, can only facilitate the functions of 
the joint work of the RCSs and in particular the work of their financial 
investigation units. The views of the police officers and particularly the 
financial investigators concerning this matter and the impact upon 
performance will be examined in details in the following chapter. In 
general, DS John Leek explains that police officers favour an expanded 
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role for NCIS by giving more operational freedom and responsibility. 
Condon (1996) points out that the Home Affairs Committee in their 1995 
report stated that the present structure of separate regional squads, with no 
central executive direction, needs to be replaced by a nationally co- 
ordinated structure. 
3.4. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, two main aspects of the British confiscation system were 
discussed. The first section examined the most distinctive powers and 
provisions of the British confiscation system provided under the 
consolidated DTA 1994 have been examined. In this examination, the 
selected powers and procedures have been divided into three main stages: 
(pre-trial proceedings, trial proceedings, and post-trial proceedings). 
This 'three-stages' division has helped to determine the nature and extent 
of these powers according to their importance. In general, these powers 
were introduced to make law enforcement agencies deal with the proceeds 
of drug traffickers which were beyond the reach of the common forfeiture 
laws provided under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the Powers of 
Criminal Courts Act 1973. 
The legislation empowered the law enforcement agencies to conduct 
searches of premises where the occupiers were not suspected of crime (for 
the first time); to enter premises to search for material; to delay allowing a 
person in custody to receive legal advice or assistance for up to 36 hours; 
to compel the defendant to co-operate (abolishing the right to silence); to 
restrain all the defendant's property (if needed); to presume that all the 
held, transferred and received property and any expenditure since 6 years 
are obtained from drug trafficking; to give courts a discretionary power to 
impose more than one financial penalty; to add to the original prison 
sentence more terms of imprisonment for defaulters (may reach an 
additional 10 years imprisonment); and lastly to confiscate legal property 
(if the defendant did not co-operate in paying the confiscation order) with 
some other unprecedented powers which make the system a very 
powerful threat not only to drug traffickers but even to the decent or the 
law-abiding parties. 
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These powers and provisions show that the novelty of some parts of the 
confiscation proceedings for the British criminal justice system was met 
with an uneasy reception by certain practitioners. This has led to various 
disputes and differences of judgements especially in the early stages. 
Subsequent amendments have now been added to the legislation. 
However, there are still some areas of disputes (e. g. the retrospective 
aspect, right of confidentiality, restrictions on restraint orders, and the 
disclosure of the informant's identity) which occupy the current argument 
about the system. 
Moreover, an examination of the confiscation proceedings and the nature 
and extent of the powers provided show that the system lacks enough 
guarantees to prevent any injudicious use of these powers supported with 
discretionary powers. Some of these powers and procedures still also need 
to be accounted and defined on sensible and situated grounds. The 
differences in interpreting the 'intentions' of the legislature about certain 
ambiguous provisions are not in the interest of justice and fairness which 
are the main principles of the system. The novelty of certain powers and 
procedures are supposed to be dealt with in a clear and open manner not 
by a vague outline or hidden intentions. 
The second section has focused mainly upon the operational side of the 
confiscation system. The specific organisation and strategies adopted for 
the enforcement of the confiscation provisions of DTA 1994 have been 
examined in detail. The section began by illustrating the developments 
that accompanied the governmental intentions to introduce the 
confiscation system, and it then reviewed the subsequent organisational 
and strategical developments which persisted and supported by the recent 
government's strategy of 1995-98 'Tackling Drugs Together'. 
The three tier approach recommended by the Broome Report (1985) is the 
common dominator in the implementation of the confiscation system by 
all law enforcement agencies in England & Wales. The structure and 
strategies of the financial investigation systems at local and regional forces 
reflect the policies and management of the forces at each area and 
particularly the attached drug squads. 
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An examination of the developments of strategies and relevant literature 
revealed that confining and restricting confiscation system to only three 
tiers of enforcement have prevented a greater impact of the system upon 
other different levels and aspects of drug trafficking crimes. This means 
that there are certain gaps between the three tiers which let some drug 
traffickers escape from being under the focus of the law enforcement 
agencies and in particular, the drug squads of the local police forces and 
the drug wings of RCSs. Wright et al (1993) allege that there is a 
misalignment between the perceptions of the practitioners on the practical 
fronts and the political intentions of the policy-makers. This has caused a 
defect in containing the actual types and extent of drug trafficking offences 
and offenders. Wright et al asserted that the three tiers approach has failed 
to deal with a multifarious aspects of the drugs market. 
This section also suggested that confiscation will work better against 
certain types of enterprises. Accordingly, the drug squads and wings 
should revise their anti-trafficking strategies to attack the different types of 
traffickers. For example, as each police force has a different type of 
distributors, an understanding of local and national drugs market by 
practitioners will necessarily determine the necessity of confiscation 
without the need to be obliged to maintain a fixed level of enforcement 
against certain labelled traffickers. 
The confiscation system is designed to be enforced by a set of relationships 
between a variety of agencies. The financial investigative work of FIUs 
alone, for example, are not enough for the enforcement of the system. A 
network of relationships between all the involved law enforcement 
agencies (between drugs squads and FIUs, FIUs and CPS or CCB, FIUs and 
courts), a high degree of understanding and co-operation between these 
agencies, effective enforcement by magistrates (the Clerks' Offices), and the 
sufficiency of resources, funding and staffing are essential for any 
successful confiscation proceedings. 
Lastly, the confiscation system is seen to operate in a difficult and 
complicated set of processes. The principles of the system are new to the 
criminal justice system, but some provisions are described as ambiguous, 
some provisions have annoyed some practitioners, and the strategies of 
enforcement are not consistent with the actual drugs market and types of 
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traffickers. The relationships between the enforcement agencies are based 
upon chances and temporal circumstances. All these issues could be 
reflected in the fairness and justice of confiscation procedures. The 
perceptions of the practitioners concerning these issues will be examined 
in details in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE VIEWS AND EXPERIENCES OF THE 
BRITISH POLICE 
4.1. INTRODUCTIONQ 
In this chapter the second main aim is realised, that is to determine how 
the British confiscation system works. Particular reference is made to the 
police financial investigation officers and others who are directly 
involved in the police proceedings. In determining their relevant views 
the focus in this chapter is directed toward the following six sub-aims: 
(1) to determine the perceptions of the police financial 
investigators about the nature of the confiscation system 
provided under the DTA 1994; 
(2) to determine the perceptions of the police financial 
investigators about the main principles and features of the 
confiscation legislation; 
(3) to determine whether or not the chosen enforcement 
strategies are consistent with the directions, conditions and 
demands of the main provisions of the system; 
(4) to determine the major defects and problems which may 
prevent the system from being enforced and those which 
could prevent the involved practitioners from achieving the 
full potential of the powers and provisions against illegal 
proceeds and profits. This also include the nature and extent 
of cooperation of other law enforcement agencies; 
(5) to determine whether the confiscation system is efficient and 
useful or not; and 
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(6) to determine the level of resources, funding and support 
dedicated by government and local forces for the system. 
In order to realise these six aims, this chapter relies upon the data collected 
for this purpose from the police financial investigators and other 
practitioners. Particular research methods and a special categorisation 
process were conducted to help in producing the significant information 
which are relevant to the contents of the above subaims. 
i 
More than one method was used in collecting the information needed for 
this study, namely, personal exploratory interviews, semi-structure mail 
questionnaire, and telephone interviews. The questionnaire was used 
only for the British system, with one hundred and seventy two being 
distributed to all the forty three police Constabularies (four for each one) 
in England and Wales. The total response received was forty seven (from 
thirty nine forces). The real number of police financial investigators was 
unknown, but from the personal visits, telephone calls to several forces 
and from Professor Levi's Report, it has become apparent that the number 
of the police financial investigators is limited and may not exceed eighty 
six. So forty seven responses (more than 54% of the presumed total 
number of financial investigators at the local police forces) with fifteen 
personal interviews conducted in England and Wales are to some extent 
reliable and could maintain credibility in achieving the research aims. 
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Figure (4.1) Data collected about the confiscation system funnelled into main categories and 
subcategories. 
Throughout this chapter two categories of respondents are considered, 
those completing the questionnaire, 47 in all who were police financial 
investigators in local police forces -to be called the questionnaire group 
from now on, and 14 others who were specially selected as high ranking 
officials who were interviewed personally, some of whom are senior 
police administrators, financial investigators, a prosecutor from CCB, and 
two administrators from the NCIS -the interview group hereinafter. 
Comparisons between these two groups were applicable. 
4.2. THE ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESSED DATA 
There are two major research categories being considered: (a) legislation: 
that is the main principles and the features of the British confiscation 
legislation; and (b) application: which include aspects of how the 
legislation is being enforced and the kinds of problems and defects which 
prevent the enforcers from achieving best results. 
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It is not always possible to be specific about the aims as there is 
considerable overlap as far as the questionnaire group was concerned. 
Nonetheless as far as is possible the data will be presented according to the 
aims noted earlier. 
4.2.1. Confiscation Legislation: 
In this section aims 1 and 2 are considered. Aim 1 is to determine the 
perceptions of the police financial investigators about the nature of the 
confiscation system provided under the DTA 1994. Aim 2 is to determine 
their perceptions about the main principles and features of confiscation 
legislation. The results are presented as follows: 
4.2.1.1. Aim 1 The Nature of Confiscation Order 
Two questions were asked about the value-based principle70. The purpose 
behind this was to determine whether the enforcers were aware of this 
principle and whether they were in favour of it as it provides new 
precedent in the British Criminal Justice System. The data collected from 
the questionnaires group shows that there was a variety of answers, i. e. 
that 15 participants (32%) agreed with the option of the value-based 
system, conversely 8 participants (17%) favour the alternative property- 
based system; and 7 participants (15%) have no knowledge about the 
principles so could not comment on difference between them; whilst 5 
participants (11%) favour both7l, and to underline the wide range of 
answers 3 participants (6%) were against both (Table (4.1)). 
70rhe frequent use of the word 'principle' in describing the value-based system in the 
literature and in the collected data have led the researcher to adopt the same connotation. 
Talbot Kennedy, the Principal Crown Prosecutor at CCU, for example, considered the 
value-based system as one of two basic principles beside the reparative aspect of the 
confiscation system. 
71This variable has been treated exclusively. This means that the responses of those who 
favoured both principles (11%) have not been included with those who either advocate the 
property-based (17%) system or the value-based system (32%). 
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Table (4.1) The value-based system 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Value-base 15 32% 8 57% 23 38% 
Property-base 8 17% 6 43% 14 23% 
No Answer 9 19% - - 9 15% 
Don't Know 7 15% - - 7 11% 
Favour both 5 11% - - 5 8% 
A ainstboth 3 6% - - 3 5% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
The numbers are too small to conduct detailed statistical tests but in the 
face of it there is a similarity between the two groups in that they were 
reasonably evenly divided between those aware of the property-based 
principle and those of the value-based principle. Except that the 
questionnaire group gave a much wider range of answers, including 'did 
not know' and 'no answer' (34% between them). This suggests that many 
of the respondents are either not familiar with the full applications of 
confiscation concerning the financial investigation processes, or were not 
able to distinguish any differences between the two main principles as 
they operate. The same point can be made in a different way. Regarding 
the perceptions of those others who were the interview group, it is 
interesting to note that over half advocated the value-based principle, 
while the remained favoured the property-based principle. All gave 
answers which were clear cut. This suggests that the second group of 
interviewees were more aware of the difference between the two 
principles than those in the questionnaire group. Some of the interview 
group who advocated the current system provided the following 
comments: 
'any investigation into property would be complex and lengthy'. 
'how would the police be able to deal with a situation where the 
only identified assets was a house? ' 
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These implies that the interview group thought that although the 
property-based system has certain attractions and would certainly be easier 
from an investigative point of view, it has certain provisions which are 
more complicated than the value-based system. Some financial 
investigators commented on that by indicating that the only solution for 
such a difficulty is to provide the police with more powers to evict and 
subsequently sell the house in order to realise the assets. 
The complexity of the property-based system, as some participants think, 
lies in terms of the means whereby the financial investigators are able to 
deal with property such as a family house. Here, the definition of a 
'house' is based upon the 'house' itself and the 'human relationships' 
which have become part and parcel of the 'house'. This means that one of 
the problems which associate the enforcement of the property-based 
system is in the difficulty and also the complexity of the separation process 
between the 'house' and its owner 'the whole family'. 
In spite of some of the comments received, it is difficult to see how such 
justifications are sufficient for not adopting a property-based system. The 
value-based system has provided the court with a power to exert a 
financial claim against the person whom the order is made; but if not 
paid, it may be realised in any property 'legally or illegally acquired' 
belongs to that person. Though the defendant has the right to choose 
which of his properties is to be realised, this does not mean that the family 
house is not at risk of realisation for a confiscation order. 
Another view was put forward by one number of the interview group 
who was against the property-based system said: 
'most of the drug traffickers in Britain keep their proceeds in cash or 
readily realisable assets. So by making the system property-based, 
this would help those middle range drug traffickers to avoid 
confiscation orders. But the value-based system is a 'catch-all' 
system, rather than being ' more selective' in its targets. 
This suggests that the support for the value-based principle is also based 
upon a new technique which could successfully deal with the 
convertibility of the proceeds and the assets of drug traffickers. 
Convertibility is considered to be the main problem in the enforcement of 
the property-based system, because this system is related only to the so 
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called tainted properties. The enforcement of a property-based system, as a 
matter of fact, does not always confine itself to those tainted properties for 
in most cases, the defendants are ordered to pay an equivalent fine. 
Convertibility itself, is not an obstacle in enforcing the system. 
Moreover, the social context and the class-relations of the drug traffickers 
could be an essential factor in deciding certain mechanisms and strategies 
for the enforcement of a special legislation for confiscation. It has been 
stated by some of the questionnaire group, when they were asked about 
the usefulness and the affects of relevant provisions, that the majority of 
drug trafficking cases are of low or middle level of offending. If we 
consider that Parliament is aware of the level of the majority of the drug 
dealers in England and Wales, then one can possibly understand the 
rationale of section 9 (1) of the DTA 1994, which provides that the 
confiscation orders shall be enforced as fines. This may mean that the 
levels of drug trafficking offences in the country can provide the 
legislators with indicators about the best enforcement techniques. But 
would the awareness of the levels of drug trafficking offences be the only 
factor to adopt this principle? As one of the questionnaire group said: 
'the value-based system requires less expenditure and funding'. 
Another, in commenting on the previous statement, referred to the 
American property-based system stating that 'the Americans needs to be 
partly self-financing and consequently looks to the property system to 
supply it with money, cars, etc. '. He described it as 'a payment by results 
system', and pointed out that it is not usually the best. 
Most of the practitioners believe that the costs is the underpinning reason 
to adopt the current system. With the property system, there is the cost of 
removal, storage and disposal which can place extra demands on the 
police service, mainly responsible for the application of the system. 
'Dealing with property is a headache' one says. 'It requires a great deal of 
storage, and staff dedicated to it's care'. A final and crucial statement 
concerning the property-based method is that it 'is difficult to dispose of 
and once disposed of, it is impossible to retrieve and is always susceptible 
to damage. The government, therefore, chooses the value-based system 
because of cost-effectiveness and for convenience of the exchequer'. 
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On the other hand, those who favoured the property-based system (17% of 
the questionnaire group) insisted that it saved valuable police time'; 'it is 
much easier and a straight-forward access to the restrained illegal gains 
and assets'; and 'property-based system would avoid complications and 
difficulties associated with assessment and valuation processes in the early 
stages of the confiscation proceedings'. 
Some of those who provided the 'don't know' responses in the 
questionnaire group (15%) indicated that they did not know about the 
property-based system and would only give a clear answer if they had 
experienced it or read enough about it. This seems odd coming from 
officers who are expected to enforce a system. Finally, there were those 
who thought that 'both systems have major defects, and both have 
complications and injustices'. Unfortunately, they did not explain what 
the complications were. However, looking closely at these 6% of 
responses, one can easily believe that they all support the confiscation 
principle albeit with some reservations. 
However, it is possible that the practical differences between the 
advantages and the disadvantages of both principles (property or value- 
based) can be achieved by simply comparing it with the current forfeiture 
system under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Powers of Criminal 
Courts Act 1973. In addition, there are other jurisdictions adopting the 
property-based system, and they could be compared with the British value- 
based system (the American, the French and the Egyptian confiscation 
system). It was not expected that these respondents should be aware of 
other confiscation systems, but at least they can differentiate between 
confiscation and forfeiture provided under the MDA 1971. 
4.2.1.2. Aim 2 Principles and Features 
This aim is mainly about the link with punishment and reparation. The 
confiscation system, as explained before, is ambiguous so much so that the 
system can be punitive or reparative. Accordingly several questions were 
asked aimed at determining the perceptions of the questionnaire and the 
interview groups about the features and procedures of the confiscation 
system. 
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The perceptions of the participants regarding the actual nature and impact 
of the confiscation system are included in the following six sub-categories: 
4.2.1.2.1. Punishment or Reparation 
The participants (questionnaires and interviews) were asked to give their 
views about the main feature of the system according to how it was 
experienced by them (Question No. 2). The responses show the following 
findings: 
Table (4.2) confiscation between punishment and reparation. 
Character Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Punishment 30 64% 13 93% 43 70% 
Reparation 5 11% 1 7% 6 10% 
Don't Know 9 19% - - 9 15% 
No Answer 3 6% - - 3 50 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
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Figure (4.2) Percentages concerning the nature of the system. 
As shown in Table 4.2, apart from the 12 who said they don't know or 
gave no answers- perhaps due to their lack of experience, the majority of 
the participants (30 in the questionnaire group and 13 in the interview 
group 43 or 70%%%, ) think that the confiscation system is a punitive one. 
Most of those who believe it so think it is aimed at redressing the 
wrongdoing acts of the offenders. This suggests that the participants think 
that although the system contains aspects of reparation, redress, and 
deterrence these are minor features when set against its punitive impact. 
Table (4.2) shows also that 6 participants (10', 'x, ) believe that the system is 
reparative in nature. Most of their answers reflect the government view 
and particularly the CCB written instructions which explain that the 
confiscation system is merely a means of reparation. 
Table 4.2 is interestingly in that whilst the interview group were less 
certain about the link with punishment the other group were more so. 
Only 1 saw that the nature of confiscation system is reparative. He stated: 
The ability to restrain and confiscate the assets must not he 
underestimated as a form of punishment' 
'It is not perceived as a formal penalty, but as the recovery of the 
benefits derived from an illegal act' 
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Again what seems to be happening is that the questionnaire group, police 
officers who operate the system had perhaps less knowledge of the 
existance of conflict in understanding or in classifying confiscation, or 
rather fewer areas of which of course must affect the way the system 
operates. 
4.2.1.2.2. The General Impact of the legislation 
Both groups were asked to express their views about whether they agree or 
disagree with the allegation that the system has no impact upon drug 
traffickers. The answers show that: 
Table (4.3) The determination of the impact of the system. 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
A ree 7 15% - - 7 11% 
Disagree 24 51% 14 100% 38 63% 
Don't Know 5 11% - - 5 8% 
No Answer 11 23% - - 11 18% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
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Figure (4.3) the percentages of the two groups concerning the impact of the system. 
All the interview group disagreed that the system had no impact upon 
drug traffickers, as did 24 of the questionnaire group. This meant thirty 
eight (63"(, ) of all the participants disagree with the views that confiscation 
has no impact upon the drug trafficking problem, while only (7 responses, 
11`, '(')) believe that the system has no impact at all. The questionnaire group 
provided the following comments: 
'The Act is described as being draconian and if the supposition is 
correct then there was no point in making it that way' 
If some wish to interpret it as such that is a matter for them, 
however, I believe the confiscation of ill-gotten gains strikes at the 
root of the problem and directly addresses the criminals' reason for 
drug trafficking. The removal of benefit,, is a sever blow to the 
traffickers' 
'I believe that the majority of drug traffickers have a greater fear of 
losing their assets than losing their liberty' 
'It appears to hurt the offender more than the threat of 
imprisonment' 
'Confiscation orders can make even bankruptcy seem generous as a 
receiver acting under the DTA or Proceeds of Crime Act can take 
every single asset, denen to the clothes the person is wearing. While 
criminal,, may roll over quietly and accept a prison sentence, they 
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will fight tooth and nail to keep their lifestyle sweet for their 
release'. 
They fight like dogs to avoid losing their assets. They do not mind 
too much doing five years in prison for drug trafficking, even doing 
another three years on top for not paying the confiscation order, but 
if you appoint a receiver to avoid doing the three years to make 
them pay, they will be instructing lawyers and fighting the 
receivership order, and the house won't be theirs, it will be wife's, 
etc. Every excuse and every stop is pulled out to avoid paying the 
order'. 
These statements from the questionnaire group imply that the majority of 
police financial investigators believe that the confiscation order has a 
punitive impact upon the convicted drug traffickers. This assertion does 
not arise out of a vacuum, but as was previously mentioned, it 
corresponds with a prevailing jurisprudential view derived from certain 
legal cases. 
Those who believe that the system has no impact (15%), from the 
questionnaire group, said the following: (a) confiscation is not even a 
formal penalty, it is the recovery of benefits derived from illegal acts; (b) it 
is an inconvenience rather than a punishment; (c) the actual application 
suggests that confiscation is not a penalty. 
From the interview group, DS from the Financial Investigation Unit in 
the West-Yorkshire Police, states: 
'I don't think a confiscation order as penal. A sentence is penal, but 
the imposition of confiscation order is not part of the sentence itself. 
Because what the DTOA 1986 said was, that before you could 
sentence, you had to impose a confiscation order. In other words the 
two things are completely different. A confiscation orders merely 
reparation of profits you have made from the offence' 
These comments suggest that they exist either as a result of the awareness 
of the differences between the two mentioned theories or they are just a 
comment upon certain adopted applications for the legislation. This 
suggests that their understanding is based upon those early decisions of 
some courts that confiscation is reparative. It might be also due to the 
belief that the government or the police force is not serious enough about 
showing the strengths of the confiscation provisions. That is that the 
force, for certain reasons do not favour applying the system in full. 
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Sixteen or 26 per cent (18% + 8%) of the responses of both groups provided 
either an unclear or irrelevant answers, or no answer at all. This could be 
related, as indicated earlier, to the limited experience and knowledge of 
the newly appointed officers. For example these are some of the 
comments they made on the interview group; 
DS from West Midlands Police, CCB, indicates that confiscation is partly 
deterrent, it is an extra means of punishment. 
DS from Gwent Constabulary and DS from South Yorkshire Police 
asserted that confiscation is a very powerful law and it is very draconian. 
DS (Gwent Police) states that if the money rather than the person is 
attacked there would perhaps be a deterrent effect to stop the person from 
being a drug trafficker in the first place. 
Others from the interview group gave same measure of agreement but the 
answers were more considered. 
Financial investigator from Customs & Excise Department, FIU, indicates 
that confiscation is a very strong piece of legislation. It does prevent 
people from drug trafficking because it impose a severe financial 
punishment. 
DI from (Leicester Police) believed that confiscation has no problem as 
legislation but the problem is in its adopted machinery. The assumption 
provision under section 4 of DTA 1994 hurts drug traffickers by taking 
cash money and by destroying the drugs, and even if they get bail, they are 
deprived of their stock in the drug and the cash in order to buy some new 
drugs. It does hurt them. 
A prosecutor from CCB, indicates that if the assets of drug traffickers are 
confiscated then that hits them where it really hurts. Confiscation 
legislation is a very heavy weapon to use. In small cases, it is a bit of a 
sledgehammer to crack a nut. 
Finally, CI from City of London Police, asserted that confiscation is a 
deterrent, but it is not a major one because it has not started to bite yet 
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because currently it is not as effective as it should be for a number of 
reasons which are mostly related to the ways of its applications and 
funding. Confiscation is considered as an additional deterrent beside 
prison. 
He also states 
Certainly, the way the legislators have viewed it and the way the 
courts are supposed to view it, it is not a penalty in its own right. 
The court deals with punishment to be dished out in respect of the 
prime criminality and then and only then do they look at the 
confiscation which is all about having proved that a person has 
benefited from a crime, removing that benefit from him. That's the 
theory. But, as I said, in practice what we are finding is that some 
prosecution lawyers, defence lawyers and judges actually view it as 
punitive and therefore they use it as a bargaining tool for the 
sentence. The theory is that it is just supposed to remove the benefit 
from the crime but not as a penalty per se. 
While the theory is that it is not punitive, to the criminals it is. 
They see themselves losing everything they have criminally 
strived to get. The problems are, the whole system at the moment is 
not as effective as it should be. So, the efforts put in by police 
officers and customs officers, to restrain funds aren't going all the 
way through the criminal justice system so the criminals aren't 
paying. If we say they should be paying £1,000,000 and, at the end 
of the day, they are only paying £20,000, it sort of diminishes the 
effectiveness. Because, elsewhere in the criminal justice systems, our 
work is being diluted; it is having an effect on us. But, yes, the first 
part of that statement I support. I think in the eyes of the criminals, 
it is seen as the most painful area of their sentence, that they lose 
the money that they have criminally acquired. 
One could add by saying that confiscation can be considered as a punitive 
procedure and it is so not only in the eyes of drug traffickers and some 
barristers, but also in the eyes of the nine judges at the Strasbourg Court 
who ruled unanimously in 1995 that a British court acted unlawfully in 
trying to confiscate £59,000 of Peter Welch's drug profits after he was 
convicted of a plot to smuggle £4 million of cannabis into the UK72. 
72Peter Welch was arrested in November 1986 and charged with drug offences. He was 
found guilty in August 1988 and sentenced to 22 years' imprisonment. The judge made a 
confiscation order for £66,914 under the Act, which came into force in January 1987, two 
months after his arrest. 
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4.2.1.2.3. The Sweeping Assumptions 
Describing the 'required assumptions' which are provided under section 4 
of the DTA 1994 as 'draconian', 'sweeping', 'an extraordinarily wide 
power' by those who wrote about the system, as explained in previous 
chapters of this study, would lead us to examine the perceptions of those 
practitioners of the confiscation provisions in everyday life. This question 
was addressed mainly to the interview group. 
The answers show that all the 14 interviewees believe that these 
descriptions are correct. Some of the interviewees refer to the wide extent 
of the provision where it did not exclude any property of any kind. One, 
for instance, indicates that 
'If it appears to the court that the defendant has held property at 
any time since his conviction, or that property has been transferred 
to him within the relevant six year period, or that he has made any 
expenditures within that period the court must assume that the 
property or expenditure is connected with drug trafficking, unless 
the assumption is shown to be incorrect in the defendant's case, or 
the court is satisfied that there would be a serious risk of injustice if 
the assumption were to be made' 
DI from West-Midlands Police indicates that it is 'draconian' and 
sweeping because section 4 (1) of the DTA 1994 provides that any payment 
or other rewards received by a person at any time in connection with drug 
trafficking carried on by him or another person can be considered for 
confiscation. He referred to the nature of the application or the way these 
assumptions are applied by the courts. He also indicated that an 
application required the judge to assume that there is a connection 
between the property of the person and the drug trafficking offence(s). 
This provision is mainly based on guesswork not on evidence properly 
tested before a jury. 
DC (Gwent Police Force, S. Wales) pointed out that the extraordinary and 
the unusual consequences which one expects from implementing the 
confiscation system explains why some judges are reluctant to apply the 
provision or even consider the confiscation legislation. CCB attributed 
such reluctance to a belief that when assessing the worth of a convicted 
drug dealer's assets all too often one was forced to take 'blind stabs in the 
dark' and he found it 'impossible to be precise'. 
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The majority of the responses did not provide differing views than what 
have been just indicated by the above mentioned interviewees. 
Accordingly, the responses provided clear evidence that to apply the 
confiscation system, the law enforcement agencies need only to assume 
that there is a relation between the property of any person and certain 
drug trafficking offence(s). Where the provision cover all the property of 
the defendant which include the illegal gains, all subsequent investments, 
and all the gifts which were given to the members of the family or even 
friends, the punitive impact is the dominant feature of the system. 
4.2.1.2.4. Receivership 
Another aspect of the legislation which also could support the attempt to 
determine the link with punishment or reparation is where the 
enforcement of the system is held by a receiver. In this case where a 
defendant is not co-operating, a receiver may be appointed by the High 
Court. The legislature has empowered the receiver to realise properties 
equivalent to the amount of the confiscation order. This decision 
embraces properties legally or illegally acquired by the defendant. Here the 
confiscation system is implicitly extended to include legally gained assets. 
This means that in the case where the value-based provision did not work 
due to, for example, the defendant himself not co-operating, the receiver 
is empowered to apply a property-based system. And this system is applied 
not against particular illegal gains or assets, but to any assets whether 
legally or illegally acquired by the defendant. Accordingly, if the property- 
based system is seen to collide with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, in particular, article 6, by overriding the defendant's proprietary 
rights in any specific property, then it follows that the confiscation system 
by including this particular provision would breach the rights of the 
defendants. This breaching of the rights could also be considered as 
promoting a further aspect of the punitive principle of the system. 
One respondent from the interview group explained the main function of 
the receiver by saying: 
'If the defendant does not pay the order, his house, for example, 
may have to be sold and if he does not sell it voluntarily then a 
receiver may be appointed to sell it'. 
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Another, CI (City of London Police) when asked about his perception of 
the extent of powers of the legislation, pointed out that: 
'The defendants do not mind an extra 3 years for not paying the 
confiscation order too much, but if you appoint a receiver to avoid 
doing the three years to make them pay, they will be instructing 
lawyers and fighting the receivership order' (Cl Thomas, City of 
London Police). 
Appointing a receiver by the High Court means a definite recovery of the 
confiscation order. The receiver, as explained above, is empowered to 
realise any available property which can satisfy a confiscation order. The 
powers vested to the receiver explain the reactions of the defendants as 
indicated by Cl Thomas. 
4.2.1.2.5. Default Sentence 
One respondent from the interview group stated that 'the receiver would 
take what he could and, if there is a shortfall, it will be met by additional 
prison sentence (default sentence) and only if it is worthwhile'. This 
statement provides that one of the features of the confiscation system is 
that it includes an additional period of imprisonment which may extend 
to 10 years in addition to the original sentence for the offence. The system 
is designed to be enforced as a fine. A fine is considered in the British 
criminal justice system as a punishment which can be imposed alone. 
Another interviewee pointed out that if the defendant has not satisfied 
the confiscation order during the time-to-pay outlined in it, or when his 
original prison term has or is about to expire, and no receiver has been 
appointed, then the enforcing magistrate's court is faced with a decision 
whether to make the defendant pay or to issue a warrant of commitment 
to make the defendant serve the sentence of imprisonment in default 
which was stated by the Crown Court. He added that the subsequent 
amendments provided under the CJA 1993 (s. 6 (7)) are, inter alia, meant 
to strengthen such cases by ensuring that the magistrates' courts consider 
or try all measures to enforce payment before issuing a warrant of 
commitment. He explained that although the amended provision 
provides that a defendant who serves a term of imprisonment in default 
does not escape the confiscation order, which may mean that the 
confiscation order continues in effect and may be enforced by other means, 
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jail sentence, as a main option. Accordingly, and because no one can argue 
that imprisonment is not penal, and the default sentence is actually 
inclusive in the provisions of the confiscation system, this in consequence 
establishes and strengthens the added punitive feature of the system. 
Moreover, measuring the size of the default sentence compared with the 
amount of the confiscation order may indicates that both the confiscation 
order and imprisonment have the same effect upon drug traffickers. This 
means that if imprisonment is a punishment then the confiscation order 
must be the same. 
The responses of the other interviewees did not provide any different 
views than these mentioned perceptions concerning the punitive feature 
of the default provision provided under the confiscation system. 
4.2.1.2.6. Retrospectivity of Confiscation 
Finally there is the question of confiscation which was made 
retrospectively. This question was addressed to both groups. For the first 
time in any English statute, the retrospective provision under section 4 (3) 
requires the court, for the purpose of determining what the benefits are, to 
make a confiscation order which is to reflect activity carried out by the 
defendant of which he has not been convicted. 
There was considerable unanimity of view- in fact more so here than 
anywhere else. The questionnaire group provided that 43 out of the 47 
participants (91%) think that this is the right approach, whilst only one 
participant (2%) disagreed with it and he did not say why he thought so. 
Most of the respondents in this group who supported the system thought 
that the time limit addressed in the legislation was not enough, and the 
prosecution should be allowed to go back any number of years they 
thought fit. 
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Table (4.4) Shows the support of the retrospective effect of the system. 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Yes 43 91% 14 100% 57 93% 
No 1 2% - - 1 2% 
No Answer 3 7% - - 3 5% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
Figure (4.4) The percentage of those advocating the retrospective provision in the DTA 
1994. 
It is interesting that of the interview group all 14 advocated the 
importance of the retrospective effect in the confiscation system, and in 
particular in serving the assumption provision. One pointed out: 
'The English and Wales Domestic Drug Trafficking Offences Act 
requires the court to determine what the benefit is from drug 
trafficking of the convicted defendant at any time since the 
defendant was born. It is not restricted to six years at all. And it also 
requires the court to determine the drug trafficking carried out by 
the defendant anywhere in the world, not just in England and Wales. 
He also added 
'I do not know why a six year period was chosen. I do not think there 
is any significance in six years. I have never heard it said that there 
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is. I think it was just an arbitrary time period. How long should we 
go back? Three years, may be not long enough, seven years, that is a 
bit long. Shall we make it 6? why not? ' 
He went on to indicate 
The significance of the six year period is purely a practical one to 
help the court conclude what that benefit might be and is only for 
the operation of the assumptions and also the gift provisions which 
also relate to six years prior to when he was charged. So, in other 
words, if the prosecution is compiling a section 3 statement for the 
assessment of the court, and it wants to show what the benefits are. 
It can look at any transfers to the defendant over the last six years 
and set this out. It can also look at any expenditure incurred by the 
defendant over the last six years or a period longer than that 
because the six years is six years prior to when he was charged and 
that just signifies the starting point and it runs all the way through 
to when he is convicted. So if he is convicted, say, a year after he is 
charged, then in effect, you have a seven year period, not just the six 
year period. But it can look at transfers to the defendant, it can look 
at expenditure incurred by the defendant and you can just set those 
out and the prosecution do not have to show a direct link between 
this expenditure and the drug trafficker. The court can assume there 
is a link under the assumptions in Section 2. So Section 3 statement 
might say over the last six years, he had £300,000 transferred to his 
bank account, he has got a very expensive house, he has an 
expensive car bought for him and the cost of that has been £20,000, 
therefore, using these assumptions, there is £320,000. The burden 
then shifts to the defendant to prove that expenditure and those 
transfers were not received by him or incurred by him from drugs 
trafficking. The Section 3 statement may also say '... and when he 
was interviewed, the defendant admitted that, say, in 1963, he sold 
a consignment of heroin for £100,000 and that was obviously prior to 
the six year period but the prosecution is relying on positive proof 
that he has benefited from drug trafficking. It does not have to be an 
admission from the defendant. It might be other evidence which the 
prosecution might have about trafficking carried on by him. He 
might say I have been doing it for fifteen years and what I got last 
year is about what I got fifteen years ago, and in those 
circumstances, the prosecution would not be relying on the 
assumptions in which case they can only look at six years, but would 
be providing positive evidence of its own' 
Customs & Excise Department (interview group ) indicates that it is not a 
new phenomena in the Criminal Justice System. 'The Inland Revenue 
has a general rule of six years', she believes that the law has been drawn 
up in line with that. 
Finally, CI from City of London Police, asserted that the benefit of the 
legislation lies in its retrospective effect. 'Once we catch somebody, we can 
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go back for a long time and catch up all those other offences, all those 
importation which we think he has done, if we can make a good case'. 
When the ruling of Strasbourg Court in' Welch's case in 1995 was 
mentioned, the Chief Inspector commented 'I am convinced that the laws 
we have are just and appropriate for dealing with drug dealers. The ruling 
of Strasbourg Court asserted what I just said that in practice many people 
in Britain and particularly those work in the drug squads and the financial 
investigation business believe that the legislation is punitive, and the 
retrospective effect is one of the main tools of the punitive part of the 
confiscation legislation'. 
4.2.1.3. Summary 
The aims in this section were to determine the nature, features and the 
main principles of the confiscation legislation as viewed by the 
questionnaire and the interview groups. The results show that although 
the perceptions (by percentages) of the interview group were almost 
similar to the police financial investigators (the questionnaire group), the 
high ranking and the administrative officials show that they were more 
aware about the issues discussed in this section concerning the content of 
the first two aims of this chapter. e. g. all of the relevant questions in this 
section were completely answered by the interview group while there 
were some financial investigators who provided no answer or did not 
know enough information about the system they were applying. In 
general, this section provided that the majority of the participants from 
both groups advocate the adopted value-based system and believe that the 
confiscation order is an additional punishment to imprisonment. 
4.2.2. The Application Aspect of the System 
This section include the data that are relevant to the issues of aims 3 and 
4. These aims are about the perceptions of the participants of both groups 
in relation to the application and methods of enforcement and the 
demands of the legislation. It has been indicated previously that the 
execution of confiscation provisions by the police varies among the 43 
constabularies in England and Wales. This variation is mainly a 
consequence of two main issues: (a) the nature of the relationship between 
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the government and the police forces (For example, Cl from the interview 
group indicated that there are forty three autonomous chief constable who 
'nobody can tell them what to do'). 
and (b) variations in priorities of each police force. Each police force has a 
different 'agenda' which depends upon the problems likely to be 
encountered in each police district. This variation is reflected in the way 
the financial investigations are conducted by each of these police forces. 
A group of questions were presented to the participants in an attempt to 
explore their views about the above two aims. A detailed analysis of the 
relevant data for each of these two aims is provided. Five questions were 
asked in an attempt to determine aim 3 (the extent of consistency between 
the powers provided in the legislation and the way enforcement is 
adopted by the police forces). The first question is about the general 
consistency between the provisions of law and the policies of 
enforcement. The second is about the problem of disclosure of the identity 
of informants (directed only to the interview group). The third is about 
the level of enforcement. The fourth is about the shortcomings in 
enforcement and if any their main causes. And the last is about the 
perception of the participants concerning the current government policy 
with the recovered proceeds. 
4.2.2.1. Aim 3 Consistency 
The responses to the first question by both groups show that 36 or 59% of 
them think that the current enforcement strategies correspond well with 
the provisions of the legislation, while 18 or 30% believe to the contrary as 
illustrated in table (4.5). 
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Table (4.5) The perceptions of the participant about the consistency of the system. 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Yes 24 51% 12 86% 36 59% 
No 16 34% 2 14% 18 30% 
Don't Know 2 4% - - 2 3% 
No Answer 5 1 1% - - 5 8% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
Figure (4.5) the perception of the participants about the consistency between the law and its 
enforcement (theory and practice) 
The responses show that the high majority at the interview group (12 out 
of 14) provided similar answers while the results of the questionnaire 
group were divided to four different responses. The similarity between the 
two groups show those who operate the legislation correspond well with 
its provisions. 
lohen pressed further the 30°(, of the participants from both groups who 
believe that there is no consistency between the law and its practice said so 
for two main reasons: (a) the financial support and training courses 
needed for achieving the purposes of the legislation are not sufficient; (b) 
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the enforcement of provisions is restricted to certain conditions. One of 
these is, for example, the so called minimum threshold policy where an 
application for a restrain order is restricted by regulating a minimum 
threshold policy. This means that the value of assets which is less that the 
minimum amount provided by CCB will not be allowed to be restrained. 
More details to follow: 
4.2.2.1.1. The Minimum Threshold Policy 
One of the questionnaire group who believes that the enforcement system 
provided by the legislation must be restricted to certain level of drug 
trafficking cases, says: 
'I think there should be a minimum amount for a confiscation order to 
apply. I believe the legislation was intended for serious drug 
suppliers who make many thousands of pounds from their dealings. 
As it is at the moment someone making just five pounds from a deal is 
included in the legislation. A minimum figure would allow us to 
concentrate on dealing with the type of person the legislation was 
intended for' 
This statement implies that the powers provided for the enforcement of 
the confiscation system were designed to be enforced against serious drug 
trafficking cases. The seriousness of the cases, of course, depend upon the 
amount or the value of the proceeds and profits each drug trafficker has. 
So the impact of the system may be more obvious when it is directed to 
high level criminals. The statement also indicates that the enforcement of 
confiscation orders for all kinds of drug trafficking offences could 
negatively affect the investigation process, and so result in dispersing the 
efforts which would otherwise be directed to serious drug trafficking cases. 
Another said: 
'At the moment the level we look at is £5,000 plus. If it is not more 
than that, we won't touch it because it is not financially viable to do 
so. Less than that is not worth the effort. So we try to do it but in 
forfeiture law, or we won't take it at all' 
Here the point is made that some police forces advocate a minimum 
threshold policies. That is some police forces apply a minimum of £2000, 
whilst others only consider a confiscation order when the assets or the 
proceeds exceeds £10,000. 
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'In the cases where offenders have realisable assets of £10,000 or 
more, the law works well. In cases where the defendants have less 
than that in assets, the law does not allow for a restraint order. CPS 
and CCB will not apply for a restraint order at the High Court for 
amounts less than £10,000'. 
'If the proceeds or the profits are under certain amounts, they are not 
interested in this Act at all. It is because it is designed for 10,000 
pounds plus, and there aren't many drug traffickers at street and 
middle level that are ever going to reach that'. 
Another, this time from the interview group pointed out that financial 
investigation officers welcome the fact that the new provisions of the CJA 
1993 enabled them to avoid wasting time making detailed reports to the 
court on offenders whom they 'know' have no assets, but he expressed 
concerns about a high 'minimum threshold figure' for confiscation 
applications by the CPS. 
The new discretionary power vested in the prosecution and the courts 
regarding a confiscation order has indeed, as many officers confirmed, met 
with a great satisfaction and appreciation from most of the enforcement 
agencies (s. 2 (1) (a) (b), DTA 1994). However, these provisions are quite 
irrelevant. The minimum threshold policy is required if the police force 
applied for restraint order. Parliament has not included such a condition 
in the DTOA 1986 and even in the DTA 1994 but it is provided in the 
confiscation system. 
In justifying the minimum policy, the interviewed prosecutor asserted 
that the CCB normal minimum threshold for drugs trafficking cases was 
already set at £5,000 in 1986, and by statue is £10,000 in fraud and other 
cases under the CJA 1988, and has not changed since. This is meant to be a 
way of rationing scarce resources to deal with the more complex cases 
where restraint is seen as 'worthwhile' and as 'cost-effective'. 
One may inquire, in this respect, why Parliament has stated the limit in 
the CJA 1988 while this is not the case in the subsequent amended DTA 
1994? It is suspected that Parliament intended to confine such provisions 
only to drug trafficking offences, and did not want to impose any such 
restrictions on enforcing them in confiscation proceedings. 
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The financial investigators and all those involved in the enforcement of 
the confiscation system, have the right to suggest a restriction(s) on the 
imposition of confiscation or even on an extension of confiscation 
powers. However, irrespective of any such justifications, adopting a policy 
that has no base or is against certain principles in the legislation, would be 
considered, of course, a breach in the supremacy of law. 
The other view, however, embraces the complaints by some respondents 
from the questionnaire group about this particular inconsistency which 
they say is mainly caused by some enforcement agencies. The following 
statements were extracted from the answers of the questionnaire group to 
a similar question: 
The current CCB policy of not going for restraint and confiscation 
below £10,000 has prevented us from confiscating the working 
capital of street-level dealers, which is an important objective, 
irrespective of whether or not it is financially cost-effective to 
make and enforce the order. Traffickers' who do small deals over an 
extended period of time generate considerable cash flows' 
The DTOA is probably the easiest English statute to understand, 
yet the courts would appear not to take sufficient cognisance of it 
which can sometimes be quite disappointing after a protracted 
investigation' 
'It is a lengthy process, but once the court have determined that a 
person has benefited from drug trafficking, that person's assets 
should be immediately made known to the court and a confiscation 
order invoked there and then, to recover the person's assets, 
whether they be monetary or realisable property. The trafficker 
should not benefit, however little, from the trade' 
4.2.2.1.2. Conviction and Disclosure 
The conviction of suspects -a logical prerequisite of confiscation 
provisions- is affected profoundly by the issue of informant disclosure (the 
second question). DI from the interview group (West-Midlands Police) 
provided the following statement 
The big problem we have at the moment is disclosure. Disclosure to 
the defence of unused material or the identity of the informants. The 
pendulum has swung far too far one way and we were having to 
abandon a lot of cases because the defence were trying to discover the 
identify of informants. In a few cases, it was reasonable for their 
defence to say that we need to know the identity of informants but, 
in many cases, it was just a ploy for them to get the case pulled. And 
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it was not uncommon for us to reach a position in a prosecution where 
we would have to make a decision, do we sacrifice the informant or 
do we pull the plug?. We have lobbied Parliament significantly and 
there is a new Act of Parliament about to come out where it makes 
the disclosure issues, in theory at least, more manageable. The 
pendulum is starting to swing back. But it is still a major problem. 
With every investigation, now, before we start the investigation, 
we look at what the disclosure issues are' 
He also added 
There are mechanisms for us to protect sensitive information and we 
can. Ultimately, we can have a secret hearing (ex party hearing) 
with the judge, where we can put information before the judge and 
we can say this is not only sensitive but, if the defence were to learn 
that we were before you, it could cause problems. If the judge rules in 
our favour, the defence never knows the issue has ever been raised. 
So there are mechanisms to deal with it, but it is a major problem. A 
major operational and practical problem. One with which I struggle 
with almost daily. 
Accordingly, he suggested the following 
'The only possibility to which I would give some consideration, but I 
would have to think about it carefully, is whether we really need to 
have a criminal conviction to pursue drug traffickers at all. At the 
moment, the conviction is only a trigger, in any event, and, as I said 
earlier, a person can be made the subject of a confiscation order, 
taking into account trafficking of which he has not been convicted. 
So what is the point or the object of having a conviction in advance. I 
suppose it makes the confiscation legislation a little bit more 
parliamentary palatable. But that is about all' 
This issue is rarely questioned or mentioned, but it was briefly referred to 
in the literature by Levi & Osofsky 1995 report. The issue, as the report 
indicates, is often neglected but and was dealt with to a certain extent in 
the Report of the Royal Commission (p. 1). The point of inconsistency, is 
not whether there is agreement about having conviction as a prerequisite 
condition for confiscation, but about the subsequent problem in 
confiscation proceedings which could be solved from within the 
legislation itself. 
4.2.2.1.3. Level of Enforcement 
Two main issues dominated the argument about level of enforcement 
(the third question). The first is about the minimum threshold policy 
which has been discussed above, and the second, is related to the three 
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tiers strategy in dealing with drug trafficking offences. These two issues are 
interconnected. The following, is a detailed analysis of the perceptions of 
the participants about the second issue. 
4.2.2.1.3.1. The Three Tier Strategy 
It has been shown above that there is a strategy in dealing with drug 
trafficking cases. This strategy is based upon a structure which consists of 
three tires (Broome Committee, see chapter one). In practice, DI from the 
interview group (West-Midlands Police) says: 
'The strategy of the force is mainly based on the national 
programme for the nation. The governmental policy made most 
police forces adopt similar strategies in combating Drugs Crime. 
They are basically the same. The way they go about collecting 
revenue maybe different. That depends on the courts. It depends on 
the procedures. But, at the end of the day, it is a national policy 
which they should adhere to'73 
Accordingly, most police forces deal with drug trafficking offences by 
following a similar structure to that suggested by the Broome Committee. 
The DI indicates that there are variation in the structure but generally 
speaking there are three levels of drug dealers: (a) level one: the ones at 
the bottom of the pyramid, who are the street dealers, they're supposed to 
be dealt with by the Divisional Crime Support Unit; (b) level two: the next 
one up on the pyramid are those who actually distribute the drugs to the 
street dealers, and they are designated to the Force Drug Squads; and (c) 
level three: the people at the apex of the pyramid, who are distributing the 
drugs country-wide to dealers who are dealing at street level (people who 
are importing). They have been dealt with by the RCS, drugs wings in 
conjunction with customs (West Midlands Police, FIU). 
He also states that: 
'RCS have to target the life-style drugs dealer, they do that 
through technical aids, through facilities and technical means 
which we don't tend to do. We tend to operate purely on a local base 
within a 25 miles of the centre of Birmingham. We are obligated as 
a drugs Squad to go to the RCS if we want to go nation-wide, or to go 
to Customs if we think it is an importation'. 
73The interviewee here referring to the three tiers suggested by Broome Committee and 
adopted by the Government and police forces. 
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The inconsistency here concerns the relationship among: the level of the 
majority of drug traffickers in the areas under the control of police forces; 
the minimum threshold policy; and the restraint order. The function of 
financial investigation units in the local police forces, according to this 
structure, is confined to the level of drug traffickers in their areas. If the 
majority of the dealers and even distributors in their areas do not have 
assets which can reach the minimum threshold policy of CCB, which 
most of the time is £10,000 or as some claim £15,000, then the restraint 
order will not take place. The FIUs (whom they involve in the 
proceedings where assets have to be restrained through the High Court in 
London), will not be able or allowed to apply for a restraint order even for 
cases with amounts near the minimum, in order to be consistent with the 
provisions under the legislation or any related rules and regulations. It 
seems then that the rules and regulations aim to simplify and clarify any 
vague or ambiguous provisions, but, at the same time, they should not 
stipulate or restrict the application of certain intended principles in the 
legislation. 
Furthermore DS from Greater Manchester Police in the interview group 
states: 
The problem we have is that the people who we are picking on on a 
street level have no assets. So at the end of the day it doesn't work 
on those. The people it does w'rk on are at the top' 
'We deal with street dealers, the middle management dealer type. 
They don't have assets, so you don't seize the assets. They don't 
have anything'. 
Compare this to one respondent from the questionnaire group who 
asserts that: 
The vast majority of drug offenders are at the bottom end of the 
social scale and accordingly have little or no assets to make 
confiscation a viable option' 
The majority of persons caught by the Act are on the lower end of 
drugs network' 
'Too much time was being spent on low level dealers. It was fairly 
obvious that they had few assets' 
'We are not allowed to use the full force of the legislation' 
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In answering the question about the desired changes the participants said 
they would like to add to the current applications. One of the respondents 
from the questionnaire group indicates: 
'I would like to recommend a way to restrain assets under £10,000. 
One new aspect which may cause problems in the future, is the CCB 
decision to limit the cases where the courts will be obliged to 
consider a confiscation order or where the amount of the restraint 
order is over £ 10,000' 
Another respondent from the same group suggests: 
The majority of cases involve suspected proceeds below that figure, 
but are nevertheless major cases in their particular area. It will be 
interesting to see whether the judges use their prerogative and 
continue to consider confiscation orders for all convicted drug dealers 
as a matter of course' 
One last perception is 
'I feel that any serious case should be judged on its merits, without 
the £10,000 bar' 
These quotations offer evidence to suggest that a large part of the 
participants understand the way the confiscation system works. More 
often the participants attribute any problems to the law; e. g. 'the law does 
not allow', although, in fact, this is not quite true. Here one can envisage 
how the application of the legislation is affected by these policies, so that 
for example certain law enforcement agencies may restrict the execution of 
particular provisions of the law. The policy of the CCB, for example, 
restricts the application for restraint orders to a limited amount (not less 
than £10,000). This restriction is not provided in the legislation. 
4.2.2.1.4. Restraint Order 
In addition to that above, there are two other related controversial issues. 
These are: (a) the variation of the restraint order; and (b) the fees for the 
receiver. The following is a brief analysis of how these two issues are 
relevant. 
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4.2.2.1.4.1. Variation 
Restraint orders under this legislation can be varied by the High Court. 
Sub-section 26 (6) provides that 'an application for the discharge or 
variation of a restraint order may be made by any person affected by it'. 
This is the source of complaints from some of the participants who 
observe that the proceeds and benefits which are restrained by a High 
Court order, are always dissipated by allowing the defendant, his family, or 
his lawyers to be able to apply to vary the restraint order. This leads them 
taking up the money that should go to the central funds. Although 
defendants are entitled to maintain their innocence, some participants 
question the appropriateness of allowing the defendants' families to 
continue spending money proven to be proceeds of drug trafficking. 
One respondent from the questionnaire group expresses that 
'I fail to understand a system which permits a drug trafficker to 
draw on assets that are pending confiscation' 
Compare this to comments from a member from the interview group, DS 
from Gwent Constabulary indicates: 
The system allows offenders or defendants to spend the seized 
money just prior to the confiscation order. It just seems a little 
unusual and ironic that they allow them to do that beforehand (in 
advance). By allowing the variation, the legislation will lose its 
main purpose' 
DS from Dyfed & Powys Police Force says 
'I don't understand why there is any problem when there is a 
restraint order. The only problem is when the defendant is allowed 
to take part of the money for certain needs (living expenses and cost 
of lawyers... etc. )' 
Accordingly, the restraining powers were described under this legislation 
as 'toothless'. This implies that some participants believe that if a 
restraining power is not strict or inalterable, the confiscation legislation 
will not achieve its purposes. It would become useless, and this is where 
inconsistency occurs. 
The financial investigator of the interview group in Custom & Excise 
Department, on the other hand, indicates that in the restraint order the 
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offender can indeed use his properties but he cannot sell them. All legal 
expenses are taxed before payment. This may mean that although the 
restraint orders could be varied, and the law did not provide any 
conditions for that, the court would allow it only for certain indispensable 
necessities and obligations like for instance, the legal fees and school fees 
for children. 
4.2.2.1.4.2. Cost-effectiveness and The Economical Viability 
Once a restraint order has been issued, the legislation vests in the High 
Court the power to appoint a receiver 'to take possession of any realisable 
property, and in accordance with the court's direction, to manage or 
otherwise deal with any property... '. Application for appointment of a 
receiver under this provision may be made only by a prosecutor, and the 
prosecutor generally pays the costs of the receiver. If the receiver is 
appointed after the confiscation order is made, the costs are paid from the 
proceeds recovered. However, if the receiver is appointed before the order 
is made, the costs are paid by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). 
Charges to the department which are not recoverable from assets are 
avoided wherever possible by the prosecution and even by Customs & 
Excise. 
Two members of the interview group believe that the current application 
in regard to appointing a receiver by the police force is described as not 
cost-effective and that receivership costs a lot of money. An officer from 
West-Midland Police, explained that by saying: 
To appoint a receivership wouldn't be economically viable. I mean, 
they cost something like £200 a day. So if a person only had £2,000 
worth of assets, it would take a receiver something like 10 days to 
put it into practice. By that time it is more than the confiscation 
order is worth. It is not common sense to layout £2,000 or £5,000 
chasing £1,000 only £1,000. It becomes a matter of economic 
viability' 
CCB asserts that it would be irrational to spend public money in pursuing 
restraint cases if the defendant would not be able to retain the proceeds. 
The courts are willing to permit the restrained proceeds to be spent on 
those purposes. So the main effect is by preventing assets from being 
restrained and receivers from being appointed. This implies that the 
development of confiscation cases and in particular, those which entail a 
171 
Chapter Four The Views and Experiences of the British Police 
need for a restraint order, relies heavily upon whether the prosecutor 
believes it is liable or not. Any preconceived suspicion of any expenditures 
may put the whole case at risk of revocation. 
4.2.2.1.5. The Politics of Proceeds 
Section 9 (1) of the DTA 1994 postulates that: 
'Where the Crown Court orders the defendant to pay any amount 
under section 2 of this Act, sections 31,32 of the Powers of Criminal 
Courts Act 1973 shall have effect as if the amount were a fine 
imposed on him by the Crown Court'. 
This section deals with the regulations concerned with the collected 
amounts of fine under the MDA 1973 Act used with the amounts of 
confiscation orders. These regulations provide that the amounts of the 
fine and subsequently the amounts of the confiscation orders go straight to 
the Treasury Department. The legislation did not provide any indication 
that the proceeds or part of the proceeds can be returned to the appropriate 
police force or to Customs & Excise or to any other relevant agency. This 
issue was the central objective of several studies which helped the police 
in their clash with the government about the recovered property and cash 
money (Feldman, 1988, Zander, 1989, Levi & Osofsky 1995). Accordingly, 
the perceptions of the practitioners is one of the main aims of the field 
work. A question is addressed to the participants and the interviewees to 
determine their perceptions about this issue, especially when other 
jurisdictions, for example, the American system, empowers the courts to 
order the return of all or part of the proceeds to those who initiated the 
case. 
The numbers and the percentages shown in table (4.6) reveals that 50 out 
of 61 or 81% of all the participants disagree with the existing regulations. 
This means that the great majority of the responses are against the current 
policy of disposing the recovered proceeds and assets of drug trafficking 
offences by transferring them to the Consolidated Treasury Fund, where 
all the proceeds go to Treasury Department, while only (7%) of the 
responses do agree with the current governmental policy. There were 
differences between the two groups. 
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Table (4.6) The attitude of the participants from the government policy in dealing with 
the recovered proceeds 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Agree - - 4 29% 4 7% 
Disagree 40 85% 10 71% 50 81% 
Don't Know 4 9% - - 4 7% 
No Answer 3 6% - - 3 5% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
Figure (4.6) The proceeds between Law enforcement agencies and Treasury 
The analysis of this data reveals that there is also disagreement amongst 
the respondents about who should benefit from the proceeds? Some 
respondents from the questionnaire group want the proceeds to be 
allocated to the police force: 
The investigation of drug trafficking offences is usually a lengthy 
and complex process, which is inevitably a great expense to any 
police force and therefore, a proportion of all the funds realised and 
recovered should he paid to the police force dealing with the case'. 
Some of the police officers who were interviewed from the questionnaire 
group believe that it should be allocated to the drug squads: 
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The British legislation regarding confiscation is based on the 
American and Canadian systems. It is worth noting that those 
countries have built in a provision whereby a certain amount of the 
funds realised are used by the relevant police forces to finance their 
anti-drug activities. In the UK, all funds are directed straight to 
the Treasury. Every police force in the country is starved of finance 
and each has to make cuts in their services according to their local 
circumstances. Law enforcement does not come cheap and this is 
particularly true of drug law enforcement, with a necessary 
emphasis on informant payments, test purchases and team 
surveillance. I feel that if the confiscated funds were awarded to 
the drug squads of the respective police force (as they are under 
section 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971) it would significantly 
enhance the ability of that force to carry out its responsibilities in 
the field of drug law enforcement. 
Others suggest that the benefits should go straight to the financial 
investigation units who are the first in initiating the confiscation cases: 
'It must go to units because more officers are required to fully 
investigate more of the information we receive from several sources'. 
The UK should adopt We US system where the agencies involved 
benefit directly. We should have the same system used in America. 
That funds realised should be returned to the particular department 
that recovered the drugs and money'. 
Another suggested that the proceeds must be allocated to police and 
customs for their mutual efforts against drug trafficking crimes. 
On the other hand, few respondents also from the questionnaire group 
suggested that all proceeds should go to a central fund: 
'All funds realised should be allocated to a central fund for use by 
police only to increase resources to aid further investigation'. 
'a separate national fund to be used in drug related problems'. 
Regarding the perceptions of the interviewees, they are divided into two 
groups. Each advocate different perception: the first group strongly 
advocate that proceeds should go back to the force without pinpointing 
any part of that force. DS from Greater Manchester, DS from Lincolnshire 
Police and DS from the Regional Crime Squad (3) (interview group), for 
example, have described the current system as the negative part of the 
legislation and as the main defect where the confiscated funds all go to the 
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government and can't be utilised by the actual police force. The 
Lincolnshire police financial investigator states: 
'My bosses think I am an additional tax man, collecting money for 
the government not for them. There is a question of why should the 
chief constable pay such an office which just collects money for the 
government' 
Another from the same group added: 
'Senior police officers at present regard confiscation as a method 
case collection for the government and do not wish to use adequate 
resources in such investigations'. 
On the other hand, DI (West-Midlands) also from the interview group 
pointed out that the forces use section 27 of the MDA 1971, to take 
amounts of £5 and above. If the value of the proceeds is higher than the 
minimum amount required by the CCB then the force will apply the 
DTOA. He states: 
'Our prime objective as far as this is concerned is section 27 because 
our force will then get the money. The money we got can be utilised 
to combat drug trafficking in the West-Midlands. It buys our cars, it 
buys our computers, give us our equipment and that is our prime 
objective. DTOA is important, because the evidential barrier is very 
tight on section 27. On DTOA, the judge can basically give it on a 
balance of probabilities. He can presume that he has been a drug 
dealer for 6 years. The problem with DTOA, is that money goes to 
the Treasury as opposed to section 27, which comes to us'. 
He also reveals that they can now make, under the DTA (1994), a dual 
application. The judge, as the DI explains, can combine the two (DTOA 
1986 and Section 27 of the MDA 1971) which they could not do before. This 
is true, but only for exceptional cases74, and not in any drug trafficking 
case. Section 43 (1) of the DTA provides that: 
A magistrates court may order the forfeiture of any cash which has 
been seized under section 42 of this Act if satisfied, on an application 
made while the cash is detained under that section, that the cash 
directly or indirectly represents any person's proceeds of drug 
trafficking, or is intended by any person for use in drug trafficking. 
74Section 2 (5) (b) of DTA 1994 provides that the court shall take account of the 
confiscation order before imposing any fine on the defendant and before making any order 
involving any payment by him; or before making forfeiture orders or deprivation orders. 
This provision does not implicitly imply that the courts are empowered to make dual 
applications (forfeiture order and confiscation order at the same time). 
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The other view advocates the current system where proceeds go straight to 
Treasury. This view emphasises that if you divide the amount of money 
confiscated to all the 50 odd police forces (England & Wales and Scotland), 
it will not make a great impact on the budgets of the police service. 
Lastly, CI from London Police (the interview group) provides a clear 
description of the current system and his opinion about it by saying: 
'Each force is funded 51% by central government, and 49% by local 
government and the funding for financial investigation units just 
comes out of that. We don't have a scenario where, if we get a 
confiscation order for £100,000, that goes back to the force. Anything 
that is confiscated in the courts goes to central government'. 
He points out that: 
'There is : Elm but it is restricted for international drugs 
investigations and it is to provide assistance in international travel 
or major informants. I think that is really so, it is only drugs and it is 
only one million and it is not enough. I think it is a sop to the police 
to say well, you are getting some money back'. 
He also attributes the current system to a 'political' and to a structural 
policy which the police forces usually follow. He stated: 
'One of the very good things about the police service in the United 
Kingdom is that they are not political. As I said earlier, there's 
forty-three, in theory, autonomous chief officers and nobody can tell 
them what to do. I think its a good thing because otherwise we 
would lose the support of a vast majority of the public, if they 
thought we were being manipulated or directed for political reasons. 
Policing in the United Kingdom is very much driven by local 
demands, local responsibilities and not by policy. And we have all 
seen politicians. I mean, at the moment, in the run-up to the General 
Election, if we were a political body, then the government would be 
getting us to do things which would show them in a good light, not 
that which is necessarily needed for the people out there. I don't 
think this country would welcome, and I support that position, 
political interference in the police'. 
Regarding the conflict between the financial and the moral factors in the 
enforcement, he explains that: 
'If we had a regime where the fruits of my investigation were fed 
back into my unit, it wouldn't be too many years down the line when 
my decisions for my finite resources, would be driven by what was 
likely to result in the financial outcome of my investigations. So let 
me give you a scenario of a local drugs squad. You've got limited 
resources and you've got two operations and you've got to choose. One 
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of them is somebody who is trafficking heroin, crack cocaine and 
cannabis throughout your divisional area and is probably making in 
the region of £20,000 per week. So, he has been doing it for some time 
and you've got in the region of £1,000,000 salted away which you can 
restrain if you attack that operation. The other operation, you've 
got a choice of is, somebody who is not earning a lot of money at all, 
and everything they earn they spend on their own drugs but they are 
selling the drugs in local schools. So they are selling crack cocaine 
and cannabis and heroin and Ecstasy in the local schools but not 
earning a lot of money. So, if you go for that one, you're not going to 
get a lot of financial resources back but if you go for the other you are 
going to get a million pound. There's your dilemma. Financially 
driven, you're going to go for the million dollar one. Morally there 
is a big case for going for the people who are getting the children. 
The problem with the funds going back to the force is that we would 
end up being driven by money. We would have to get cases which 
would keep our funding level up. Because what would happen, 
either directly or indirectly, is that our direct funding from 
government would be reduced, so we would have to keep our indirect 
funding going. So it's not an easy question. 
Accordingly, He asserts that he does not support totally that the force get 
everything back. But he also mentions that he support an argument for a 
bigger pot, which would be more easily accessible. In this he states: 
'I'm crying out upstairs for good computers which we can't afford. If I 
get a successful case and see the money go off to the government, I 
should be able to say, well, I can put a forward to this central fund 
that I need three lap-top computers, two stand-alone computers and 
this software and that should be a reasonable bid'. 
Moreover, the prosecutor of the CCB agreed with what the Cl has declared 
by saying: 
'I am very unhappy about people who are involved in the system of 
administering justice being paid out of it, if they are involved in the 
assessment of collection money. I think that is shifty and presented 
to the wrong place. I don't suggest that public bodies like the police 
and the courts and the prosecutors shouldn't be required to perform to 
a higher standard that shouldn't be measured, that there shouldn't 
be rewards for doing well, and that there shouldn't be sanctions for 
doing badly. I think it is wrong for people to take decisions about 
what should be pursued and how orders should be enforced, which 
are influenced by the amount of money which can be recovered. You 
have to get it right in principle. 
4.2.2.2. Aim 4 Defects (Difficulties and Deficiencies) 
A combination of questions were addressed to the participants in order to 
determine the defects and shortcomings in the confiscation system. Some 
are intended to highlight the basic defects, while others concentrated upon 
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specific problematic issues that have been revealed in previous chapters. 
In what follows, is a detailed analysis of the main findings. 
In a direct question about whether there are any defects in the application 
of the legislation the participants provided the following responses. 
Table (4.7) Defects in the system. 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Yes 15 32% 11 79% 26 43% 
No 25 53% 3 21% 28 46% 
No Answer 7 1 5% - - 7 11% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
The above table and figure shows that altogether 28 participants or 46% 
believe that the system does not encounter any major defect, 26 
participants or 43% believe otherwise. In general, the responses again 
show that the interview group were more aware of certain defects in the 
confiscation system. More details about the main difficulties and 
deficiencies in the confiscation system as they have been viewed by the 
43% of participants are discussed in the following. Differences occur 
between the two groups when comparing their responses. 
4.2.2.2.1. Awareness and Understanding 
The awareness about all the powers provided under the legislation and all 
relevant laws, regulations, court's rules and even relevant precedents, and 
the understanding of what, when, why and how this awareness could 
serve the actual application of the legislation, and by all the involved 
enforcement agencies, are crucial factors in achieving a successful 
execution of the confiscation system. The participants have referred to 
several elements and features concerning this matter. Some of these 
issues are related to courts, while others are related to prosecutors and 
police officers. 
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Some members of the interview group made these points clear. The DS 
from South Wales, indicates that some judges and barristers lack sufficient 
degree of understanding which greatly effects their decisions. He claims 
that: 
'Some judges are afraid that people will appeal to the higher courts 
and the judges will be criticised. So every trial judge now is trying to 
ensure that no appeal goes through. They are afraid to use the 
legislation. There are very few judges who will use the legislation 
to the full. If they did, it would certainly have a lot of effect on drug 
trafficking. So the main reason behind failure in some cases is the 
lack of understanding on the legislation by barristers and some 
judges, and there are quite a lot in the legal system'. 
DS from West Yorkshire police, adds 
'Some courts are not very aware of the new rules of the assumptions 
of the burden of proof or the standard of proof'. 
The Financial Investigation Unit at Customs & Excise, comments on this 
by saying: 
'One of the biggest problems has been the judiciary of the courts 
which has not understood the system or not been interested in it 
because it is post-conviction. They are not so aware of the financial 
side. In fact, we have had problems with some judges who actually 
disagree with it. Magistrates generally are not trained in the law. 
The only people who seem to understand it are actually the people 
who prepare the cases. So, whether you are a police officer or a 
custom officer, I think everybody tends to run a mile when they see a 
financial case coming. They say, it is your decision because it is 
complicated and people don't seem to understand it'. 
Moreover, the DI from West Midlands Police, states that: 
'Some judges are quite weak. They can say, well, I've heard the 
story, it seems acceptable, I'm not going to make an order. It depends 
on the judge'. 
But the DI from Leicestershire Police, pointed out that: 
There are instances where judges don't understand the legislation. 
That is not criticism of the judges, that's a criticism of the system 
whereby certain people should form an expertise group in the 
legislation. We need to have people that are fully conversant with 
work practices'. 
The Principal Crown Prosecutor from CCB, has commented: 
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'Judges do not like making confiscation orders. That is a 
generalisation, some do, some don't. But they find some of the 
concepts either difficult to understand, or they have never turned 
their mind to trying to understand them, or they are trying their best 
to avoid the consequences of them' 
But he also points out that: 
'We must accept that DTOA does introduce concepts which are 
somewhat alien to traditional criminal law, and that judges are 
required to carry out a function of the Crown Court after a conviction 
for a criminal offence which is not very familiar to them. They do 
not like making orders which have the effect of making defendants 
homeless, although they are obliged to do that if the defendant has 
that asset and has an interest in the matrimonial home, and it has 
to be calculated for the purpose of making a confiscation order which 
reflects the value of the house as well'. 
He also referred to judges who do not understand the basics of the 
confiscation system by revealing that: 
'Many judges, as for not being keen to make the order, not being keen 
to turn people out of their family homes, not being keen to make an 
order relying on reverse burden of proof, they also do not understand 
many of the basics of confiscation orders. They understand that a 
confiscation order does not confiscate assets. We have got so many 
orders where a judge has made a confiscation order, a house, a car or 
a bank account. He does not understand that is not what he is doing, 
he is just looking at those assets to determine whether or not the 
defendant could pay the confiscation order. That is the significance 
of the assets. To be valued to see if the defendant can pay it. So the 
courts do get into a terrible mess about it'. 
Cl from City of London Police, supported that by saying: 
'Many of the prosecutors and, indeed, many of the judges and 
magistrates, don't really understand the confiscation law. And 
because they don't understand it, they don't apply it properly' 
On the other hand, and where most of the problems of understanding are 
often related to courts, some participants indicate that there is also a lack 
of awareness and understanding within the police forces. Some Head 
officers in the drug squads and those officers who work in the divisions 
are not well informed about the legislation and its applications. DS from 
Greater Manchester, for example, points out that: 
'Education and awareness about the new legislation is almost nil at 
drug squad officers' 
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Interestingly, one respondent from the questionnaire group provided that: 
'The drug squad find that solicitors of the CPS, some of whom 
appear to have only limited knowledge of drug offences, are 
reducing charges of supplying and possession with intent down to 
simple possession, even though the evidence could well convict on 
the greater charge'. 
Another from the same group respondent said: 
There is a general lack of knowledge of the confiscation units work 
amongst managers and there follows a failure to recognise the needs 
of such a unit'. 
Compare this with DS from the interview group from West Yorkshire 
Police who declared: 
'I don't think that CPS are particularly aware of confiscation law. 
No, they are not as aware as they should be. It is a lack of 
knowledge on their court that causes that problem. But, as I say, the 
answer to it seems to be get yourself someone from the CCB and you 
are more likely to get a good confiscation order. Simply because they 
know what they are doing. This action may save the cost of trial, 
but presents a false picture of the accused actions'. 
These are mainly self-explanatory statements. The majority of the 
participants believed that the applications correspond well with the 
provisions of the legislation. This seems difficult to understand, and 
suggests that the confiscation system suffers from serious defects in its 
own construction. If these are not immediately resolved, unexpected 
negative and unjustifiable consequences are inevitable. 
4.2.2.2.2. Difficulties 
Taken altogether table (4.8) shows that 37 participants or 61% believe that 
the most difficult aspects in the confiscation proceedings encountered by 
the financial investigators are related to the enforcement strategies and 
applications adopted by police forces and other enforcement agencies 
involved in the process. 13 participants or 21% believe that some 
difficulties do exist in the provisions of the legislation itself. The 
percentage of those who provided no answers is relatively high (18%) if 
compared with previous responses. It was confined only within the 
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questionnaire group. Other differences between the two groups show the 
following: 
Table (4.8) The location of defects. 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Le islation 11 23.4% 2 14% 13 21% 
Application 25 53.2% 12 86% 37 61% 
No Answer 11 23.4% - - 11 18% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
Some of the difficulties provided by the participants are a direct or indirect 
consequence of certain adopted principles and applications which have 
already been highlighted. Difficulties concerning understanding, 
conviction and restraint orders have already been analysed in detail, but it 
is important here to indicate, in brief, the difficult aspects which are 
relevant to this category. CCB's prosecutor from the interview group states 
that: 
'The most difficult bit is education of the practitioners, of 
prosecutors, of police officers, particularly senior police officers, of 
courts and of magistrates courts, and magistrate's fines enforcement 
departments and of the Bar, who at the moment at least are the only 
people with rights of audience in the Crown Court where 
confiscation orders are made. The standard of competence, of 
understanding, of these people are (by these people I mean the 
courts, the Bar, senior police officersm and prosecutors generally) is 
very low. They are competent at what they do, but because the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act introduces new and different concepts, 
because terminology is obscure and confusing, like confiscation, what 
they actually mean, they frequently get it wrong, they get it wrong 
all the time. And that causes major problems but the problem is an 
educational one, education and understanding'. 
The point here is that educating, training, and making all those involved 
in the confiscation proceedings well informed and proactive in 
confiscation law is not a difficult process but it needs effort and funding. It 
is quite clear that without solving this difficulty, major problems are 
inevitable. 
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The difficulty in disclosing the identity of informants and its relation with 
the pre-requisite conviction was discussed in a previous section 
concerning difficulties associated with the application for restrain order. 
One respondent from the questionnaire group states: 
'I wish the crown court were able to issue some sort of temporary or 
interim restraint order that could be ratified or overturned by the 
High court say within 7 days. The present procedures are 
cumbersome particularly for provincial forces and often do not work 
fast enough to prevent assets being removed' 
Comparing this with the comments of CI (city of London police) from the 
interview group who pointed out in detail the difficulty in the current 
restraining system by saying: 
'We should be able to go before a court at whatever level, whether 
it be civil, High Court or magistrate, and say to them, here's our 
evidence. This is why we think it is drugs money or criminal money. 
We would like an interim restraint order. And then it would be for 
the court to say, yes, we will grant you one for seven days, three 
months, and we would have to make our case to meet every occasion. 
But we can't do that. We can get a restraint order provided if we 
only can satisfy the Central Confiscation Unit that we can get a 
charge in 28 days. What's happening is we are seeing money in 
accounts that we haven't got sufficient evidence to convince CCB we 
are going to get a restraint order on, so therefore, you've just got to let 
the money go. That is the biggest single problem' 
Though section 31 of the DTA 1994 provides new powers which allow the 
prosecution to. apply to appoint a receiver from a county court, the 
application of a restraint order cannot be obtained except by the High 
Court via CCB in London. The participants, therefore, referred to the need 
for interim restraint orders because they believe that the current system is 
responsible for the deficiencies arising in the early stages of the 
confiscation proceedings. For instance, some forces, as implicitly stated, do 
not follow the threshold minimum policy or the 28 days period for the 
charge, which are the conditions ruled by the CCB. Accordingly, though a 
restraint order is needed, they do not wish to apply for it via CCB due to 
these conditions. So without empowering the county court or any other 
enforcement agencies to issue a restraint order or a so called temporary 
interim restraint order, the financial investigation officers will encounter 
unnecessary difficulties and complications in dealing with their cases. 
This may entail, in the end, an inevitable risk of revocation of protracted 
investigations. 
183 
Chapter Four The Views and Experiences of the British Police 
Difficulties related to a lack of funding, resources and deficiencies in 
recovering the confiscation orders will be examined in the later part of 
this section. The remaining difficulties which are highlighted by the 
participants are expressed by the following issues: 
4.2.2.2.2.1. Valuation, Assessment, Tracing And Proving 
Most of the difficulties involved under this category are related to certain 
aspects in the financial investigation process. The following selected 
statements, expressed by the participants, explain the main aspects of the 
difficulties in the confiscation proceedings. 
Two comments from members of the interview group are interesting. DS 
from Gwent police force, indicates that 'all the financial investigation 
proceedings are a difficult problem'. DI of West-Midlands Police adds on 
that by saying: 
'It sounds easy but it is very difficult to relate the money to drugs. 
The system in force is far too complicated when dealing with assets 
other than money'. 
DS from West Midlands Police, states that: 
'The preparation of 'Affidavits' is the most difficult one. Because 
the requisite of information is not readily available and can only be 
obtained by using the production orders and protracted inquiries. 
When speed is of the essence to prevent possible dissipation of 
assets, it seems that time turns against the investigators, as 
unfortunately the procedure of obtaining the restraint order is a 
lengthy one'. 
This statement implies that the core of the financial investigations 
depends, to a considerable extent, upon the involvement or the 
relationship with other relevant procedures (ex. production order and the 
stipulated period for the restraint order), and other agencies or financial 
institutions who follow a different set of regulations and policies. 
Some respondents specified the difficulties in tracing assets to discover 
concealed assets, and in linking the assets to the defendant and then in 
proving the ownership of these assets (assets of the offender held in the 
name of other persons). False names or giving that of a girlfriend who is a 
prostitute, for example, are difficult to prove or disapprove. 
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Some respondents, this here from the questionnaire group related the 
difficulties to the assessment of the assets or the proceeds of the 
defendants to the difficulty inherited in the process itself. 
'Assessing and calculating are not simple processes' 
The actual analysis of accounts, income, expenditure and assets in 
order to reach a figure to put to the court is a very difficult and 
complicated process' 
'With those whose drug proceeds are relatively modest. It is 
difficult if not impossible to pinpoint drug related assets. The 
accused usually gets the benefit of the doubt in the form of a low 
confiscation order' 
'Determining the benefits, knowing what to include and how far to 
go 
Finally, other respondents from the same group have highlighted the 
difficulties in the valuation of properties: 
'The prime difficulty lies in the valuation of property, where the 
value may be less than thought'. 
4.2.2.2.2.2. Lengthiness and Complexity 
In examining the perceptions of the participants about the nature of the 
confiscation proceedings and the credibility of describing these proceedings 
as lengthy and complex, a question was included which was once 
expressed in Parliament to the former Home Office Minister Mr. Stephen 
Jack. The Minister then replied that 'the realisation of confiscation orders 
is often necessarily a lengthy and complex process' (Hansard, Written 
Answers, House of Common, 20th October 1992, col. 262). 
The majority of the responses of the participants, excluding the new 
officers, agree with the former Minister that the realisation of confiscation 
orders, in particular, is a lengthy and complex process. But is it the only 
lengthy and complex part in the confiscation proceedings? The following 
statements explicitly show what other aspects in the proceedings cause 
such difficulties, and why lengthiness is considered a difficulty. 
Some respondents as set out below from the questionnaire group believe 
that the nature of the process in assessing and calculating assets and in 
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distinguishing the benefits and proceeds of drug trafficking from other 
legal properties is the main cause of lengthiness and complications. The 
following statements explain that: 
'When the assets have passed through several avenues, it is 
difficult to assess. Assessing and calculations, for instance, are not 
simple processes'. 
The law may be adequate, but the system in force is far too 
complicated when dealing with assets other than money'. 
Some respondents this time from the same group attribute these 
difficulties to the non-cooperative defendants or their defence attorneys: 
The reason for it is that the defendant remains the owner of the 
property until he chooses to relinquish that ownership. If he does 
not co-operate, the process of getting the property from him can be 
long and expensive'. 
The defence use all kir Is of figures to undermine the prosecution 
case, usually in court, when adjournments have to be made to re- 
calculate the application. In the majority of the cases they are 
unsuccessful, but it takes sometime to be resolved. Such practices are 
due to their lack of understanding of the law. ' 
Magistrates' courts and clerk's offices also bear a responsibility in making 
the realisation of confiscation orders very difficult to obtain, which 
implies the need for appointing a specialised personnel: 
'In many cases, magistrate's clerks were insufficient in obtaining 
liquid assets to satisfy the order, and the procedure to be followed to 
realise property, is, in itself time-consuming, as it is based on civil 
law'. 
'Because realisation is mainly left in the hands of magistrate's 
clerks officers, rather than appointing someone with specialist 
powers. Perhaps the appointments of a court's recovery officers may 
be worthy of development'. 
The realisation of assets can involve official receivers and civil 
litigation. It is sometimes unavoidable that these matters take 
times to resolve'. 
Co-operation of other financial institutions forms an important element 
in the confiscation proceedings. Respondents from the questionnaire 
group believe that obtaining assistance from co-operative financial 
institutions is also a reason for lengthiness 
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'Obtaining details from financial houses takes a long time, where 
inquiries are necessary within a short period'. 
'Partly because of the inherent secrecy within the banking systems'. 
'Understanding' is also referred to in this matter by pointing out that: 
'Legislation and the implementation are not always fully 
understood by either police, lawyers or judges'. 
Some respondents asserted again upon the negative consequences of the 
current application for the restraint order. One of the responses, for 
example, states that 
'When speed is of the essence to prevent possible dissipation of 
assets, it seems that time turns against the investigators, as 
unfortunately the procedure in obtaining the restraint orders is a 
lengthy one' 
Some respondents attributed the lengthiness and complexity to the 
sophistication in concealing assets gained from drug trafficking: 
Traffickers use even more sophisticated methods to conceal assets 
and launder money. It is only by better training and extra resources 
that financial investigators can keep pace. 
On the other hand, some respondents believe that it should not be 
considered as a distinctive problem. One, for example, has stated that: 
'Any kind of investigation into property whether for the sake of 
confiscation orders or for any other systems, would be complex and 
lengthy'. 
Finally, one respondent pointed out that the legislation and 
implementation are not too complex especially for dedicated financial 
investigation units. He stated 'as long as the end justify the means, it 
matters little to me how lengthy and complex the process takes, as long as 
we able to seize all assets and to leave the person with nothing'. 
4.2.2.2.3. Cooperation of Courts (Judiciary) 
The judiciary is one of the main pillars in the application of the 
confiscation system. A question was addressed to the respondents to 
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determine their perceptions of the way the judiciary operates and deals 
with the dedicated financial investigations work which exploited the 
efforts and money of the force. 
Table 4.9 shows that 38 (63%) of the 61 participants were not satisfied with 
the way the courts deal with the provisions of confiscation legislation 
under the DTA 1994, yet (26%) of the respondents were satisfied with the 
way the courts handled the confiscation proceedings. There were 
differences between the two groups. Their responses centred around the 
following issues: 
Table (4.9) Relations with other law enforcement agency (courts). 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Satisfied 13 28% 3 21% 16 26% 
Not Satisfied 27 57% 11 79% 38 63% 
Don't Know 5 11% - - 5 8% 
No Answer 2 4% - - 2 3% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
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Figure (4.7) The degrees of satisfaction with court's proceedings and sentencing 
policy. 
Some respondents -these taken from the interview group- believe that 
confiscation system will not effectively work unless it is accompanied by 
severe imprisonment. They believe that the sentencing policy adopted by 
courts is not sensible and is unsatisfactory: 
'The problem is that the criminal justice system is more relaxing 
rather than increasing the penalties of the law. Drug traffickers 
should get a severe sentence and confiscation. Confiscation may work 
but only when its accompanied with a severe sentence. The problem 
that people in this country know that when they go to court, they 
will get a lenient sentence on the first occasion, the second occasion 
they're caught they might get a bit more of a severe sentence. Some 
sentences were very lenient (e. g. 20X) hours community service for 8000 
poundsworth of amphetamine, and a guilty plea to possess with 
intent to supply)'. 
In this regard, the financial investigator from Greater Manchester 
elaborates: 
There doesn't 
, seem to be any consistency between some cases. Some 
offenders go to court for the possession of a small amount of drug; and 
they end up getting a three year sentence. Some other offenders who 
get caught with a large amount of drugs come out with a community 
service order'. 
He also pointed at the sentencing policy and its effects on the enforcement 
of the confiscation orders by saying: 
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The problem is that the man still has his own brain, he is still the 
boss. Unless he has had a severe sentence as well, he could come 
right out again and commence where he left off. The sentencing 
policy requires us to go to court twelve times. It starts with a caution 
by a senior police officer, then the defendant will be eligible for 
another caution after 6 months, and then because he is on his first 
occasion at court, he will get absolute discharge, the next time before 
court, he will get a conditional discharge with sub-conditions placed 
on that discharge. If he goes a third time condition B means he pays 
a fine (which is normally less than 50 pounds). This time he is 
eligible for a bigger fine because he has still not learned his lesson, 
£1,000, but usually ends up paying only £150-£200 at most. If he goes 
sixth time, he gets a probation order and a fine (for two years). The 
seventh time, the court would consider a prison sentence. But because 
of a probation report, they would give him a deferred sentence 
(which could be six month for two years). The final time they would 
send him to prison, but because it is the first time in prison he may 
get 3 months, if he behaves he could get his sentence halved (six 
weeks). During prison he can get access to drugs and even hard drugs, 
so he comes out probably more addicted than when he went in. That 
is the defects we find within the sentencing guidelines. The custody 
officer has a responsibility either to bail him or send him to the 
next available court. We know from past experience that unless the 
money concerned is £5,000 plus or even 10,000 plus, depending on the 
type of drugs, he will ge. bail in court. ' 
This kind of sentencing reflecs what has been said by one of the 
questionnaire group who indicated that: 
The sentence still does not fit the crime, when they appear at court 
the suspect is not deterred from stopping his activities'. 
Some respondents reveal that the difficulty in making the required 
assumptions by courts could negatively reflect upon the intact execution 
of the confiscation provisions. One respondent from the questionnaire 
group, for example, indicated that: 
'Judges do not use the assumptions given to them by the DTOA 
especially in the more complex cases (6-8 weeks)'. 
Compare this to DS from the interview group from West Yorkshire Police 
blames the Court when: 
'Courts don't automatically adopt the assumptions. It seems to us 
that, on occasions, they don't adopt them when they should adopt 
them'. 
190 
Chapter Four The Views and Experiences of the British Police 
Others from the same group like the DS from the Regional Crime Squad 
(3), North East, Wakefield, attributes the problem to the reluctance of 
some judges and he justifies that by saying: 
'The -judges are reluctant to make presumptions they are entitled to 
make under the Act. The basis for that being that the judiciary are 
brought up in this country on a matter of criminal proof that there 
has always been an element of criminal proof in this country, and 
the judges find it somewhat alien to their nature'. 
According to DS of West Yorkshire Police: 
The judicial system in regard to sentencing is frustrating. Sentencing 
rarely satisfies officers in the case. It seems that the courts have 
their own constraints as far as sentencing is concerned'. 
He also mentions: 
'We haven't even got the right to appeal only in a very few 
circumstances. The only time is when the CPS think that the 
sentence is too lenient. They will not appeal on confiscation if the 
confiscation order is too low'. 
Of course it is commonplace for police officers to complain about too 
lenient sentencing and this is not new in itself. What is important here 
however, is that the perceptions of over lenient sentencing alter the way 
police officers think about and operate the confiscation process. As a result 
the confiscation system itself is sometimes felt to be restrictive or 
insufficient when in fact it is sentencing policy which creates this 
perception. 
Beside a reluctance and inconsistency in the sentencing policy, some 
participants ask for the need for a minimum sentence in drug trafficking 
cases, while others did not agree with any minimum threshold in 
sentencing. DS from Manchester Police, from the interview group for 
example, stated: 
'there should be a minimum sentence, depending on the amounts, 
that you are caught in possession of, (amounts, quality, and the 
content). 
While others from the same groups such as DS from South Yorkshire, 
believes: 
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The problem with the minimum sentence is that it doesn't allow for 
the exceptional cases where the guy has unusual circumstances, and 
the judge is given no choice but to record the sentence without the 
proportional defence'. 
Some participants reveal that the main problem lies in the awareness and 
the understanding within courts and the crown prosecution service which 
form an important part in any confiscation case. One respondent from the 
questionnaire group has stated: 
'Both CPS, and the courts have a lack of knowledge of how drugs are 
used and fail to understand some of the evidence put before them'. 
Another respondent from the same group says: 
'Judiciary, barristers and solicitors have little understanding of the 
Act' 
CCB's prosecutor from the same group introduces the : 
'Judges do not like making confiscation orders. That is a 
generalisation, some do, some don't. But they find some of the 
concepts either difficult to understand, or they have never turned 
their mind to trying to understand them, or they are trying their best 
to avoid the consequences of them. I think as a starting point, you 
have to accept that the DTOA does introduce concepts which are 
somewhat alien to traditional criminal law, and that judges are 
required to carry out a function of the Crown Court after a conviction 
for a criminal office which is not very familiar to them'. 
Finally, Cl of city of London Police raised two sensitive issues quite 
relevant to the subject under examination here. These two issues are the 
credibility of the police to the judiciary and public, and the relationship 
with the European Court of Justice. Regarding the first issue he states: 
There was a time, fifteen, twenty years ago, if a policeman said it, 
it was true. There was a time, not too many years ago, that if a 
policeman said it, it was not true. Again, I think the pendulum is 
starting to swing back. We are usually subjected to the most energetic 
and robust challenges to our evidence by the defence. And the 
charges can form many parts. Suggestions that we are mistaken, 
suggestions that we haven't done our job properly, suggestions that 
we have missed obvious evidence deliberately or through 
inefficiency. Suggestions that we have planted evidence, suggestion 
that we have beaten up and tortured. I have been accused of just 
about every offence, in my time. In short, our courts don't accept as 
true our evidence just because we are police officers. In fact, we are 
more likely to be subjected to strong challenge by the defence than 
any other witnesses. It can be quite uncomfortable sometimes'. 
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He also discloses the following: 
'We are suffering in the United Kingdom at the moment on a whole 
range of legal issues. There is this additional court which people 
have the use of which is the European court, the European Court of 
Human Rights. It is a problem. It is a problem on a political sphere 
which I really haven't got either the information or the 
wherewithal to comment on, other than it is another obstacle and if 
it continues to be an obstacle, it is going to significantly dilute the 
effectiveness of our legislation in this country'. 
This is perhaps related to Welch's case, which was discussed earlier in 
chapters two and three, regarding the retrospective effect of the 
confiscation system. 
4.2.2.3. Summary 
This section covered the issues of aims 3 and 4 stated in the Introduction 
of this chapter i. e. to determine the perceptions of the participants of both 
groups about how consistent the chosen application and methods of 
enforcement with the directions, conditions and demands of the 
legislation and to determine the major defects and problems in the 
enforcement of the legislation. The results show that despite the 
restrictions and the unnecessary governmental policies, the majority of 
the participants from both groups (59%) believe that the enforcement of 
confiscation system is consistent with the provisions of the DTA 1994. The 
perceptions about the existence of defects in the system show that the 
participants were divided into two opposite groups. One hold the opinion 
that the system has defects (46%) whilst the second see no major defects at 
all (43%). Awareness, lengthy of process, complexity, difficulty and the lack 
of cooperation and understanding of other law enforcement agencies are 
the major points of defects. 
4.2.3. Aim 5 Efficiency and Usefulness of the System 
In determining how efficient and useful are the confiscation system (aim 
5), two questions were addressed to the participants to determine the 
general perceptions about the efficiency of the enforcement of the 
confiscation system and the usefulness of the confiscation provisions. The 
first question showed that 44 responses or 72% of all the 61 participants 
believe that the legislation and its applications are efficient in dealing with 
193 
Chuptrr f 0111 i/ic Viczos and I ipetiýnrr. ý Of flic Prifish Police 
drug trafficking problem in general and individual drug traffickers in 
particular, while 8 or 13`;;, think that the system is not efficient. 
Table (4.10) the efficiency of the system 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Efficient 32 68% 12 86% 44 72% 
Not-Efficient 6 13% 2 14% 8 13% 
Don't Know 5 1 1% - - 5 8% 
No Answer 4 8% - - 4 7% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
Figure (4.8) The perceptions of the respondents about the efficiency of the confiscation 
system. 
The results here show that both groups produce similar results to those of 
an earlier question about the general impact of the confiscation system 
where the number of those who believe that the system has an impact 
upon the drug trafficking problem was 38 or 63%% of all the members of the 
two groups. The difference or the increase in the number of those who 
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believe that the system is efficient may be due to the decreased in the 
number of those who provided no answers i. e. from 11 in this question to 
4 in the efficiency question. 
On how useful the legislation is; (72%) of the respondents believe that it is 
useful while only 2 out of 61 or 3% did not think so. Strikingly, the 
percentage of those who provided 'Don't Know' answer in the second 
question is four times more than those who denied the usefulness of the 
system (3% compared with 15%, see Tables 4.11 & 4.3). However, it is fair 
to say that those who said they 'don't know' seem not to have enough 
knowledge and practical experience to enable them to provide a clear 
comment, while other respondents consider that it is too early to 
comment upon crucial confiscation provisions that only came into force 
in 1995. 
Table (4.11) The usefulness of the system. 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Useful 30 64% 14 100% 44 72% 
Not-Useful 2 4% - - 2 3% 
Don't Know 9 19% - - 9 15% 
No Answer 6 13% - - 6 10% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
A close look at the responses of those who believe that the system is not 
useful revealed that this is mainly due to their perceptions concerning 
consistency and defects. Most of the responses are concerned with the 
following issues (questionnaire group): 
'Due to the large profits that can be made by a drug dealer, it is 
unlikely that the legislation deters people from dealing' 
The vast majority of drug offenders are at the bottom end of the 
social scale and accordingly have little or no assets to make 
confiscation a viable option' 
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The drug problem will never go away, and DTOA was intended to 
deal with the upper levels of trafficking organisation' 
'Long-term problems will not be influenced as long as there is a 
market for drugs there will always be a supply' 
'New laws do not deter traffickers, but merely make them more 
secretive and careful about how to conceal their proceeds' 
'Accomplished traffickers are devising other methods of disguising 
the money derived from their illegal activities. 
Regarding the interviewees, the analysis shows that all the answers 
concerning this issue unanimously coincide with the perceptions of the 
majority of the 47 respondents of the questionnaire. This means that the 
efficiency and the usefulness in the system is supported unanimously by 
the interviewees. The following is some of their views: 
'I think confiscation is a very valuable weapon. People who think 
that it is a waste of time are naive and I don't agree with them. I 
wonder if they comment out of pure opinion or lack of knowledge. 
Judges and courts do not use confiscation to the full potential. If they 
did it would have a lot of effect'. 
'It is a very powerful law. It is so draconian. It is the only law I 
know of in this country where the defendant has to prove his 
innocence to a certain extent'. 
The required presumption provides that the proceeds are related to 
drug trafficking unless the defendant can prove to the contrary. This 
presumption is the real significance of this legislation-It hurts drug 
traffickers by taking cash and by destroying the drugs. And even if 
they get bail, they are deprived of their stock in the drugs and the 
cash in order to buy some new drugs. It does hurt them'. 
On the other hand a statement by the CCB's prosecutor, from the 
interview group which was previously referred to in explaining the 
impact of the system, shows some indications about the usefulness of the 
system. The prosecutor asserted in his statement that: 
'If you take their assets away from them, they will be very upset 
indeed and I suppose there are a number of reasons for that. But they 
fight like dogs to avoid losing their assets. They do not mind too 
much doing five years in prison for drug trafficking, even doing 
another three years on top for not paying the confiscation order. But 
if you appoint a Receiver which would mean they avoided doing 
the 3 years., they would be instructing lawyers and fighting the 
receivership order, and the house wouldn't be theirs, it would be 
their wife's, etc. Every reason and every stop would be pulled out to 
196 
Chapter Four The Views and Experiences of the British Police 
avoid paying the order. We proceed to ensure that the order is paid 
because that is the intention of the legislation. So, if the defendants 
reaction to the Act is any indication, then it is a very useful piece of 
legislation. ' 
Some of the interviewees, though supporting the system and agreeing 
with its usefulness and efficiency, have pointed out that there are certain 
issues missing that would make the system more efficient and useful. 
Others anticipates that: 
'If judges and courts use confiscation to the full potential, it would 
have a lot of effect'. 
Another adds that the system would be more effective and efficient if 
there is a 'national ideology'. This means that a national operational 
agency is essential for the confiscation system. 
Finally, Cl from city of London Police (interview group) has emphasised 
the importance of international co-operation: 
'Drug traffickers are very sophisticated. They work 
internationally. These laws are just starting to become effective and 
it is very difficult persuading people from other jurisdictions to come 
together and assist in a common task'. 
4.2.4. Aim 6 Funding 
The level of resources, funding and support dedicated by government and 
the police forces for the confiscation system are here realised. Funding 
plays a vital role. If we examine closely the programmes of some 
individual police forces their focus of action depends on budget 
provisions. The following analysis is directed at finding out how funding 
affect financial investigations. This is mainly related to aim 3 which asked 
whether or not the chosen enforcement strategies are consistent with the 
directions, conditions and demands of the main provisions of the system. 
Three questions were addressed to the participants concerning the funding 
of the confiscation system. To find out whether the system is sufficiently 
funded by the government or not, the general funding allocated for 
pursuing drug offences in England and Wales, the funding allotted for the 
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financial investigations by the head of the police forces (chief constables) 
and the causes of deficiency in recovering the confiscation orders are 
questioned. It should be noted here that when the researcher addressed 
the former question to the interviewees, most of them had included it in 
their responses. 
4.2.4.1. Resources Allocated For Combating Drug 
Trafficking Crimes 
The responses show that 39 respondents or 64% of all the respondents 
from both groups think that the resources allocated by the government for 
the enforcement of anti- drugs legislation are not enough, and only 13 or 
21% believe they are quite sufficient (see table (4.12)). This may imply that 
if the majority of the respondents believe that drug enforcement agencies 
lack sufficient resources to deal properly with drugs problems, then one 
can presume that this defect will be reflected in the efficiency of the 
financial investigation system and of the enforcement agencies. The 
following are, selected statements of the respondents from the two groups 
revealing why the government is not providing sufficient funding for the 
anti-drugs legislation and implementations. 
Table (4.12) the sufficiency of funding and resources. 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Sufficient 10 21 % 3 21% 13 21% 
Not-Sufficient 28 60% 11 79% 39 64% 
No Answer 9 19% - - 9 15% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
Some respondents from the questionnaire group lay the responsibility on 
the government. One participant, for example, states that: 
'Government is not serious in enforcing the legislation' 
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Other respondents from the same group refer to the nature and extent of 
the drug-related crimes. Some other respondents wrote about the 
proportionality between the continuous expansion of the size of the 
drugs' problem and the appointed allocations: 
'A large proportion of crimes committed are drugs related, which 
has not been fully expected by the government'. 
'A remarkable 50% increase in drug seizures and the number of drug 
offenders' (Lincolnshire Constabulary Police). 
'Drug problems and all crimes related to drugs are much larger than 
any allocations. Drugs problems are much larger than how they are 
currently represented by statistics' 
'Most drug related offences are prolonged and require a higher 
concentration of money and resources' 
Compare this to those from the interview group who reveal that the 
policy of the force, which is mainly designed by the Chief Constable (the 
head of the district's police force or the Constabulary) bears a great part of 
the responsibility 
'Any lack of resources is due to 'inadequate funding policies', the 
reason is financial or economic restraints placed on police forces by 
the government in which they believe that 'most forces have a 
system of devolved budgeting even at department level. This has a 
knock on effect in the drug squads which have to prioritise their 
operations in order to make the best use of limited manpower and 
equipment' 
Lastly, DI from the West-Midlands Police imputed the cause of 
insufficiency upon a legislative provision which provides that money or 
properties seized as proceeds of drug trafficking convicted offences is not 
returned to the force. 
In this concern Cl from City of London Police illustrates the situation by 
saying: 
'I don't know if you are aware that the Home Affairs Selection 
Committee on Organised Crime recommended to the Home Secretary 
that money laundering enquiries, financial investigation units, 
should become one of the Home Secretary's policing objectives. 
Therefore, causing police officers to pay more attention to it, to put 
more resources into it. The Home Secretary, for whatever reason, 
chose not to adopt that recommendation. What he did do was to 
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send a letter to all the Chief Constables encouraging them to put 
more resources into financial investigation but he didn't actually 
make it one of his policing objectives' 
And he continues 
'You can understand chief officers of the county force. They've got 
burglaries and car theft and assaults and rapes and so the public 
can't identify the benefit of financial investigations because they 
are never going to be directly victimised by money laundering. So, it 
is a very difficult issue but you are actually right, in an awful lot of 
forces, it is a very low priority, an extremely low priority. Forty 
three police forces, each with an autonomous chief officer exist. In 
theory, nobody can tell chief officers how to police their areas. 
However, through the now bi-annual inspectors by Her Majesty's 
Chief of Constabulary, and through the distribution of Home Office 
circulars, there are certain things which chief officers are 
encouraged very strongly to do. Added to that, more recently, from 
the Police and Magistrates Court Act, the Home Secretary, every 
year, gives his policing objectives, on which chief officers should 
structure their own forces' policing plans'. 
On the other hand, CCB's prcsecutor believed that there is enough 
funding and resources allocated for the police forces. He clarifies that by 
saying: 
'There are probably enough resources, but there is a multi-agency 
involvement. With confiscation for instance, a senior police officer 
has to decide out of say £10 million budget, how much of it goes cn 
drug prevention, drug squads, financial investigations, police 
officers, as opposed to money which is set aside for anti-burglary 
schemes, and any other policing responsibilities which they have. 
And the important thing is that the police officer makes decision 
where to channel his budget, how important is drugs. He's got 
enough money to be able to channel it all into it, but it is a matter of 
relative importance. And of course the people who run these 
organisations always say they don't have enough money. Have you 
ever heard one who says that he has got too much? They always say 
they don't have enough money, and perhaps they don't, but public 
spending always has to be kept under control because otherwise it 
just runs riot. But generally I don't think there is a real problem with 
funding for it'. 
4.2.4.2. Resources Allocated For The Financial 
Investigations Unit 
The numerical analysis of the responses concerning funding and 
resources allocated for the financial investigation systems are almost 
identical with those related to the general funding for anti-drugs 
legislation and implementations. 
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Table (4.13) the availability of enough resources for the financial investigations 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Yes 13 28% 2 14% 15 25% 
No 30 64% 12 86% 42 68% 
No Answer 4 8% - - 4 7% 
Total 47 100% 14 100% 61 100% 
Regarding the sufficiency of funds and the resources devoted for the 
enforcement of confiscation proceedings and for police financial 
investigations, the majority of all the respondents 42 (68%) mentioned 
that the system lacked appropriate funding and resources. On the other 
hand, 15 participants or 25% of all the respondents believe that the 
financial investigation systems are sufficiently well funded to deal with 
drug trafficking cases. There were differences between the two groups. As 
there were, however, other concerns. These are included in the following. 
Some of the respondents-these from the interview group, called attention 
to the lack of funding and the lack of awareness and understanding of 
senior officers (mostly, the chief constables). 
There is a general lack of knowledge of the confiscation work and 
proceedings amongst managers or senior police officers. This could 
lead to a failure to recognise the needs of the financial 
investigators'. 
The misunderstanding of the role of the financial investigators by 
chief officers and those responsible in planning the strategies of the 
force' 
'Some chief constables do not consider the requirements of 
intelligence and investigation, beside that, the police service does 
not fully accept the true level of drug abuse and as a consequence, 
fails to allocate appropriate resources at an early stage in the 
development of the problem effectively to combat its growth' 
DS from Gwent Constabulary, states: 
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'It is not for the government to increase the staff, it is for the Chief 
Officer who decides the needs'. 
DS from West Yorkshire Police says: 
'It is a question of money and resources. But at the end of the day, the 
operational decision is with the Chief Constable'. 
One of the respondents refers to the impact of the Home Office Statistics 
upon Chief Constables by stating: 
'In a world dominated by Home Office Statistics, how tempting it 
must be for a Chief Constable to keep his Drug Squad to a minimum 
size, and on a low budget. Not only does he save money for other 
cash starved departments, but he can claim to have a low drug 
problem in his force area'. 
DS from Derbyshire Constabulary pointed out that financial investigation 
units have only 2 officers since 1987 (the interview conducted in Nov. 
1995). 
Lastly, DS from West Yorshire Police indicated that the work generated by 
the Drugs Squad and the Drugs Divisional Units falls on the financial 
investigation unit which consist also of two detective inspectors, who 
must conduct an inquiry in respect of most of the individuals charged 
with a drug trafficking offence. He also states: 
This has increased the workload by some 150% although no 
additional manpower has been provided to assist in many forces. So 
because of the volume of work undertaken by the units investigations 
are 'less thorough' than perhaps they should be'. 
These responses reveal clearly the role of funding when determining the 
efficiency of enforcement of confiscation. The lack of funding may lead the 
financial investigators to be unable to use the full power of the provisions 
of the system. It may also lead them to neglect many drug trafficking cases 
especially those cases which require expenses for tracing and seizing. As 
was mentioned earlier by some interviewees, the units are forced to select 
and this lets off some drug traffickers. There is also the ethical problem; 
when all drug offences are to be treated equally, in reality some police 
forces concentrate on the big cases and have very few resources to attend 
to the small timers. 
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4.2.4.3. Deficiency 
The study has shown that the confiscation system encounters difficulties 
in recovering confiscation orders imposed by the Crown Courts and 
enforced by magistrates' courts. While certain causes and justifications are 
identified in chapter two, the focus here will be upon the participants' 
relevant views. But before listing the main causes, a brief illustration of 
the extent of recovered confiscated orders is necessary. 
Data collected from Home Office Statistical Bulletin and the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) suggest that in the period January 
1987 (when DTOA 1986 start being in force) to December 1995 a total of 
£95.4 million are ordered to be confiscated in England and Wales. 
However, the same resources suggest that only 27 million are either 
obtained or written off as a result of offenders serving imprisonment in 
default (for the purpose of the relevant provisions under the DTOA 1986). 
The distribution, as Levi & Osofsky mentioned, between these latter 
categories is unknown. 
The responses of the participants from the questionnaire group and the 
interview group to a direct question concerning the defects in the recovery 
of confiscation orders reveals that there are certain issues which have 
dominated the views of the participants. 
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Table (4.14) the causes of defects. The answers of the participants were multiple75 
Answer Questionnaire Interview Total 
Number 
Total 
Percentages 
N % N % 
Courts 37 79% 12 86% 49 80% 
Defendants 31 66% 9 64% 40 66% 
Market 1 2% 4 29% 5 8% 
Proceedings 25 53% 10 71% 35 57% 
Specialists 2 4% 8 57% 10 16% 
No Answer 11 23% - - 11 18% 
In addition to the official justifications and certain findings of a few 
studies in this area which are identified in chapter two, the respondents 
have provided the following adaitional views: 
Forty nine or 80% of all respondents think that the clerk's offices in the 
magistrates bear most of the responsibility of this problem. This include 12 
or 86% of the interview group and 37 or 79% of the questionnaire group. 
Some of the responses from the later group explained that: 
'Magistrate's clerk office failing to take action to recover amounts 
stated in orders' 
'Weak courts who lack the resources and commitment to pursue assets 
subject to a confiscation order' 
'Unfortunately the magistrate's clerk offices appear unable to effect 
recovery' 
'Lack of urgency and commitment by magistrate's clerk offices' 
'Because the magistrate court is fairly toothless in enforcing the 
small amounts'. 
75Multiple answer means that most of the participants provided several different causes 
for defects. Accordingly, this table include the highest percentages of each of the 
mentioned causes of defects in the confiscation system. 
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Another respondent from the same group referred to a communication 
between the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and magistrates' courts by 
saying: 
'A break down in communication between the crown prosecution 
service and collecting courts led to such deficiencies in the amounts of 
the recovered confiscation orders' 
The responses also shows that 35 or 57% of the questionnaire group and 25 
or 53% of the interview group attribute the problem of recovery to the 
nature of the confiscation proceedings, and mostly about how lengthy and 
complicated the applications of certain procedures in the system have to 
be. The prosecutor from the interview group points out that: 
'the recovery of assets ordered to be or calculated for the purposes of 
confiscation, and the realisation of them, is a lengthy process. The 
amounts recovered may be accounted for as far as the statistics 
which are returned to the Home Office by the Magistrate's Courts in 
more than one fiscal year. So it is very misleading to draw the 
conclusion that simply because £54 million pounds has been ordered 
to be recovered and only £14m is recovered that there is only a 30% 
recovery rate. That is simply not true. Of that £54 million it is 
likely that 60% to 70% of that will be recovered ultimately, but it 
would be very difficult to calculate precisely because if you're going 
to have to look at the amounts recovered in, say, 1990. The amount 
ordered to be paid in 1990 was £20 million, you'll find that the 
amounts paid pursuant of 1990 orders will be accounted for in 1990, 
1991,1992,1993, and 1994. Small amounts throughout. If you 
aggregate them, they might come to £15 million which will be quite 
a high proportion of the amount which has been ordered to be 
recovered'. 
Some respondents from the questionnaire group attributed the problem to 
the convicted drug traffickers themselves. The table shows that 40 or 66% 
of the questionnaire group and 31 or 66% of the interview group believe 
that the defendants are not co-operating in the enforcement of the order. 
Obstructive and delaying tactics by the defendant and his legal 
representations are a normal action or reaction to prevent paying the 
order or even part of it as one of the respondents from the former group 
put it: 
The convicted person will do everything in his power to evade 
meeting the order'. 
Others from the same group clarifies that the expenses of a receiver which 
originally due to a lack of co-operation of the defendant could reach 
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£200.00 per a day. These fees are mostly deducted from the recovered 
confiscation orders to the extent that may cause a great difference between 
the estimated value of the realisable properties and the amount of 
confiscation order. 
A proportion of 29% of all the participants refer to the fluctuations of the 
market values, where the sudden reduction in the property values, or the 
depreciation of vehicle value could affect an old valuation processes 
conducted by the financial investigators. The CCB's prosecutor (interview 
group) says: 
'If a house is valued at £100,000 and he is ordered to pay £100,000 
and you sell the house and only realise £70,000 the whole house is 
gone. The defendant has lost his house. It doesn't matter whether it 
is assessed at £100,000 or £70,000. In the same way that, if you were 
sitting in your house, during the course of the 1970s and the 1980s, 
and the house rocketed in value, and then came back down and 
stabilised as a result of a recession and of a drop in house prices, it 
didn't mean you were any poorer, or any richer during the course of 
that whole period. You are still in your house and you still enjoy it. 
It is just paper wealth or paper property and it is the same with 
confiscation. You are ordered to pay a certain sum, and you lose the 
asset which is calculated to represent that sum. then you have lost 
it all. It has gone, it doesn't matter which way you cut it'. 
Two respondents or 4% of the questionnaire group and 8 or 57% of the 
interview group (a total of 16% of all participants) attributed the problem 
to the lack of professional people in accountancy. On this regard, the CCB's 
prosecutor mentioned that: 
'The amount ordered to be paid, of course, only reflects what the 
Crown Court assessed to be the value of the benefit or the value of 
the defendant's realisable property if it is less. And the fact of the 
matter is that, the amount which is assessed from a house or a car by 
the Crown Court is often very much higher than is in fact realised. 
What appears to be a failing in the confiscation legislation is that 
people are being deprived of their assets because £50 million has 
been ordered to be paid but only £40 million has been paid. It is a 
mere accountancy failing because if you recover all the assets which 
were calculated for the purposes of the £50 million originally, and 
all the assets only realise of £40m, then in fact you have a 100% 
recovery rate and not only an 80% recovery rate. So that is also 
misleading'. 
Finally, the lack of sophisticated training and understanding about how 
the system could be improved is also one of the essential reasons of 
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overstatements about certain miscalculations. On this regard, the CCB's 
prosecutor states: 
'I don't think it is the recovery that is difficult. It is, however, 
understanding the principles. It comes back to education and 
understanding. People don't understand how the system works and 
how it is intended to work and a lot of it is theoretical amounts 
which have been ordered to be paid'. 
4.2.4.4. Summary 
The above aims 5 and 6 were realised. i. e. to determine the perceptions of 
the two groups concerning the efficiency and the usefulness of the 
confiscation system and to determine what they think about the extent of 
funding and the allocated resources. The results show that the majority 
from the two groups think that the confiscation system is efficient and 
useful in dealing with drug trafficking crimes or with individual drug 
traffickers. On the other hand, this section shows that the majority of both 
groups (interview group and the questionnaire group) think that the 
funding and the available resources are not sufficient and that most of the 
defects of the current application and enforcement are mainly due to the 
lack of proper funding and support. 
4.3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
Negatively or positively the analysis of the data shows that the 
participants provided responses to most of the inquiries stated in the 
general aims of the analysis. The major findings from the above detailed 
analysis concern two important aspects of confiscation system: (a) the text 
of the legislation (powers and procedures); and (b) the application of the 
legislation by the law enforcement agencies (strategies and resources) are 
summarised in this final section of the chapter. 
The CCB has indicated that the British confiscation system, as it is 
provided under the DTA 1994, has two basic principles: (a) a new 
reparative confiscation procedure; and (b) the value-based principle. These 
two principles were never questioned. The perceptions of the police 
financial investigators and other officers who are involved in the 
enforcement of these two principles were never examined too. It has been 
found that questioning these two principles was the most important 
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process in determining the actual nature of the confiscation system. That 
will reveal how consistent are the implementation strategies adopted by 
the law enforcement' agencies. 
A clear understanding of the actual nature of any confiscation system is 
essential in determining its extent and impact its a criminal procedure 
issued by a criminal court. The confiscation order, as DTA 1994 provides, 
is an additional procedure to imprisonment and has priority over 
imposing any fine or any other financial orders. However, neither the 
DTOA 1986 nor the DTA 1994 have provided a clear explanation about its 
nature and theoretical assumptions. The analysis of relevant material in 
this chapter exposes a necessity for a legislative declaration and 
intervention to prevent certain differences in interpretations of the 
legislation which have no legislative grounds. 
As was shown by those questioned, the lack of a clearly stated rationale is 
bound to cause ambiguities, and not surprising these have led to 
differences among the decisions of different courts. These differences were 
similar to those who wrote about the system (as shown in chapters two 
and four). Attempts to solve such differences have already occurred, e. g. 
the government in the early 1990s frequently announced that the 
intention of the confiscation system was to be considered as a reparative 
system. However, because of the special nature of the British criminal 
justice system, in which discretionary powers are given to the courts, and 
more specifically to judges in dealing with undefined or ambiguous 
legislative provisions, the governmental declaration is not binding to 
judges. This study shows that different interpretations about the nature of 
the confiscation order exist throughout the system. Some judges, for 
example, have dealt with confiscation proceedings by regarding 
confiscation order as an additional punishment, while others have 
considered it exclusively a reparative procedure. Each of these parties have 
their own rationale for adopting a specific theory of confiscation, but 
which one represents the true one? 
Apart from the differences between the two majority views-those in the 
literature and those of the police financial investigators- the data in this 
chapter shows that differences and conflicts also occur among the police 
financial investigators themselves. When just 10% of them perceive the 
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confiscation order as a reparative option, this implies that the 
practitioners are in a state of confusion and even frustration especially 
when faced with different viewpoints by some judges who believe in a 
different rationale for the system. The problems which Parliament has 
created still exists as far as law enforcers are concerned and all attempts to 
solve them are neither useful nor helpful when a judge can hold an 
opposite interpretation. This may lead the British confiscation system to 
be in danger of being in a continuous state of confusion and conflict to the 
point where it might affect its overall character. 
It has been found from the data related to aim 3 that some police forces 
chose to exclude seeking a confiscation order in many drug trafficking 
cases which demand the application of confiscation system. Moreover, 
many applications for restraint orders and confiscation orders have been 
rejected or disapproved by some judges only because the judges hold a 
different perspective that demands different procedural systems. One of 
the negative consequences of the differences in interpretations by courts, is 
where some police forces, in order to escape the difficulties in providing 
evidence and in proving that there is a positive relationship between 
certain property and drug trafficking offence(s) they will bypass (disregard) 
the confiscation law by applying the less powerful provisions of forfeiture 
law under the MDA 1971. If the judge, as in many cases (i. e. R. v. Dickens, 
1990) believe that the underpinning intention of a confiscation order is to 
be an additional punishment that requires the same standards (i. e. the 
normal criminal burden of proof, namely, proof beyond reasonable 
doubt), then this, as the data shows, will be very difficult for the financial 
investigators to apply so they go for a forfeiture order instead. 
These consequences expose another problem. As shown in this chapter 
there is a lack of any mandatory character in the confiscation system that 
would oblige law enforcement agencies to apply the system when all the 
basic elements for confiscation are available against illegal proceeds of 
drug trafficking offences. It also indicates that the system lacks consistency 
where enforcement does not reflect the main goal for which the 
legislation was designed (as the only statute that deals with the recovery of 
proceeds and profits of drug trafficking offences). This does not mean that 
the confiscation system has failed to reflect the needs of the law 
enforcement agencies in their desire to trace, seize and confiscate the 
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proceeds of local drug traffickers, but there are difficulties which need to be 
dealt with by new techniques. 
Resorting to unusual theories which do not reflect actual effects and 
consequences is in fact an easy solution to complex problems. To provide 
the obligatory appearance of 'doing something' by just considering the 
whole system, for example, as part of a reparative policy is inadequate. 
This does not mean that the system include no reparative character. 
Confiscation can be considered as a reparative system but this is not its 
dominant character. An insistence that confiscation is just a reparative 
procedure had actually led the system into further confusion and 
ambiguity. One of the consequences of this confusion is the 'Watch case' 
in 1995 which has exposed the direction of enforcement in the system. 
The responses to several questions about relevant provisions in the 
system indicate that the majority of the participants believe that the 
adopted confiscation system, which includes a variety of pre-trial powers, 
new and far-reaching powers for trial and post-trial powers is an 
additional punishment to imprisonment. Many participants, while 
expressing their views about the nature and the impact of the system, 
have considered the system to be extraordinary and draconian. 
A financial investigator pointed out that the extraordinary and unusual 
consequences which one expects from implementing the required 
assumptions explains why some judges are reluctant to apply the 
provision or even consider the application of the confiscation legislation. 
The CCB attributed such reluctance to the belief that assessing the worth of 
a convicted drug dealer's assets all too often involves taking 'blind stabs in 
the dark' and is 'impossible to be precise'. Accordingly, these kind of 
descriptions and expectations of possible overestimations could lead 
sometimes to unacceptable consequences with important penal effects. 
One can also infer that early attempts to give the principle of personal 
reparation a more prominent place in the penal system, did not think of 
applying a system which even those who recommended it (the Hodgson 
Committee) had later denied. Those who suggested reparation theory and 
wanted it to be included in the penal system explained that their main 
concern was with monetary compensation, restitution of stolen property 
and community services. Lady Ralphs (1989) indicated that the objectives 
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of sentencing lie in one of the following theories (retribution, 
denunciation, deterrence, protection, rehabilitation and lastly reparation). 
She pointed out that reparation seeks to recompensate the victim to some 
degree and underlies compensation and restitution orders and various 
mediation initiatives. She asserted that the objectives of reparation accord 
with the rehabilitation of offenders so that their behaviour begins to 
conform to societal norms. This kind of reparative objective does not 
reflect the main purposes of confiscation as they were determined by 
Parliament in the early stage of the legislation. 
Furthermore, the principle of making good the damage the offenders 
have caused was built on the desire to support compensation and 
restitution systems only. Forfeiture orders and fines can serve the same 
principles, but most of the studies about reparation theory since 1966 
when the government started to think about the principle of personal 
reparation by the offenders did not mention how, for instance, the fine or 
the forfeiture order (which include deprivation powers similar to 
confiscation), could be used as one of the reparative means. 
The powers vested to a receiver shows another aspect of the system which 
can add more evidence to this argument of the nature of the system. One 
of the financial investigators described, graphically, the extent convicted 
drug dealers will go to avoid confiscation measures preferring to serve 
lengthy prison sentences. This is clear evidence that the confiscation 
system includes powers and procedures which, if they are used in full will 
cause very strong effects upon drug trafficking sentencing. The receiver is 
authorised to realise the proceeds of the offence(s). If the property which 
was determined to be the proceeds of drug trafficking offence(s) is not 
available, the receiver is also authorised to realise any other property 
irrespective of their legality or their relation to the offence. This means 
that the receiver is empowered to recover even legal property by selling 
them to satisfy the confiscation order. These powers, indeed, justify the 
reaction of the offenders once they know that the police or magistrate's 
court will call for a receiver. One of the interviewees in describing the 
reaction of drug traffickers said that they will fight like dogs to avoid 
losing their assets. 
211 
Chapter Four The Views and Experiences of the British Police 
Another important principle in the British confiscation system which has 
been considered is the value-based principle. It is this value-based 
principle which Parliament chose for recovering the amounts of the 
confiscation orders by ordering a convicted drug trafficker to pay a sum of 
money (cash) and not a deprivation of certain illegal proceeds which is the 
most common form of confiscation procedure. This method of recovery is 
considered as a new precedent in the Criminal Justice System, and the 
main reason for questioning it, is because it is accused of being one of the 
major deficiencies in the recovery processes. In the assessments made by 
the judges (Crown Courts) to establish the value of a convicted drug 
trafficker's assets, for example, it has been mentioned that judges have too 
often been forced to undertake unsubstantiated guess-work. This means 
that the value-based system can cause defendants to be tried and sentenced 
to years in jail based on little more than guesswork and not on evidence 
properly tested before a jury. 
The analysis of the perceptions provided that although the participants are 
aware that most of the defects originally resulted from this new principle, 
the data shows that the majority (38%) favoured the value-based system 
mostly because the value-based method is much easier and less costly than 
the common property-based one. 
The analysis also shows that the responses of the participants from the 
two groups (concerning the value-based method) extended also to six 
different views: 15% provided no answers; 23% favoured the property- 
based system; 11% provided 'Don't Know' answers; 8% favoured the use 
of both methods, and 5% against both. This means that the responses are 
extensive and in a way which indicates that confusion and uncertainty 
tend to dominate. 
To determine whether a property-based system is better or worse is 
difficult since there is no equivalent property-based method with which 
one could compare. Moreover, a comparison using rough indicators 
between the British value-based method and the American property-based 
method can also be misleading. The important issue here is that property- 
based systems do not lead law enforcement agencies (judges and the police 
financial investigators) to undertake wild guesswork or blind stabs in the 
dark. 
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Several responses have given clear indications about the current status of 
the confiscation system by the law enforcement agencies (police, courts, 
prosecutors). How the police financial investigators and other involved 
participants have perceived the way the confiscation system is being 
implemented, the nature of defects, and the limits of resources and 
funding allocated for the enforcement of the provisions of the legislation 
are a major finding. To overview these matters and other relevant issues, 
several points are noted: 
First, the responses, in general, show that most of the problems of the 
confiscation system are more related to certain applications and to the 
strategies of enforcement chosen by individual police forces rather than to 
the existence of certain legislative defects. This is mainly due to the many 
amendments which affected major provisions of the original DTOA 1986 
(e. g. the compulsory provision of the confiscation order in section 1 of the 
DTOA 1986). 
The analysis of the data shows particular perceptions concerning 
inconsistencies between theory and practice, lack of individual and 
organisational incentives, lack of resources, lack of awareness and in 
sufficient training. These reveal that the full use of the powers of the 
confiscation legislation is not a central aim in the government agenda or 
most of the police forces. The perceptions show that the confiscation 
system is greatly affected by political and economical factors. The 
Explanatory and Financial Memorandum accompanying the Bill of the 
original DTOA 1986, for example, stated that the Government anticipated 
that there would be of the order of one hundred cases a year involving 
additional costs of £5.5m, plus £1.1m in respect of extra staff costs for 
customs and excise. However, this sum, it was stated, was 'likely to be 
more than off-set by the revenue from confiscated assets'. This study 
indicated that the total amount of the confiscation orders which were 
imposed during the period 1987-1995 is £95.4m. The actual amount of the 
recovered orders is not clear but the data collected from different sources 
indicated that the amount did not exceed £25m. In addition to that the 
current governmental policy in regard to the use of the recovered 
amounts prevents any 'off-set' for the police forces who have a 
discretionary power and right to choose to support the system or to neglect 
it. In such situations police forces want to benefit from the recovered 
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proceeds but the government does not co-operate. This leads to a sense of 
resentment among police officers, expressed a number of times in this 
research. 
Other senior police officers at higher management levels in one of the 
Drug Squads expressed, in greater details, an obvious preference for a 
system which affords them the financial gain rather than deposited in the 
Treasury. This enables them to deal with some of the effects of perceived 
under funding. In addition, one of the police explained that the financial 
investigation system is not a major policing objective for the government. 
An important reason for the low priority assigned to financial 
investigations was expressed in the interviews. It is that the general public 
do not perceive money laundering as a threat on a par with offences such 
as burglary, theft, assault and rape. Resourcing for financial investigations 
was described as very poor and largely restricted for international drugs 
investigations. Any financial investigation is likely to be particularly 
costly, for example, in terms of informant payments and surveillance 
costs. This fuelled the view that confiscation funds should be awarded to 
the relevant drug squad in order to enhance their law enforcement 
abilities. 
This provides clear indications of the actual enforcement status of the 
confiscation system. It also demonstrated the nature of the problems and 
the causes of some of these problems. A relevant proverb says 'If the cause 
is defined, the wonder becomes invalid'. But is this the last finding? There 
are, other important issues which indicate that law enforcement agencies 
themselves also bear a large part of responsibility for the way the system 
has been perceived by the participants. 
The minimum threshold policy provided by the CCB introduced a 
restriction upon the application of one of the most important provisions 
in the confiscation proceedings. The analysis shows that the majority of 
the police financial investigators are against this particular restriction. It 
has been mentioned that the government was aware that this is a serious 
infringement of individual rights that property should be so restrained. 
Mr. Mellor, the former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the 
Home Office indicated that 'this power cannot be given lightly because it is 
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an interference with the liberty of the subject. Because this is a serious 
matter, we have given the power to a High Court judge, not to lesser 
judges. It will require the judge to take a balanced view as to whether it 
would be proper to make the order. Plainly, the only basis on which he 
can determine that it would be proper if he is satisfied, on the merits, that 
there is evidence that the individual concerned has been involved in drug 
trafficking and has benefited from it' (HC., 18/ 2/ 1986, col. 197 & 198). 
Accordingly, the restraint order can only be applied for from a High Court 
and the High Court judge is supposed to be the only one to decide whether 
to issue such an order. 
The current application stipulates that all restraining applications must be 
examined first by the CCB of the CPS. In short, the CCB, created a 
minimum threshold policy for any restraining applications. This policy, as 
mentioned by the majority of the participants, prevents the financial 
investigators to consider necessary confiscation proceedings for many drug 
trafficking cases. Interview material revealed that it is CCB policy not to 
pursue confiscation proceedings of a value of less than £10,000. This 
means that many 'street-level' dealers are not prosecuted and acted upon. 
The rigidity about authorisation for restraint which is primarily due to the 
sanctity attached to the right to privacy of the individual, property rights 
and certain economical reasons merits great respect. However, Parliament 
has distinguished the DTOA from the CJA 1988 by providing a clear 
minimum restriction in the latter statute only. The inability to use the 
powerful confiscation provisions against drug trafficking cases of less than 
£10,000 or sometimes £15,000, which is against the intention of the 
Parliament, led to 'disappointments' among those dedicated officers who 
are very well aware of the provisions and the differences with the 
provisions of the CJA 1988. Disappointment, frustration, loss of credibility, 
and feelings of unjustified discriminations are some of the reactions 
which were resulted from such unnecessary restriction. 
The analysis shows that the cost-effectiveness in enforcing the 
confiscation system is occupying great concern by several police forces. 
This means that some forces consider any additional costs in enforcing the 
provisions of the DTOA as a major burden and an obstacle which may 
prevent them from initiating the confiscation proceedings. Appointing a 
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professional receiver (i. e. accountant) and a barrister to represent the 
prosecution demands cumbersome charges. The legislation allows them 
to deduct from the recovered payments, and where these payments are 
insufficient or the defendant is acquitted, the cost will be paid from the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). However, the analysis shows that fear 
of repeal or reversal of decisions and the expectation of no returns or any 
compensation make such demands a reasonable justification for avoiding 
spending money on enforcing the system. 
This issue is a prevailing problem among many police forces. It leads to a 
suggestion that the adopted strategy of enforcement for the confiscation 
system is experiencing a serious defect on a national scale. It is for the law 
enforcement agencies to motivate staff and to find solutions for 
conflicting priorities if they are willing to combat local and national drug 
trafficking offences. 
The lack of awareness and understanding is one of the major findings in 
this study. The analysis shows that there are certain major problems 
which result from a lack of awareness and understanding among financial 
investigators themselves. The analysis shows that a proportion of the 
police financial investigators lack proper understanding or sufficient 
professional training concerning financial investigations. Lack of 
understanding is common among officers at upper management level 
too. Those who appeared to have no real idea of what financial 
investigations entail and the importance of these investigations. 
Moreover, lack of awareness and understanding is common among many 
of the drug squads' officers who are supposed to initiate confiscation cases. 
Lastly, the analysis shows that the financial investigators believe that 
there is also a lack of awareness and understanding among prosecutors, 
judges, clerks and even the public. 
These indicators reveal that the causes of allegations of ambiguities, 
difficulties and deficiencies are justified. This means that no one can 
doubt that a lack of awareness and understanding can prevent the 
occurrence of these problems or any other shortcomings and defects. The 
lack of understanding and the possession of little knowledge concerning 
all aspects of the confiscation proceedings and their impact upon 
investigations and individual defendants is very dangerous. Confiscation 
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law is like a sword which can cut many ways. If the system did not cut or 
at least deter people from involvement in drug trafficking offences, it 
would be inefficient, yet its ambiguities at present can lead to regrettable 
consequences. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE AMERICAN FORFEITURE SYSTEM 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim in this chapter is as set in the Introduction, i. e. aim 4 seek to 
determine the link between the American system and the development of 
the British system. In this chapter and also in chapter six attempts are 
made to examine the particular features of the British system by 
identifying any convergences and divergences which may exist with other 
system; a perspective so far absent from the British literature (Ruggiero & 
South, 1995). However, the situation is changing, some studies have 
begun to examine different aspects of the developments of law 
enforcement in different countries (see Albrecht & van Kalmthout 1989, 
Dorn & South 1991, Flood 1991, Savona et al. 1994), but even so, they have 
still not gone far enough especially in examining the actual nature of the 
confiscation system. 
In addition to that stated in the introduction regarding the link between 
the American system and the development of the British confiscation 
system, the other reason for choosing the American system is that it is 
ahead in terms of its definition and methods of application. Furthermore, 
the American system has helped to determine the conditions under 
which different types of confiscation systems have developed in other 
countries so the questions about the extent of that system provide a critical 
understanding of the British confiscation system. There are two studies 
which provided a comparative account of the American and the British 
asset confiscation systems. The first was conducted by Michael Zander in 
1989 and the second study was introduced by Clive Scott in 199676. These 
76For further information about the theory of confiscation and its applications see also the 
Notes of Decisions collected from the Library of the American Embassy in London; Asset 
Forfeiture: Law, Practice, Policy, a Manual by Asset Forfeiture Office, Criminal Division, 
US Department of Justice; and the Drug Agents Guide to Forfeiture of Assets (1987 
Revision), from the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, written by 
Harry I. Myers and Joseph P. Brzostowski. Distinctively, the latter resource includes notes, 
bibliography, court cases, history of forfeiture law and enforcement in the US, and 
describes (with examples) how drug agents should proceed. 
218 
Chapter Five The American Forfeiture System 
two studies provide indications that there are close links between the two 
systems. 
Accordingly, one of the features of this chapter is that by looking at how 
lawmakers and law enforcement agencies in a country like the United 
States have responded to drug trafficking crimes, one may learn about the 
nature of the sanctions a society has at its disposal, how they work, what 
advantages and disadvantages they may have, and what costs they entail 
on the administration of justice. In sum, how far and to what extent do 
the legislative instruments developed in a particular country may serve as 
models for lawmakers in other countries. The American forfeiture system 
has been the main reference in the debate about a British confiscation 
system. The British lawmakers, those who wrote about the system and the 
law enforcement agencies always refer to certain differences with the 
American forfeiture system. They implicitly suggest that the American 
system has been influential and helped to determine provisions of the 
British confiscation system (e. g. Hodgson Committee 1984, Home Affairs 
Committee 1985, Zander 1989, Levi & Osofsky 1995 and Scott 1996). 
5.2. THE AMERICAN FORFEITURE SYSTEM77 
While 'enterprise crime' and its control has gained currency in the United 
States, it is a concept that remains alien to the European situation 
(Martens, 1991, p. 1). This is quite obvious with the new concepts of 
control that accompanied the development of drug trafficking offences. 
Forfeiture law(s) aimed at depriving the proceeds and the illegal gains of 
drug traffickers in particular, was first enacted in 1970 as an instrument to 
deal with the 'continuing criminal enterprise' activity in the area of drug 
trafficking78. 
77Due to the limited material about the American forfeiture laws circulated in the UK, 
this has prompted the researcher to go to Washington DC., USA, seeking for updated 
information about laws and regulations and views of major law enforcement agencies. 
However, this study confined only to the main available forfeiture laws and provisions 
which are under consideration in United States until October, 1996. Accordingly, any 
subsequent changes or amendments which might occur after this date are not covered in this 
study. 
7&The term 'forfeiture', as mentioned before, has different meanings in Britain and the 
United States. In the British context it refers to the seizure of the material tools of crime 
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Apart from one statute after the Civil War when Congress authorised the 
seizure of the estates of various rebels, the government's right to seize a 
drug offender's assets was first codified with Congress's passage of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA)). In this Act, the Congress of the United 
States included civil forfeiture provisions as part of a broad effort to 
reduce the trade of illicit drugs in the United States (Snider, 1996, p. 2). 
Before examining and discussing the main American forfeiture 
provisions, it is essential to determine in more detail the definition of 
'forfeiture', because definitions have become central to the parameters of 
the law. That is to say, 'definitions enforces the legal justifications for 
government to intervene in and punish what is labelled 'deviant 
behaviour', and without a definition, there can be no crime' (Martens, 
1991, p. 1). 
The American legislature defines forfeiture as 'the taking by the 
Government of property illegally used or acquired, without compensating 
the owner" (Brad et al, 1986; cf., US v Eight Rhodesian Statutes, 449 F. 
Supp. 193 [CD CAL. 1978]). This definition implies a general principle 
which reflects accredited authority granted by the legislature to the 
government or certain law enforcement agencies dealing with illegal acts 
by taking certain things without compensation. This principle has been 
adopted not only by the American legislator, but by many other legislators, 
who preceded America in applying the forfeiture system. It seems that the 
main difference, which will be determined later in this section, lies not in 
the principle itself but in the scope of the 'taking'. A closer look at this 
definition, for instance, reveals why the American legislator has said 
'taking by government' and not as normally stated by most other 
legislations 'taking by court'. It seems that the original intention to apply a 
new forfeiture system with a civil and criminal application has led the 
legislators to draft a general definition. 
(e. g. a car, a crowbar), seizure of money actually used in the carrying out of crime, or of the 
money that is shown to be the proceeds of crime where such money can be shown to directly 
relate to the offence before the court. Provision for such forfeiture is made under s. 27 of the 
MDA 1971. Courts have also had recourse to a general forfeiture measures under the PCCA 
1973, s. 43, which makes provision for forfeiture of money or other property intended to 
facilitate the commission of future offences. However, in the American context, the term 
'forfeiture' has roughly the same legal meaning as has confiscation in Britain. 
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Furthermore, the Americans have been using the term 'forfeiture' for all 
confiscation procedures provided by the criminal and the civil laws. Any 
subsequent amendments to those procedures would be contained within 
the same terminology, unlike that of the British system79. The difference 
between forfeiture laws is based upon the extent of each forfeiture system 
and the powers provided for enforcement. This means that not all the 
American forfeiture laws use the same powers. The powers of drug 
trafficking-related forfeiture, for example, are more wide and exceptional 
in certain situations. 
As originally enacted, the American forfeiture provisions under CSA are 
limited primarily to vehicles, certain types of equipment, and raw 
materials that are used in drug trafficking. This is quite similar in scope to 
the current British concept of forfeiture, because it did not include the 
power to forfeit or confiscate the proceeds of drug trafficking. 
In 1970, for the first time in American history, two criminal forfeiture 
statutes were enacted by the United States Congress (Ibid., p. 2). They are 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO) (18 U. S. 
C. § 1963) and the Controlled Substances Act, Continuing Criminal 
Enterprise Offence (CCE) (21 U. S. C. § 848 which at present located at 21 U. 
S. C. § 853). These two forfeiture statutes, together with the criminal 
forfeiture provisions in the later-enacted Money Laundering Control Act 
1986 (MLCA)80, remain the basis for the present American forfeiture law 
(Snider, p. 3 ). 
5.2.1. Methods of Forfeiture 
Once someone has violated a statute that confers forfeiture power upon 
the government, the government has two immediate actions from which 
79The British legislator has created a new order 'confiscation order' to deal with illicit 
proceeds of crime, while the Americans favoured not to do so and continued to use the 
common forfeiture term but with more extensive powers against certain crimes. 
80The MLCA is excluded in this section because it is about a different offence and the 
forfeiture provisions were designed in a way to contains broad authority to seize and forfeit 
the proceeds of various federal crimes involved in laundering activities (see Schroeder, 
1995). 
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to choose81. It can either proceed with a forfeiture action in a civil 
proceeding or do so in a criminal proceeding. 
5.2.1.1. Criminal Forfeiture 
The first recognition of criminal forfeiture in American law came in 1970 
when Congress passed the RICO and CCE statutes. The objective of both 
statutes was to strike at the economic base of two of the main problems 
faced by law enforcement. RICO was aimed at organised crime (which also 
includes narcotics related offences), and CCE was aimed at major drug 
trafficking offences. Both statutes had similar forfeiture provisions 
(Zander, 1989, p. 19). 
Criminal forfeiture proceeding is part of the criminal prosecution, because 
a criminal forfeiture action is 'ißt personarn' (against the person). It may 
not occur unless there is a conviction of the person charged with the 
criminal activities (Snider, 1996: 12). Hyde (1995) in his critique of 
American civil forfeiture, indicates that criminal forfeiture occurs only 
after a trial of the defendant at which full constitutional and procedural 
safeguards of due process apply. 'No conviction; no forfeiture. No proven 
wrongdoing; no property confiscation'. The issue at trial is the 
individual's misconduct, not the fictional guilt of an inanimate object, as 
in civil forfeiture cases (p. 26). 
Where it is noticeable that RICO and CCE have embraced provisions that 
are related to drug trafficking offences or narcotics related offences, it is 
necessary for the purpose of this section to examine both statutes to 
determine their most distinctive features and the way they apply to 
criminal forfeiture provisions. 
811t is worth to note here that the mere fact that property has been used illegally, 
however, does not automatically give the government the right to confiscate and condemn 
it. Property may be forfeited only if its forfeiture is specifically authorised by statute (see 
Brad, et al, 1986). 
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5.2.1.1.1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 1971 
(RICO) 
5.2.1.1.1.1. Categories of property subject to criminal forfeiture under 
RICO 
The Senate Report No. 91-617, (1st Session, Congress, 1969) indicates that 
the main purpose of RICO is the elimination of the infiltration of 
organised crime and racketeering82 into legitimate organisations operating 
in interstate commerce83'(USC. Title. 18, Ch. 96, sect. 1961-1968). Robert 
Blakey (1982) the Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal 
Laws and Procedures (1969-1970) indicates that the goals are to eliminate 
organised crime by concentrating on the illegal monies through the use of 
new criminal and civil forfeiture, rather than by the old means of 
attempting to dismantle the mob by imprisoning gang bosses. Moreover, 
the United States Code Annotated, under title 18 subs. (a) of s. 1963 
provides that RICO is designed to impose forfeiture upon defendant's 
entire interest in enterprise, so as to sever his connection with it (see US. 
v. Walsh, D. C. Fla. 1981). 
To accomplish this, RICO establishes four separate criminal offences (see 
18 U. S. C. s. 1962), and provides for fines and imprisonment and 
mandatory criminal forfeiture (18 U. S. C. s. 1963). Section 1961 provides 
that: 
'Any person who commits a 'predicate' or triggering offences as part 
of a pattern of racketeering84 from which he acquires dirty money or 
acquires by illegal acts or by illegal uses an interest85 in an 
82"Racketeering" refers to the activities of organised criminal who extort money from 
legitimate business by violence or other forms of threats or intimidation or conduct of 
illegal enterprises such as gambling, narcotics traffic, or prostitution (Black's Law 
Dictionary 1258,6th ed., 1990) 
83"Interstate commerce" refers to any business (including an illegal business) whose 
transactions cross the borders between states within the United States. It often serves as 
justification to enact national (Federal) legislation (Snider, 1996, Notes, p. 38) 
84The definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" as used in this Act requires at least 
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurs after the effective date of this Act 
and the last of which occurs within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after 
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity (s. 1961 (5)). Zander (p. 19) described 
the forfeiture provisions under the extent of the definition of the patterns of racketeering 
as comprehensive in its scope. He also thinks that it covers not simply the ill-gotten 
proceeds of crime but even perfectly legitimate assets. 
85A close look at the Notes of Decisions and in regard to the definition of "interest" or "any 
interest" one can observe how complicated and controversial the situation is in interpreting 
the meaning of those two terms by courts. For example, in US. v. McManigal (1983) the term 
"any interest" interpreted as it does not include income, proceeds, or profits derived from a 
pattern of racketeering activity. In US. v. Martino (1982), the term "interest" as used in 
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enterprise affecting interstate commerce shall forfeit upon 
conviction (s. 1961 & 1962, RICO, 1970)'. 
The predicate offence may be any one of more than three dozen listed 
State or Federal felonies86, including drug trafficking offences (18 U. S. C. s. 
1961 (1)). 
The offence of racketeering must be connected to an enterprise in one of 
three ways: first, the acquisition of an enterprise with money which 
represents illicit proceeds of the specified criminal acts (18 U. S. C. s. 1962 
(a)) second, the acquirement of interest in, or control of, an enterprise by 
illegal acts (e. g., by murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, 
extortion, dealing in obscene matter, and dealing in narcotic or other 
dangerous drugs) (s. 1962 (b)), and third, using an enterprise to commit 
acts of racketeering (s. 1962 (c)). In addition to these, RICO makes it a 
criminal offence to conspire to violate any of the three substantive 
offences (s. 1962 (d)). In effect, it makes a new crime of an agreement to 
participate in an enterprise by engaging in any pattern of racketeering 
activity (Snider, p. 14). 
The RICO defines enterprise as: 
'any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other 
legal entity, and union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity' (s. 1961(4)). 
Snider points out that although Congress viewed the RICO statute as a 
response to organised crime's infiltration of legitimate enterprises, it has 
been expansively interpreted by the courts to reach wholly illegitimate 
'enterprises' that are essentially loosely defined criminal conspiracies. 
Therefore, the term 'enterprise' as used in RICO encompasses both 
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. Snider suggests that this concept is 
important in determining the reach of the forfeiture provisions to 
property, the use of which contributes to the illegitimate enterprise (p. 14). 
subsec. (a) (1) of section 1963 interpreted by court as includes income or profit derived from 
pattern of racketeering activity and is not limited to interests in enterprise (C. A. Fla. 1982, 
681 F. 2nd 952) 
86Felonies in the American system divided into state felonies and federal felonies. RICO 
deals with various state and federal felonies. Dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs 
are considered 'racketeering activity under state law, and considered as state and federal 
felonies (see Zander, 1989: 20). Lombardo (1991) indicates that each of the fifty states has 
its own laws and system of jurisprudence. 
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Conviction of a RICO offence mandates the forfeiture of the defendant's 
interest in the enterprise; i. e. everything affording a source of influence 
over the enterprise, and any property or proceeds directly or indirectly 
derived from the racketeering activities (s. 1963 (a)). This includes real 
property, and tangible and intangible personal property, in other words, 
everything (s. 1963 (b)). Subs. (I) note (4) of the same latter section, i. e., the 
second paragraph provides very clearly that forfeiture of property 
involved in violation of this chapter is mandatory rather than 
discretionary. 
5.2.1.1.2. Continuing Criminal Enterprise Offence statute (CCE): 
Part of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) 
Lombardo (1991) suggests that most police officers outside the United State 
believe that all the American forfeitures are RICO forfeitures. In fact, they 
are not. The Controlled Substances Act has a forfeiture section too. 
CCE statute under the Controlled Substances Act, was passed in 1970, eight 
days after RICO and sixteen years before enactment of the British DTOA 
1986. This statute is enacted to deal, inter alia, with suppression of illicit 
traffic in drugs. It contains a mandatory minimum sentencing provision 
of not less than 10 years and up to life imprisonment following 
conviction. It also contains a provision to seek forfeiture of the profits 
obtained by the defendant from the criminal enterprise and the 
defendant's interest in the enterprise (21 U. S. C. s. 848 (a)). 
This Statute is considered to be the most important federal criminal 
statute in the United States directed at illegal drug traffickers and their 
organisations (Corcorn & Carlson, 1983). Section 848 is directed at any 
person who 'occupies a position of organiser, a supervisory position, or 
any other position of management' in a drug-producing and drug- 
distributing enterprise, and provides for one of the most severe penalties 
of any federal criminal statute was then in force (Ibid., p. 78). 
Corcorn and Carlson designate that Congress had two purposes in mind 
when it adopted s. 848, which are to punish severely major traffickers of 
illegal drugs who have conducted their activities through an organised 
group of individuals; and to deter prospective criminal entrepreneurs (p. 
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79). Moreover, Corcorn and Carlson illustrates that the authors of the CCE 
Act explained; 
This section ... is the only provision of the bill providing minimum 
mandatory sentences, and is intended to serve as a strong deterrent to 
those otherwise might wish to engage in the illicit traffic, while 
also providing a means for keeping those found guilty of violations 
out of circulation' (p. 79). 
In this sense, Congress intended to create a powerful deterrence against 
large-scale drug trafficking and to provide prosecutors with a multi-faceted 
tool for proceeding against drug distribution networks. Congress attempts 
to achieve these goals by providing s. 848 with a punitive scheme directed 
against both the criminal enterprise and its individual participants. By 
arming this Act with severe penalties, including extended terms of 
imprisonment, heavy fines and a prohibition on parole, Congress aims to 
punish and to deter individuals engaged in drug trafficking (Ibid., p. 93). 
5.2.1.1.2.1. Categories of property subject to criminal forfeiture under 
CSA 
The criminal forfeiture provisions of the CSA require mandatory criminal 
forfeiture for all felony drug offences. The property subject to criminal 
forfeiture within the CSA consists of: (a) any property representing the 
proceeds of a defendant's drug trafficking activities (21 U. S. C. § 853 (a) 
(1)); (b) any of the defendant's property used or intended to be used to 
facilitate his drug trafficking activities (21 U. S. C. § 853 (a) (2)); and (c) any 
property that affords a defendant a source of control over a continuing 
criminal enterprise (21 U. S. C. § 853 (a) (3)). 
The first two categories (proceeds and facilitating property) apply to any 
felony drug offence. The third category covers the property of major drug 
traffickers which provides them with a source of control over a significant 
drug trafficking organisation. 
For a person to be subject to this third category, the government must 
prove the following: that the person must be an organiser, supervisor or 
manager of a CCE; he must be involved in a continuing criminal 
enterprise composed of at least five other persons (21 U. S. C. § 848 (c) (2) 
(A)). CCE must be involved in a continuing series of drug crimes, which 
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are classified as felonies under United States Law (21 U. S. C. § 848 (c) (2)), 
and finally, the government must also prove that the defendant obtained 
substantial income or resources from the CCE (21 U. S. C. § 848 (c) (2) (B)). 
5.2.1.1.3. Criminal Forfeiture Proceedings 
5.2.1.1.3.1. Criminal Trial 
The prosecution begins with an indictment87 or information88, which 
states the criminal charges against the person. Any property that the 
Government seeks to forfeit must be named within the indictment or 
information (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7 (c) (2)). If the 
defendant is found guilty of a crime, then the property named in the 
indictment or information is subject to forfeiture. 
Upon the completion of the criminal trial, if the jury finds the defendant 
guilty, then it may return a verdict specifying the property to be forfeited 
(Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 (e)). The special verdict authorises the Attorney 
General to seize the property named under the terms and conditions fixed 
by the court's order (Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 (b) (2)). A court may enter a wide 
variety of orders to preserve the value of the said property (appropriate 
restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of satisfactory 
performance bonds, appoint receivers, conservators, appraisers, 
accountants, or trustees, or take any other action to protect the interest of 
the United States in the property ordered forfeited) (18 U. S. C. §. 1963). 
5.2.1.1.3.2. Ancillary hearings to dispose of third party interests 
The special verdict only forfeits the interest of the defendant (Snider, p. 
15). In order for the government to have complete title to the property, it 
is necessary to resolve the interests that any third party may have. This is 
done through ancillary proceedings following the criminal trial. After 
notice is published, any party asserting an interest in the property must 
petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his/her 
87"indictment" is a formal written accusation originating with a prosecutor and issued by a 
grand jury against a party charged with a crime (Black's Law Dictionary 772 (6th ed. 
1990); cf. Snider, 1996, p. 39). 
88"information" is an accusation in the nature of an indictment, from which it differs only 
in being presented by a competent public officer on his oath of office, instead of a grand jury 
on their oath. (Black's Law Dictionary 779 (6th ed. 1990). 
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interest in the property. The judge then conducts a hearing which is 
basically civil in nature. The petitioner must establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he/she is the legitimate owner of the property. Such 
ownership interest may include loans and mortgages on the forfeited 
property. After the hearing, the judge will issue a final order of forfeiture 
which will resolve and dispose of the interests of any third party (21 U. S. 
C. § 853 (n); 18 U. S. C. § 1963 (1)). This can include rejecting the third 
party's interest, or providing satisfaction of that interest. 
5.2.1.1.3.3. Pre-trial seizure of property subject to criminal forfeiture 
The RICO and the CSA each include three pre-trial restraining options 
whereby the Government can seek to prevent the property from being 
removed from the court's jurisdiction or otherwise disposed of (18 U. S. C. 
§ 982 (b) (1) (A)). 
First, the Government may seek a restraining order or injunction to 
preserve the availability of the property upon the filing of the indictment 
or information (18 U. S. C. §. 1963 (d) (1) (A); 21 U. S. C. § 853 (e) (1) (A)). 
The second alternative, before the indictment or information is filed, and 
after giving notice to the apparent property owner and announcing the 
opportunity for a hearing, the Government may request such a restraining 
order or injunction. Under this alternative, the court will issue the order 
or injunction if it determines that there is a 'substantial probability' that 
the property will be subject to forfeiture and that 'failure to enter the order 
will result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction 
of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture'. Such orders 
are effective for only ninety days unless 'extended by the court for good 
cause shown' (18 U. S. C. § 1963 (d) (1) (B); 21 U. S. C. § 853 (e) (1) (B)). 
The third alternative provides that a pre-indictment temporary 
restraining order may be issued without notice and opportunity for a 
hearing if the Government demonstrates that there is 'probable cause to 
believe the property would, in the event of conviction, be subject to 
forfeiture and that provision of notice will jeopardise the availability of 
the property for forfeiture' (18 U. S. C. § 1963 (d) (2); 21 U. S. C. § 853 (e) (2)). 
This type of restraining order is valid for only ten days unless good cause 
for an extension is demonstrated. 
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In addition to these pre-trial options, the CSA provides that the 
Government may request the issuance of a seizure warrant, if the court 
determines that there is 'a probable cause to believe the property will be 
forfeited, and if a restraining order may not be sufficient to assure the 
property's availability for forfeiture' (21 U. S. C. § 853 (f)). 
5.2.1.1.3.4. Substitute Assets 
In 1986, both the RICO and the CSA were amended to provide for 
forfeiture substitute assets. This means that upon conviction and in 
consequence of a special forfeiture verdict (when the property subject to 
forfeiture cannot be located, has been transferred to a third party, has been 
placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or has diminished in value or 
commingled with other property as a result of any act or omission of the 
defendant), the court has authority to 'order the forfeiture of any other 
property of the defendant up to the value of any property subject to 
forfeiture' (18 U. S. C. § 1963 (m); 21 U. S. C. § 853 (p)). 
5.2.1.2. Civil Forfeiture 
Criminal forfeiture has an even more potent companion in the form of 
civil forfeiture. There are many similarities between the two in regard to 
what may be forfeited and in what circumstances. The crucial difference is 
that civil forfeiture proceedings are much easier to bring for two main 
reasons: (a) they do not require a criminal conviction and (b) they take 
place without any form of hearing. This may be partly a justification as to 
why most law enforcement agencies would favour a civil forfeiture 
action. 
The critical result of such favouring for the civil forfeiture is best described 
by Lombardo's (1991) commentary. He mentions that 'we not only sue 
individuals for the proceeds of their illicit activity, we also sue to obtain 
property that has been misused, by creating a legal fiction that the property 
has committed a crime. Quite often our court complaints will read 
'United States v. One Mercedes Automobile', or 'United States v. Five 
Thousands Dollars'. We charge property with committing a crime, just as 
we charge individuals with committing different types of offences' (p. 45). 
Because the burden of proof is lower than criminal cases, and the 
innocence of the property owner is not a defence, the criminal who 
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escapes conviction can be punished through a civil forfeiture action. Such 
an action can even be brought against property owned by a defendant who 
is acquitted in criminal proceedings. The acquittal does not debar 
subsequent civil forfeiture proceedings (Zander, p. 26). 
Whereas criminal forfeiture laws in the United States date back only to 
1970, civil forfeiture has been a significant feature of United States law for 
years. Its use, as in England, is mainly in relation to seizures by customs 
and Inland Revenue authorities, in relation to all forms of contraband. It 
seems, as will be illustrated, that civil forfeiture has a role to play in the 
future as American law enforcement agencies favour the civil aspects 
over the criminal one. 
Scott (1996) asserts that it may be due to the origin or the history of the 
concept of the asset forfeiture which is linked to a specific statement of 
verse 28 in Chapter 21 of Exodus in the Old Testament: 
'If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be 
stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall 
be quit'. 89 
Hyde (1995) maintains that civil forfeiture is premised on an archaic and 
curious legal fiction that personifies property. This 'personification 
theory' holds that an 'object' can commit a wrong and be held guilty for 
'its' misdeeds (p. 17). In contrasting this old theory with the present 
forfeiture system, Kessler (1996)90 indicates that the sovereign does not get 
the offending property or its value, nor does society benefit by eating the 
ox, rather, this is a social justice, probably to discourage revenge from the 
deceased's family (p. 1). 
Such type of forfeiture is quite similar to the English common law where 
it is known as the law of deodand (see Hodgson's Report, 1984). Kessler 
describes the English deodand as the spiritual predecessors of forfeiture 
statutes. Derived from the Latin phrase 'Deo Dandum', meaning 'to be 
given to God', which held that when an inanimate object or an animal 
caused the death of a person, say, a domestic animal killed a child, that 
89 It has been observed that most writers in this subject referred to this verse as the origin 
of the modern civil, criminal or quasi-criminal in rem forfeiture systems. 90An article of three parts obtained from the Internet system 'Crime and Punishment', 
'Punishment: Civil Forfeiture', and the Double Jeopardy Clause'. 
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object is automatically forfeited to the Crown as a deodand (p. 1). Hyde 
comments that this response is a superstition where a dead soul will not 
rest until its death is avenged. The deodand is to be disposed of by the 
sovereign for the good of the deceased person's soul. It might be sold and 
the proceeds are then used as Church offerings, to have a Mass said for the 
victim. Hyde continues saying that the deodand rapidly took on the 
double purpose of religious expiation and forfeiture, or 'amercement', 
similar to other exactions of the Crown aimed at raising revenues rather 
than at saving souls (p. 18). 
For the royal deodand collectors, the guilt or innocence of the object's 
owner in relation to the accident has little or no relevance to the forfeiture 
of the property. In effect, the English tradition views the property itself as 
'guilty' of the crime and the royal forfeiture is tantamount to an 'arrest' of 
the object. In English common law, the procedure used by the Court of the 
Exchequer on behalf of the Crown against the object come to be known as 
an in rem proceeding (literally, in Latin, 'against the thing'). The object is 
personified and is declared 'tainted' or evil, a continuing stigma the 
property can not evade, regardless of subsequent ownership (p. 18) 
Snider (1996) draws attention to the 1787 United States Constitution. He 
clarifies that the Constitution has banned the harsh English Common law 
of forfeiture of estate, and in 1790 this constitutional law has been 
supplemented by a specific statute which provides that a criminal 
conviction can not lead to corruption of the blood or any forfeiture of 
estate. From that time, until 1970, there is virtually no use made of 
criminal forfeiture laws in the United States (p. 1). In this regard, Scott 
(1996) points out that the unpopularity of these laws, which were 
sometimes used against political prisoners and dissenters caused the 
virtual disappearance of criminal asset forfeiture legislation for more than 
two centuries 
However, in rein civil forfeiture against property continued 
unobtrusively in traditionally accepted areas of use, such as the forfeiture 
which is related to maritime and customs laws. Hyde points out that 
English admiralty law is the immediate wellspring of American civil asset 
forfeiture law and procedure (p. 20). Such forfeitures are in rein which 
have become as legal actions directly against the 'thing' or the property 
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itself, which is the defendant before the court. Snider justified such type of 
action by saying that it is perceived to be necessary because the owners of 
smuggling ships, pirate ships and slave ships would often hire crews who 
were expendable. The ships may have been caught and the crews 
punished, but the courts would not be able to reach the owners. The 
owners can be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or will assert that the 
ships are merely leased by them. Without direct evidence of their wrong- 
doing, the owners can not be convicted of a crime. Thus, without in rem 
forfeitures, the ships could be put back into their illegal trade with new 
crews. Therefore, the new American Republic has in rent forfeitures to 
attack such activities (Snider, 1996, p. 2). 
Hyde asserts that 'it is not an overstatement to say that the pernicious and 
eccentric doctrines of deodand, outlawry, and in rear personification of 
property are the direct ancestors of modern American civil forfeiture'. 
Thus, the revival of such type of action in the early seventies and against 
similar kind of offences, where the courts would not be able to reach the 
major criminals in drug trafficking crimes has encountered no opposition. 
But it has continued to be implemented and strengthened by some 
subsequent amendments in 1978 and 198491. Currently, civil forfeiture is 
one of the main features of the American laws and provisions that 
accompanying the inception of the war on drugs. 
5.2.1.2.1. Categories of property subject to civil forfeiture under CSA 
Anything within the jurisdiction can be made the subject of civil 
forfeiture proceedings (Zander, p. 26). Snider (1996) indicates that until 
recently, the Government's right to take possession of property stems 
from the misuse of the property itself. Further, the property must fall 
within the provisions of a forfeiture statute, and there can be no forfeiture 
without a forfeiture statute. Consequently, when the CSA was enacted in 
1970, the civil forfeiture provisions covered only five specific types of 
property that are used to facilitate drug trafficking crimes. The original 
five provisions of this statute [set forth in paragraphs (a) (1) through (a) (5) 
of s. 881, Title 21, United States Code (U. S. C. )] closely parallel the early 
statutes used to enforce customs laws, piracy laws and revenue laws (p. 4). 
911970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act; the 1978 Psychotropic 
Substances Act; and the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act. 
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In 1978, Congress added a new category to the Psychotropic Controlled 
Substances Act 1970 (CSA) which provided that all proceeds of illegal drug 
sales and of money intended to be used to purchase prohibited drugs could 
be forfeited (21 U. S. C. 881 (a) (6)). This is considered to be the first 
American statute that allows the civil forfeiture of the accumulated profits 
of criminal activity. 
The CSA 197092 (CSA/ 21 U. S. C. 881) allows the federal government to 
forfeit five categories of property connected with drug offences. These 
correspond approximately to the types of property that are commonly 
forfeited in the UK under s. 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Hodgson' 
Report, p. 32). Those five categories include (i) the illicit drugs themselves; 
(ii) the raw materials and equipment that are used, or intended for use, in 
illegally manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, 
or exporting any controlled substance; (iii) containers used, or intended to 
be used for illegal drugs or their associated raw materials or equipment; 
(iv) any conveyances93 used or intended for use in or facilitating the 
transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of forfeitable drugs 
and (v) records kept by drug violators, including research, formulas, 
microfilm, tapes, and data (21 U. S. C. 881 (a) (1,3,4,5), (f), (g) (2)). In 1978, as 
mentioned above, Congress added a sixth category; the proceeds of illegal 
drug sales and of money intended to be used to purchase prohibited drugs 
(21 U. S. C. 881 (a) (6). 
The 21 U. S. C. 881 (a) (6) provides that all monies negotiable instruments, 
securities or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished 
by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of CSA; 
all proceeds traceable to such an exchange; and all moneys, negotiable 
instruments and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any 
violation of the CSA could be forfeited. 
92The unpopularity of the traditional forfeiture laws, which are sometimes used against 
political prisoners and dissenters have caused the virtual disappearance of criminal asset 
forfeiture legislation for more than two centuries. The in rem civil forfeiture against 
property continues unobtrusively in traditionally accepted areas of use, such as in the 
enforcement of customs law (see Clive Scott, 1996). 
93Snider (Ibid., p. 5) clarified that "conveyance" is any mobile thing capable of 
transporting objects or people. While it applies to vehicles, vessels or aircraft, the term 
suggests a broader meaning. Mobility is at the heart of any definition of "conveyance". 
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The Hodgson Report mentions that the first and third paragraphs 
correspond approximately to the types of property that can be forfeited by 
the UK criminal court under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 or under s. 43 
of the powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. The second paragraph, 
however, has no equivalent in English law, but it corresponds well with 
the definition of the proposed power of 'confiscation' in the Report, 
which is now under the DTA 1994. 
Between 1978 and 1984, real property could be forfeited only if it could be 
traced to the proceeds of drug trafficking. In 1984, Congress amended the 
civil forfeiture provisions to allow forfeiture of real property that is used 
to facilitate drug violations (21 USC, s. 853 (a) (7))94. The statute allows 
forfeiture where 'facilitation' takes place 'in any manner', but the courts 
have generally required some form of 'sufficient nexus' between the illicit 
act and the property (Zander, 1989). The power to forfeit real property has 
been used against laboratory sites, growing fields, airstrip locations and 
drug storage facilities. The courts have held that a whole tract of land can 
be forfeited even when the violation only took place on a small portion of 
it (see US v Real Property, 1986). 
5.2.1.2.2. Civil forfeiture procedure 
It starts with seizure of that which is to be forfeited. If the property is in or 
on private property this requires a warrant issued by an appropriate 
judicial authority on a showing of probable cause (equivalent to the 
English requirement of reasonable grounds to suspect). There must be 
probable cause to believe that the property is forfeitable. Seizure of lands 
and buildings, large vessels, cargo, accounts etc. is often done by means of 
an 'admiralty' warrant under USC, s. 881 (b). 
If the property is in a public place, there appears to be no requirement for a 
warrant. This applies especially to vehicles. Once the property has been 
lawfully seized, with or without a warrant, it can be searched. If the matter 
is uncontested, the forfeiture will then take place without further 
requirement of proof. If it is contested, the court has to decide on a balance 
of probabilities. Moreover the scales are tipped heavily in favour of the 
9421 U. S. C. § 881 (a) (7) states that it covers drug trafficking violations "punishable by 
more than one year's imprisonment... ". 
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government by the rule that once probable cause has been established, it is 
for the owner to show that the property is not forfeitable. Zander affirms 
that this burden of proof has been laid on the owner in American civil 
forfeiture cases for nearly two hundred years (p. 29). 
In federal law, neither an owner's innocence nor his ignorance is a 
defence. The Supreme Court has held that it is constitutional to forfeit 
illegally-used property regardless of the innocence of the owner. The 
action is against the property, and the state of mind of the owner is 
generally regarded as irrelevant. The leading case in this respect is of a 
rented yacht forfeited because of a single marijuana cigarette found abroad. 
The Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture even though the owners had no 
knowledge of the illegal use made of the yacht and were not negligent in 
that regard (the Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co, 1974). 
Under the US Constitution a person must be given an advance notice and 
an opportunity of being heard before his property is taken. Civil forfeiture 
is an exception to this hallowed principle. But notice has to be given after 
the seizure. Such notice is given normally by certified or registered mail. If 
the person affected is missing or unknown, notice can be given through 
publication in a newspaper of general circulation (Zander, p. 30). 
These harsh rules do not necessarily apply under State law. In virtually all 
the states mere possession is not enough on its own; it must have been for 
the purpose of trafficking. In some of the States the position is different 
and persons who are innocent of any criminal involvement and who are 
totally ignorant of the illegal use made of their property are protected from 
forfeiture. The applications of forfeiture by States will be discussed in 
detail in later part of this Chapter. 
5.2.1.2.3. Types of the civil forfeitures 
Whether there is a right to a hearing will depend on the type of forfeiture 
being made. There are three types: summary, judicial, and administrative 
forfeiture. 
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5.2.1.2.3.1. Summary forfeiture 
Such forfeiture is exclusively for possession of illegal drugs. Schedule I 
and II drugs95 and certain hazardous materials are subject to summary 
forfeiture (21 U. S. C. § 881 (f)). This type of material is considered 
contraband, and as such there is no right to possess it. No proceedings are 
required, and the material is peremptorily forfeited upon seizure. This 
simply means that the drugs are seized and that is the end of the matter. It 
is rare for such seizures to be contested. 
5.2.1.2.3.2. Administrative forfeiture 
This forfeiture applies to something like 80 per cent of all civil forfeitures 
by the Drugs Enforcement Agency (Zander, p. 30). It is half-way between 
summary and judicial forfeiture but in practice it is closer to the summary 
procedure. 
Administrative forfeiture proceedings are established as a means to keep 
uncontested forfeiture actions out of the courts (Snider, p. 10). Also, it 
provides an alternative administrative remedy for property owners who 
are not involved in drug trafficking, even though their property may 
have be used to facilitate such trafficking. The concept of administrative 
forfeiture is not new in the United States. It dates back to 1844 when 
Congress authorised the administrative forfeiture in cases where the 
value of the seized property was $100 or less. The monetary limit was 
gradually raised over the next 140 years. In 1984, the limit was $10,000 or 
less (Snider, p. 10). 
Currently, the Government may commence administrative forfeiture 
proceedings against property valued at $500,000 or less; except that real 
property of any value must be judicial forfeited. Additionally, money in 
any amount is subject to administrative forfeiture (Ibid., p. 10), as is any 
conveyance (vehicle, vessel or aircraft) that is used to import, export, 
transport, or store illicit drugs (19 U. S. C. § 1607 (a)). 
In an administrative forfeiture proceeding, the Government is required to 
publish notice of the seizure and of its intention to forfeit (19 U. S. C. § 
1607). The Government sends notice by mail to all persons who may have 
95Determining the list of the drugs under each of these two schedules is not the focus in this 
particular study, therefore, it will not be discussed thoroughly. 
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an interest in the property. Also, it must publish notice of the seizure in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the judicial district in which the 
seizure was made. Following the publication of the notice, anyone who 
has an interest in the seized property can elect to demand a judicial 
proceeding in Federal Court, or to seek administrative relief from the 
seizing Federal investigative agency. A person cannot avoid an 
administrative forfeiture by merely alleging that he did not receive the 
notice of the forfeiture96. On the other hand, failure by the Government to 
send notice to a proper address when it knows of a person's interest in the 
seized property will void an administrative forfeiture (Snider, p. 10). 
If the person chooses to have the forfeiture action adjudicated in Federal 
Court he must notify the Government (file a 'claim'). This notification 
(claim) must be filed within twenty days of the first date of publication of 
notice (if the notice is mailed late for any reason, additional time is 
normally granted for the filing of a claim). Together with the claim, the 
person seeking to contest the forfeiture must post a cost bond (the cost 
bond is generally ten percent of the value of the seized property, but no 
less than $250 and no more than $5,000 (19 U. S. C. § 1608)). 
If no claim is filed within twenty days of the first date of publication, the 
property may be declared forfeit. The decision to forfeit is made by a 
Department of Justice Attorney, based upon information in the 
investigative file (Ibid., p. 11). 
5.2.1.2.3.3. Judicial forfeiture 
It is of civil character, a full civil trial, where the plaintiff is the 
government and the forfeitable property is the defendant. For real 
property (land, buildings, residences), for property valued in excess of the 
administrative forfeiture limits, and when a claim is filed against property 
undergoing administrative forfeiture, the Government must institute 
judicial proceedings to secure forfeiture. The judicial proceeding is 
normally initiated in the Federal Court for the judicial district in which 
the property was seized by the United States Attorney's Office (28 U. S. C. 
1395), or in the judicial district in which the defendant owning the 
96see Sarit v. US. Drug Enforcement Administration, 987 F. 2nd 10,14 (1st Cir. 1993). For 
more details see the Report of the Office of Chief Counsel Drug Enforcement 
Administration (1996). 
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property is found or in the judicial district in which the criminal 
prosecution against the owner is brought (21 U. S. C. § 881 (j)). 
The judicial forfeiture action begins when the Government files a 
pleading97 called a 'verified complaint'98. Generally, the complaint must 
contain: (i) A verification on oath by the Assistant United States Attorney 
prosecuting the forfeiture action attesting to the truth of the contents of 
the complaint; (ii) a description of the property to be subject to forfeiture; 
(iii) a statement that the property seized or to be seized is within the 
jurisdiction of the court; and (iv) a statement of the facts of the offence 
justifying forfeiture. 
The statements in the complaint must be sufficiently detailed that anyone 
wishing to contest the forfeiture will be able to file an answer responding 
to the complaint. Once the complaint is filed, the court issues a 'warrant of 
arrest in rein' which gives the court jurisdiction to act on the forfeiture 
(Admiralty Rule C (3)). The property is placed in the custody of the United 
States Marshal for that judicial district, who provides notice of the 
forfeiture action to all persons having an interest in the property 
(Admiralty Rule C (4)). Any person who contests a judicial forfeiture is 
called a 'claimant'. Claimants are entitled to file an answer to the 
forfeiture complaint, to 'discover' the Government's evidence and to 
demand a jury trial (Admiralty Rule C (6)). 
The burden of proof is on the Government to produce enough evidence 
to persuade the judge that 'probable cause' exists to believe the seized 
property is forfeitable. 'Probable cause' is the reasonable grounds for belief 
of the guilt of the seized property supported by less than prima facie proof 
but more than mere suspicion. Once the Government demonstrates 
probable cause, the burden shifts to the claimant to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the property should not be forfeited. 
This means that the claimant to the property must produce some 
evidence in defence of the forfeiture of the property. If he does not, the 
97"Pleadings" are the formal written statements containing the claims and defences of the 
parties to a lawsuit. 
98Rule C (2) of the Supplemental Rules of Certain Admiralty and Martime Claims 
(Admiralty Rules). Snider (1996) explains that because civil forfeitures in the United 
States evolved out of the Customs laws against smuggling, the procedures used are those 
relating to admiralty and maritime matters. The application of these rules in lieu of 
normal civil procedure rules is merely a matter of historical accident (p. 36). 
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judge must direct a verdict in favour of the Government. Snider believes 
that although this placing of the burden of proof on the claimant has been 
criticised by commentators, it has been upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court for almost 150 years. Generally, however, if the claimant 
desires, the trial will takes place before a jury to consider any contested 
issue of fact (Snider, 1996, p. 12). 
5.2.1.2.4. Civil RICO 
In addition to the mentioned civil and criminal forfeiture provisions 
under both statutes, there is also what is so called 'Civil RICO'. It is a civil 
forfeiture which comes under the RICO statute. The provisions here are 
predicated on the general RICO provisions already described above (18 
USC ss 1964-1968). The civil RICO provisions have been used mainly by 
private parties rather than by government prosecutors. Private parties can 
bring actions under civil RICO to treble damages and attorneys' fees and 
large numbers of such cases have been brought. 
If the action is successful the defendant also faces being divested of all the 
alleged proceeds of his racketeering activity. Federal government 
prosecutors have only very recently started to use civil RICO, mainly in 
cases involving trades unions. The heart of civil RICO is s. 1964 which 
gives federal courts jurisdiction to grant injunctive and other equitable 
relief to prevent and restrain violations of s. 1962 (dealt with under 
Criminal RICO above). 
Civil RICO cannot result in uncompensated forfeiture as can criminal 
RICO. But it can result in equitable relief including divestiture in the form 
of sale of the enterprise. It can remove individuals from the management 
of an enterprise and put it under a trusteeship so as to prevent the 
criminal elements from simply being replaced by others. Criminal RICO 
could not necessarily achieve this result. Private parties can claim treble 
damages and attorney fees if they can show injury to their business or 
property by racketeering activity as defined in RICO (Ibid., p. 10) 
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5.2.2. Innocent - Owner Defence 
Within English and American legal tradition, 'the innocence of the owner 
of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a 
defence'. Forfeiture of property used in violation of the narcotics laws 
fosters the purposes served by the criminal statutes, both by preventing 
further illicit use, and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby 
rendering illegal behaviour unprofitable. And that could happen to the 
extent that such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or 
secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing. Snider justifies 
this 'legal principle' by indicating that confiscation may have the desirable 
effect of inducing those innocent people to exercise greater care in 
transferring possession of their property (p. 12). 
5.2.3. Exemptions 
Section 881 (a) (4) (b) provide that common carriers are exempt unless it 
can be shown that 'the owner or person in charge of such conveyance was 
a consenting party or privy to' a violation of the drug control laws. There 
is also statutory exemption where the owner of the conveyance can show 
that the illegal use occurs while it is stolen (Ibid. ). But the person claiming 
the benefit of either exemption has the burden of establishing that it 
applies. 
5.2.4. Remission / Pardon 
The power of granting remission can only be exercised by executive action 
through the office of the Attorney General. The courts have no function 
in this regard. 
5.2.5. Rewards 
The person or agency making the seizure, or the one who provides 
information which leads to the seizure, can be paid an award or reward of 
up to $150,000. Amendments passed in 1984 and 1986 permit the sharing 
of assets forfeited with other law enforcement agencies which participated 
in the seizure or forfeiture (s. 881 (e)). Zander asserts that this power has 
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been used very extensively and, as has been seen, has resulted in additions 
of millions of dollars to the budgets of local police and other law 
enforcement agencies. If the property is valued at under $750,000, it is 
delegated by the Attorney General to the head of the department of the 
investigative bureau responsible for the processing of the forfeiture. 
5.3. STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
5.3.1. The Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Program 
The preceding argument contains a detailed examination of the main 
asset forfeiture legislations in the United States. This provides a backdrop 
to a discussion of the structures and practices of the main law enforcement 
agencies. Within the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Transportation, 
Defence, State, and the U. S. Postal Service, there are numerous agencies 
with operational and law enforcement responsibilities for drug control. 
This reflects the magnitude and complexity of asset forfeiture structures in 
the United States. The Department of justice system (the Department of 
justice Asset Forfeiture Program (hereinafter referred to as 'Program')) is 
equivalent to another existing system under the control of Treasury 
Department. This system involves the US Customs Service, the Internal 
Revenue Service and other Treasury Department agencies and offices. 
However, the Program has been chosen in this study mainly because it is 
the largest and best organised and has a considerable degree of overlap 
with other asset forfeiture programs. 
The primary purpose of the Program is law enforcement, that is to deprive 
criminals of the proceeds and profits of their illegal activities and to 
weaken criminal enterprises by removing the instrumentalities of their 
crime. There are six main agencies responsible for identifying and seizing 
forfeitable property under the Program. These six agencies are: the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI); and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the 
Department of Justice; the US. Postal Inspections Service (USPP) of the 
Department of the Interior; and the Office of Criminal Investigations of 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
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In addition to these six agencies, other institutions perform vital and 
unique functions in accomplishing the Program's mission. The US 
Marshals Service (USMS) maintains and disposes the vast majority of 
properties seized for forfeiture. The 94 Attorneys' Offices (USAOs) are 
primarily responsible for the litigation of forfeiture cases that proceed 
judicially. The Asset Forfeiture Office (AFO) of the Criminal Division of 
the Department of justice provides legal advice and litigation support to 
the Attorneys' Offices nation-wide and serves as general counsel to the 
Program. This office is almost similar to the function of the Central 
Confiscation Branch (CCB) of UK. 
5.3.1.1. Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (EOAF) 
EOAF, part of the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, was established 
in 1989 to provide central management, direction, and control for the 
Program and to achieve the full law enforcement potential of the Asset 
Forfeiture Program. Throughout the financial year 1994, EOAF continued 
to be responsible for the establishment and implementation of uniform 
forfeiture program procedures and operations, the establishment and 
promulgation of forfeiture policy, the coordination of financial policy and 
analysis, the execution and formulation of the Assets Forfeiture Fund 
budget, the oversight and coordination of internal controls, the 
development and implementation of the Consolidated Asset Tracking 
System (CATS), and the coordination of communication and participation 
among the various components. The Annual Report of the Department of 
Justice, FY 1994 indicates that with the assistance of the various Program 
participants, EOAF is responsible for fulfilling the Program's mission of 
deterring crime through the effective use of forfeiture. 
In December 1994, EOAF was reorganised. The Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General transferred Program direction, policy, and general 
oversight responsibilities to the Asset Forfeiture Office (AFO) of the 
Criminal Division. 
5.3.1.2. Asset Forfeiture Office (AFO) 
This office handles both civil and criminal forfeiture litigation, provides 
legal support to the US. Attorneys' Office, develops and coordinates with 
federal components legislation to improve and enhance forfeiture 
procedures, advises the Appellate Section and the Solicitor General's 
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Office on appellate forfeiture litigation, and coordinates multi-district asset 
seizures and related litigation, as well as the international forfeiture and 
sharing of assets. AFO is responsible for developing and implementing a 
wide variety of forfeiture training courses for the Criminal Division and 
law enforcement personnel, including the US. Attorneys' Offices, as well 
as the prosecution and law enforcement personnel in various foreign 
countries. 
5.3.1.3. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
The responsibility of the DEA is to enforce all federal laws relating to the 
manufacture, sale, prescription, possession, and use of drugs. The largest 
and best known area of operations of this agency is in the area of illegal 
trafficking in narcotics and other drugs of dependence (D'Oranzo, pers. 
communication, in an interview, 1996). 
As drug trafficking generates phenomenal amounts of cash, all of which is 
subject to seizure under federal law, the DEA has become highly organised 
in its management of its asset forfeiture functions. In the field, there are 19 
Divisional Asset Removal Teams (DARTs). These teams work in 
conjunction with other operational investigation teams and assist in the 
identification and seizure of forfeitable property. In 1993, the DEA issued a 
Strategic Management System, outlining the agency's policies and 
priorities for the upcoming year. These priorities are: (1) incapacitating 
leaders and important players in major international and interstate drug 
trafficking organisations; (2) disrupting the production of illegal drugs; (3) 
preventing the diversion of controlled substances; (4) controlling the 
chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs; (5) supporting interdiction 
efforts; and (6) seizing and forfeiting assets derived from drug trafficking. 
To achieve these goals, the Strategic Management System delineates three 
specific responsibilities for DEA. First, to lead federal drug law 
enforcement by conducting, managing, and coordinating major 
investigations and international operations. As part of this responsibility, 
DEA has implemented the Kingpin Strategy, where the primary 
enforcement effort focusing on the identification and targeting of drug 
Kingpins and their supporting infrastructure. Second, to coordinate and 
disseminate drug intelligence, for example, DEA manages the National 
Narcotics Intelligence System, collecting, analysing, and disseminating 
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drug-related intelligence. And third, to share its experience and to provide 
investigative support to state and local enforcement agencies. DEA's State 
and Local Task Force Program is the primary vehicle by which DEA 
provides a federal presence at the state and local law enforcement levels 
(United States Sentencing Commission, 1996). 
5.3.1.4. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
The investigative responsibilities of the FBI are very broad, including not 
only the 'forfeiture rich' of drug trafficking, but also other classes of 
investigation such as wire fraud, kidnapping, child pornography, motor 
vehicle theft and etc., (Schroeder, 1996). As a result of its resources being 
spread over a wide area of law enforcement, the FBI has less asset 
forfeiture experience than the DEA, and has developed an interest in the 
area later than DEA. However, one advantage of its relatively late entry 
into asset forfeiture is the fact that it has been able to learn from the 
mistakes of the DEA and has developed what has been described as 'an 
outstanding program' that has served as a model for other federal agencies 
(JDAFP Annual Report 1990, p. 9). 
The FBI equivalent of the DEA's DART are Forfeited Asset Seizure Teams 
(FASTs). These are located in 14 of the FBI's field offices. Like the DART, 
FASTs specialises in asset forfeiture legislation and technique and provide 
assistance on this subject to other investigative teams within the field 
office concerned (Schroeder, 1996). 
5.3.2. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
The U. S. Department of the Treasury also plays a major role in 
implementing and directing efforts devoted to combating international 
organised crime. It strives to advance counter-money laundering 
measures through prevention, detection and enforcement of financial 
crime, as well as other international criminal activity (Charlotte Hatfield, 
1996, an interview)99. 
FinCEN is a key component of the U. S. international strategy to combat 
organised crime. The Department of the Treasury has designated FinCEN 
99An interview held in the Department of Treasury, FinCEN, Washington DC, U. S. A in 
October, 5,1996. 
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as one of the primary agencies to formulate, oversee and implement 
policies to prevent and detect money laundering, serving as the link 
between the law enforcement, financial and regulatory communities. Its 
mission is to provide world leadership in the prevention and detection of 
the movement of illegally derived money and to empower others by 
providing them with the tools and expertise needed to combat financial 
crime. 
As the British NCIS, FinCEN consist of intelligence analysts and criminal 
investigators as well as specialists in the financial industry and computer 
field. Forty per cent of long-term detailees are assigned to FinCEN from 21 
different regulatory and law enforcement agencies (FinCen facts, 
Department of Treasury, 1996). 
5.3.3. The Emergence of Opposing Politics for Reform 
Increasingly, the proponents of the forfeiture laws in the United States, 
who can be characterised as mostly reflecting either the jurisprudential or 
law enforcement point of views, have attracted wider and closer attention 
from the concerned public. American asset forfeiture, and particularly 
civil asset forfeiture, has been the subject of much critical debate within a 
variety of academic and societal circles in recent years. This situation is 
partly due to the widespread concerns from misuses of civil forfeiture in 
consequence to high-profile use to combat rampant drug trafficking since 
1984. The highly visible and effective use of asset forfeiture by law 
enforcement agencies is indeed cause for criticism, both from a 
philosophical perspective, by those who view it as too broad an exercise of 
governmental power, and from a practical perspective, by those whose 
lives and interests are affected by forfeiture. 
Most criticisms focus upon the government's use of the forfeiture 
provisions of 21 U. S. C. § 881, the primary federal civil drug forfeiture 
statute. The opponents of civil forfeiture maintain that it is abused by law 
enforcement, which has a vested interest in the property forfeited (Gurule, 
1995). The proceeds of forfeited assets are often distributed to law 
enforcement agencies through the Federal Asset Forfeiture Fund (28 
U. S. C. § 524 (1) (Supp. V 1993). In many cases, forfeiture provides a needed 
budgetary supplement to law enforcement agencies. Cheh (1994), indicates 
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that forfeitures are popular, not because they are quick and easy, but 
because they are also highly profitable. The more the law enforcement 
agencies confiscate, the more they get. As a result, a significant portion of 
law enforcement revenue now depends on aggressive and frequent 
pursuit of forfeitable property. For example, since 1985, the federal 
government has given $1.2 billion to state and local police. According to a 
former head of Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Section, Michael 
Zeldin, the department's 'marching orders' were: 'Forfeit, forfeit, forfeit. 
Get money, get money, money'. 
Further criticism is directed at the fact that the government is not required 
to meet the more demanding criminal standard of 'beyond reasonable 
doubt'. Instead, and as has been mentioned before, civil forfeiture only 
requires a showing of 'probable cause' that the subject property is used for, 
or is derived from a prohibited purpose. 
Two bills have been introduced to Congress seeking major legislative 
reform. Congressman Henry Hyde introduced a bill in June 1993 which 
was directed at, among other things, amending the 'innocent owner' 
defence. The Hyde Bill ' Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993' seeks 
to avail the defence to an owner who is either without knowledge, or does 
not consent to the illegal conduct giving rise to forfeiture. Gurule (1995) 
realises that this will resolve a current split in the circuits concerning 
whether a claimant must prove both that the illegal use of the property 
occurred without the owner's knowledge and without his consent. In 
addition, he claims that it also authorises the district court to appoint 
counsel for indigent claimants, and perhaps more importantly, it seeks to 
enhance the standard needed for the government to sustain a forfeiture 
from the current probable cause to a 'clear and convincing' standard. 
Upon Gurule's remarks, many institutions have given consideration and 
support. Mark Kappelhoff, for example, a legislative counsel from the 
American Civil Liberties Union mentioned that the Union and the 
National Association of Criminal Defence Lawyers have joined 
Congressman Hyde in seeking major legislative changes to the forfeiture 
laws (1996, p. 2). 
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The second bill was introduced by Congressman John Conyers in October 
1993 which is, as Gurule described it, a much more ambitious bill (p. 160). 
This Bill is entitled 'The Asset Forfeiture Act'. It proposed sweeping 
changes that would, in effect, dismantle civil forfeiture. The Conyers' Bill 
would mandate that forfeiture proceedings be conducted only upon the 
conviction of the property owner for the relevant crime. Accordingly, a 
criminal conviction would be a necessary precondition to civil forfeiture 
like the situation with the criminal forfeiture. It would also require the 
government to show by 'clear and convincing evidence'100 that the 
property was subject to forfeiture. In addition, claimants unable to afford 
legal representation would receive court-appointed counsel. The right to a 
jury trial would also be extended to civil forfeiture proceedings. 
Furthermore, bona fide attorney's fees would be exempted from forfeiture 
and the value of forfeited property would be limited so as not to exceed 
the pecuniary gain derived by the wrongdoer from the offence. 
While Congress has been actively re-examining the civil forfeiture laws, 
the United States Supreme Court has not stood silent on the subject, but 
has issued several major civil forfeiture decisions, of which two have 
substantially restricted the use of civil forfeiture (Gurule, p. 161). In Austin 
v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court pierced the legal fiction 
of in rem forfeitures and held that civil forfeiture under § 881 (a) (4) and 
(a) (7) is punitive in nature and, therefore, subject to the constraints of the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendments. In the following, there 
will be a detailed examination of the two issues that made the American 
Supreme Court look at it attentively, and caused it to give a reversed 
decision . 
5.3.3.1. Civil Forfeiture: Punitive or Remedial Procedure 
The defendant, Austin, was convicted in State court for possessing two 
grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Following his conviction, 
the United States filed an in rem action seeking forfeiture of his mobile 
home and auto body shop, the locations of the drug transaction which led 
to his conviction. Austin argued that the forfeiture of his mobile home 
and auto body shop would violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against excessive fines. The district court rejected the excessive fines 
100Standards of proof range from the minimal "probable cause" through a "preponderance 
of the evidence" to "clear and convincing evidence" to proof "beyond reasonable 
doubt"(Hyde, 1995, p. 59). 
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argument and entered summary judgement for the government. The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction. 
The Supreme Court, reversing the Eighth Circuit, concluded that 
forfeiture constituted punishment and reasoned that the Eighth 
Amendment, unlike other amendments, does not contain language 
expressly limiting itself to criminal cases. The Court noted that the 
purpose of the Eighth Amendment was to limit the government's power 
to punish. Thus, the Court stated that the dispositive question was not 
whether the forfeiture provisions were characterised as criminal or civil, 
but whether forfeiture served in part to punish. If so, civil forfeiture 
under §§ 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) is limited by the Excessive Fines Clause. 
The Supreme Court proceeded to analyse whether civil forfeiture was 
considered to serve in part to punish at the time the Eighth Amendment 
was ratified. The Court also questioned whether forfeiture under §§ 881 (a) 
(4) and (a) (7) should be construed as imposing punishment today. After 
engaging in an historical review of civil forfeiture, the Court concluded 
that even though the 'innocence' of the owner could not serve as a 
common-law defence, forfeiture consistently has been recognised as 
serving, at least in part, the goal of punishing and deterring the owner. 
The Court next considered whether the forfeiture statute at issue was 
considered punishment today. Three reasons were advanced in support of 
the conclusion. First, the Court reasoned that the forfeiture provisions 
expressly provide an 'innocent owner' defence which serves to focus on 
the culpability of the owner. From this, the Court inferred a 'congressional 
intent to punish only those involved in drug trafficking'. Second, the 
Court noted that the congressional intent was to tie the availability of civil 
forfeiture directly to the commission of drug offences. Third, the 
legislative history revealed that Congress intended forfeiture to serve as 'a 
powerful deterrent' or punishment against those dealing in illicit drugs. 
In enacting § 881 (a) (7) in 1984, Congress recognised that 'the traditional 
criminal sanctions of fines and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or 
punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs'. 
Finally, the Court rejected the government's arguments that the civil 
forfeiture provisions should be considered remedial in nature, rather than 
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punitive. This is quite similar to the argument concerning the nature of 
the British confiscation as a punitive or reparative procedure. 
The Court found an insufficient nexus between the value of the forfeited 
property and any damages sustained by the government. The Court 
commented that the 'forfeiture of property. .. is a penalty that 
has 
absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the cost 
of enforcing the law'. Even assuming that §§ 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) serve 
some remedial purpose, the Court stated that the Government's 
argument must fail because 'a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said 
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as 
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment'. Since the 
forfeiture of the property constitutes punishment, the Court held that the 
provisions are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause (Austin v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801,1993). 
The Supreme Court's holding in Austin, has generated a firestorm of 
judicial controversy (Gulue, 1995, p. 163). The determination of the exact 
content of the judicial controversy will not be examined here, but the 
impact of Austin upon prosecution and law enforcement agencies is 
worth being reviewed. 
With the Supreme Court having overcome its fixation that civil forfeiture 
is remedial in nature, Kessler (1994) indicates that Austin probably will 
instil an element of moderation in the prosecution of forfeiture cases. 
Extreme and weaker cases, such as 'drive-by'l 01 cocaine sales, probably will 
be dropped, with the government concentrating its efforts on those 
properties with a greater nexus and financial correlation to the underlying 
criminal activity. In a statement predicting victory in the circuit court, the 
Department of Justice asserted that it has anticipated 'no significant 
change in day-to-day operations' (Kessler, 1993). The Department has 
exercised restraint in enforcing civil forfeiture laws and will continue to 
do so. One thing is certain; the Court's decision will encourage more 
challenges to the government's seizure and forfeiture procedures (Kessler, 
1994). 
101In these cases, the government seizes an automobile where its only connection to a crime 
is its use to transport its owner to the location where the owner purchased narcotics. Those 
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5.3.3.2. The Innocent Owner Defence 
The Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue 
has likewise been controversial and has created a split in the circuits (113 
S. Ct. 1126 (1993)). The majority of the writers on this issue believe that the 
decision in this case is significant for two main reasons. First, the court 
holds that the innocent owner defence is not limited to bona fide 
purchasers. Accordingly, a donee, someone who paid no value and 
received the tainted property as a gift, can claim the defence. Second, the 
Supreme Court states that the innocent owner defence trumps the 
relation-back doctrine which provides that the government's interest rests 
after the offence giving rise to forfeiture (see 21 U. S. C. § 881 (h)). Thus, a 
donee who is without knowledge or does not consent to the property 
being used for criminal activities holds a superior title over the 
government. 
Nevertheless, Kessler explains that the Court reveals that there is a clear 
ambiguity in the statutory language and found that the statute is punitive 
in nature. Consequently, the court reasons that the rule of lenity applies, 
which requires that any ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the 
claimant. Moreover, the Court states that the statutory construction 
problem arises not from certain decisions in certain cases or the Court's 
interpretation of the relevant statute, but rather that the problem 
originates from Congress when it fails to draft a statute that takes into 
account the substantial differences between the owners of property during 
the improper use and those who acquire it afterwards. The Court has 
strongly admonished Congress to redraft the statute. 
Gulue (1995) attributes the failure of the proposed Bills by Representatives 
Hyde and Conyers to those recent ruiings by the Supreme Court where 
both Bills have been not taken into consideration. 
In November 1995, Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) presented a 'Statement of Principles on the Revision of 
the Federal asset Forfeiture Laws' to the House of Delegates consisting of 
thirteen general principles which urge that federal asset forfeiture laws be 
amended. 
cases in which the car is used to transport or import narcotics probably will not be affected 
(Kessler, p. 213) 
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The Criminal Justice Section created a working group to study the need for 
revision of the federal forfeiture laws. The members of the working 
group, as the attached report mentioned, held widely divergent views on 
the details of any revisions of the forfeiture laws, but found that there was 
general agreement that some legislative changes should be made to 
ensure that forfeiture is administered in accordance with the 
requirements of due process (common criminal standards). 
5.3.4. The Interest of the Law Enforcement Agencies 
Where the British law provides that all proceeds recovered from the 
payments of the confiscation orders must goes directly to the Treasury, the 
American law allows sharing the fruits of confiscation with law 
enforcement agencies. Zander suggests that a closer inspection of the 
American approach is needed. The obvious advantage is that it provides a 
direct incentive to the police to be effective in their pursuit of criminals; 
the more effective they are, the greater the resources available to them. 
But there is a serious danger that such incentives will distort law 
enforcement. For instance, it seems that investigators sometimes actually 
hoard their information rather than sharing it for fear that their 
organisation will otherwise have to share the ultimate spoils of success. 
Units are apt to suffer pressure to make bigger and bigger seizures to ease 
other financial burdens within the organisation. This can lead to a hurried 
investigation, a poorly prepared prosecution and an unjustified acquittal. 
Zander reveals that there are known cases where police authorities and 
even politicians have included projected future seizures as part of the 
police budget (p. 48). 
5.3.5. Scale of Asset Forfeiture 
It is worth noting here that there is a huge contrast between the volume of 
asset forfeiture (both civil and criminal) in the United States, compared 
with the British system (England and Wales). Lombardo (1991) holds that 
forfeiture in the United States differs from forfeiture in most other parts 
of the world. The major difference is that the United States advocates civil 
forfeiture, while most other countries permit only criminal forfeiture. 
The power to apply any of the two systems (civil or criminal) or both, 
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which are the most common in United States, makes the attempt to 
compare it with the British single confiscation system quite difficult, 
confusing, and inconsistent. 
Added to that, is the absence of authentic records of forfeiture revenues 
for the whole United States. The available information is attributed to 
certain federal agencies and particular states. This is contrary to the British 
system where it is governed by a central office. Resolving the difficulty of 
comparison cannot overcome another problem which is of the validity of 
the records provided by the American federal law enforcement agencies. 
The impreciseness of the real amounts recovered compared with the 
values of the forfeited properties also leads to a belief that the size of the 
profits in large scale drug trafficking remains more or less an open 
question. 
The Annual Report of the Department of Justice, Asset Forfeiture 
Program, fiscal years 1993 and 94, indicates that the amount deposited in 
the U. S. Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund increased from $27 
million in fiscal year 1985, to $556 million in 1993 and ' $550 million in 
1994. The 1994 Report pointed out that since 1985, more than $3.8 billion 
in illicit cash and proceeds from the sale of forfeited property have been 
deposited into the Assets Forfeiture Fund. 
Schroeder from the FBI, indicates that the value of property forfeited by 
criminal and civil actions in one year and half is roughly one billion 
dollars. He explains that the number of forfeiture actions for the same 
period is 5,000, and of about 85% are civil. He also asserts that the 
difference between the amounts and values of the seized properties and 
the recovered forfeiture orders never exceeds 10 percent. 
The following tables show the volumes and values of seizures, forfeitures, 
deposits, and the budgets and allocations for the criminal justice system 
and in particular the federal law enforcement agencies compared with 
other law enforcement agencies and other institutions. The distribution of 
the recovered proceeds is also explained. 
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Table (5.1) Seizure statistics of the financial year 1990 to financial year 1996 which 
were carried out by the DEA. 
DrugEnforcement 
Seizures 
Referred Asset 
Seizures 
Grand Total 
Year Count Value Count Value Count Value 
1990 16,154 $886,611,029 2,685 $219,191,282 18,839 $1,105,802,311 
1991 16,376 725,102,225 2,621 232,029,298 18,997 957,131,523 
1992 17,042 664,420,164 3,112 213,693,245 20,154 878,113,409 
1993 14,007 560,500,177 2,948 127,674,372 16,955 688,174,549 
1994 11,186 502,056,512 2,700 149,682,748 13,888 651,739,260 
1995 11,205 503,851,713 2,695 145,054,494 13,800 648,906,207 
1996 10,896 365,544,397 1,736 86,578,153 12,632 452,122,550 
Total 96,866 $4,208,086,217 18,497 $1,173,903,592 115,365 $5,381,989,809 
Source: The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 1996. 
Table (5.2) Forfeiture statistics financial year 1990 to financial year 1996. 
Administrative Judicial Grand Total 
Year Count Value Count Value Count Value 
1990 14,189 $152,812,525 3,583 $513,033,484 17,772 $665,846,009 
1991 11,503 148,580,154 4,095 418,343,759 15,598 566,923,913 
1992 12,228 183,363,745 3,934 450,888,755 16,162 634,052,500 
1993 10,632 184,209,087 3,886 387,308,970 14,518 571,518,057 
1994 8,469 202,926,447 3,223 314,793,199 11,692 517,719,646 
1995 7,076 152,883,754 2,283 201,923,120 9,359 354,806,874 
1996 6,415 142,449,393 1,662 107,151,715 8,077 249,601,108 
Total 70,512 $1,167,225,105 22,666 $2,393,243,002 93,178 $3,560,468,107 
Source: The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 1996. 
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Table (5.3) The amounts ($m) of deposits in the Asset Forfeiture Fund, Treasury 
Department, from 1986-1994. 
YEAR DEPOSITS 
1986 93.7 
1987 177.6 
1988 205.9 
1989 580.8 
1990 460.3 
1991 644.3 
1992 631 
1993 555.7 
1994 549.8 
Source: Annual Report of the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Program, Fiscal 
Year 1994. 
The Asset Forfeiture Fund holds an account in the Treasury Department 
that receives forfeited cash and the proceeds of sale from forfeited property 
from all cases involving Department of Justice DOJ and the judicial cases 
from those non-DOJ agencies that are participating in the Program. Fund 
revenue is measured in terms of net deposits to the Fund. In FY 1985, $27 
million in forfeited cash and property sale proceeds were deposited into 
the Fund, since then as it indicated in table (5.3), remarkable increase have 
been made in depositing revenues gained by the law enforcement 
agencies. (the amounts is counted by $ millions). The annual report of the 
DOJ (Fiscal Year 1994) indicated that without the forfeiture fund, law 
enforcement agencies would not have adequate resources to aggressively 
implement the Asset Forfeiture Program (p. 17). 
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Table (5.4) Allocation of law Enforcement Agencies for 1993 & 1994. (Dollars in 
Thousands). This table shows that FBI and DEA receive the highest allocation 
comparing with other law enforcement agencies. 
Direction 1994 1993 
Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture 3,097 450 
Community Relations Service 1,400 0 
Civil Rights Division 3,500 0 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 28,460 24,200 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 9,127 4,000 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 4,000 0 
United States Marshals Service (USMS) 4,995 0 
United States Postal Service 1,250 0 
United States Food and Drug Administration 450 0 
Internal Revenue Service 3,400 2,000 
Department of Health and Human Service 250 0 
Total $59,930 $30,650 
Source: Source book of Criminal Justice Statisti ; s, 1994. 
The Annual Report of the Department of justice-Asset Forfeiture Program 
(DJAFP) (FY 1994) indicates that in the beginning of FY 1994, the Federal 
Accounting Standards Advisory Board's Statement of Federal Financial 
Accounting Standards (Number 3) 'Accounting for Inventory and Related 
Property', required that revenue associated with property not disposed off 
through sale be recognised upon approval of distribution. During FY 1994, 
the property was distributed pursuant to the Attorney General's authority 
to share forfeiture revenues with state and local law enforcement agencies 
that participated in the forfeiture that generated the property, and 
pursuant to the Department's authority to place forfeited property into 
official use by the Government. The amount for the respective property 
distributions are as indicated in Table 5.5: 
Table (5.5) Distribution of forfeited property. *United States Marshal Services ($m) 
Way of Distribution 1994 
Property Retained by USMS* 1,570 
Property Transferred to State and Local Agencies 7,299 
Property Transferred to Federal Agencies 12,872 
Total Revenue 21,741 
Source: Source book of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1994. 
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5.4. SUMMARY & CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although a substantial amount of studies have been focused on American 
forfeiture laws and in particular about the civil forfeiture law, few studies 
have been conducted to determine the common comparative aspects of 
the American forfeiture system which can be contrasted with different 
jurisdictions. But despite the difficulties and the normal complications 
that distinguish forfeiture laws, determining the most distinctive features 
and principles of one forfeiture system is very important in comparing it 
with other systems. 
Inspired by the lucid categorisation that Walther (1994) has considered as 
'broadly sweeping', we can summarise the discussion of this chapter 
regarding the American confiscation system with the following: 
(i) The 'gross worth' principle: where not only the profits are the subject of 
the forfeiture order, but also all the proceeds and the entire fruits of the 
criminal activity are subject to forfeiture; 
(ii) The 'no back door', or 'substitution' principle: the forfeiture embraces 
not only the immediate proceeds, but also any derivative proceeds. 
Further, the law permits the forfeiture of alternative property in case the 
perpetrator has caused the originally tainted property to be unavailable in 
order to thwart its seizure; 
(iii) The 'exclusion of third parties' principle: the state's forfeiture rights 
are largely given priority over any third party rights which might accrue at 
the time the crime is committed (it is also known as the 'relation back 
doctrine'). Thus, a third party having acquired the property subsequently 
can only prevail, if he or she can prove having done so in 'good faith'. 
Procedurally, third parties cannot intervene in the defendant's trial, but 
must pursue their property claims in a separate proceeding. Similarly, 
victims will be referred to the Justice Department's Forfeiture Fund for 
their compensation claims; 
(iv) The 'relaxation of proof' principle: with regard to the connection 
between criminal activity and the proceeds. It should be noted that it 
entails a relaxation of the standard and method of proof, but not shifting 
the burden of proof to the defendant. Thus, the prosecution, who carries 
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the burden of proof that the property in question is subject to forfeiture, 
can do so by a demonstration that the property was acquired during the 
time period the crime was committed or within a reasonable time 
thereafter, and there was no likely source for its acquisition other than 
revenue from the violation of the drugs laws. If these elements can be 
established (by a preponderance of evidence), the judge or jury may draw a 
'permissible inference' that the property in fact represents illicit proceeds. 
Walther indicates that in American evidence law, this principle is known 
as the 'bursting bubble' principle - because the defendant can make the 
'bubble burst' by coming forward with some evidence making a legitimate 
source plausible. Then the presumption disappears, or 'bursts', and the 
case must be treated as if such a presumption has never existed; 
(v) The 'freezing principle': it gives the law enforcement broad powers to 
secure the availability of the 'suspect' property by way of a restraining 
order or injunction when formal proceedings are commenced, i. e. when 
an indictment or information is filed with the court, and, often more 
importantly, by way of a temporary restraining order even before that 
time. To secure such a temporary restraining order, the prosecution need 
demonstrate to the judge that there is 'probable cause to believe that the 
property in question would, in the event of conviction, be subject to 
forfeiture (21 USC. sec. 853 (e)). This is quite similar to the English 
restraint order; 
(vi) The 'tainted property' principle: it provides for civil forfeiture of illicit 
proceeds as 'tainted' where criminal prosecution is not feasible or where a 
conviction can otherwise not be obtained. 
As far as the differences and distinctions are concerned, with some 
explanations and comments that have been accompanied with the 
previous detailed examination of the American forfeiture provisions, 
there are some major differences between the British confiscation system 
and the American Laws of forfeiture. These major differences appear to be 
the following: 
-English law has no equivalence of criminal RICO which creates 
various new criminal offences defined by reference to a 'pattern of 
racketeering'. 
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-English law has no equivalence of the forfeiture of convicted 
person's entire interest in an 'enterprise' reaching interests which 
are not derived from a criminal source. 
-Other than in the context of customs' enforcement and a few other 
exceptional cases, English law makes little use of confiscation 
powers without a conviction for a criminal offence, whereas 
American law, especially in recent years, has made extensive use of 
'civil forfeiture' which does not require any criminal proceedings. 
-American law goes considerably further than English law in 
permitting confiscation/ forfeiture without any hearing, simply by 
administrative action. 
In addition to these general and major distinctions, there are many other 
differences which can be located, some of the other distinctive differences 
are: 
-The unitary system of government: it is the British unitary system 
which may avoid many of the complications encountered in 
federations such as the clash or overlap of federal and state 
legislation, the creation of multiple levels of jurisdiction involving 
federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, and the problem 
of state and federal courts. The federal structures tend to cause 
fragmentation as the result of the division of power and 
responsibility between the various, horizontal levels of 
government. When the effect of this horizontal division of power 
is combined with the vertical division of power between the 
Parliament, the executive and the legislature, found in most 
democratic systems, a complex structure is created which is very 
difficult to move in any particular direction as no one part of it has 
sufficient power. 
-Unlike the English value-based system where the government 
must be able to collect on the value judgement, and requires 
considerable post-forfeiture work in the investigation and tracing of 
assets belonging to the convicted defendant, the United States 
adopts a property confiscation system which require less 
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investigation because the property to be forfeited has already been 
identified at the outset of the criminal action. 
Although the United States has generally adopted a property 
confiscation system, as opposed to a value confiscation system, it 
provides authority to secure money judgements of forfeiture and to 
forfeit substitute assets in criminal proceedings against defendants 
charged with drug trafficking, money laundering, or racketeering 
offences102. It should be noted, however, that this authority extends 
only to criminal forfeiture. No civil statute provides for the 
forfeiture of substitute assets, presumably because civil forfeiture is 
premised on the theory that the subject property itself is 'guilty' of 
the underlying criminal offence. Thus, the issue of enacting a 
property or value confiscation system is tied to the broader question 
of whether the forfeiture system provides for civil or criminal 
forfeiture. 
-Under the criminal forfeiture law (21 USC. 853(d)), a rebuttable 
presumption is created that any property belonging to a person 
convicted of a drug felony is forfeitable if the prosecution 
establishes that: (1) such property is acquired by such person during 
the period of the violation or within a reasonable time after such 
period, and (2) there is no likely source for such property other than 
drug trafficking. 
Under United States law, drug traffickers who carry out their 
offences over many years can be charged with conspiracy to violate 
the drug laws. All drug income generated within the span of the 
conspiracy is subject to forfeiture. The British system in this regard 
applies a more explicit assumption, providing for the forfeiture of 
all earnings generated by a defendant within a statutory-defined 
period (six years) prior to the date of the offence which he stands 
convicted. 
102The forfeiture of substitute assets (as authorised by 21 U. S. C. 853(p), 18 U. S. C. 1963 
(P), and 18 U. S. C. 982) allows the United States to reach alternatives property of a 
convicted defendant if he or she has dissipated or alienated the actual proceeds or 
instrumentalities of the crime or transferred them beyond the jurisdiction of the court. 
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-Under the American civil forfeiture system, the government must 
first establish probable cause to believe that the property in question 
is forfeitable. Each claimant must then establish a legally viable 
defence by a preponderance of the evidence. In criminal forfeiture, 
there is a rebuttable presumption in favour of the government that 
certain proceeds are forfeitable drug wealth. 
-The legal fiction in civil proceedings, upon which in reißt actions 
rest provide that the property itself is guilty of the forfeitable 
offence, and is therefore the defendant in the suit. And although in 
recent years, and as mentioned in this chapter, Congress attempted 
to incorporate 'innocent owner' defences into recent civil forfeiture 
statutes, the innocence of the property's owner will have no bearing 
on civil forfeitability of his or her property. This is of course 
contrary to the situation in the criminal proceedings which is 
analogous to the British confiscation system where conviction 
always preceded the confiscation or forfeiture decisions of all 
normal cases103. 
In determining the British position from the American system, and as 
mentioned in chapter one, Mrs Thatcher's Government rejected the 
House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee's recommendation 
concerning the importance of providing the civil and criminal law with 
more powers of seizures and forfeiture of assets connected with drug 
traffic in accordance with the American practice. The issue came up in 
1986 during the debates on the Drug Trafficking Offences Bill. Speaking on 
the Second Reading, Mr. David Mellor, then Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary for the Home Office said: 
'The reason why we decided not to adopt the American example of 
civil proceedings was that we did not think that it would fit 
readily into the British system. The power is draconian and would 
have appeared out of sorts with anything we have hitherto done 
because it gives authorities powers to seize property, if they have 
reasonable suspicion that it has been acquired illegally. Then the 
individual who claims to be the owner is put to proof. Without 
having been convicted of anything, it is up to him to establish that 
the property was lawfully acquired '(Hansard, HM, 1986). 
103 Confiscation without conviction is only permitted in cases where the defendant is 
absconded. 
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On the 'Third Reading' of the Drug Trafficking Offences Bill, Mr Mellor 
returned to the issue: 
'The civil forfeiture procedure, though effective in America is 
difficult for us to swallow. As links across the Atlantic have proved 
to be so controversial these days I hope that we have not taken 
hook, line and sinker the American model but that we have used the 
American experience to spur us on with a British answer to the 
problems' 
The answer of the British government then is conclusive. That 
confiscation where there is no criminal conviction is unacceptable because 
it is fundamentally objectionable. Calling the process 'civil' does not alter 
the fact that it is in reality penal and, being effectively a penal process, it 
should not in principle be permitted without the safeguards associated 
with a criminal proceedings. 
Lastly, forfeiture in the United States differs from forfeiture in most other 
parts of the world. The major difference is that the United States advocates 
civil forfeiture, while most other countries permit only criminal 
forfeiture. The power to apply any of the two systems (civil or criminal) or 
both, which are the most common in United States, makes any attempt to 
compare it with the British single confiscation system quite difficult, 
confusing, and inconsistent. 
The American forfeiture system was one of two main references to those 
who proposed the confiscation theory for the British Government, beside 
the Canadian confiscation system. It has been influential and helped to 
determine some important provisions of the DTOA 1986. But in spite of 
the defects or the critiques addressed to the British confiscation system, the 
British legislator is wise in not adopting the powers of the American civil 
forfeiture. The American forfeiture laws seems to be a reaction to 
problems of organised crime and drug trafficking on a very large scale. The 
Hodgson Committee said: 'Britain has both (organised crime and drug 
trafficking), but not on the same scale' (p. 36). Whether organised crime or 
drug trafficking offences is or is not on the increase in Britain, no-one 
seriously suggests that it is anything like that in the United States, notably 
in the form of the mafia. Dorn et al (1992) asserted that there is no mafia, 
no cartel organising the market overall, rather, a large number of small 
organisations operate fairly autonomously of each other in a manner that 
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may be described as 'disorganised crime' (p. 202). This issue is also 
consistent with data shown previously in chapter three. 
The reach and scope of the definitions and powers provided under the 
American criminal and civil forfeiture laws are clear indicators that they 
are established to strike at the economic base of two of the main problems 
facing the American law enforcement: organised crime and major drug 
trafficking offences. Supporting and strengthening these laws by the 
American government is part of its strategy in the so called 'war on 
drugs'. The 'war on drugs', however, must not be used as a pretext for 
weakening the traditional protections of individual and property rights. If 
the American federal government is adopting the legal precept which says 
'Necessity has (or knows) no law' 'necessitas fact licltum quod alias no nt 
est licitum' , then one can expect that such adoption is supposed to be for a 
limited period of time to deal with certain unusual problem(s), not as a 
general rule for a fluctuated kind of problem. If there is a possibility of 
abuse in the enforcement of these excessive powers by law enforcement 
agencies, no one will be able to measure the extent of the subsequent 
destructive consequences and impact upon the rights of citizens and the 
trust between people and law enforcement agencies. This means that 
compliance with the common criminal standards is the only protection by 
which any abuses can be avoided. Adopting striking powers requires 
rational justifications not only for having such powers but also to justify 
the ways of enforcement. The clamour about the civil forfeiture law is a 
clear indicator that either the link between the underpinning principles of 
the system and the practical enforcement by the law enforcement agencies 
is lost, or the purposes are re-directed to serve irregular interests. Marrero, 
(1993), for example indicated that the main purpose of American 
forfeiture laws was the protection of the federal fisc, not criminal law 
enforcement. Hyde (1995) revealed that Units are apt to suffer pressure to 
make bigger and bigger seizures to ease other financial burdens within the 
seizures as part of the police budget. organisation. Zander (1989) pointed 
out that there are known cases where police authorities and even 
politicians have included projected future seizures as part of the police 
budget. Accordingly, if 'the end justifies the means' is the underpinning 
philosophy of civil forfeiture law and the threat posed by drug trafficking 
has been used to justify the means that infringe individual liberties then 
the end of civil forfeiture law must be examined. If the system produces 
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more mischief than it prevents then it loses its justification (Bean, 1981, p. 
36). Accordingly, the subsequent chorus of resentments and continuous 
allegations of injustice incidents since the enactment of the American 
forfeiture systems will make the law lose its justification and credibility, 
not only to the public but also to the law enforcement agencies who are 
part of the same society. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE KUWAITI AND THE EGYPTIAN 
CONFISCATION SYSTEMS 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to realise aim 5 of main aim 1 as set out in the 
Introduction i. e. to examine the Kuwaiti and the Egyptian asset 
confiscation systems and to locate any convergences and discrepancies 
with the British system (and where it is useful to refer also to the 
American systems). 
Various legislations and subsequent amendments of the confiscation laws 
in both systems are introduced, specifying wherever possible the rules 
upon which the original provisions and the amendments are based, and 
the legal operators, enforcement agencies and institutions involved in, 
and assigned for, sustaining these rules. The aim is to point out the 
locations of the main situations which could draw attention to the values 
embedded in both systems. Such an aim is believed to help with an 
understanding of the various reasons for having confiscation laws. 
The point which is important to re-state, and as stated in the introduction, 
is that the premise for including the Kuwaiti confiscation system in the 
context of studying the British confiscation system results from the 
researcher's national concerns. A critical study of the British system 
enables a frame of reference to be established in which the Kuwaiti 
position can be contextualised. In other words, including the Kuwaiti 
confiscation system as an object of analysis (or even comparison at 
particular aspects) can act as a warning to any dangers, risks and 
unreasonable costs that might arise for Kuwait. 
The method incorporated to study the Kuwaiti system (including the 
Egyptian system) is to use various sorts of published and unpublished 
documents, together with conducted interviews to examine the way the 
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legal texts related to confiscation are addressed and inscribed into the 
present socio-legal situation of Kuwait and Egypt. 
The chapter consists of two sections. The first section is devoted to a 
review of the theory and practice of the Kuwaiti confiscation system. The 
focus will be mainly on the development of the system to include new 
principles and powers to deal with the proceeds and profits of drug 
traffickers, the extent of the available powers, and the views of some of 
those involved in legislating and enforcing the available confiscation 
powers. 
The second section will examine the theory and extent of application of 
the Egyptian confiscation law provided under Act No. 34 of 1971, amended 
by Act No. 95 of 1980 in regard to Organising the Imposition of 
Sequestration104 and Securing the People Safety. 
It is important to mention here that due to the similarities between the 
original confiscation provisions provided by the Constitutions and Penal 
Codes of both countries (Kuwait & Egypt), an examination of these 
provisions will be confined only to the Kuwaiti system. The similarities 
between both systems are attributed to the fact that most of the precepts of 
confiscation laws provided under the Kuwaiti criminal law were extracted 
from the Egyptian criminal law. Accordingly repetition is not necessary 
and an examination of the Egyptian confiscation system will be in terms of 
the above mentioned Act only. 
6.2. CONFISCATION LAW IN KUWAIT 
6.2.1. Introduction 
The renaissance of Kuwait's legal system is relatively new, having started 
with the enactment of the judiciary Organisation Act 1959 (Al-Tabtabae, 
1994, p. 308). It was part of the development that accompanied the 
transformation in Kuwait brought about by the discovery of oil, the 
104Section 729 of the Civil Code define sequestration as 'handing over a property which 
has a dispute about its origins and rights to a reliable person who save it and administer it 
and return it to whoever proved to be his'. 
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gaining of independence and the continuous popular demand for 
participation in running its own affairs. 
The legal evolution in Kuwait was preceded by a phase of preparation 
during which Kuwait partly depended upon foreign expertise. Capable and 
highly qualified experts were needed to promulgate and codify laws, rules 
and legal customs prevalent at the time. Following the revocation of the 
Kuwait-Britain Treaty of 1960, there were increasing calls to establish a 
basic system that determines the rights and obligations of the ruler (Al- 
Amir) and the people. This occurred in the wake of the declaration of 
independence in 1961 and the announcement of the intention to hold 
general elections for a first constituent assembly in the State. Some 
Kuwaiti specialists and other experts contribute in drafting the provisions 
of the Constitution. The Constitution was then issued on the 11th of 
November 1962. It contained several chapters: the system of government, 
the fundamental constituents of the Kuwaiti society, public rights and 
duties, powers (legislative, executive, judicial), and lastly, some basic 
financial and military affairs. 
After the election of the first People's Assembly (Majless Al-Omah) in 
Kuwait in 1963, the issue of registration was perceived necessary. There 
had to be rules laid down to regulate and control the legal system 
(regularisation) on the basis of popular and sound rules, administered 
once again by specialised national cadres who are also assisted by external 
legal expertise from different Arab countries. Seeking the assistance of 
experts, particularly from Egypt, goes back to the strong, cultural and 
religious relations and bonds, as well as a realisation by the Kuwaiti 
government that Egypt is one of the advanced countries in the region in 
regard to legal domainlos. 
105The two mentioned features dictating the nature of relations between Egypt and Kuwait 
have established a well grounded justification for recourse to a friendly state like Egypt. In 
fact, it was the ambition of Kuwait to sustain its relation with it, recreating thus a stronger 
position in light of increasing challenges of development. A situation which had required 
from the state to strive for modern and advanced legal progression keep pace with the 
rapid socio-political and economic growth. Distinctively, the exchange of expertise in 
between the two states enhanced as a result of existence of what was called the 'Kuwait 
House' in Egypt at the time. This house played a great role in achieving objectives and 
requirements taking place for development processes, particularly, in connection with 
modernising the legal system. 
266 
Chapter Six The Kuwait and the Egyptian Confiscation Systems 
There are many significant similarities in the codification processes and 
provisions between Egyptian and Kuwaiti's legal system especially those 
which tackle the Penal and Drugs law. Actually, the Kuwaiti legislature 
has adopted similar principals and philosophies regarding the graduation 
of punishment. Punishment has been established on two premises; the 
seriousness of the offender and the degree of offence. The provision of 
article No. 78 of the Kuwaiti Penal law No. 16 for 1960 regarding the 
question of confiscation, for example, is a similar version of the provision 
of article No. 30 of the Egyptian Penal law, and also provision of article 
No. 39 of the Kuwaiti Narcotic Drugs Act No. 74 of 1983 regarding 
confiscation which corresponds with the provision of No. 42 of the 
Egyptian Drugs Prevention Act No. 182 for 1960 and some other 
provisions. 
In this section, a detailed review of the confiscation provisions provided 
under Kuwaiti law is confined to the provisions of the Constitution, 
criminal law and the Combat of Narcotic Drugs Act No. 74 of 1983 and the 
subsequent amendments in the Act No. 13 of 1995. But before examining 
the available powers and defects in dealing with the proceeds of drug 
trafficking a close look at the nature, character and scope of the common 
confiscation system in Kuwait will be reviewed. 
6.2.2. Confiscation System (The Constitution And The Penal 
Code) 
In regard to the Constitution, the principle law in Kuwait explains the 
system of the State and the Government, the fundamental constituents of 
the Kuwaiti society, public rights and duties, the powers of the Head of the 
State, the fundamental legislative and executive powers (the cabinet, the 
financial affairs, and the judicial powers). Article 174 of the Constitution 
provides that 
'Either the Amir or one-third of the members of the National 
Assembly shall have the right to propose the revision of this 
Constitution by amending or deleting one or more of its provisions or 
by adding new provisions' (Kuwait Constitution, Article. 174) 
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In respect to confiscation, the Constitution, contains three important 
articles that must be regarded by government and law enforcement 
agencies. These three articles are: 
'Public property is inviolable and its protection is the duty of every 
citizen' (Article. 17). 
'Private property is inviolable. No one shall be prevented from 
disposing of his property except within the limits of law. No 
property shall be expropriated except for the public benefit in the 
circumstances and manner specified by law, and on condition that just 
compensation is paid. Inheritance is a right governed by the Islamic 
Sharia' (Article. 18) 
General confiscation of the property 106of any person shall be 
prohibited. Confiscation of particular property as a penalty may not 
be inflicted except by a court judgement in the circumstances 
specified by law' (Kuwait Constitution, Article. 19). 
Traditions of Kuwaiti Constitutions are based upon the continental law 
and the Islamic shariah. Dr. Gannam in an interview in (1996)107 points 
out that the origins of some of the provisions of the current Constitution 
and most of the laws and regulations (the Penal Code, the procedural 
Code) are mainly extracted from the Egyptian legal system which is also 
extracted from French law. The historical relations between Egypt and 
France has had its own impact upon the formation of the legal system in 
Egypt, which subsequently, extended to other Arab countries in the region. 
The most distinctive feature of the legal system which has been adopted by 
the Egyptian and the Kuwaiti governments is that it is a 'written law'. 
This feature is common to Continental or Latin legal family systems 
unlike the situation with Common law systems (the Anglo-Saxon legal 
family). 
Zweigert. K& Kotz. H, (1977) affirm some differences between those two 
legal families by stating 
106The exact translation of the things which are confiscable under the Kuwaiti 
confiscation laws is "monies", but the official translator for the government had translated 
the term as "property". Al-Gamaz (1996) had defined "property" as everything or 
anything which has a certain monetary value (cash money, drugs, boats, vehicle etc. ), on 
the other hand, Al-Gannam (1996) refers to General Rules which provide that the 
confiscation order is only confined to the things that already seized, and this does not 
include for instance, buildings, real properties or any other immovables. 107This statement is part of a telephone interview with Dr. Gannam a senior lecturer at 
Law Faculty in Kuwait University (2nd of October, 1996), who explained the recent 
relevant amendments and interpretations of the Kuwaiti confiscation laws. 
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The tradition of the English Common law has been one of gradual 
development from decision to decision; historically speaking, it is 
case-law, not enacted law. Common law comes from the court, unlike 
the Continental law108 where it comes from the study. The great 
jurists of England were judges, on the Continent professors. On the 
Continent lawyers, faced with a problem, even a new and unforeseen 
one, they ask what solutions the rule provides, unlike Anglo-Saxon 
legal systems in England and the United States where lawyers 
predict how the judge would deal with the problem, given existing 
decisions. These differences in style run through the whole legal 
system' ........ Accordingly, 
French law dominated most of the Arabs 
states'(p. 66). The authors ended their arguments by saying that 
'recently the attitudes of Common law and Continental law have 
been drawing closer' ((p. 63-75, p. 71). 
The second traditional source that the Kuwaiti constitution has derived its 
legitimacy is the Islamic Shariah. Article 2 of the Kuwaiti constitution 
states 'Vie religion of the state is Islam, and the Islamic Shariah shall be a 
main source of legislation'. This Shariah is a premise that can be a guiding 
element for evaluating the extent that the confiscation order as witnessed 
in other countries can establish a consistent theory with the tradition of 
the Kuwaiti system. What is essential to know is that the Islamic Shariah 
has its own details that might contradict main premises of the current 
confiscation systems. It is not possible to go into details about the 
variations in the system except the ones that can help us in determining 
the extent that the British confiscation system is in harmony with the 
tradition that the Kuwaiti constitution relies upon. 
A close analysis of the Islamic Shariah, shows that two school of thought 
regarding the confiscation issue exist. The first is exclusionary where the 
pecuniary punishments are forbidden on the ground that no guilt can 
replace the property of a person. This punishment is exercised on the ill 
personain and not on the goods. The second is inclusive where the judge 
can withhold a culprit's property for some time on the ground of 
108lnsummingup the comprehensive examination of the world wide law systems and the 
origin of grouping the legal systems Zweigert & Kotz stated that 'these groupings 
primarily for taxonomic purposes, so as to arrange the mass of legal systems in a 
comprehensible order'. They indicated that many attempts tried to devise grouping those 
mass legal systems (Arminjon; Nolde; Wolf and many others). The legal ideologies of the 
Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Romanistic, and Nordic families are essentially similar, and it is 
because of other elements in their styles that they must be distinguished. But in general, 
the world today knows two different 'law types': Latin or Continental legal system which 
stem from Roman and Germanic law (combine the legal system of most countries of Europe, 
Latin America, many countries in Middle East and Asia) on one side, and the Anglo-Saxon 
legal system which the United States, England and some other countries come under on the 
other side (p. 63-75 ). 
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deterrence that can lead to repentence. If this is achieved the property will 
be given back to him when his repentence becomes clear without passing 
such property to the public treasury. 
Regarding the nature of the confiscation principles, the Kuwaiti 
consitution adopts the view of the Islamic Shariah. The Shariah requires 
confiscation to be a principal punishment imposed on the crime, but 
mostly it is enforced as a complementary punishment decided by law in 
consequence of other penalties. The justification for the confiscation are as 
follows: 
a) non-payment of the Zakat (a type of Islamic tax applied on 
Individual) to the state provides the right to confiscate part of the 
offender's property. 
b) illegal investments and gains which are obtained from robbery or 
theft and the owner is unknown. These can be confiscated to the 
Treasury. 
c) suspected gains and gifts that are presented to the officials of the 
states during the duty appointed for them. The law entitles the 
confiscation of half of their properties even those which are gained 
in legal means. 
In light of these, the confiscation of the proceeds of drug traffickers can be 
treated under the category (b). 
6.2.2.1. Theoritical Principles 
Al-Shinnawi (1988) indicates that the general power of confiscation is 
abolished in most of the developed and developing legislations (referring 
to Article 19 of the Kuwaiti Constitution) because it prejudices the social 
position of the convicted person and makes his repetition of the crime 
more likely. This is apart from the fact that the consequences thereof affect 
his children and spouse. This is said to be a state of affairs which is 
inconsistent with the spirit of justice. However, particular or 'speciale' 
confiscation as originally called by the French legal system (Merle. R& 
Vitu. A, 1978), has been permitted by most legal systems, provided that it 
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should be made by a court judgement and only in the events set forth by 
the law. 
Section 78 of the Penal Code consists of two paragraphs: the first indicates 
that the judge may (discretionary power) order the confiscation of the 
seized things which have been used or intended to be used in committing 
the crime and their yields if the judge is sentencing for a felony (a serious 
crime) or a deliberate misdemeanour and without prejudice to the rights 
of bona fide third parties. The second paragraph provides that if the mere 
possession of the mentioned seized things is an offence, then the judge 
shall (obligatory) order the confiscation and irrespective to the rights of 
bona fide third parties (Department of Fatwa and Tashrea, p. 33). 
Confiscation procedures are considered to be complementary procedures 
to the principle sentences (Al-Shinnawi, 1988, p. 222). Section 66 of the 
Kuwaiti Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 lists clearly the types of consequential 
and complementary sanctions. Section 67 specifies the events where 
sanctions are to be consequential or complementary. Reviewing, in brief, 
the differences between the consequential and the complementary 
procedures is important because they enclose the philosophy and 
principles of the current application of confiscation orders. 
6.2.2.2. The Consequential Sanctions: 
The consequential procedure comes from committing certain crimes 
irrespective to whether the principle penalty has been executed or not and 
even an Amiri pardon109 does not affect it. (sect. 239 of Criminal 
Procedures Act). 
Accordingly, it is mandatory in any sentence of a criminal offence to entail 
deprivation of certain rights which are listed under section 68 of the Penal 
Code. These rights are not recoverable unless the defendant has been 
exonerated in accordance with the procedure of law. These rights are: (a) 
occupying public office or acting as contractor or supplier to the 
government; (b) running for membership of public councils or other 
109Article 75 of the Constitution provides that "The Amir (the president of the State) 
may, by decree, grant a pardon or commute a sentence. However, general amnesty shall not 
be granted except by a law and then only in respect of offences committed prior to the 
proposal of the amnesty". 
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bodies, or appointment in one of them as a member; and (c) voting in 
elections of members of councils or public organisations. 
Al-Thahabi (1978) indicates that a confiscation order is not a consequential 
sanction by virtue of its nature and its direct relation to the offence (p. 
142). 
6.2.2.3. The Complementary Sanctions 
Section 66 of the Penal Code determines the complementary penalties by 
providing a list of eight procedures. Confiscation is one of these 
procedures. The Penal Code stated very clearly that all these procedures 
are punishments. Section 67 explains that complementary penalties 
depend upon their announcement by the judge, whether the law has 
made it mandatory or discretionary. 
In most cases, the term 'confiscation' is meant to be the special 
confiscation which is devoted to the transfer of ownership of a certain 
thing to the state without compensation (Al-Thahabi, 1978 & A1-Gamaz, 
1985). Along the same line, Al-Shinnawi defines confiscation as a 
deprivation of the ownership of a property from beneath the hand of its 
owner, against his will, and add it to the State's Finance and without any 
compensation (Al-Shinnawi, 1988, p. 222). 
The first paragraph of section 78 of the Penal Code states that confiscation 
is discretionary and the second paragraph states that it could be for other 
cases as mandatory (The Penal Codes and the Supplementary Codes, 1993, 
p. 7-33). 
Section 39 of the Narcotic Drugs Act No. 74 of 1983 and section 49 of the 
subsequent Act No. 48 of 1987 provide that 'in all events, the judgement 
or the sentence should include a confiscation order for the seized drugs, 
plants (which are stated in schedule 5 of this Act), used instrumentalities, 
appliances, vessels and seized vehicles and without prejudicing the rights 
of those who are acting in a good faith'. This means that confiscation- 
related drug misuse, in all cases, is a mandatory sanction (Ibid., p. 179). 
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6.2.2.3.1. Mandatory Confiscation: 
Al-Gamaz (1985) mentions that in accordance with specific provisions of 
the first paragraph of section 39 of the Narcotic Drugs Act 1983 and 
pursuant to the provision of second paragraph of section 78 of Penal Code 
1960, confiscation of illegal narcotic substances is deemed to be one of the 
precautionary procedures because manufacturing, possessing or dealing 
with them is an offence by itself which entails direct implementation of 
confiscation. Thereupon, confiscation is enforced by an administrative 
action even if the final sentence did not mention it. This, however, 
should not be taken to mean that confiscation is restricted to conviction, 
but it is mandatory whether there is conviction or not, whether the 
criminal proceedings has been ceased due to the death of the accused; 
prescription (the invalidation of the sanction by lapse of time) or for any 
other reasons. Confiscation is mandatory and there is no need for it to be 
announced or stated in the sentence as long as there are some drugs which 
have been seized. Lacking the knowledge of who is the owner does not 
affect these proceedings (p. 345-349). 
Al-Shinnawi (1988) confirms that 'mandatory confiscation is the one 
which the judge should order along with or in addition to the original 
sanction. For this reason it is regarded as a complementary sanction in all 
events' (p. 224). A1-Shinnawi also indicates that mandatory confiscation 
applies only in two exceptional cases: 
(i) In the event of the things that are used in the crime or that result 
from the crime, where the mere possession of or dealing with such 
things is not, by itself, an offence. This is similar to discretionary 
cases, but the whole idea is that the legislator requires this 
punishment to be imposed in accordance with the legal provisions 
dealing with such crimes in order to achieve more deterrence. For 
this reason, confiscation in such cases is purely penal, and should be 
imposed against the convicted person alone (the second paragraph 
of section 39, Act No. 74 of 1983). 
(ii) Where the seized things are of the type whose manufacture, 
possession or dealing with is regarded as an offence per se then a 
confiscation order must be imposed in the sentence. This provision 
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also provides that advanced and actual seizures are important for 
confiscation orders (sect. 78 (2) of the Penal Code 1960). 
Apart from these two exceptional cases, the conditions of confiscation 
would be different to the point where this could be considered as a 
precautionary and a discretionary measure rather than a pure punishment 
in the strict sense of the word (Al-Shinnawi , 1988, (p. 226) and Al-Gamaz 
1985, (p. 346)). Consequently, the imposition of a confiscation order does 
not need to be preceded by an original sanction, and the court must 
impose the order if possession or dealing with a certain thing is an offence 
even if the court has acquitted the defendant. Furthermore, the court 
should order the confiscation of the seized thingsl10 even if ownership of 
such things has passed to another party (inheritors or others) prior to 
conviction, or where the confiscation order may infringe upon the rights 
of third party who act in good faith (sect. 39 (1) of the Narcotics Act, No. 74, 
1983 & sect. 78 of the Penal Code, No. 16,1960). 
Al-Gamaz (1985) criticises the latter provision (referring to the second 
paragraph of sect. 78 of the Penal Code), by saying that it could cause 
damage(s) to the person who acts in good faith. Confiscation should not be 
reverted to by courts where the possession of things is only an offence to 
the person whose in his possession they are found, while they are actually 
owned by another party. Therefore, they should return to their owner. 
While this could be conceivable, it seems that the legislator in drafting 
this provision has depended upon the guarantees and protection provided 
in Article 18 of the constitution111 and by the main provision of 
confiscation under Act No. 74 of 1983 and Act No. 49 of 1987 where both 
provide that the imposition of confiscation order should not prejudice the 
rights of those who are acting in a good faith (p. 347). 
11OThe legislator and even the writers in this area are always using the term 'thing' or 
'things' which often reflects the ambiguity in determining what the 'things' actually are, 
or what comes under it. Unlike the English system where the definition of the things was 
quite clear (see the definition of property under the DTA 1994). 111Article 18 of the Constitution provides that "Private property is inviolable. No one 
shall be prevented from disposing of his property except within the limits of law. No 
property shall be expropriated except for the public benefit in the circumstances and 
manner specified by law, and on condition that just compensation is paid". 
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6.2.2.3.2. Discretionary Confiscation: 
The first paragraph of section 78 of the Penal Code provides that the judge 
may consider confiscation of the seized things but only when he imposes a 
criminal or a deliberate misdemeanour sanction. This means that 
confiscation is a discretionary procedure. Al-Shinnawi (1988) comments 
that such confiscation requires certain conditions: 
(a) The defendant must be sentenced with a principle sanction for a 
criminal offence or for a deliberate misdemeanour. Accordingly, 
confiscation is not permitted if the sentence is acquittal, or the 
committed offence is not deliberate. 
(b) The materials or drugs subjected to confiscation should have 
been seized either because they are used in the committal of the 
offence or could have been used in the committal thereof, or is one 
of the things which resulted from the committal of the offence. 
Therefore, the court should not confiscate things that are irrelevant 
to the offence. Moreover, confiscation should not be permitted for 
things that are not seized. In cases where there are things that are 
sought to be seized, section 77 of the Procedures Act should be 
implemented, which gives the investigator the right to issue an 
order to the person in possession of such things to present those 
things at such time and place as are specified in the order. If this is 
not affected, the investigator may conduct a search and take any of 
the measures within the jurisdiction of the public power to oblige 
such person to do so. 
(c) When a confiscation order is imposed, care should be taken to 
observe the rights of the third party who is acting in a good faith. In 
accordance with section 180 of Procedures Act, the court which 
renders the sentence in this matter should impose its sentence in 
respect of the demands of the litigant parties in connection with the 
things that have been impounded. The judge should refer the 
dispute to a civil court for hearing or should dispose of the 
impounded things by means of an independent and separate 
decision, such as an order of delivery of things, or an order to 
confiscate the impounded things for the benefit of the government 
or to destroy them. 
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(d) Discretionary confiscation is of an absolute penal character. 
Accordingly, imposing confiscation should take into consideration 
the personal aspect of the matter (the sanction is personal). This 
means that the sanction may be imposed only against the defendant 
or the convicted person (p. 347). 
6.2.3. Act No. 13 of 1995 (Confiscation of Assets) 
Powers of investigating, seizing and confiscating the proceeds and profits 
of drug traffickers similar to the British, American and the Egyptian 
criminal or civil laws are not available in Kuwaiti law before the issuance 
of Act No. 13 of 1995 which amended Act No. 74 of 1983 in regard to the 
Combat of Narcotics Drugs. 
Before the issuance of this latest Act (No. 13 of 1995), and as explained 
above, confiscation was confined only to the narcotic substances and 
compositions or seized plants mentioned in a special schedule. The law 
also provides that tools, equipment and containers utilised as well as the 
seizing of the means of transportation used in committing the offence can 
be confiscated (Section 39, Act No. 74,1984). 
Act No. 13 of 1995 amended some provisions and added some new 
paragraphs to Act No. 74 of 1983. The two paragraphs of section 3 Act No. 
13 of 1995 are added to section 39 of Act No. 74. These two paragraph 
provide that: 
The court also shall order the confiscation of properties proved to be 
acquired from committing the crimes provided for in this Act; and 
the court, upon request from the Public Prosecutor may order to 
restrain the accused from disposing of all of his properties or part 
thereof until the court makes its final judgement in the criminal 
proceeding' (Section 3, Act No. 13,1995). 
Because there is no comprehensive explanation for the purpose of such an 
addition in the explanatory memorandum of this Act, and because there 
are no studies or researches on the new confiscation measures, several 
interviews were conducted to establish an explanation for those two 
paragraphs. The aim was to identify the rationale behind such a new 
additions, to locate the principal aims the legislature seeks to accomplish, 
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and to determine the arrangements taken by government and in 
particular the police and prosecution to enforce these new provisions. 
The legal expert in the Kuwaiti Parliament (pers. communication, 12 Feb. 
1995) has commented on these particular additions by saying that, 
'properties acquired from an offence is the outcome of an offence. It is 
impossible for the person, as long as the act itself is impermissible, 
to benefit from outcome of such act, and so, there should be 
confiscation. This is a logical obvious principle'. 
He also points out that this addition is a consequence of the awareness of 
the Kuwaiti legislature to this new aspect of drug trafficking offences and 
the subsequent international concerns by stating: 
The Kuwaiti legislator has perceived the importance of extending 
the provision of confiscation to this procedure, therefore he added 
it. He might also realised the same through the development and 
exacerbation of drugs problems and their conversion into organised 
crimes. This is besides the fact that confiscation of illegal proceeds 
has become a main objective of a world-wide strategy against illicit 
drug trafficking offences'. 
In his explanation for this new confiscation provision, he asserts that 
confiscating the proceeds, as provided in the text, is obligatory on every 
outcome of any drug trafficking offences determined by the law. This 
means that the same procedures are provided for narcotic substances 
mentioned in the first paragraph of the section. 
The legal counsellor in the Drugs Prosecution Office at the Ministry of 
Justice in an interview held in his office on 13 February 1995, affirms that 
the new addition to the provision of section 39 of the Drugs Act entitles 
the court to confiscate all the properties acquired from drugs trafficking 
offences. The meaning of 'properties' include everything having 
monetary value whether movable or immovable. 
Regarding the actual application of this new provisions and the current 
level drug trafficking offences in Kuwait, Al-Athari112 (pers. 
communication, 1996), thinks that there is no serious drug trafficking 
cases. He states: 
There are a limited individual activities which are far from being 
described as an organised criminal gangs. Most of the drug 
112Mr. AI-Athari is one of few Kuwaiti lawyers specialised in drug cases. 
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trafficking offences, however, in Kuwait are accidental and are not 
permanent'. 
The recorded numbers of drug trafficking cases provided by the Kuwaiti 
Ministry of Interior give a different picture. The figures included in table 
6.1 below provide very clearly that all forms of illegal possession and 
dealings are escalating. The number of drug cases (illegal possession for 
personal use and illegal trafficking offences) increased from 101 cases in 
1980 to near 400 in 1995. The table reveals also that the number of drug 
trafficking offences is not 'limited to accidental activities', as Mr. Al- 
Athari indicated. From 1986 onwards the number of drug trafficking cases 
is higher than the number of personal taking cases. Taking 1986 as the 
median year, the number of drug trafficking cases increase from 222 in 
1987 to 266 in 1995 (a total increase of 44 cases). However, an increase in 
the number of personal taking had jumped from 14 cases in 1987 to 128 in 
1995 (the amount of increase is 114 cases). 
Table (6.1) shows the number of cases, defendants, drug trafficking, and illegal taking 
during the period 1980-1995. The numbers of 1990 is not included due to the 
invasion crisis. 
Year No. Cases No. Defendants Trafficking Taking 
1980 101 206 75 26 
1981 111 215 56 55 
1982 144 270 60 84 
1983 231 384 110 121 
1984 234 350 86 148 
1985 154 236 75 79 
1986 221 342 198 22 
1987 236 330 222 14 
1988 168 313 143 25 
1989 173 312 143 30 
1991 82 177 66 16 
1992 238 375 199 39 
1993 348 744 279 69 
1994 335 565 220 115 
1995 394 664 266 128 
Source: The Annual Statistical Report, 1996, The General Department of Criminal 
Investigation. 
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Figure (6.1) The differences in the number of all drugs cases and number of suspects and 
number of drug trafficking cases and possession for personal use cases. (Source: The 
Annual Statistical Report, 1996, The General Department of Criminal Investigation) 
Al-Athari also indicated that: 
'We suffer tragedies that have nothing to do at all with what the 
legislator means of the provisions under Drugs Act. Act No. 13 of 
1995 has unreasonably escalated all the penalties and included life 
imprisonment and death penalty for certain drug trafficking 
offences. The legislator has raised the penalty of possession for 
personal use to 10 years imprisonment. This is too much'. 
This statement indicates that there is a different perspective beside that of 
which the government hold. It shows that there are those who do not 
believe that the drug trafficking problem in Kuwait needs to be dealt with 
by increasing penalties. The statement implies that the nature of the 
Kuwaiti culture, traditions and relationships require looking at a variety 
of other social and practical solutions other than the deprivation of liberty. 
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This is quite similar to the negative impressions Derek Hodgson, the 
chairman of Hodgson Committee, has about the provisions of the DTOA 
1986. The British Government has set its pace against some of the proposed 
principles aimed at providing alternatives and justifications that should 
be reflected as a matter of mitigation in any sentence of imprisonment. 
The Committee pointed out that the aim must be to construct a system of 
redress that is adequate to obviate, as much as possible, the necessity to 
resort to imprisonment (Hodgson Report, 1984, p. 7). 
The statement also implies that the new governmental sentencing policy 
does not reflect a response to a serious drug trafficking problem as much 
as to reflect certain regional or international conditions and developments 
which lead to some unjustified obligations and pressures upon national 
laws. The ratification of the United Nation Convention (1988) and the 
subsequent Arabic Convention Against Illicit Trafficking In Narcotics 
Drugs And Psychotropic Substances 1994 by the Kuwaiti Government is a 
natural consequence of being a member state and of the attempts and 
conditions which subsequently entail such new powers to be inserted 
within the national laws. The argument of Al-Athari implies that the 
actual problem is not in the addition of a confiscation order because it is a 
discretionary power which needs a long period of time to be enforced by 
law enforcement agencies, but it is in the increase of the prison sentences 
(life imprisonment and the death penalty for traffickers and 10 years 
imprisonment for mere possession). These penalties, as Al-Athari stated: 
'were originally designed for a country that not only lost the war on drugs 
but even failed to control and restrict the developing epidemic aspect of 
their drug problem. In Kuwait, however, the problem of drugs is under 
control even before the introduction of these new additions'. In 
responding to such a statement, table (6.1) provide two pieces of evidence: 
(a) the number of drug trafficking cases is escalating (from 75 cases in 1985 
to 266 in 1995) and (b) the number of drug trafficking cases were higher 
than the number of illegal drug taking case which indicate that the greater 
part of the drug problem in Kuwait is related to illegal drug trafficking. 
This may means that the drug trafficking problem in Kuwait is part of a 
bigger organised criminal network in the area which demand more 
efficient protection powers and qualified law enforcement agencies. 
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The scandal of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International BCC1113 
(in United Arab Emirates) had led most of the states in the area to review 
their laws and look for new laws and regulations which provide them 
with more protections against any similar problems. 
The Riyadh Seminar on Economic Crimes held in Saudi Arabia in October 
1993 is another example of how different forces are determined to extend 
the recognition of the United Nation Convention on confiscation of the 
proceeds of drug traffickers to the Arabian Gulf's states because they are 
considered as the most important financial centres in the world114. 
On the other hand, Al-Athari adds that law enforcement agencies must at 
least realise differences between the various types of drug traffickers. i. e. 
between professional traffickers, street dealers, and the accidental ones. 
The Narcotic Drugs Act deals with the nature and type of the offence and 
not with offenders' conditions. This may entail that professional and 
accidental offenders may be charged with the same offence and receive the 
same penalty115. He exemplifies this by saying 
'If we review the definition of trafficker in the Commerce Code, we 
shall find that it stipulates that the 'trafficker' is the person who 
considers the sale of narcotic substance as ordinary profession for 
him. Accordingly, if someone acquires a prohibited substance and 
sells it accidentally, this cannot be considered as trafficking'. 
This suggests that drug traffickers in Kuwait are of a different type and 
level, and unless one recognises this fact, the court will always misjudge 
the defendants and then impose disproportionate sanctions. Moreover, 
the social relations, customs and traditions of the Kuwaiti society play an 
important part in the drug problem, in the awareness of the definitions, 
principles and all the social aspects and its potential positive and negative 
elements is a key factor in dealing with drugs offences. Al-Athari asserts 
that such essential awareness does not exist at present among the judiciary 
and law enforcement agencies in Kuwait. And the Narcotic Drugs Act 
113The Bank was accused of involvement in money laundry and fraud crimes in which USA 
played a major part in the subsequent investigations and prosecution. 
114This Seminar was organised by SAMA (The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency), GCC 
(Gulf Co-operation Council, and FATF (Financial Action Task Force). 
115The Kuwaiti law is a written law, which means that the judges must first identify the 
offence which must be conform with one of particular offences provided in the law, and 
then apply the attached penalty to this offence. The only discretionary power the judges 
have is in choosing between a minimum to a maximum penalty. 
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amended by the 1995 Act is intended to fight the real professional drug 
traffickers whose number does not really exceed 1% of the total drug 
trafficking offences. 
With regard to confiscation orders, Al-Athari mentions that the court 
usually orders the confiscation of the seized materials and properties 
acquired from the offence, and the properties that have been seized at the 
time of the arrest and in the scene of the crime. This means that 
confiscation is provided only for the seized illegal things. 
The new confiscation provisions which empowered the court to confiscate 
the proceeds of crime did not encounter any official or real opposition or 
academic analysis. This is due maybe to the lack of experience and because 
people have not yet experienced its effects. Where the British confiscation 
system is mostly a consequence of actual drug trafficking incidents (the 
Julia case), the situation in Kuwait is different. The new confiscation 
provisions have been inserted into the system without preceding 
incidents or unusual cases. 
The last contact with the Drugs Prosecution Department in the Ministry of 
Justice, the Drugs Department in the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry 
of Finance was on 15th of September 1997. They confirmed that the 
government did not yet establish any financial investigative systems to 
execute the new confiscation provisions by determining the 
responsibilities and jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies in regard to 
the enforcement of confiscation proceedings. The Act provides the powers 
of seizing drugs and assets, and empowers the court with confiscation 
orders, but it did not explain how, when and who is responsible for its 
implementation. 
The country, after the Gulf war, has witnessed several outrageous 
transgressions on public monies and some embezzlement cases which 
have dominated the attention of the mass media and even the legislative 
authority. Several Parliamentary committees were established to 
investigate such crimes. Act No. 1 of 1993 was one of the solutions 
provided by the Parliament and governmental committees for such 
crimes. The Parliament and the public, in general, are interested in 
following the proceedings of these cases and their investigations. The 
282 
Chapter Six The Kuwait and the Egyptian Confiscation Systems 
punishments provided under this Act include an obligatory 
complementary 'punishments' (suspension from job, returning the same 
amount of money, fine of double the stolen embezzeld public money 
money. 
The new confiscation provision under the Narcotic Drugs Act 1983 
amended by the Act No. 13 of 1995 did not stimulate any criticism mainly 
because of two reasons: (a) the anger of people over those who committed 
the crimes may have prevented them from questioning the confiscation 
provisions in 1995 and (b) the confiscation of proceeds is quite similar to 
the obligatory complementary punishments provided under The 
Protection of Public Money Act 1993. Section 11 & 12 provide that 
benefiting from embezzlement is also a crime. All the profits are included 
within the return of the amounts of money or properties of the state or 
within the double fine which is equal to the amount of the stolen money. 
Moreover, the country has not witnessed yet any conflict in dealing with 
the confiscation of assets and profits of drug trafficking offences. All the 
drug trafficking cases which were dealt with by courts or police did not yet 
require financial tracing nor showed any interest in seizing properties 
which might be proved to be related to drug trafficking offences. 
The confiscation of proceeds and profits as provided by the Narcotic Drugs 
Act will not be efficient simply because it lacks a detailed provisions that 
cover all the necessary procedures needed for a successful 
implementation. Without realising, for instance, the most important 
supportive provisions such as the production order, the restraint order, 
and seizing provisions, the confiscation system will be counter- 
productive. 
6.2.4. United Nation Conventi 
Narcotics Drugs And P 
(Vienna) 
Against Illicit Trafficking I 
chotropic Substances 1988 
There are a vast number of official reports and correspondences between 
governmental Ministries116 and legislative committees concerning the 
116Copies of most of the correspondences between Ministries and legislative Committees 
were collected from different resources (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of justice, Ministry of 
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ratification of this Convention. Though most of the correspondents 
advocate ratification, some reservations about particular articles in the 
Convention have prevented the government from proceeding in ratifying 
it. The confiscation provisions provided under this Convention have 
been accepted and reservations are confined to other articles, like for 
instance, the extradition's provisions under article six and eleven. In what 
follows is a review of some of the correspondents and some of views and 
disputes about confiscation procedures provided under article five. 
A letter from the Office of International Relations at the Ministry of 
Justice, declares that confiscation provisions of the United Nation 
Convention complements national law. It asserted that depriving the 
illicit gains of drug traffickers is one of the objectives intended to be 
achieved by the Convention. It is considered also as an international goal 
and a great advantage for the international community, and the state 
should persist in achieving it (Ministry of Justice, 1993). 
Another letter from the Public Prosecutor forwarded to the Under 
Secretary, Ministry of Interior, indicates that article five of the 
Convention, with some exceptions, does not contradict the basic 
confiscation system provided for in the national laws. There is no harm in 
taking the measures and procedures recommended in articles 2,3, and 4 as 
long as they shall not be taken without certain guidelines for law 
enforcement agencies within the limits permitted by procedural rules 
applicable in the state. The public prosecutor raises a reservation against 
section five of article five and particularly subsection (B) (i) which 
provides: 
When acting on the request of another Party in accordance with this 
article, a Party may give special consideration to concluding 
agreements on: 
(i) Contributing the value of such proceeds and any property, 
or funds derived from the sale of such proceeds or property, 
or a substantial part thereof, to intergovernmental bodies 
specialising in the fight against illicit traffic in and abuse 
of narcotic drugs and psychtropic substances; 
The public prosecutor believes that it is necessary to have a reservation 
against such a paragraph because selling narcotics and psychotropic 
Finance, Central Bank, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Council of Ministers and the Public 
Assembly's legislative Committee). 
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substances resulting from the offences or sharing the same, which are 
practically prohibited intoxicant, is in conflict with the Islamic Sharia and 
Constitution which prohibit such patterns of action (Ministry of justice, 
1989). 
It seems that the public prosecutor has been confused. Selling confiscated 
drugs or alcohol and contributing the yielded money to certain legal 
institutions is indeed prohibited in Islam, but alcohol and drugs are not 
included under this provision. The 'proceeds' under article 1 of this 
Convention is defined as 'any monies (properties) which are obtained 
from or acquired in direct or indirect way from committing one of the 
offences listed in section (1) of article 3'. 
Most of the sources that have been contacted in this regard asserted that a 
complete ratification will take place in the near future. The final point is 
that the preceding confiscation provisions under the Narcotics Drugs Act 
and the reservation against certain articles of this Convention need to be 
examined in-depth. In determining the actual need for such provisions in 
dealing with domestic, regional, and international drug trafficking 
offences, the authorities must take into consideration the provisions of 
the Constitution which protect the rights of the people, and prevents 
them from being at risk by a misuse or in going too far in applying certain 
provisions by the law enforcement agencies, whilst at the same time 
providing them with sufficient and efficient powers to deal with the 
proceeds of drug trafficking offences. 
6.2.5. The Arabic Conv 
Narcotics Drugs 
(Tunisia) 
Against Illicit Trafficking In 
svchotronic Substances 19! 
Kuwait has ratified this Convention in 1994. Ratification is evidence that 
Kuwait is supporting the new international and regional trends in 
combating drug trafficking offences and the confiscation provisions 
provided under this Convention which are almost the same as the United 
Nation Convention against illicit trafficking of 1988. The Kuwaiti 
government must be very careful in implementing any of the provisions 
provided under this Convention which has no counterpart in domestic 
law. At the current time, there is no clear confiscation domestic system 
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that deals with tracing, seizing, and confiscating the proceeds of drug 
trafficking offence that is supported by laws and powers for enforcement. 
In such a situation it is not recommended to ratify regional or 
international systems before having a system that is able to deal efficiently 
with any inquiries such as reciprocity. 
By reviewing the articles of the Convention, and comparing its provisions 
with the aforementioned United Nation Convention, it has been found 
that the Arabic Convention has adopted the exact confiscation procedures 
stipulated by the United Nations Convention. 
Al-Gamaz (1996) mentions that ratifying the Convention by the state 
makes the Convention be in force by law within the state. Section (70) of 
Kuwait's Constitution provides that 'A treaty shall have the force of law 
after it is signed, ratified and published in the Official Gazette'. 
This means that the prosecutor may rely on the articles of such a treaty in 
pleading against the offence of drugs trafficking which include proceeds 
and returns worth being confiscated, but this rarely happens. Ratification 
at a regional or international level must go through executive and 
legislative channels in Kuwait. This ratification must reflect a real need 
and a preceded preparation in dealing with subsequent inquires and 
questionings. 
6.3. CONFISCATION IN EGYPTIAN LAW 
6.3.1. Introduction 
Confiscation related to the proceeds of drug trafficking offences in Egypt is 
not wholly different from that in the USA, inasmuch as there is more 
than one procedure to be used by those concerned with the drug 
trafficking offences prevention system in achieving their goals and their 
effort to dispossess drug traffickers of their illegal profits. Just as American 
confiscation laws are linked to criminal and civil confiscations, so too is 
the position in Egypt. Though the Egyptian legislature has not created 
special legislation for confiscating drug trafficking assets, it has established 
several rules and provisions included in different legislations which, 
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somehow, serve as an alternative. The main confiscation provisions 
which deal only with assets and proceeds of the drug trafficking offences 
are provided under the following laws: 
1- Drugs Act No. 182 of 1960, amended by Act No. 122 of 1989 in regard to 
Drugs Act (Criminal law). 
2- Act No. 34 of 1971, amended by Act No. 95 of 1980 in regard to 
Organising Sequestration Laws 117 and Securing the People Safety, which 
organise sequestration rules of illegally earned properties and issue 
confiscating orders if there is substantial evidence that the accumulation 
of properties as a whole or in part is done by self or by others through 
specified illegal activities - the most important of which is drug trafficking 
and smuggling. 
3- The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (Vienna), ratified by the Egyptian 
government in 1989. 
4- The Arab Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1994 (Tunisia). 
This section will examine the theory and extent of powers vested to a 
particular law enforcement agency (the General Socialist Prosecutor) 
which are provided under the second law, Act No. 34 of 1971, amended by 
Act No. 95 of 1980. Details about the remaining laws are available in 
Appendix. V. 
6.3.2. Act No. 34 of 1971, in Regard to Organising 
Sequestration Laws and the Complementary Subsequent 
Act No. 95 of 1980 Regarding Protecting Ethics from Fault 
In addition to the powers of confiscation provided under the criminal 
Narcotics Drugs Act 1960 the Egyptian system has a special rule which 
deals with the proceeds of crime. Act No. 34/1971 which was enacted in 10 
117Section 729 of the Civil Code define sequestration as 'handing over a property which 
has a dispute about its origins and rights to a reliable person who save it and administer it 
and return it to whoever proved to be his'. 
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June 1971 and amended by Act No. 95/1980 lays down rules for the 
sequestration of illicitly acquired property. 
This Act has two main functions: first, it supplements the criminal laws 
where the latter is seen as insufficient to deal with the illegal gains and 
profits of drug trafficking offences (see Appendix. V). Second, it deals with 
illegal gains and unusual suspected expansion of money and properties. 
Section 3 authorises the sequestration of all or part of a person's property 
if it is established that such property has increased as a result of activities 
performed either by that person or through someone else in smuggling or 
trafficking in drugs, even if such property is registered in the name of the 
person's spouse or children or any other person. The section provided a 
list of certain acts which initiate the application of its powers (extent of 
jurisdiction): 
1. The exploitation of position or occupation. 
2. Fraud, collusion, or bribery. 
3. Drug smuggling or trafficking. 
4. The trafficking with illegal goods or the black market or the 
manipulation with the people's aliment or medicine. 
5. The illegal appropriation of the state's public or private 
money or body corporate. 
The background and principles of this law were originally related to the 
rules and regulations provided by the military government who 
succeeded the Egyptian monarchy after its fall in the 23th of July 1952118. 
An examination of the historical developments of the confiscation system 
in Egypt is a very complicated process. It has extended into a dispute about 
political perceptions pertaining to the benefits and interests of socialism. 
What is important to mention here is that there are several subsequent 
confiscation provisions provided within several sequestration laws which 
were issued by the military government during the period 1952-1970, and 
were repealed mostly due to some subsequent unjustified transgressions 
118Te revolution started in the 23th of July 1952, and the rising of the republic government 
in the 18th of June 1953. 
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and excess in the enforcement of the confiscation and sequestration 
powers119 against individual and property rights. After more than fifteen 
years, the government became aware of the importance of organising and 
rationalising the confiscation orders provided under these sequestration 
laws. Act No. 34 of 1971 aims at substituting the preceding sequestration 
laws and procedures with a system defined with certain rules and 
conditions (the explanatory memorandum of the Act, in Al-Shawarbi, p. 
380). 
The prosecution and trial have a special position under this Act. They are 
independent of the Common law and pertain to cases of sequestration 
imposed on the properties of some persons committing certain criminal 
behaviours or sinful acts (Saleh, 1986). What is important for us here is to 
focus upon the confiscation provisions of profits and proceeds of drug 
trafficking offences. 
The former Director of the Arabic Bureau for Drugs Affairs (1995), 
indicated that in 1960s, the government became aware of the aggravated 
dangers and complications associated with drug trafficking crimes and of 
the role of the vast illegal proceeds and benefits of these crimes in 
criminal organisations. Accordingly, the government found the need to 
support the criminal system in dealing with drug trafficking offences by 
including drug trafficking offences within the jurisdiction of the court of 
Ethics and the work of the socialist general prosecutor (p. 3). 
The socialist prosecutor works under the supervision of the People's 
Assembly and is not subordinated to the Supreme Judiciary Council (the 
judiciary power (section 6 of Act No. 95 1980) as is the case with the 
common law. One tenth of the members of People's Assembly amounting 
to 454 members may request relieving the socialist prosecutor from his 
position, and if the majority of the People's Assembly agree, then he shall 
be deemed retired. One of the forms of Parliamentary control over the acts 
of the socialist general prosecutor is what is decreed by section 15 of Act 
119e term 'sequestration' form a threat of confiscation. It does not mean confiscation, but 
the way sequestration laws were executed by the law enforcement agencies of the military 
government during 1950s and 1960s, suggests that mere imposition of the sequestration by 
the Court of Ethics could lead to an impression that sequestration order is meant to be a 
definite and inevitable confiscation procedure. Al-Shawarbi (1993) defines sequestration 
by indicating that it is a temporary restraint order (a precautionary measure) imposed by a 
judge and enforced by the socialist general prosecutor (p. 23). 
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No. 95 for 1980. This section provides that the socialist general prosecutor 
should submit an annual report indicating the tasks performed, the 
investigations carried out and the procedures taken by him. The 
submission of this report to the People's Assembly should be no later than 
March of every year (Al-Shawarbi, 1993, p. 396). 
However, section 5 of the Act states that the socialist prosecutor is 
appointed and discharged by a decision from the President of the Republic 
(The ruling authority). The system is provided in the Egyptian Permanent 
Constitution which was enacted three months after issuing this 1971 Act. 
Section 179 thereof provides that the prosecutor is to be named 'the 
socialist general prosecutor'. Moreover, the Constitution specified his 
powers in general terms120. 
Notwithstanding the unusual origin, functions and powers of this Act, 
allocating a chapter in the Constitution about the jurisdiction of the 
socialist general prosecutor can be considered as clear evidence of the 
constitutionality of this system and its procedures which still exist to the 
present day. The socialist general prosecutor's office mentions that sinful 
deeds as determined in this Acts are deeds that can occur in any society 
whether socialist or capitalist. It also indicates that the economy's 
conversion from capitalism to socialism and vice versa does not mean 
divesting such economy away from an authority that protects capital 
turnover. Saleh (1986) points out that the such a unique system was 
originally inspired from analogous systems in Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark (p. 27). 
Litigation procedures in regard to sequestration cases brought by the 
socialist general prosecution's panel are made before the Court of Ethics121 
(a court of first instance for ethical judiciary whose judgements are 
120Act No. 34 for 1971 was issued on 17/6/1971, while Egypt's Permanent Constitution was 
issued on 12/9/1971. Section 179 thereof stipulates that "Socialist General Prosecutor is 
responsible for taking measures which insure the people's rights and society's safety, 
political system, maintaining socialism benefits, committing to socialist conduct. .. 
". As for 
calling such General Prosecutor as the Socialist General Prosecutor, this was contemporary 
with the issuance of July Socialist Laws in 1961, for changing the nation's social structure 
and for serving the issue of transition from capitalism (at the time of monarchy) to 
socialism (Saleh, 1986). 
121Act No. 34 of 1971 established the Court of Sequestration, and Act No. 95 of 1980 
established the Court of Ethics which substituted the Court of Sequestration (Al- 
Shawarbi, 1993, p. 255). 
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challenged only before the Supreme Court of Ethics). The Court of Ethics 
consist of a judge (president) from the Court of Cassation (a court of 
ordinary judiciary), three counsellors from the Cassation Court or Courts 
of Appeal, and three persons from the public (of good conduct and most 
likely from leaders in governmental institutions). In appealing the case, 
the Supreme Court of Ethics will take over. 
More details about sequestration and the confiscation procedures provided 
under this Act are examined below: 
6.3.2.1. Sequestration Procedure 
The socialist general prosecutor office starts its contact with drug 
trafficking cases through complaints from police, statement, reports or 
notifications from government, domestic financial institutions, 
supervisory organisations, individuals, private or public establishments. 
Certain complaints or case studies published by the mass media are also 
taken under consideration (Soliaman, 1996). 
The Complaints Department working under the socialist prosecutor office 
examines all received complaints and reports on whether the Panel has, 
or has no jurisdiction over their subject matter in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act. If it is found that the Panel has a jurisdiction, then it 
begins to identify the facts and inquiries about its contents. If the 
information contained therein are correct, it will be then submitted to the 
Office of Investigation and Prosecution to investigate the facts again and to 
verify the existence of substantial evidence122 on what is contained in the 
complaint. 
122Mr. Ibrahim, the Technical Advisor for the Socialist General Prosecutor, indicated that 
substantial evidence is the verified way in sequestration and, as preventive or protective 
measure, does not stipulate a proof that has the power of certainty, as the more it is 
preponderant by the presumptions submitted to the prosecutor and then to the Court of 
Ethics, the more the imposition of sequestration becomes permissible. As for confiscation 
action, the definitive and conclusive proof is stipulated because confiscation decision as a 
punishment results in forcibly expropriating the property's ownership from its owner. 
However, the law, since sinful acts are confirmed in sections 2 and 3, does not stipulate more 
than the presence of substantial evidence thereto, yet investigation procedures in the Panel 
are performed with the guidance of Act of Demonstration and Criminal Procedure Code for 
more precaution in order to provide sufficient guarantees to whom the acts imputed are 
investigated. 
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According to the provisions of the Act, the socialist general prosecutor 
shall have all the jurisdictions determined for the authorities of 
investigation in the Criminal Procedure Code, and in particular, the right 
to make reservation upon any relevant documents or files. He can also 
make an order similar to the 'production order' in the British system, to 
get any information from any institution in the State. He can also ask the 
normal general prosecution to investigate about relevant matters which 
serves or facilitates his cases. 
If the Investigative Office has probative evidence(s) about an increase of 
properties or monies because of drug trafficking offences, it can order the 
police (who in most of the cases is the original claimant) to do more 
investigation about the monies and properties of the accused, his wife or 
husband, and all children. The socialist prosecutor shall then order to 
restrain them from administering or disposing of the reserved properties 
in preparation of referring the case to Court of Ethics. 
Section (7) of Act No. 34 provides that the case must be submitted within 
sixty days from the date of the restraining order123. If not, the restraint 
order would be considered as not having been issued. The socialist office 
should then prepare a detailed statement similar to the 'a affidavit' in the 
British system, to be presented to the court during the mentioned period. 
The seizing and restraining orders would be enforced by specialised 
committees formed by the socialist prosecutor's office for this purpose. In 
regard to properties such as, vehicles or any similar things, they would be 
seized in one time wherever they are located in the country. The banks 
and other relevant institutions will be informed about the restraint order 
as well. 
The socialist general prosecutor decides an 'alimony' for the person who 
is prevented from disposing his properties or administering thereof until 
the court reach a conclusion in the sequestration case. 
Within the sixty days from submitting the matter before it, the Court of 
Ethics passes its decision, whether by setting the matter aside, or by 
123 Mr. Ibrahim mentioned that the period of sixty days is the period within which more 
verification and investigation can be made to prove that the seized properties are indeed 
belonging to the accused person or his family. 
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continuing the execution thereof for a period not exceeding one year from 
the date of issue of the order. Before -the expiration of such a period, the 
general prosecutor may request the court itself to continue the execution 
of the order for another period of no more than five years in total. The 
order, however, can be abolished if: (a) by law after the elapsing of the five 
years and/or (b) by the discontinuance of the prosecution before the 
elapsing of the five years. 
The imposition of sequestration entails preventing the accused from 
administering the properties under sequestration. Every free act by the 
accused during the period of prevention shall be void, and the person 
violating the same shall be punished by imprisonment of no more than 
one year or a fine of no more than five hundred Egyptian Pounds 
(equivalent to one hundred Sterling Pounds) or both. 
The law permits the person whose properties are under sequestration to 
appeal against such. decision within 30 days from the date of the decision 
or notification thereof. The right of appeal is warranted for bona fide third 
parties at any time whether during the period of seizure and prevention 
in the office of the socialist general prosecutor, who then submits the 
complainer's opinion to the competent court in the event of being 
rejected. 
6.3.2.2. Confiscation Procedure 
Section 22 of the Act entitles the socialist general prosecutor, during the 
period of sequestration, to apply to the court of ethics to confiscate all or 
some of the seized properties under the sequestration order which are a 
proceeds of drug trafficking offences. 
The General Socialist Prosecutor Office provided that confiscation referred 
to in the provision of section 22 is not a general confiscation which 
extends to all properties of the person without regarding their origins. It is 
a special confiscation restricted to properties upon which sequestration is 
imposed and which are vested in the person because of drugs smuggling 
or trafficking or some other specified illegal acts. Confiscation does not 
include the properties vested in the person during the sequestration as a 
result of his legal business, and it does not extend to the property acquired 
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before the imposition of the sequestration order, or thereafter, as long as 
the object of confiscation is property descended to him by inheritance. 
Once confiscation is finally decided for the good of the people124, the panel 
of the socialist general prosecution delivers the confiscated properties to 
the Panel of Sequestration Settlement in the Finance Ministry and thereby 
the decision of confiscation is executed. 
With regard to the volume and the value of properties upon which a 
sequestration order is imposed, the data collected from the socialist 
prosecutor's office could not establish a complete picture in the differences 
between sequestration decisions and confiscation decisions. The technical 
adviser of the socialist general prosecutor provided this study with some 
figures concerning the difference between the amounts of the 
sequestration orders and the number of confiscation orders for 1995, and 
the value of the confiscated properties from 1994 to 1996. 
Table (6.2) Number of cases, persons and the value of properties of those who 
received a sequestration order and confiscation order in 1995 by Court of Ethics or the 
Supreme Court of Ethics. *The Court of Ethics and the Supreme Court of Ethics deal 
only with properties. 
Sequestration 
cases 4 
persons *0 
Amounts 3,747,521 
Confiscation 
cases 14 
persons *0 
Amounts 13,880,340 
Source: The Socialist General Prosecutor Office (1996) 
124"for the good of people' 'or as in the British language 'in the public interest' is a 
statement which always indicted in the confiscation provisions of this Act. 
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Table (6.3) The value of properties confiscated by the Socialist General Prosecutor 
Office during the period 1994-1996 (up to 1/12/1996). 
Year Confiscated Properties (Egyptian Pounds) Equivalent in 
.C 
1994 31,694,994 2,881,363 
1995 7,339,804 667,254 
1996 6,878,672 625,334 
Source: The Socialist General Prosecutor Office (1996) 
In addition, an assessment report from the Department of International 
Affairs to the work of the General Department of Narcotics Drugs 
Prevention states that during 1995, the Department transferred 21 drug 
'traffickers to the socialist general prosecution office to take the necessary 
actions regarding the imposition of sequestration on their properties 
amounting to 114m (Egyptian pounds) and to be subject for a confiscation 
order. 
Comparing such an amount with those specified in the above two tables 
for 1995 reveals the following. First, the latter amount (114 million) might 
be an overestimate of the value of the properties, and second, the 
amounts shown in the two tables, though they are different, are not 
related to the value of the properties assessed by the General Department 
of Narcotics Drugs Prevention. This is because the trial and the 
sequestration proceedings take time to be enforced and may extend over 
five years. Confiscation decisions must be imposed within that five years. 
Accordingly, the inquiry and investigation of cases starting from 1995 may 
have taken longer than commencement of the action of sequestration 
imposition. So, if we assume that it has commenced in the beginning of 
1995, then we may expect the issuing of a confiscation order by the end of 
1999. The amount mentioned in table (6.3) represents the actual amount 
confiscated during 1995, reflects the number and the type of drug 
traffickers dealt with prior to 1995. 
Finally, the Egyptian Constitution and the provisions of this Act 
empowered the Court of Ethics and the socialist general prosecutor's office 
to deal with inter alia, the illegal proceeds of drug trafficking offences 
which have escaped from the control of the common criminal system. 
The powers under this Act do not depend upon conviction because, as 
indicated, the Act deals with properties not individuals (in rein). In 
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comparing this system with the Egyptian criminal system, the British 
confiscation system and the American criminal forfeiture system, one can 
observe that a pre-requisite conviction is a common factor for the last 
three systems, but with this particular socialist system, it is not related to 
any past or future conviction. This means that a person is accused of 
possessing illegal properties and proceeds and he shall present evidence of 
ownership and legality. If he can not defend his properties then the 
consequences will be a confiscation by the Ethics Court. 
The socialist general prosecutor is empowered to order the pre-trial 
seizure of any documents, restraining the person from dealing with his 
properties, and seeking information from any governmental and non- 
governmental institutions. These powers and others can only be obtained 
by courts orders under the British and American criminal systems. 
However, there is a close similarity with the American civil forfeiture. In 
the latter system the criminal who escapes conviction can be punished 
through civil forfeiture action. Such an action can even be brought against 
any property owned by a defendant who is acquitted in criminal 
proceedings. The acquittal does not debar subsequent civil forfeiture 
proceedings. This is exactly what the powers of the socialist system are 
about. 
6.4. SUMMARY 
The confiscation of proceeds and profits of drug trafficking offences is a 
new concept in the Kuwaiti criminal law system. Recently, the legislator 
has added this concept as a short sentence in the common confiscation 
provisions of the Narcotic Drugs Act 1983 under the amended Act No. 
13/1995. 
The problematic situation or the consequential subsequent condition in 
adopting such a concept came as a result of demands for major changes 
and for reorganising the structure and the functions of the law 
enforcement agencies. They had to deal not only with this new legislative 
addition in the Narcotic Drugs Act but also with similar powers provided 
by regional and international conventions which are beginning to 
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dominate the debate about a new means of dealing with organised crime 
and money laundering. - 
Kuwait, as a member state in the United Nation and of the League of 
Arabic States, is bound to adopt certain confiscation measures provided 
under the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988 and the Arabic Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1995. However, 
application of the new provision still lack appropriate acknowledgement 
by the government and the law enforcement agencies. The Drugs 
Department under the Ministry of Interior, for example, has not set out 
any instructions concerning this matter. 
There are certain assertions that the ratification of the two Conventions by 
the Kuwaiti government is sufficient to deal with any attempts to trace, 
seize, and confiscate the proceeds and profits of drug trafficking offences. 
Currently, the government has not exercised any of the new provisions of 
the asset-confiscation of Act 1995 nor any of the measures of the 
confiscation proceedings of any of the two conventions simply because the 
means to achieve the aims of such provisions are not yet available. 
In short, because the confiscation proceedings are supposed to be initiated 
by the police and in particular, the Narcotic Drugs Department, as is the 
case with the British system, and because, as mentioned above, the 
Kuwaiti police has no powers yet to do so, then one can infer that maybe a 
zealous effort is needed by the police or prosecution to activate these new 
means in dealing with drug trafficking offences. The Protection of Public 
Monies Act (No. 1 of 1993) might be an important step forward which may 
support the need to establish an effective financial investigative system 
that could deal with the proceeds of drug trafficking. 
With regard to Egyptian asset confiscation system, the government is 
heavily reliant upon Act No. 34 of 1971 which was amended by Act No. 95 
of 1980 in regard to organising the sequestrations and securing the peoples 
safety. The socialist general prosecutor is empowered to implement any of 
the available powers and provisions which are relevant and facilitate the 
seizure of suspected illegal gains. This means that he is authorised to 
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benefit from all the available administrative, civil and criminal 
proceedings in conducting investigations and subsequent prosecutions. 
Unlike the British and American confiscation and forfeiture systems, the 
Egyptian confiscation system provides that production orders, searching 
orders, restraining orders and the subsequent enforcement of the court's 
decisions with regard to sequestration and confiscation orders are the 
main jurisdiction of the socialist general prosecutor. The system does not 
depend upon a pre-conviction or a post-conviction of any crime but 
depends on the powers that are vested to the Socialist office to deal with 
certain crimes. It does not deal with persons who are accused of 
committing these crimes, but with illegal profits and proceeds that they 
have no right to possess. Interestingly, one can observe that whilst the 
general constitutional precept provides that the defendant is innocent, 
until the court proves his conviction, the constitutional precept of the 
Egyptian socialist confiscation system provides that the person is a suspect 
until he (the person) can prove his innocence. This means that the 
properties of any suspects are liable to be seized and put under complete 
control of the socialist prosecutor's office for more than five years. If the 
owner did not produce any defences or a definite evidences the Court of 
Ethics will confiscate all the seized properties. In justifying such a process, 
the government turned to the Constitution as a means of injecting 
fairness and balance into a statutory confiscation system that often lacks 
both. Accordingly, identifying what current limitations the constitution 
might impose upon the use of such a confiscation system requires a 
historical analysis of both the confiscation law and the evolving balance 
between the government's interests in law enforcement and citizens' 
rights. 
The criminal confiscation system under Egyptian Common law is 
restricted and not sufficient to deal efficiently with tracing, seizing and 
confiscating the proceeds of drug trafficking offences (for more details see 
Appendix. VI). The regional and international conventions are important 
in determining the status and nature of legality of certain domestic 
powers, and in exposing the strengths and weaknesses of those domestic 
powers which ensure legitimate confiscation of the proceeds of crimes. 
These Conventions may provide an important and needed recognition 
and justification of certain sweeping powers and restrictions upon 
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individual and property rights. (see Appendix VI). In short, the current 
Egyptian socialist confiscation system needs to be questioned thoroughly 
by criminologists and libertarians and those whose speciality is the 
protection of human rights, because securing the safety of people is indeed 
a noble aim but it might not be achieved by adopting such a system. 
299 
Conclusion 
CONCLUSION 
The Philosophical Position 
The government, legislative bodies, police forces and the general public 
like the idea of confiscation against drug traffickers because it appeals 
strongly to their common sense of justice. It allows the 'good guys' a tool 
that can remove the ill-gotten gains that 'greedy drug kingpins' have 
accumulated by selling people 'misery disguised as pleasure'. The 
objectives of British confiscation legislation are to ensure that drug 
traffickers do not profit from their offences, to disrupt the functioning of 
organised crime syndicates and low-level street dealers by removing their 
working capital, and to deter existing potential offenders by inducing them 
to believe that they will not be able to keep the funds that they have either 
obtained or hoped to obtain. It can be said that British law on forfeiture 
and confiscation in its current form has a formidable array of powers that 
can be used potently to achieve t: iese objectives. 
In general, confiscation legislation provided under the DTA 1994, as it 
appears in the perceptions of the majority of the practitioners, looks at first 
sight to be workable and comprehensive. What makes such a positive 
perception sustainable are certain principles which have been made 
throughout the system. These principles centre around issues of legality 
and personal liability. If these are established, it is thought that all 
problems and defects can be solved. The British confiscation system is 
clearly struggling to attain these two conditions against anything that 
might contradict them. The system is meant to be a legislative statute and 
directed at the illegal proceeds of a particular drug trafficker. The 
confiscation system provided under the DTA 1994 is within the criminal 
law and operates as an a priori conviction. 
However, no sooner have the positive aspects been put under close 
scrutiny, than the system seems to have disturbing contradictions that 
could undermine its very nature. Broadly speaking, even if the creation of 
a network of statutory provisions leads to the taking away of all the 
'profits out of crime', this does not plug the loopholes which are 
themselves causing the problems related to the definition of and the 
nature and extent of the existing confiscation system. 
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The ambiguities surrounding the legislation as this thesis has 
demonstrated, have surfaced and crystallised into three main areas. The 
first surrounds the difficulty of resolving the nature and extent of a 
confiscation system which, if it continues in its current form, would 
almost reintroduce the same situation which led to the abolition of an old 
general forfeiture powers by the Forfeiture Act 1870. Equalisation and 
equity are a premise that should never be dispensed with. The second area 
is that the measures, amendments and theorisation relevant to the new 
system were a reaction to increasing international, national and local 
pressures. The problem with such pressures is that they are embedded in 
ad hoc policies which surface when there is a demand that 'something 
should be done'. This reactive situation had actually prompted a third 
area of difficulty. Under a desire for action, confiscation legislation has not 
received the amount of scrutiny by various sectors of society it deserves. 
Clearly these are the conditions which led the Hodgson Committee to 
express frustration concerning the current provisions. When the 
members of Hodgson committee suggested a 'confiscation order' they 
were concerned to establish a clear rationale, with unambiguous purposes 
and straightforward conditions. The effects of these tensions have been 
felt throughout the application of the confiscation system. 
The philosophy that the Hodgson committee introduced was that: 'no-one 
shall profit by his own wrong' and 'unjust enrichment' is something that 
the Committee took seriously, while at the same time exploring the 
relationship between a legal reality and a legal ideal; regarded as 
inescapable for any critical socio-legal analysis. 
Confiscation cannot be separated from the problems and criticisms 
surrounding judicial and governmental institutions i. e. is confiscation 
about reparation or punishment. The current application of the 
confiscation system of the DTA 1994, is most certainly geared towards 
punishment rather than reparation? The principle that no-one should 
profit from their own wrong is a reparative principle which only applies if 
the requirements and consequences of the system do not, for example, 
extend to the defendant's relatives and friends, and if there is also no 
substantial prison sentence, in default. Crucially, even the default 
sentence does not wipe away the obligation to pay a confiscation order. 
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The process of determining the amount to be repaid, although it is 
perceived by the law enforcement agencies as of real significance can 
hardly be considered a serious attempt at restoring the status quo ante. 
Where there is no evidence of the defendant having received any 
particular payment or reward the courts are empowered for the purpose of 
determining whether the defendant has benefited from drug trafficking, to 
make a number of assumptions about the defendant. These assumptions 
are, plainly, of a rebuttable nature: (a) any property that appears to the 
court to have been transferred to the defendant in the six years ending 
with commencement of proceedings is assumed to be received in 
connection with drug trafficking; (b) any expenditure in the last six years 
has been made from payments received in connection with drug 
trafficking; and (c) for the purpose of valuing any property received or 
assumed to have been received by the defendant at any time, this property 
was so received by him free of any other interest in it (s. 4 (3), DTA 1994). 
The most important critique about the system is not just that there are 
matters which can prove that the system is punitive or reparative but 
about the inconsistencies which result and the differences in the court's 
decisions in similar cases. Consequently, this study has shown that in 
practice, many judges are reluctant to apply the required assumptions 
under the law and some judges habitually refuse to use it. It seems almost 
as if Parliament was aware that such conditions would arise, so it 
introduced such powers in the DTOA 1986. However, the confiscation 
system provided under the subsequent CJA 1988 has no equivalent 
provisions. This means that the legislature intended to deal very severely 
and in a punitive way by exploiting all the available powers and 
procedures in civil and criminal laws against drug traffickers. The severity 
of the law is shown by the fact that defendants are tried and sentenced 
based largely on a matter of guesswork. 
Moreover, the study shows that the British confiscation system of DTA 
1994 is burdened by numerous technical difficulties and unnecessary 
complications. It also lacks an adequate and unified procedural structure 
for decision-making. The major weaknesses in the system lie, for instance, 
in the interpretations of the system by different courts and in the 
seriousness and the willingness of the government and police forces to 
support the system. 
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It has been found that the government and some jurists are emphasising 
that a confiscation order is essentially about reparation rather than 
punishment. This plays a central role in how judges and prosecutors 
perceive their task and consequently how they seek a proportionate 
sentence. The courts' decisions in regard to confiscation cases indicate that 
there are clear inconsistencies and that the law enforcement agencies are 
in a state of confusion and uncertainty. This also means that the attempt 
to relate the system to reparative principles would legitimise certain 
draconian provisions and procedures such as the restraint procedures, the 
burden of proof, the retrospective impact, the realisation processes and the 
appointment of a receiver. The prosecution will face no difficulty in 
having a successful prosecution cases. The actual situation, as this study 
has demonstrated, is that the police and the prosecution are encountering 
a serious difficulties in convincing some judges that the intention behind 
these provisions is a reparative one. Some judges believe that the 
confiscation system must be considered as an additional punishment 
beside the original penalty of imprisonment. The Criminal justice system, 
as is the case with the American Federal prosecutors, and the double 
jeopardy problem, restricted the powers provided for prosecutors and 
police by demanding a higher standards of proof from them (proof beyond 
reasonable doubt). Prosecutors believe that it is impossible for them to 
confiscate the illegal proceeds of the drug traffickers if such proof is 
required. Accordingly, and because Parliament did not explain the exact 
intention behind the confiscation order, relating the order to reparative 
principles is the only access for them to be able breach, for instance, the 
right of silence or in applying any retrospective provision. 
The two major relevant categories about the confiscation system are the 
impact of certain provisions, and the implications of the value based 
principle. The importance of these two categories is that they can help to 
decipher, analyse and expose the legal reality of those involved in 
enforcement and become crucial elements in any articulation of 
confiscation law. 
There are a number of related features, resulting from the inadequacies 
and ambiguities of the legislation, that show clearly the punitive nature of 
the system. Firstly, the value-based system involves potentially unreliable 
and non-expert assessment by some police financial investigators. In turn, 
303 
Conclusion 
their assessments are treated by courts as wholly reliable, leading to 
disclosure orders (the deprivation of the right of silence) which are 
themselves punitive. Secondly, in terms of the applications of the 
legislation, extensive powers of entering and searching premises are 
available, even where the property is owned by, for example lawyers, who 
are not even accused let alone convicted. Such a serious breach of 
confidentiality is itself punitive. A third area that is far from satisfactory is 
the retrospective effect, whereby all property and wealth falling within a 
six year period is, assumed by courts to be directly related to drug 
trafficking offences. Finally, the default sentence, is clearly punitive in 
nature, since a prison sentence results from non-payment of the order, 
and further that serving a prison sentence does not remove the liability of 
payment made by the confiscation order. 
Policy Implications 
The study shows that most of the problems result from both the law and 
its enforcement. The law provided certain unusual principles and 
provisions, and the machinery the government and the law enforcement 
agencies chose for implementing the law faces defects and 
misunderstanding. However, there are other factors which also play a 
great role in the current status of the confiscation system. One of these, for 
example, is the discretionary power of judiciary. The judge has a broad 
discretion in choosing which sanction to impose and at what level of 
severity. Sentencers are guided in this by their own penal philosophy, be it 
incapacitation of the offender, protection of society, belief in the 
reformative qualities of punishment, general or individual deterrence, 
compensation to the victim or some interpretation of retribution and just 
deserts. This kind of freedom is inevitably a source of disparity because 
judges pursuing different objectives will treat similar cases differently. For 
example, a judge pursuing deterrence would consider a different type and 
severity of sentence than the retributively-minded judge. Such disparity is 
a plain breach of equal treatment principles of due process. The 
confiscation system offers a clear example, where some judges believe it is 
an additional punishment while others believe it is a means of reparation. 
The solution to the current confusion is to define a principal objective 
through legislation. Indeed, if the nature of confiscation is defined very 
clearly this will have important consequences. Early, it was noted that the 
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CJA 1991 was an attempt to resolve such problems; it provided an 
authoritative definition whose primary rationale was to focus on 
retribution and just deserts (CJA 1991, s. 1). Unfortunately, this Act 
received intense -criticism from sentencers who resented the 'straight- 
jacket' imposed upon their exercise of discretion. So under attack from 
magistrates, judges and, most fiercely, from the Lord Chief Justice Taylor, 
the Government abandoned its adherence to desert theory. Just nine 
months after the 1991 legislation had come into force, the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993 once more gave sentencers the discretion to consider previous 
convictions. 
The confusion in the philosophy of the confiscation system has its own 
implications for law enforcement. The empirical work in the thesis shows 
the areas where such confusion exists. The 14 interviews and 47 responses 
of the questionnaires provided the research with an important comments 
from various influential personnel who also involve in the enforcement 
of the system. The data collected from the field work helped in producing 
a critical resource which goes beyond the recorded intentions of the 
legislation and the subjects provided by the literature. 
In respect to the major findings about the British confiscation system and 
how the system can be improved, one can conclude that legislative 
intervention is urgently needed to resolve the conflicts in interpretations 
and to explain the legality of several procedures which resulted from these 
inconsistent interpretations. The government and the legislature must be 
aware of the actual nature of the confiscation system. They must be aware 
that an abuse of power led to the abolition and repeal of the Forfeiture Act 
of 1870, so the current conflict in interpretations between sentencers could 
lead to a similar result. Government intervention ought not to be based 
upon having a powerful system but on a fair system which considers 
legality and liability as its main principles. Although the legislative 
process is a net result of various phases of readings and amendments 
(from a 'Green Paper', passing through draft legislation and discussions, to 
Acts of Parliamnet), one is taken aback by the distinct ambiguities and 
inconsistencies of certain provisions which are embedded in the 
legislation and its enforcement. These can be a hinge to produce a gap 
between the original intention of the legislation decided by Parliament 
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and the govermental policies and strategies and the actual realites of the 
applications and enforcements undertaken by those relevant institutions. 
Another important factor is the multiplicity in policies and applications. 
The relationship between central government with its forty three police 
forces in England and Wales reduces the impact of confiscation law. Each 
force is funded 51% by central government and 49 % by local government. 
There are forty-three autonomous chief officers. Policing in the United 
Kingdom is very much driven by local demands, local responsibilities and 
not by centralised policy. However, the only way available that central 
government can have an impact is by the so-called Home Office circulars. 
The responses of some of the interviewees show that the local police 
forces do not welcome political interference. This means that the way the 
confiscation system is being perceived and enforced varies among these 
forces. It is wrong then to generalise about them. Their performance 
depends upon a depth understanding of the socio-economic factors and 
the strategical policies which are adopted by each force to deal with 
particular local problems. 
To determine the weaknesses and shortcomings in the enforcement of the 
confiscation system and to provide suggestions for improvements is an 
attainable goal. Periodic empirical examinations of the conditions, 
resources and the perceptions of the law enforcement agencies will help to 
improve the system. The study of Levi & Osofsky (1995) is a good example. 
Their report suggested that a number of factors have mitigated against the 
effective use of confiscation provisions provided under the DTOA 1986 
and they then recommended how law enforcement agencies might 
improve their procedures in order to make financial investigation and 
confiscation more effective. Improving confiscation. is not achieved only 
by providing resources and enforcement strategies. 
Legal Implications 
The problems in determining the actual nature of the confiscation system 
can only be resolved by legislative intervention and by clarifying this 
important issue in new or amended provisions in the DTA 1994. If this 
could be achieved, all courts will be bound to apply whatever the 
legislation provides without any differences leading to unjustified 
applications. 
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It seems clear that while Parliament desire was to ensure that not one 
unlawful penny is left unconfiscated and being eager to introduce unusual 
principles and uncommon criminal procedures that could threaten 
fundamental individual and property rights, it did not bother to clarify the 
essential purpose of the system. Is the purpose to punish the offenders or 
to restore the status quo amte? This study shows that confiscation is still 
oscillating between punishment and reparation. It has been indicated that 
this is mainly due to the intention of Parliament to leave such essential 
issues to be dealt with by law enforcement agencies and in particular by 
judges and prosecutors. Accordingly, differences and contradictions 
occurring between decisions of similar law cases by different Crown Courts 
has led to more confusion about the rationale and proportionality of 
certain subsequent consequences. 
This also implies two important observations: (a) that the exact nature of 
the system is indeed oscillating between two different schools of thought 
(there are those who advocate a reparative aspect of confiscation with a 
majority of practitioners who believe that the system was intended to be a 
punishment) (b) that there is a confusion also amongst the practitioners 
where some believe that the system is merely reparative (10%). And in a 
direct question about whether the system is punitive or reparative the 
data shows that 70% of all the participants believe that it has great 
punitive effects upon drug traffickers, whilst only 10% believe that it is 
merely reparative. This shows that there are wide differences of opinions 
about the essential nature of the system. 
Confiscation legislation represents a new departure in sentencing systems. 
The confiscation order was designed to supplement the normal criminal 
sanction of imprisonment by ensuring that the trafficker was deprived of 
any of the financial benefits of his drug trafficking crimes. The passage of 
the Act generated a degree of political excitement, but unfortunately this 
obscured some of the legal difficulties and practical problems which the 
Act created, and with which the law enforcement agencies and especially 
the police forces are now confronting. It is said, for example, that it is a 
common complaint that modern legislation is written in language which 
seems to be designed to obscure rather than to clarify, and the DTOA 1986 
and the subsequent DTA 1994 are no exceptions. Examples can be found in 
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section 30 (2) of the DTOA 1986 which was repeated in DTA 1994 under 
section 59 (2). 
Unfortunately, as this thesis has demonstrated, the reparation aspect in 
the confiscation seems to be facing a recurrent dilemma. The current aims 
seem to be mainly concerned with returning the drug offenders to status 
quo ante. Yet such measures are inappropriate because they transform 
reparation into punishment, thereby marginalising the distinction that is 
sought to be made clear in the philosophical nature of the confiscation 
system. There has to be a reconsideration of this policy of reparation. It has 
to include rehabilitative aspects as a necessary principle. In doing so, one 
could say a resolution is then made consistent with the problem of 
achieving justice. 
Status of Current Research 
It is essential to state the conclusions of this research in respect of other 
studies that have dealt with the confiscation system. Clarifying the 
positions of these studies draws out the particular critical contribution 
achieved by this research. There are many relevant issues needing to be 
explored, either as extensions to the work carried out in this thesis or as 
attempts to overcome a lack of otherwise in-depth case studies existing 
already. 
This study is considered to be one of the early, if not first, critical 
examinations of the theory and practice aspects of the British confiscation 
system. Such a contribution that it makes can only be a preliminary one 
towards a more important up to date socio-legal critique which desperately 
needs to be undertaken. Specialists in the sociology of law and human 
rights need to pay attention to these sensitive and crucial procedures 
which affect the relationship between the rights and obligations of the 
state and the people. 
The recommendations of the Hodgson Report were a landmark in this 
report. It tried to introduce a new concept for the enforcement of 
confiscation. Its scope emerged in the light of an increasing realisation of 
the deficiencies already available in the law and of a recognition of the 
profits in drug trafficking at the national and international levels. The 
perspective in that report is an important one. Others have taken things 
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further, but not a great deal further it must be said. For example Feldman 
(1988), Mitchell et al (1992), and Fortson (1992) approached the issue by 
clarifying and interpreting the legislative powers. They do so by 
categorising and differentiating those which have caused complications 
and difficulties for the law enforcement agencies. Their methods centred 
around examining the powers and evaluating the consistencies of court 
sentences. 
Zander (1989) writing in terms of an assessment of the powers of existing 
law was concerned about the legitimate financial returns to be made 
available to law enforcement agencies. This study was commissioned by 
the police as a basis for assessing the need and validity to adopt the wider 
powers in the British confiscation system which exist in American 
forfeiture laws. This perspective was a comparative one. 
However, in a different vein altogether Levi & Osofsky (1995) focused on 
the technical and practical problems encountered by those enforcing 
confiscation proceedings. Their aim was to produce some suggestions to 
improve standards of 'good practice' (tracing, seizure and confiscating). 
Their work was the first empirical study to look at the perceptions of those 
involved in the enforcement of the system. As stated above, Levi and 
Osofsky have much in common with other research concerned with 
determining the extent of powers. The methodology is similar in that it is 
concerned with examined relevant proceedings. 
Further research on the law of confiscation could more usefully be 
involved in the sociology of law. This approach is based on two main 
premises: Firstly, on examining how the law is developed and justified- 
that is how it has been interpreted by those who are involved in its 
enforcement, and how these interpretations determine the course of 
actions relating to confiscation principles and values. Secondly, by 
examining confiscation itself focusing on identifying the areas where 
confiscation has been taken for-granted. Before specifying the legal content 
required for confiscation there has to be some understanding of the 
definitions of the confiscation system. These will account for the 
dimensions, the scopes and the paradigms which deal with confiscation. 
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It is important also to focus on the relations between the principles and 
enforcement, and the status of any alternative principles found in 
different jurisdictions. This may help to avoid reproducing the same 
errors as before. 
Future Research and Grounds for Model Advocacy 
A study of the confiscation system in this thesis is restricted to certain 
aspects and has been conducted from a particular perspective. The 
exclusion of certain other features does not mean they are insignificant. It 
is important to take the confiscation system from different aspects of the 
drug problem including market forces, politics, culture and the lines of 
intersection at various junctures of a society's history. The suggestion here 
is that further research needs to be done on legal definitions, extent of 
powers, restrictions, safeguards and policies -but this list is not of course 
exhaustive. 
This research has revealed that the current status of the confiscation 
system is not separate from a wider global system. Yet international 
systems, in terms of enablements and constraints, were not taken into 
account here, is not because of their marginal status but because such work 
would require more resources and time than that available for this 
research. Nor has this research be undertaken in terms of political 
economy. Such research is still rare but it is important to tackle 
confiscation in relationship to the market, to banking circuits and to the 
financial institutions, ownership, funding processes, priorities and 
preferences, and lines of distribution and their effect on defining the 
mechanisms of policies. 
In the course of doing this research, it has been found that there is still too 
little attention to the cultural and social distinctions which constitute and 
produce variations in the types of drug trafficking crimes. This is an area 
too which needs more attention, explanation and impetus. 
One of the most important means through which one can establish a 
convincing criteria about the effect of a confiscation system is through a 
number of studies that trace its impact upon the individual, investigation, 
proportionality and desert justice. Such studies too would be welcomed. 
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The Kuwaiti System 
The final question to be asked is whether the current status of the British 
confiscation system and the experience gained produces a sensible and 
efficient model that sustains consistency with the principles of the 
Kuwaiti constitution? The answer is as yet unknown but Kuwait has 
ratified the Arabic Convention which is a sign that it is interested in 
acknowledging the regional and the international trends for tracing, 
seizing and confiscating the proceeds of drug trafficking offences. 
Significantly, there is now a confiscation provision or a confiscation order 
available under the Drugs Act, but more details about the way the order 
should be implemented and the necessarily provisions and procedures are 
required. 
Without going into details about the conditions which produced the 
Kuwaiti legislation what is important to mention here is that there are 
certain political and constitutional (even cultural) factors which are the 
determining forces accompanying the Kuwaiti ratification of the Vienna 
Convention and the Arab Convention. Understanding these forces is 
essential in establishing the grounds in which to decide whether one can 
or cannot take the British confiscation system as a model. 
The thesis has revealed that both conventions arose at the point where 
the concerns of Kuwaiti society were focused on certain public financial 
embezzlements and the establishment of relevant legislation in 
consequence to the Iraqi Invasion in 1990. This situation removed 
confiscation from the centre of attention. The recurring question is that 
with the passing of the invasion, is it the proper time to have a closer look 
at the confiscation issue? It seems that current research is not far from the 
influence of such a question. There have to be more studies to examine 
the way that the Kuwaiti system could fit with the British confiscation 
system. 
The other crucial factor that has prevented the development of a 
confiscation system in Kuwait is the serious differences and 
inconsistencies emerging from having a completely different legal system 
based as it is on a written constitution. This research has shown that there 
are areas which were found to be critical and a cause for inconsistencies in 
the British confiscation system. Some of these are, for example, the value 
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based principle where assets are not available for confiscation; also the 
retrospective nature of the legislation is a prominent and sensitive issue. 
Article 32 of the Kuwaiti constitution states that 'no crime and no penalty 
may be established except by virtue of law, and no penalty may be imposed 
except for offences committed after the relevant law has come into force'. 
The rationale of such prevention lies in the fact that the nature of Kuwait 
confiscation law and particularly the confiscation of proceeds and assets is 
quite clear. It classify confiscation as an additional form of punishment. 
Another Articles provide that the 'penalty is personal', and the 'accused 
person is presumed innocent until proved guilty in a legal trial at which 
the necessary guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence are 
secured'. This legislation is partly derived from religious doctrines, 
Islamic jurisprudence which prevents any proposed amendments except 
for certain emergencies. 
Despite multiple reservations about the British confiscation system there 
are many useful and influential elements in the model that can be 
imported into Kuwait. As long as the principles of the confiscation system 
are already a focus of serious debate in the Kuwaiti legislative authority 
then the British confiscation system can be a source of inspiration. There 
are already demands for early financial investigations, co-operation of 
financial institutions and governmental departments. Strategies of 
enforcement (local and regional forces), national and international 
intelligence services, a variety of powers for tracing and seizing evidences 
for the police, and utilising civil experiences in accountancy are being 
considered. 
Finally, the British confiscation system has many other facets that can be 
incorporated within the Kuwaiti confiscation system. The original 
motivation for looking at the British confiscation system as a model for 
Kuwait stemmed, for example, from the unusual practice of the value 
based system. This system exists in stark contrast with other proceedings 
that confine confiscation to tangible assets (property based systems). This 
difference is an object of some wonder and is worth investigation to 
establish the extent to which the value based system could become as an 
option for the law enforcement agencies in Kuwait. However, the very 
uniqueness of the English system at the theoritical level, as the thesis 
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demonstrated, does not necessarily and sufficiently escape from being a 
cause of unfairness and ambiguity at the practical level. 
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The Questionnaire 
Loughborough University 
Department of Social Sciences 
Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal justice 
Cl»cºcfinnnairn Fnr Pnlirn flfiieprc 
Do you think that enough resources are allocated for anti-drug trafficking 
programs in your force? 
IYes J 
INol 
If (No) please state whv. 
2. The opinions about the actual nature of the confiscation system have 
divided. Some believe that the system is an additional punishment and some 
others believe that it is merely a means of reparation (redressing the 
wrongdoing). What do you think is the actual character of the system? 
3. What is, in your opinion, the usefulness of the powers which facilitate the 
imposition and the recovery of confiscation orders? 
4. Do the confiscation system provided under the DTA 1994 has an impact 
upon the drug trafficking offences in Britain? 
(Yes J 
INol 
Please state why. 
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5. Do you think that the current applications and enforcement by all law 
enforcement agencies correspond well with the provisions of the legislation? 
[Yes] 
[No] 
State why: 
6. It seems that the main purpose of confiscation of drug trafficker's assets is 
to deprive and strip offenders of their ill-gotten gains, however small the 
amounts that was likely to be recovered under a confiscation order might be, 
and regardless of the cost and time-limit of investigation and the procedural 
system of recovery. 
7. Do you think that there are any defects in the law regarding drug 
trafficking offences? 
[Yes] 
[No] 
If the answer is (Yes) would you please state these defects. 
8. What is the most difficult aspect of the case that you encounter when it 
demands practising the provisions of the DTA 1994? 
9. The former Home Office Minister Mr. Stephen Jack said 'the realisation of 
confiscation orders is often necessarily a lengthy and complex process'. Could 
you comment on this statement giving the reasons and the solutions? 
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10. The law allows the court to assume that any assets held by the defendant 
during the previous six years have been derived from trafficking. Do you 
think that this is the right approach? 
[YesJ 
[No] 
State why: 
11. What do you think of a 'property based system' which require less 
investigation, because the property to be confiscated has already been 
identified at the outset of the criminal action?, and why do you think the 
British Government adopted a 'value confiscation system'? 
12. What are the main causes of the deficiency in the recovery of the amounts 
declared as confiscation orders? 
13. Do you agree that all the funds 'realised and recovered' are paid into the 
consolidated fund of HM Treasury. 
[Yes] 
[No] 
State why: 
14. Do you think that the Unit you work for is sufficiently well funded to deal 
with confiscation cases ? 
[Yes] 
[No] 
State why: 
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15. Are you satisfied with the way the courts dealt with your suspects? 
[Yes] 
[No] 
State why: 
16. What further changes in the law, if any, would you like to see regarding 
drug trafficking? 
17. If you have any comment which is not discussed in this questionnaire, 
please explain : 
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APPENDIX II 
The Interview Questions: 
A. Questions About The Principles Of The System 
1. Would you please tell me what confiscation order is all about? 
2. What do you think is the underpinning social justification(s) and purposes 
of the confiscation system? 
3. Does your force need to have the powers of the DTOA 1986 to deal with 
local drugs problem? 
4. What is wrong with the forfeiture order and fine? Do you think that 
extending the power of forfeiture order, for example, could be sufficient to 
deal with the proceeds of crime? 
5. The opinions about the nature of the confiscation system have divided. 
Some judges consider the system is an additional punishment and some 
others regard it as means of reparation (redressing the wrongdoing). What do 
you think is the actual nature of the system? And what do you think is the 
rationale behind such differences? 
6. The legislation did not provide a clear declaration about its nature, but the 
government through the Central Confiscation Branch emphasised in their 
manuals and guides that they used to send to all the financial investigation 
Units that the system is not a punishment but a reparative procedure. What 
do you think are the purposes of doing that and how that would serve the 
enforcement of the system by all the enforcement agencies? 
7. The 'required assumption' provided in the legislation was described as 
sweeping and draconian. Is this true? If these descriptions are appropriate, 
why do you think they are appropriate? 
8. Same descriptions were said about the investigation powers (searching, 
entering premises, delaying allowing a person in custody to receive legal 
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advice or to inform someone that he has been arrested for up to 36 hours, 
detaining a person without charge for over 24 hours or more and many 
others). To what extent these powers are powerful? Do you think that these 
powers would serve reparative purposes? 
9. Same descriptions were also mentioned about the retrospective effects 
provided in the system (the six year period)? How and why? 
10. The decision of nine judges of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg declared that the retrospective provision of the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986 to be contrary to Article 7 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The judges ruled unanimously in 1995 that a British court 
acted unlawfully in one of the drug trafficking cases (Walch case). What do 
you think of that? And what do you think the government should do? 
11. Default sentences are provided for those who are not willing to satisfy the 
confiscation order. If confiscation is considered as a reparative provision, is 
the default sentence means that confiscation may leads to be a punitive by 
putting the defaulter in prison and because imprisonment is a punishment 
and not a reparation procedure? 
12. The legislation has introduced, for the first time in the criminal justice 
system, a new application for confiscating the proceeds of drug traffickers. 
An application which based mainly upon ordering a person to pay a sum of 
cash money or what so-called 'value-based system'. What do you think about 
this new principle and to what extent its application is efficient? 
B. Questions About Applications 
13. Do you think that enough resources are allocated for anti-drug trafficking 
programs in your force? 
14. Do you think that the Unit you work for is sufficiently well funded to deal 
with confiscation cases ? 
15. Do you think that the current applications and enforcement by all law 
enforcement agencies correspond well with the provisions of the legislation? 
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16. The former Home Office Minister Mr. Stephen Jack said 'the realisation of 
confiscation orders is often necessarily a lengthy and complex process'. Could 
you comment on this statement givng the reasons and the solutions? 
17. What is the most difficult aspect of the case that you encounter when it 
demands practising the provisions of the DTA 1994? 
18. Do you think that there are any defects in the law regarding drug 
trafficking offences? 
19. What are the main causes of the deficiency in the recovery of the amounts 
declared as confiscation orders? 
20. Do you agree that all the funds 'realised and recovered' are paid into the 
consolidated fund of HM Treasury. 
21. Are you satisfied with the way the courts dealt with your suspects? 
22. What is the nature of the relationship between the local force and the 
Regional Crime Squads? And what are the differences in regard to the 
application of the confiscation system? 
23. What further legislative changes or amendments the current system needs 
to be improved? 
24. What changes or issues you think are important to be added or resolved 
in the way the legislation is implemented by your force? And how you 
describe the current strategies of enforcement? 
25. If you have any comment you wish to add or there are any important 
issues which we did not cover about the confiscation system and merit to be 
mentioned, please explain. 
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APPENDIX III 
Drug Trafficking 
Act 1994 
Selected Provisions 
Confiscation orders 
2. -(1) Subject to subsection (7) below, where a defendant appears before the Crown 
Court to be sentenced in respect of one or more drug. trafficking offences(and 
has not previously been sentenced or otherwise dealt with in respect of his 
conviction for the offence or, as the case may be, any of the offences 
concerned), then- 
(a) if the prosecutor asks the court to proceed under this section, or 
(b) if the court considers that, even though the prosecutor has not asked it 
to do so, it is appropriate for it to proceed under this section, 
it shall act as follows. 
(2) The court shall first determine whether the defendant has benefited from drug 
trafficking. 
(3) For the purposes of this Act, a person has benefited from drug trafficking if he 
has at any time(whether before or after the commencement of this Act) 
received any payment or other reward in connection with drug trafficking 
carried on by him or another person. 
(4) If the court determines that the defendant has so benefited, the court shall, 
before sentencing or otherwise dealing with him in respect of the offence or, 
as the case may be, any of the offences concerned, determine in accordance 
with section 5 of this Act the amount to be recovered in his case by virtue of 
this section. 
(5) The court shall then, in respect of the offence or offences concerned- 
(a) order the defendant to pay that amount; 
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(b) take account of the order before- 
(i) imposing any fine on him; 
(ii) making any order involving any payment by him; or 
(iii) making any order under section 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971 (forfeiture orders) or section 43 of the Powers 1973 c. 62. 
of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (deprivation orders); and 
(c) subject to paragraph (b) above, leave the order out of account in 
determining the appropriate sentence or other manner of dealing with 
him. 
(6) No enactment restricting the power of a court dealing with an offender in a 
particular way from dealing with him also in any other way shall by reason 
only of the making of an order under this section restrict the Crown Court 
from dealing with an offender in any way the court considers appropriate in 
respect of a drug trafficking offence. 
(7) Subsection (1) above does not apply in relation to any offence for which a 
defendant appears before the Crown Court to be sentenced if- 
(a) he has been committed to the Crown Court for sentence in respect of that 
offence under section 37 (1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980(committal to 
Crown Court with a view to sentence of detention in a young offender 
institution); or 
(b) the powers of the court(apart from this section) to deal with him in 
respect of that offence are limited to dealing with him in any way in 
which a magistrates' court might have dealt with him in respect of the 
offence. 
(8) The standard of proof required to determine any question arising under this 
Act as to- 
(a) whether a person has benefited from drug trafficking, or 
(b) the amount to be recovered in his case by virtue of this section, shall 
be that applicable in civil proceedings. 
(9) In this Act "confiscation order" means an order under this section and 
includes, in particular, such an order made by virtue of section 13,14 or 19 of 
this Act. 
3. -(I} Where the Crown Court is acting under section 2 of this Act but considers that it requires further information before- 
(a) determining whether the defendant has benefited from drug trafficking, or 
(b) determining the amount to be recovered in his case by virtue of that section, it 
may, for the purpose of enabling that information to be obtained, postpone 
making the determination for such period as it may specify. 
(2) More than one postponement may be made under subsection (1) above in 
relation to the same case. 
(3) Unless it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, the court shall 
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not specify a period under subsection( 1) above which- 
(a) by itself, or 
(b) where there have been one or more previous postponements under 
subsection (1) above or (4) below, when taken together with the earlier 
specified period or periods, 
exceeds six months beginning with the date of conviction. 
(4) Where the defendant appeals against his conviction, the court may, on that 
account- 
(a) postpone making either or both of the determinations mentioned in 
subsection (1) above for such period as it may specify; or 
(b) where it has already exercised its powers under this section to 
postpone, extend the specified period. 
(5) A postponement or extension under subsection (1) or (4) above may be made - 
(a) on application by the defendant or the prosecutor; or 
(b) by the court of its own motion. 
(6) Unless the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, any 
postponement or extension under subsection (4) above shall not exceed the 
period ending three months after the date on which the appeal is determined or 
otherwise disposed of. 
(7) Where the court exercises its power under subsection (1) or (4) above, it may 
nevertheless proceed to sentence, or otherwise deal with, the defendant in 
respect of the relevant offence or any of the relevant offences. 
(8) Where the court has so proceeded, section 2 of this Act shall have effect as if- 
(a) in subsection (4), the words "before sentencing or otherwise dealing 
with him in respect of the offence or, as the case may be, any of the 
offences concerned" were omitted; and 
(b) in subsection (5) (c), after "determining" there were inserted "in 
relation to any offence in respect of which he has not been sentenced 
or otherwise dealt with". 
(9) In sentencing, or otherwise dealing with, the defendant in respect of the 
relevant offence or any of the relevant offences at any time during the 
specified period, the court shall not- 
(a) impose any fine on him; or 
(b) make any such order as is mentioned in section 2 (5) (b) (ii) or (iii) of 
this Act. 
(10) Where the court has sentenced the defendant under subsection (7) above 
during the specified period it may, after the end of that period, vary the 
sentence by imposing a fine or making any such order as is mentioned in 
section 2 (5) (b) (ii) or (iii) of this Act, so long as it does so within a period 
corresponding to that allowed by section 47 (2) or (3) of the Supreme Court 
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Act 1981 (time allowed for varying a sentence) but beginning with the end of 
the specified period. 
(11) In this section- 
"the date of conviction" means- 
(a) the date on which the defendant was convicted; or 
(b) where he appeared to be sentenced in respect of more than one conviction, and 
those convictions were not all on the same date, the date of the latest of those 
convictions; and 
"the relevant offence" means the drug trafficking offence in respect of which the 
defendant appears (as mentioned in section 2 (1) of this Act) before the court; 
and references to an appeal include references to an application under section 111 of 
the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980(statement of case by magistrates' court). 
4. -(1) For the purposes of this Act- 
(a) any payments or other rewards received by a person at any 
time(whether before or after the commencement of this Act) in 
connection with drug trafficking carried on by him or another person 
are his proceeds of drug trafficking; and 
(b) the value of his proceeds of drug trafficking is the aggregate of the 
values of the payments or other rewards. 
(2) Subject to subsections (4) and (5) below, the Crown Court shall, for the 
purpose- 
(a) of determining whether the defendant has benefited from drug 
trafficking, and 
(b) if he has, of assessing the value of his proceeds of drug trafficking, 
make the required assumptions. 
(3) The required assumptions are- 
(a) that any property appearing to the court- 
(i) to have been held by the defendant at any time since his 
conviction, or 
(ii) to have been transferred to him at any time since the beginning 
of the period of six years ending when the proceedings were instituted against him, was received by him, at the'earliest time 
at which he appears to the court to have held it, as a payment or 
reward in connection with drug trafficking came on by him; 
(b) that any expenditure of his since the beginning of that period was met 
out of payments received by him in connection with drug trafficking 
carried on by him; and 
(c) that, for the purpose of valuing any property received or assumed to have been received by him at any time as such a reward, he received the 
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property free of any other interests in it. 
(4) The court shall not make any required assumption in relation to any particular 
property or expenditure if- 
(a) that assumption is shown to be incorrect in the defendant's case; 
a 
(b) the court is satisfied that there would be a serious risk of injustice in 
the defendant's case if the assumption were to be made; 
and where, by virtue of this subsection, the court does not make one or more of the 
required assumptions, it shall state its reasons. 
(5) Subsection (2) above does not apply if the only drug trafficking offence in 
respect of which the defendant appears before the court to be sentenced is an 
offence under section 49,50 or 51 of this Act. 
(6) For the purpose of assessing the value of the defendant's proceeds of drug 
trafficking in a case where a confiscation order has previously been made 
against him, the court shall leave out of account any of his proceeds of drug 
trafficking that are shown to the court to have been taken into account in 
determining the amount to be recovered under that order. 
(7) References in subsection (6) above to a confiscation order include a reference 
to a confiscation order within the meaning of- 
(a) the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986; or 
(b) Part I of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987. 
(8) For the purposes of the application of Part II of this Act in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, the expression "proceeds of drug trafficking" shall be 
construed in accordance with section 48 (2) of this Act. 
5. -(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, the amount to be recovered in the defendant's 
case under the confiscation order shall be the amount the Crown Court 
assesses to be the value of the defendant's proceeds of drug trafficking. 
(2) If the court is satisfied as to any matter relevant for determining the amount 
that might be realised at the time the confiscation order is made (whether by 
reason of the acceptance of an allegation made in a statement given under 
section II of this Act or made in the giving of information under section 12 of 
this Act, or otherwise) the court may issue a certificate giving the court's 
opinion as to the matters concerned, and shall do so if satisfied as mentioned 
in subsection (3) below. 
(3) If the court is satisfied that the amount that might be realised at the time the 
confiscation order is made is less than the amount the court assesses to be the 
value of his proceeds of drug trafficking, the amount to be recovered in the 
defendant's case under the confiscation order shall be- 
(a) the amount appearing to the court to be the amount that might be so 
realised; or 
(b) a nominal amount, where it appears to the court (on the information 
available to it at the time) that the amount that might be so realised is 
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nil. 
6. -(1) For the purposes of this Act the amount that might be realised at the time a 
confiscation order is made against the defendant is- 
(a) the total of the values at that time of all the realisable property held by 
the defendant, less 
(b) where there are obligations having priority at that time, the total 
amount payable in pursuance of such obligations, 
together with the total of the values at that time of all gifts caught by this Act. 
(2) In this Act "realisable property" means, subject to subsection (3) below- 
(a) any property held by the defendant; and 
(b) any property held by a person to whom the defendant has directly or 
indirectly made a gift caught by this Act. 
(3) Property is not realisable property if there is in force in respect of it an order 
under any of the following enactments, namely- 
(a) section 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (forfeiture orders); 
(b) section 43 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (deprivation 
orders); 
(c) section 223 or 436 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) (forfeiture of 
property); 
(d) section 13 (2), (3) or (4) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1989 (forfeiture orders). 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, an obligation has priority at any tune 
if it is an obligation of the defendant- 
(a) to pay an amount due in respect of a fine, or other order of a court, 
imposed or made on conviction of an offence, where the fine was 
imposed or the order was made before the confiscation order; or 
(b) to pay any sum which would be included among the preferential 
debts(within the meaning given by section 386 of the Insolvency Act 
1986) in the defendant's bankruptcy commencing on the date of the 
confiscation order or winding up under an order of the court made on 
that date. 
7. -(1) Subject to the 
following provisions of this section and to section etc. 8 of this 
Act, for the purposes of this Act the value of property (other than cash) in 
relation to any person holding the property is the market value of the property, 
except that, where any other person holds an interest in the property, the value 
is- 
(a) the market value of the first-mentioned person's beneficial interest in 
the property, less 
(b) the amount required to discharge any encumbrance(other than a 
charging order) on that interest. 
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(2) Subject to section 8 (2) of this Act, references in this Act to the value at any 
time(referred to in subsection (3) below as "the material tune") of a gift caught 
by this Act or of any payment or reward are references to 
(a) the value of the gift, payment or reward to the recipient when he 
received it, adjusted to take account of subsequent changes in the value 
of money, or 
(b) where subsection (3) below applies, the value there mentioned, 
whichever is the greater. 
(3) Subject to section 8 (2) of this Act, if at the material time the recipient holds- 
(a) the property which he received(not being cash), or 
(b) property which, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represents in his 
hands the property which he received, 
the value referred to in subsection (2) (b) above is the value to him at the material 
time of the property mentioned in paragraph (a) above or, as the case may be, of the 
property mentioned in paragraph (b) above so far as it so represents the property 
which he received, but disregarding in either case any charging order. 
(4) References in this section to a charging order include a reference to a charging 
order within the meaning of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. 
8. -(1) A gift (including a gift made before the commencement of this Act) is caught by this Act if- 
(a) it was made by the defendant at any time since the beginning of the 
period of six years ending when the proceedings were instituted 
against him; or 
(b) it was made by the defendant at any time and was a gift of property- 
(i) received by the defendant in connection with drug trafficking 
carried on by him or another person; or 
(ii) which in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented in 
the defendant's hands property received by him in that 
connection. 
(2) For the purposes of this Act- 
(a) the circumstances in which the defendant is to be treated as making a 
gift include those where he transfers property to another person 
directly or indirectly for a consideration the value of which is 
significantly less than the value of the consideration provided by the 
defendant; and 
(b) in those circumstances, the provisions of subsection (1) above and of 
section 7 of this Act shall apply as if the defendant had made a gift of 
such share in the property as bears to the whole property the same 
proportion as the difference between the values referred to in 
paragraph (a) above bears to the value of the consideration provided by 
the defendant. 
9. -(1) Where the Crown Court orders the defendant to pay any amount under section 
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2 of this Act, sections 3 1(1) to (3C) and 32 (1) and (2) of the Powers of 
Criminal Courts Act 1973 (powers of Crown Court in relation to fines and 
enforcement of Crown Court fines) shall have effect as if that amount were a 
fine imposed on him by the Crown Court. 
(2) Where- 
(a) a warrant of commitment is issued for a default in payment of an amount 
ordered to be paid under section 2 of this Act in respect of an offence or 
offences, and 
(b) at the time the warrant is issued, the defendant is liable to serve a term of 
custody in respect of the offence or offences, 
the term of imprisonment or of detention under section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1982 (detention of persons aged 18 to 20 for default) to be served in default of 
payment of the amount shall not begin to run until after the term mentioned in 
paragraph (b) above. 
(3) The reference in subsection (2) above to the term of custody which the 
defendant is liable to serve in respect of the offence or offences is a reference 
to the term of imprisonment, detention in a young offender institution, or 
detention under section 4 of the 1982 Act which he is liable to serve in respect 
of the offence or offences; and for the purposes of this subsection- 
(a) consecutive terms and terms which are wholly or partly concurrent 
shall be treated as a single term; and 
(b) there shall be disregarded- 
(i) any sentence suspended under section 22 (1) of the 1973 Act 
(power to suspend sentence of imprisonment) which has not 
taken effect at the time the warrant is issued; 
(ii) in the case of a sentence of imprisonment passed with an order 
under section 47 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 (sentences 
of imprisonment partly served and partly suspended) any part 
of the sentence which the defendant has not at that time been 
required to serve in prison; and 
(iii) any term of imprisonment or detention fixed under section 31 
(2) of the 1973 Act (term to be served in default of payment of 
fine etc. ) for which a warrant of commitment has not been 
issued at that time. 
(4) In the application of Part III of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 to amounts 
payable under confiscation orders- 
(a) such an amount is not a sum adjudged to be paid by a conviction for 
the purposes of section 81(enforcement of fines imposed on young 
offenders), or a fine for the purposes of section 85(remission of fines), 
of that Act; and 
(b) in section 87 of that Act(enforcement by High Court or county court), 
subsection (3) shall be omitted. 
(5) Where the defendant serves a term of imprisonment or detention in default of 
paying any amount due under a confiscation order, his serving that term does 
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not prevent the confiscation order from continuing to have effect, so far as any 
other method of enforcement is concerned. 
(6) This section applies in relation to confiscation orders made by- 
(a) the criminal division of the Court of Appeal, or 
(b) the House of Lords on appeal from that division, 
as it applies in relation to confiscation orders made by the Crown Court, and the last 
reference in subsection (1) above to the Crown Court shall be construed accordingly. 
10. -(1) If any sum required to be paid by a person under a confiscation order is not 
paid when it is required to be paid(whether forthwith on the making of the 
order or at a time specified under section 31 (1) of the Powers of Criminal 
Courts Act 1973) that person shall be liable to pay interest on that sum for the 
period for which it remains unpaid; and the amount of the interest shall for the 
purposes of enforcement be treated as part of the amount to be recovered from 
him under the confiscation order. 
(2) The Crown Court may, on the application of the prosecutor, increase the term 
of imprisonment or detention fixed in respect of the confiscation order under 
subsection(2) of section 31 of the 1973 Act(as it has effect by virtue of 
section 9 of this Act) if the effect of subsection(1) above is to 
increase the maximum period applicable in relation to the order under 
subsection (3A) of that section. 
(3) The rate of interest under subsection (1) above shall be that for the time being 
applying to a civil judgement debt under section 17 of the Judgements Act 
1838. 
Statements etc. in connection with confiscation orders 
11. -(I) Where the prosecutor asks the court to proceed under section 2 of this Act he 
shall give the court, within such period as it may direct, a statement of matters 
which he considers relevant in connection with- 
(a) determining whether the defendant has benefited from drug 
trafficking; or 
(b) assessing the value of his proceeds of drug trafficking. 
(2) In this section such a statement is referred to as a "prosecutor's statement". 
(3) Where the court proceeds under section 2 of this Act without the prosecutor 
having asked it to do so, it may require him to give it a prosecutor's statement, 
within such period as it may direct. 
(4) Where the prosecutor has given a prosecutor's statement- 
(a) he may at any time give the court a further such statement; and 
(b) the court may at any time require him to give it a further such 
statement, within such period as it may direct. 
(5) Where any prosecutor's statement has been given and the court is satisfied that 
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a copy of the statement has been served on the defendant, it may require the 
defendant- 
(a) to indicate to it, within such period as it may direct, the extent to which 
he accepts each allegation in the statement; and 
(b) so far as he does not accept any such allegation, to give particulars of 
any matters on which he proposes to rely. 
(6) Where the court has given a direction under this section it may at any time 
vary it by giving a further direction. 
(7) Where the defendant accepts to any extent any allegation in any prosecutor's 
statement, the court may, for the purposes of- 
(a) determining whether the defendant has benefited from drug trafficking, 
or 
(b) assessing the value of his proceeds of drug trafficking, 
treat his acceptance as conclusive of the matters to which it relates. 
(8) If the defendant fails in any respect to comply with a requirement under 
subsection (5) above he may be treated for the purposes of this section as 
accepting every allegation in the prosecutor's statement in question apart 
from- 
(a) any allegation in respect of which he has complied with the 
requirement- and 
(b) any allegation that he has benefited from drug trafficking or that any 
payment or other reward was received by him in connection with drug 
trafficking came on by him or another person. 
(9) Where- 
(a) there is given to the Crown Court by the defendant a statement as to 
any matters relevant to determining the amount that might be realised 
at the time the confiscation order is made, and 
(b) the prosecutor accepts to any extent any allegation in the statement, 
the court may, for the purposes of that determination, treat the acceptance by the 
prosecutor as conclusive of the matters to which it relates. 
(10) An allegation may be accepted, or particulars of any matter may be given, for 
the purposes of this section in such manner as may be prescribed by rules of 
court or as the court may direct. 
(11) No acceptance by the defendant under this section that any payment or other 
reward was received by him in connection with drug trafficking carried on by 
him or another person shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings for 
an offence. 
12. -(1) This section applies where- 
(a) the prosecutor has asked the court to proceed under section 2 of this 
Act; or 
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(b) no such request has been made but the court is nevertheless 
proceeding, or considering whether to proceed, under section 2. 
(2) For the purpose of obtaining information to assist it in carrying out its 
functions, the court may at any time order the defendant to give it such 
information as may be specified in the order. 
(3) An order under subsection (2) above may require all, or any specified part, of 
the required information to be given to the court in such manner, and before 
such date, as may be specified in the order. 
(4) Crown Court Rules may make provision as to the maximum or minimum 
period that may be allowed under subsection (3) above. 
(5) If the defendant fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with any order 
under this section, the court may draw such inference from that failure as it 
considers appropriate. 
(6) Where the prosecutor accepts to any extent any allegation made by the 
defendant in giving to the court information required by an order under this 
section, the court may treat that acceptance as conclusive of the matters to 
which it relates. 
(7) For the purposes of this section, an allegation may be accepted in such manner 
as may be prescribed by Crown Court Rules or as the court may direct. 
Compensation 
18. -(1) If proceedings are instituted against a person for any drug trafficking offence 
or offences and either- 
(a) the proceedings do not result in his conviction for any drug trafficking 
offence, or 
(b) he is convicted of one or more drug trafficking offences but- 
(i) the conviction or convictions concerned are quashed, or 
(ii) he is pardoned by Her Majesty in respect of the conviction or 
convictions concerned, 
the High Court may, on an application by a person who held property which was 
realisable property, order compensation to be paid to the applicant if, having regard to 
all the circumstances, it considers it appropriate to make such an order. 
(2) The High Court shall not order compensation to be paid in any case unless the 
court is satisfied- 
(a) that there has been some serious default on the part of a person 
concerned in the investigation or prosecution of the offence or offences 
concerned, being a person mentioned in subsection (5) below; and 
(b) that the applicant has suffered loss in consequence of anything done in 
relation to the property by or in pursuance of 
(i) an order of the High Court or a county court under sections 26 
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to 29 of this Act; or 
(ii) an order of the Court of Session under section II (as applied by 
subsection (6) of that section), 27 or 28 of the Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 1987 (inhibition and arrestment of property 
affected by restraint order and recognition and enforcement of 
orders under this Act). 
(3) The High Court shall not order compensation to be paid in any case where it 
appears to the court that the proceedings would have been instituted or 
continued even if the serious default had not occurred. 
(4) The amount of compensation to be paid under this section shall be such as the 
High Court thinks just in all the circumstances of the case. 
(5) Compensation payable under this section shall be paid- 
(a) where the person in default was, or was acting as, a member of a 
police force, out of the police fund out of which the expenses of that 
police force are met; 
(b) where the person in default was a member of the Crown Prosecution 
Service or was acting on behalf of the service, by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions; and 
(c) where the person in default was an officer within the meaning of the 
Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, by the Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise. 
Confiscation orders where defendant has absconded or died 
19. -(1) Subsection (2) below applies where a person has been convicted of one or 
more drug trafficking offences. 
(2) If the prosecutor asks it to proceed under this section, the High Court may 
exercise the powers of the Crown Court under this Act to make a confiscation 
order against the defendant if satisfied that the defendant has died or 
absconded. 
(3) Subsection (4) below applies where proceedings for one or more drug 
trafficking offences have been instituted against a person but have not been 
concluded. 
(4) If the prosecutor asks it to proceed under this section, the High Court may 
exercise the powers of the Crown Court under this Act to make a confiscation 
order against the defendant if satisfied that the defendant has absconded. 
(5) The power conferred by subsection (4) above may not be exercised at any 
time before the end of the period of two years beginning with the date which 
is, in the opinion of the court, the date on which the defendant absconded. 
(6) In any proceedings on an application under this section- 
(a) section 4(2) of this Act shall not apply; 
(b) section II of this Act shall apply as it applies where the prosecutor asks 
the court to proceed under section 2 of this Act, but with the omission 
of subsections (5), (7) and (8); 
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(c) the court shall not make a confiscation order against a person who has 
absconded unless it is satisfied that the prosecutor has taken reasonable 
steps to contact him; and 
(d) any person appearing to the court to be likely to be affected by the 
making of a confiscation order by the court shall be entitled to appear 
before the court and make representations. 
(7) Subject to subsection (8) below, section 9 of this Act applies in relation to 
confiscation orders made by the High Court by virtue of this section as it 
applies in relation to confiscation orders made by the Crown Court and, for 
that purpose, references to the Crown Court in the provisions of the 1973 Act 
referred to in subsection (1) of that section (except in section 32(1)(b) of that 
Act) shall be construed as references to the High Court. 
(8) Where the High Court makes a confiscation order by virtue of this section in 
relation to a defendant who has died, section 9(1) of this Act shall be read as 
referring only to sections 31 (1) and 32(1) of the 1973 Act. 
(9) Where the High Court- 
(a) has been asked to proceed under this section in relation to a defendant 
who has absconded, but 
(b) has decided not to make a confiscation order against him, section 14 of 
this Act shall not apply at any time while he remains an absconder. 
(10) Where a confiscation order has been made in relation to any defendant by 
virtue of this section, section 15 of this Act shall not apply at any time while 
he is an absconder. 
(1) Where, in the case of any defendant, the High Court has made a confiscation order 
by virtue of section 19 of this Act, the Crown Court shall, in respect of the offence or, 
as the case may be, any of the offences concerned - 
(a) take account of the order before- 
(i) imposing any fine on the defendant; 
(ii) making any order involving any payment by him; or 
(iii) making any order under section 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971 (forfeiture orders) or section 43 of the Powers of Criminal 
Courts Act 1973 (deprivation orders); and 
(b) subject to paragraph (a) above, leave the order out of account in 
determining the appropriate sentence or other manner of dealing with 
him. 
(2) Where the High Court has made a confiscation order by virtue of section 19 of 
this Act and the defendant subsequently appears before the Crown Court to be 
sentenced in respect of one or more of the offences concerned, section 2(1) of 
this Act shall not apply so far as his appearance is in respect of that offence or 
those offences. 
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Restraint orders and charging orders 
25. - (1) The powers conferred on the 
High Court by sections 26(1) and 27(1) of this 
Act are exercisable where- 
(a) proceedings have been instituted in England and Wales against the 
defendant for a drug trafficking offence or an application has been 
made by the prosecutor in respect of the under section 13,14,15,16 
or 19 of this Act; 
(b) the proceedings have not, or the application has not, been concluded; 
and 
(c) the court is satisfied that there is reasonable cause to believe- 
(i) in the case of an application under section 15 or 16 of this Act, 
that the court will be satisfied as mentioned in section 15(4) or, 
as the case may be, 16(2) of this Act; or 
(ii) in any other case, that the defendant has benefited from drug 
trafficking. 
(2) The court shall not exercise those powers by virtue of subsection (1) above if 
it is satisfied- 
(a) that there has been undue delay in continuing the proceedings or 
application in question; or 
(b) that the prosecutor does not intend to proceed. 
(3) The powers mentioned in subsection (1) above are also exercisable where- 
(a) the court is satisfied that, whether by the laying of an information or 
otherwise, a person is to be charged with a drug trafficking offence or 
that an application of a kind mentioned in subsection (1)(a) above is to 
be made in respect of the defendant; and 
(b) the court is also satisfied as mentioned in subsection (1)(c) above. 
(4) For the purposes of sections 26 and 27 of this Act, at any time when those 
powers are exercisable before proceedings have been instituted- 
(a) references in this Act to the defendant shall be construed as references 
to the person referred to in subsection (3)(a) above; 
(b) references in this Act to the prosecutor shall be construed as references 
to the person who the High Court is satisfied is to have the conduct of 
the proposed proceedings; and 
(c) references in this Act to realisable property shall be construed as if, 
immediately before that time, proceedings had been instituted against 
the person referred to in subsection (3)(a) above for a drug trafficking 
offence. 
(5) Where the court has made an order under section 26(1) or 27(1) of this Act by 
virtue of subsection (3) above, the court shall discharge the order if 
proceedings in respect of the offence are not instituted, whether by the laying 
of an information or otherwise, or (as the case may be) if the application is not 
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made, within such time as the court considers reasonable. 
26. -(1) The High Court may by order (in this Act referred to as a "restraint order") 
prohibit any person from dealing with any realisable property, subject to such 
conditions and exceptions as may be specified in the order. 
(? ) A restraint order may apply- 
(a) to all realisable property held by a specified person, whether the property is 
described in the order or not; and 
(b) to realisable property held by a specified person, being property transferred to 
him after the making of the order. 
(3) This section shall not have effect in relation to any property for the time being 
subject to a charge under section 27 of this Act or section 9 of the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act 1986. 
(4) A restraint order- 
(a) may be made only on an application by the prosecutor; 
(b) may be made on an ex parte application to a judge in chambers; and 
(c) shall provide for notice to be given to persons affected by the order. 
(5) A restraint order- 
(a) may be discharged or varied in relation to any property; and 
(b) shall be discharged on the conclusion of the proceedings or of the 
application in question. 
(6) An application for the discharge or variation of a restraint order may be made 
by any person affected by it. 
(7) Where the High Court has made a restraint order, the High Court or a county 
court- 
(a) may at any time appoint a receiver- 
(i) to take possession of any realisable property, and 
(ii) in accordance with the court's directions, to manage or 
otherwise deal with any property in respect of which he is 
appointed, 
subject to such exceptions and conditions as may be specified by the court; and 
(b) may require any person having possession of property in respect of 
which a receiver is appointed under this section to give possession of it 
to the receiver. 
(8) For the purposes of this section, dealing with property held by any person 
includes (without prejudice to the generality of that expression)- 
(a) where a debt is owed to that person, making a payment to any person 
in reduction of the amount of the debt; and 
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(b) removing the property from Great Britain. 
(9) Where a restraint order has been made a constable may seize any realisable 
property for the purpose of preventing its removal from Great Britain. 
(10) In subsection (9) above, the reference to a restraint order includes a reference 
to a restraint order within the meaning of Part I of the Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 1987, and in relation to such an order "realisable property" has 
the same meaning as in that Part. 
(11) Property seized under subsection (9) above shall be dealt with in accordance 
with the directions of the court which made the order. 
(12) The Land Charges Act 1972 and the Land Registration Act 1925 shall apply- 
(a) in relation to restraint orders, as they apply in relation to orders 
affecting land made by the court for the purpose of enforcing 
judgements or recognisances; and 
(b) in relation to applications for restraint orders, as they apply in relation 
to other pending land actions. 
(13) The prosecutor shall be treated for the purposes of section 57 of the Land 
Registration Act 1925 (inhibitions) as a person interested in relation to any 
registered land to which a restraint order or an application for such an order 
relates. 
27. -(1) The High Court may make a charging order on realisable property for securing 
the payment to the Crown- 
(a) where a confiscation order has not been made, of an amount equal to 
the value from time to time of the property charged; and 
(b) where a confiscation order has been made, of an amount not exceeding 
the amount payable under the confiscation order. 
(2) For the purposes of this Act a charging order is an order made under this 
section imposing on any such realisable property as may be specified in the 
order a charge for securing the payment of money to the Crown. 
(3) A charging order- 
(a) may be made only on an application by the prosecutor; 
(b) may be made on an ex parte application to a judge in chambers; 
(c) shall provide for notice to be given to persons affected by the order; 
and 
(d) may be made subject to such conditions as the court thinks fit 
including, without prejudice to the generality of this paragraph, such 
conditions as it thinks fit as to the time when the charge is to become 
effective. 
(4) Subject to subsection (6) below, a charge may be imposed by a charging order 
only on- 
(a) any interest in realisable property which is an interest held beneficially 
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by the defendant or by a person to whom the defendant has directly or 
indirectly made a gift caught by this Act and is an interest- 
(i) in any asset of a kind mentioned in subsection (5) below; or 
(ii) under any trust; or 
(b) any interest in realisable property held by a person as trustee of a trust 
("the relevant trust") if the interest is in such an asset or is an interest 
under another trust and a charge may by virtue of paragraph (a) above 
be imposed by a charging order on the whole beneficial interest under 
the relevant trust. 
(5) The assets referred to in subsection (4) above are: 
(a) land in England and Wales; or 
(b) securities of any of the following kinds- 
(i) government stock; 
(ii) stock of any body (other than a building society) incorporated 
within England and Wales; 
(iii) stock of any body incorporated outside England and Wales or 
of any country or territory outside the United Kingdom, being 
stock registered in a register kept at any place within England 
and Wales; 
(iv) units of any unit trust in respect of which a register of the unit 
holders is kept at any place within England and Wales. 
(6) In any case where a charge is imposed by a charging order on any interest in 
an asset of a kind mentioned in subsection (5)(b) above, the court may provide 
for the charge to extend to any interest or dividend payable in respect of the 
asset. 
(7) In relation to a charging order, the court- 
(a) may make an order discharging or varying it; and 
(b) shall make an order discharging it- 
(i) on the conclusion of the proceedings or of the application in 
question; or 
(ii) on payment into court of the amount payment of which is 
secured by the charge. 
(8) An application for the discharge or variation of a charging order may be made 
by any person affected by it. 
(9) In this section "building society", "dividend", "government stock", "stock" and 
"unit trust" have the same meaning as in the Charging Orders Act 1979. 
28. -(1) The Land Charges Act 1972 and the Land Registration Act 1925 shall apply in 
relation to charging orders as they apply in relation to orders or writs made or issued 
for the purpose of enforcing judgements. 
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(2) Where a charging order has been registered under section 6 of the Land 
Charges Act 1972, subsection (4) of that section (effect of non-registration of 
writs and orders registrable under that section) shall not apply to an order 
appointing a receiver made in pursuance of the charging order. 
(3) Subject to any provision made under section 29 of this Act or by rules of 
court, a charge imposed by a charging order shall have the like effect and shall 
be enforceable in the same courts and in the same manner as an equitable 
charge created by the person holding the beneficial interest or, as the case may 
be, the trustees by writing under their hand. 
(4) Where a charging order has been protected by an entry registered under the 
Land Charges Act 1972 or the Land Registration Act 1925, an order under 
section 27(7) of this Act discharging the charging order may direct that the 
entry be cancelled. 
(5) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument amend 
section 27 of this Act by adding to or removing from the kinds of asset for the 
time being referred to there any asset of a kind which in his opinion ought to 
be so added or removed. 
(6) An order under subsection (5) above shall be subject to annulment in 
pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament. 
Realisation of property 
29. -(1) Where a confiscation order- 
(a) has been made under this Act, 
(b) is not satisfied, and 
(c) is not subject to appeal, 
the High Court or a county court may, on an application by the prosecutor, exercise 
the powers conferred by subsections (2) to (6) below. 
(2) The court may appoint a receiver in respect of realisable property. 
(3) The court may empower a receiver appointed under subsection (2) above, 
under section 26 of this Act or in pursuance of a charging order- 
(a) to enforce any charge imposed under section 27 of this Act on 
realisable property or on interest or dividends payable in respect of 
such property; and 
(b) in relation to any realisable property other than property for the time 
being subject to a charge under section 27 of this Act, to take 
possession of the property subject to such conditions or exceptions as 
may be specified by the court. 
(4) The court may order any person having possession of realisable property to 
give possession of it to any such receiver. 
(5) The court may empower any such receiver to realise any realisable property in 
such manner as the court may direct. 
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(6) The court may- 
(a) order any person holding an interest in realisable property to make to 
the receiver such payment as it may direct in respect of any beneficial 
interest held by the defendant or, as the case may be, the recipient of a 
gift caught by this Act; and 
(b) on the payment being made, by order transfer, grant or extinguish any 
interest in the property. 
(7) Subsections (4) to (6) above do not apply to property for the time being 
subject to a charge under section 27 of this Act or section 9 of the 1986 c. 32. 
Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. 
(8) The court shall not in respect of any property exercise the powers conferred by 
subsection (3)(a), (5) or (6) above unless a reasonable opportunity has been 
given for persons holding any interest in the property to make representations 
to the court. 
30. - (1) The following sums in the hands of a receiver appointed under section 26 or 
29 of this Act or in pursuance of a charging order, that is- 
(a) the proceeds of the enforcement of any charge imposed under section 
27 of this Act, 
(b) the proceeds of the realisation, other than by the enforcement of such a 
charge, of any property under section 26 or 29 of this Act, and 
(c) any other sums, being property held by the defendant, 
shall be applied, subject to subsection (2) below, on the defendant's behalf towards 
the satisfaction of the confiscation order. 
(2) Before any such sums are so applied they shall be applied- 
(a) first, in payment of such expenses incurred by a person acting as an 
insolvency practitioner as are payable under section 35(3) of this Act; 
and 
(b) second, in making such payments (if any) as the High Court or a 
county court may direct. 
(3) If, after the amount payable under the confiscation order has been fully paid, 
any such sums remain in the hands of such a receiver as is mentioned in subsection 
(1) above, the receiver shall distribute those sums- 
(a) among such of those who held property which has been realised under 
this Act, and 
(b) in such proportions, 
as the High Court or a county court may direct after giving a reasonable opportunity 
for such persons to make representations to the court. 
(4} The receipt of any sum by a justices' clerk on account of an amount payable 
under a confiscation order shall reduce the amount so payable, but the justices' 
clerk shall apply the money received for the purposes specified in this section 
and in the order so specified. 
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(5) The justices' clerk shall first pay any expenses incurred by a person acting as 
an insolvency practitioner and payable under section 35(3) of this Act but not 
already paid under subsection (2) above. 
(6) If the money was paid to the justices' clerk by a receiver appointed under 
section 26 or 29 of this Act or in pursuance of a charging order the justices' 
clerk shall next pay the receiver's remuneration and expenses. 
(7) After making- 
(a) any payment required by subsection (5) above, and 
(b) in a case to which subsection (6) above applies, any payment required 
by that subsection, the 'justices' clerk shall reimburse any amount paid 
under section 36(2) of this Act. 
(8) Any balance in the hands of the 'justices' clerk after he has made all payments 
required by the preceding provisions of this section shall be treated for the 
purposes of section 61 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1979 (application of 
fines, etc. ) as if it were a fine imposed by a magistrates' court. 
(9) In this section "justices' clerk" has the same meaning as in the Justices of the 
Peace Act 1979. 
Exercise of powers for the realisation of property 
31. -(]) The following provisions apply to the powers conferred 
(a) on the High Court or a county court by sections 26 to 30 of this Act; or 
(b) on a receiver appointed under section 26 or 29 of this Act or in 
pursuance of a charging order. 
(2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, the powers shall be 
exercised with a view to making available for satisfying the confiscation order 
or, as the case may be, any confiscation order that may be made in the 
defendant's case, the value for the time being of realisable property held by 
any person, by means of the realisation of such property. 
(3) In the case of realisable property held by a person to whom the defendant has 
directly or indirectly made a gift caught by this Act, the powers shall be 
exercised with a view to realising no more than the value for the time being of 
the gift. 
(4) The powers shall be exercised with a view to allowing any person other than 
the defendant or the recipient of any such gift to retain or recover the value of 
any property held by him. 
(5) In exercising the powers, no account shall be taken of any obligations of the 
defendant or of the recipient of any such gift which conflict with the 
obligation to satisfy the confiscation order. 
(6) An order may be made or other action taken in respect of a debt owed by the 
Crown. 
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Investigations into drug trafficking 
55. - (1) A constable may, for the purpose of an investigation into drug trafficking, 
apply to a Circuit judge for an order under subsection (2) below in relation to 
particular material or material of a particular description. 
(2) If on such an application the judge is satisfied that the conditions in subsection 
(4) below are fulfilled, he may make an order that the person who appears to 
him to be in possession of the material to which the application relates shall- 
(a) produce it to a constable for him to take away, or 
(b) give a constable access to it, 
within such period as the order may specify. 
This subsection has effect subject to section 59(11) of this Act. 
(3) The period to be specified in an order under subsection (2) above shall be 
seven days unless it appears to the judge that a longer or shorter period would 
be appropriate in the particular circumstances of the application. 
(4) The conditions referred to in subsection (2) above are- 
(a) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a specified person 
has carried on or has benefited from drug trafficking; 
(b) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the material to 
which the application relates- 
(i) is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together 
with other material) to the investigation for the purpose of 
which the application is made; and 
(ii) does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege or 
excluded material; and 
(c) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the public 
interest, having regard- 
(i) to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the material 
is obtained, and 
(ii) to the circumstances under which the person in possession of 
the material holds it, that the material should be produced or 
that access to it should be given. 
(5) Where the judge makes an order under subsection (2)(b) above in relation to 
material on any premises he may, on the application of a constable, order any 
person who appears to him to be entitled to grant entry to the premises to 
allow a constable to enter the premises to obtain access to the material. 
(6) An application under subsection (1) or (5) above may be made ex parte to a 
judge in chambers. 
(7) Provision may be made by Crown Court Rules as to(a) the discharge and 
variation of orders under this section; and (b) proceedings relating to such 
orders. 
341 
Appendix III 
(8) An order of a Circuit judge under this section shall have effect as if it were an 
order of the Crown Court. 
(9) Where the material to which an application under subsection (1) above relates 
consists of information contained in a computer- 
(a) an order under subsection (2)(a) above shall have effect as an order to 
produce the material in a form in which it can be taken away and in 
which it is visible and legible; and 
(b) an order under subsection (2)(b) above shall have effect as an order to 
give access to the material in a form in which it is visible and legible. 
(10) An order under subsection (2) above- 
(a) shall not confer any right to production of, or access to, items subject 
to legal privilege or excluded material; 
(b) shall have effect notwithstanding any obligation as to secrecy or other 
restriction upon the disclosure of information imposed by statute or 
otherwise; and 
(c) may be made in relation to material in the possession of an authorised 
government department; 
and inthis subsection "authorised government department" means a government 
department which is an authorised department for the purposes of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1947. 
56. - (1) A constable may, for the purpose of an investigation into drug trafficking, 
apply to a Circuit Judge for a warrant under this section in relation to specified 
premises. 
(2) On such application the judge may issue a warrant authorising a constable to 
enter and search the premises if the 'judge is satisfied 
(a) that an order made under section 55 of this Act in relation to material 
on the premises has not been complied with; 
(b) that the conditions in subsection (3) below are fulfilled; or 
(c) that the conditions in subsection (4) below are fulfilled. 
(3) The conditions referred to in subsection (2)(b) above are- 
(a) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a specified person 
has carried on or has benefited from drug trafficking; 
(b) that the conditions in subsection (4)(b) and (c) of section 55 of this Act 
are fulfilled in relation to any material on the premises; and 
(c) that it would not be appropriate to make an order under that section in 
relation to the material because- 
(i) it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to 
produce the material; 
(ii) it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to 
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grant access to the material or entitled to grant entry to the 
premises on which the material is situated; or 
(iii) the investigation for the purpose of which the application is 
made might be seriously prejudiced unless a constable could 
secure immediate access to the material. 
(4) The conditions referred to in subsection (2)(c) above are- 
(a) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a specified person 
has carried on or has benefited from drug trafficking; 
(b) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is on the 
premises material relating to the specified person or to drug trafficking 
which is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together 
with other material) to the investigation for the purpose of which the 
application is made, but that the material cannot at the time of the 
application be particularised; and 
(c) that- 
(i) it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to 
grant entry to the premises; 
(ii) entry to the premises will not be granted unless a warrant is 
produced; or 
(iii) the investigation for the purpose of which the application is 
made might be seriously prejudiced unless a constable arriving 
at the premises could secure immediate entry to them. 
(5) Where a constable has entered premises in the execution of a warrant issued 
under this section, he may seize and retain any material, other than items 
subject to legal privilege and excluded material, which is likely to be of 
substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the 
investigation for the purpose of which the warrant was issued. 
57. -(1) For the purposes of sections 21 and 22 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 (access to, and copying and retention of, seized material) - 
(a) an investigation into drug trafficking shall be treated as if it were an 
investigation of or in connection with an offence; and 
(b) material produced in pursuance of an order under section 55(2)(a) of 
this Act shall be treated as if it were material seized by a constable. 
(2) In sections 55 and 56 of this Act "excluded material", "items subject to legal 
privilege" and "premises" have the same meaning as in the 1984 Act. 
58. -(1) Where, in relation to an investigation into drug trafficking- 
(a) an order under section 55 of this Act has been made or has been 
applied for and has not been refused, or 
(b) a warrant under section 56 of this Act has been issued 
a person is guilty of an offence if, knowing or suspecting that the investigation is 
taking place, he makes any disclosure which is likely to prejudice the investigation. 
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(2) In proceedings against a person for an offence under this section, it is a 
defence to prove - 
(a) that he did not know or suspect that the disclosure was likely to 
prejudice the investigation; or 
(b) that he had lawful authority or reasonable excuse for making the 
disclosure. 
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) above makes it an offence for a professional legal 
adviser to disclose any information or other matter- 
(a) to, or to a representative of, a client of his in connection with the 
giving by the adviser of legal advice to the client; or 
(b) to any person- 
(i) in contemplation of, or in connection with, legal proceedings; 
and 
(ii) for the purpose of those proceedings. 
(4) Subsection (3) above does not apply in relation to any information or other 
matter which is disclosed with a view to furthering any criminal purpose. 
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six 
months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both; 
and 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
five years or to a fine or to both. 
Disclosure of Information Held by Government Departments 
59. -(1) Subject to subsection (4) below, the High Court may on an application by the 
prosecutor order any material mentioned in subsection (3) below which is in the 
possession of an authorised government department to be produced to the court 
within such period as the court may specify. 
(2) The power to make an order under subsection (1) above is exercisable if- 
(a) the powers conferred on the court by sections 26(1) and 27(1) of this 
Act are exercisable by virtue of subsection (1) of section 25 of this 
Act; or 
(b) those powers are exercisable by virtue of subsection (3) of that section 
and the court has made a restraint or charging order which has not 
been discharged; 
but where the power to make an order under subsection (1) above is exercisable by 
virtue only of paragraph (b) above, subsection (4) of section 25 of this Act shall apply 
for the purposes of this section as it applies for the purposes of sections 26 and 27 of 
this Act. 
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(3) The material referred to in subsection (1) above is any material which- 
(a) has been submitted to an officer of an authorised government 
department by the defendant or by a person who has at any time held 
property which was realisable property; 
(b) has been made by an officer of an authorised government department 
in relation to the defendant or such a person; or 
(c) is correspondence which passed between an officer of an authorised 
government department and the defendant or such a person; 
and an order under that subsection may require the production of all such material or 
of a particular description of such material, being material in the possession of the 
department concerned. 
(4) An order under subsection (1) above shall not require the production of any 
material unless it appears to the High Court that the material is likely to 
contain information that would facilitate the exercise of the powers conferred 
on the court by sections 26 to 29 of this Act or on a receiver appointed under 
section 26 or 29 of this Act or in pursuance of a charging order. 
(5) The court may by order authorise the disclosure to such a receiver of any 
material produced under subsection (1) above or any part of such material; but 
the court shall not make an order under this subsection unless a reasonable 
opportunity has been given for an officer of the department to make 
representations to the court. 
(6) Material disclosed in pursuance of an order under subsection (5) above may, 
subject to any conditions contained in the order, be further disclosed for the 
purposes of the functions under any provision of this Act, apart from section 
16, of the receiver or the Crown Court. 
(7) The court may by order authorise the disclosure to a person mentioned in 
subsection (8) below of any material produced under subsection (1) above or 
any part of such material; but the court shall not make an order under this 
subsection unless- 
(a) a reasonable opportunity has been given for an officer of the 
department to make representations to the court; and 
(b) it appears to the court that the material is likely to be of substantial 
value in exercising functions relating to drug trafficking. 
(8) The persons referred to in subsection (7) above are 
(a) any member of a police force; 
(b) any member of the Crown Prosecution Service; and 
(c) any officer within the meaning of the Customs and Excise 
Management Act 1979. 
(9) Material disclosed in pursuance of an order under subsection (7) above may, 
subject to any conditions contained in the order, be further disclosed for the 
purposes of functions relating to drug trafficking. 
(10) Material may be produced or disclosed in pursuance of this section 
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notwithstanding any obligation as to secrecy or other restriction upon the 
disclosure of information imposed by statute or otherwise. 
(11) An order under subsection (1) above and, in the case of material in the 
possession of an authorised government department, an order under section 
55(2) of this Act may require any officer of the department (whether named in 
the order or not) who may for the time being be in possession of the material 
concerned to comply with it, and such an order shall be served as if the 
proceedings were civil proceedings against the department. 
(12) The person on whom such an order is served - 
(a) shall take all reasonable steps to bring it to the attention of the officer 
concerned; and 
(b) if the order is not brought to that officer's attention within the period 
referred to in subsection (1) above, shall report the reasons for the 
failure to the court; 
and it shall also be the duty of any other officer of the department in receipt of the 
order to take such steps as are mentioned in paragraph (a) above. 
(13) In this section "authorised government department" means a government 
department which is an authorised department for the purposes of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1947. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Financial Investigation Reports 
WARRANT TO ENTER AND SEARCH PREMISES 
DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENCES ACT 1986, SECTION 28 
To each and all of the Constables of the South Yorkshire Police Force 
An application having been made up on this day by Detective Constable Michael 
David Gagg, I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that............. has carried on or benefited from drug trafficking and that there is at the 
premises of .............. material 
likely to be (by itself or with other material) of 
substantial value to the investigation, namely, all files, documents and other records 
used in ordinary business, whether those records are in written form, are kept on 
microfilm, magnetic tape, or any other form of mechanical or electronic data retrieval 
mechanism, managers notes, paid cheques, credit and debit slips, money market 
deposits, inter-account transfers, telegraphic transfers and all correspondence 
including inter-bank correspondence, concerning financial transactions in relation to 
all accounts in which the name of INSERT NAME OF SUBJECT appears on the 
Mandate or Signature card, any locked boxes or parcels , and that the 
issue of a 
warrant is appropriate by reasons of Sub-Section (2)(a), (3), (4) and Section 28. 
You are hereby authorised to enter on one occasion only within one month from the 
date of this Warrant the said premises and to search them for the material in respect of 
which the application is made. 
..................................................................................... 
Date: 
(Signature of Circuit Judge) 
ENDORSEMENT (to be made by Officer executing the Warrant) 
1. (The following items were found (list) or (no item found) 
2. (The following items other than items which were sought were seized: (list) or 
(no other item was seized). 
Signature of Officer ................................ D. C. 1644 Date: 19 January 1995 
A copy of this Warrant should be left with the occupier of the premises, or, in his 
absence, the person who appears to be in charge of the premises or if no such person 
is present, any prominent place on the premises. 
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PRODUCTION ORDER 
(Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, Section 27) 
To: 
An application having been made in pursuance of Section 27 of the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986, by Detective Constable Gagg of the South Yorkshire Police, that 
you should give the said Detective access to all the material to which the said 
application relates, namely, all files, documents and other records used in ordinary 
business, whether those records are in written form, are kept on microfilm, magnetic 
tape, or any other form of mechanical or electronic data retrieval mechanism, 
managers notes, paid cheques, credit and debit slips, money market deposits, inter- 
account transfers, telegraphic transfers and all correspondence including inter-bank 
correspondence, concerning financial transactions in relation to all accounts in which 
the name of INSERT NAME OF SUBJECT appears on the Mandate or Signature 
card. 
I am satisfied that the conditions specified in Sub-Section (4) of Section 27 are 
fulfilled in relation thereto. 
You are hereby ordered to produce the said material to the Detective for him to take it 
away, or give access to the material, to the said Detective no later than the end of the 
period of seven (7) days from the date of this order. 
Signed: (Circuit Judge) 
Dated: (Court Stamp) 
Note: 
(a) Where the material consists of information contained in a computer the 
material shall be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in 
which it is visible and legible. 
(Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, Section 27 (8a)). 
(b) Where the material consists of information contained in a computer the 
Constable shall be given access to it in a form in which it is visible and 
legible. 
(Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, Section 27 (8b)). 
(c) Disclosures of information about this investigation may contravene Section 31 
of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. If you are contacted by anyone in 
connection with this order you may wish to seek legal advice, or contact 
Detective Constable Gagg before disclosure is made. 
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IN THE CROWN COURT 
AT MAIDSTONE 
NO. 
PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT 
DRUG TRAFFICKING ACT 1994 
DEFENDANT 
NAME 
STATEMENT DETAILS 
PREPARED BY 
RANK AND NUMBER 
ADDRESS 
I Druggie 
D Frost 
DETECTIVE SERGEANT 
FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT 
(DRUG TRAFFICKING) 
BUTTON ROAD 
MAIDSTONE, KENT 
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: Date: 29 October-1-99-6 
STATEMENT TENDERED BY: 
PROSECUTOR: 
ADDRESS 
D Lawyer 
Crown Prosecution Service 
South East 
Maidstone Branch 
Priory Gate 
29 Union Street 
Maidstone 
Kent ME141PT 
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FINANCIAL STATEMENT: 
The prosecution have asked the Court under Section 2 of the Drug 
Trafficking Act 1994 to consider the defendant's benefit from Drug 
Trafficking. Thus it 1 necessary for the Court to have a confiscation hearing. 
This is the Prosecution statement prepared by Detective Sergeant D Fro t 
financial investigation officer for Kent County Constabulary made on behalf 
of the prosecutor after consultation with the Central Confiscation Branch, 
Crown Prosecution Service, Ludgate Hill, London EC4M 7EX pursuant to 
Section 11 of the Drug Trafficking Act, 1994. 
I have made enquiries into the financial affairs of I Druggie for the purpose of 
establishing- 
(a) the proceeds of drug trafficking received by him, to the civil standard 
and 
(b) the nature, extent, amount and value of the realisable property of the 
defendant so far as it is known to me, from which any Confiscation 
Order made by the Court in accordance with the Drug Trafficking Act 
1994 may be paid. 
1. DETAILS OF ARREST 
On Tuesday 25th July 1995, the defendant was arrested by police officers, 
whilst driving his Vauxhall Cavalier car, registration F392 PIM in Gillingham. 
A subsequent search of the defendant revealed that he had nine plastic bags 
containing Amphetamine Sulphate secreted in his underpants. the total weight 
of the Amphetamine Sulphate was 245 grams (8.75 ounces). When 
interviewed the defendant stated that he intended supplying this consignment 
as 9 ounces. 
A search of the defendant's home, 77 Ecstasy Road, Rochester, Kent, was 
conducted; cash amounting to E7,820.02 was found in the bedroom and cash 
totalling $850 was found in his girlfriend's, J Sanger, hand bag. On 
Wednesday 26th July 1995, I obtained a warrant, from the Crown Court in 
Maidstone. This was executed by me on the Midland Bank at 231 High Street, 
Chatham, Kent. As a result, a blue, locked safe deposit box belonging to the 
defendant and his girlfriend J Sanger was handed to me by an officer of the 
Midland Bank. The safety deposit box contained a substantial amount of cash 
and a quantity of jewellery and various building society account books, cash 
cards and a bank book. 
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2. PERSONAL HISTORY 
The defendant is a plumber by trade and lives at 77 Ecstasy Road, Rochester, 
Kent with his girlfriend Miss Sanger in a house owned by her. The defendant 
claims that Miss Sanger supports both him and their three children. Enquiries 
have shown that Miss Sanger owns two other properties, namely 45 Maidstone 
Road, Rochester and 38 Boundary Road, Chatham (both of which were let to 
DSS tenants at the time of the defendant's arrest). 
3. LEGITIMATE SOURCES OF INCOME 
The defendant claims to have earned about £3,000 in cash for work during the 
previous year, prior to which he claims to have earned £15,000 to £18,000. 
However, no further information is known to support the defendants claims. 
The defendant was unemployed at the time of his arrest, and has stated that he 
has been since mid 1994. He does not claim any state benefits, and at the time 
of his arrest, was not registered as unemployed. Enquiries have shown that the 
defendant has no legitimate source of income. 
4. FINANCIAL RECORD EXAMINATION 
In the safety deposit box lodged at the Midland Bank, Chatham the details of 
nine building society accounts discovered. Table at Appendix 1 shows the 
amounts deposited. The defendant has admitted in interview that these 
represent some of his profits from drug trafficking. 
5. CALCULATION OF PROCEEDS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING 
A. Benefit admitted-by-defendant 
i) Cash in safety deposit box (excluding (1,000) 19,985.00 
ii) Deposits in Building Society/Bank accounts 16,790.00 
------------ 
36,775.00 
Defendant has stated in interview that the money identified above has come 
from his Drug Trafficking. This money obviously represents the defendant's 
profit from those drug deals. Mr Justice Henry in the Court of Appeal, in the 
matter of R -v- Simons, [ (1994) 98 Cr. App. Rep 100] stated that "The word 
"proceeds" means that which proceeds from something, such as "the proceeds 
of sale. "The proceeds of sale are not profit made in the sale but the sale price. 
This is confirmed by the definition of "proceeds" in the Act, namely the value 
of payments or other rewards received in connection with drug trafficking 
carried on by him. "[DTOA 1986] 
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The defendant has also stated that he bought his drugs for £50 an ounce and 
sold them for £90 a ounce. Thus the £36,775.00 represents the £40 profit 
made on each ounce of drug the defendant has sold. To calculate the total 
proceeds you need to calculate the total proceeds received by the defendant. 
This is found as follows; 
£36,775.00 divided by £40 equals 919 ounces of Amphetamine 
Sulphate. 
Defendant sold 919 ounces of Amphetamine Sulphate at £90 which totals 
£82,710 
Thus the defendant's proceeds from his admitted drug dealing is £82,710 
B. Assumptions 
a. Property held by the defendant at any time since conviction 
i) Cash found in safety deposit box 1,000.00 
The defendant stated that included in the money 
found in the safety deposit box was a E1,000.00 
belonging to Miss Sanger, and was holiday money. 
ii) Cash found in Miss Sanger's handbag 850.00 
The defendant claimed that the 5: 850.00 found in 
Miss Sanger's handbag was money left over from a 
recent holiday taken in Florida, and Miss Sanger 
confirmed this in interview. 
iii) Cash found in bedroom 7,860.02 
The defendant claimed that the cash found in the 
bedroom some £7,860.02 had come from a job that 
he had worked on in London and that it had been 
there for about four years. His girlfriend, Miss 
Sanger, stated that she thought it had been there for 
about six months possibly a year at the most. 
As no documentary evidence has been produced by the defendant as to the 
source of the above monies then in accordance with Section 4(3) (a) (i) Drug 
Trafficking Act 1994 the Court shall assume the money has come from Drug 
Trafficking unless 
- the assumption is found to be incorrect 
Or 
- there would be serious risk of injustice to the defendant 
If the Court rules that the assumptions are incorrect then the Court should state 
its reasons. 
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b. Transfers 
i) Midland Account Number 123456 in the defendant's name. 
Total Lodgements £120,000 
ii) Halifax Account Number 1235678 in the name of Miss J Sanger. 
Total lodgements £35,000 all from 
accepted that this money forms 
trafficking proceeds. 
DSS rental payments. It is therefore 
no part of the defendant's drug 
As no documentary evidence has been produced by the defendant as to the 
source of the monies under i) then in accordance with Section 4(3) (a) (ii) 
Drug Trafficking Act 1994 the Court shall assume the money has come from 
Drug Trafficking unless 
- the assumption is found to be incorrect 
a 
- there would be serious risk of injustice to the defendant 
If the Court rules that the assumptions are incorrect then the Court should state 
its reasons. 
c. Expenditure 
i) Holiday £4,000.00 
ii) Renovations £15,000.00 
iii) Purchase of Vauxhall Cavalier Registration F392 PJM £2,800.00 
iv) Drugs (on possession) 9 ounces @. £50 oz E13450.00 
As no documentary evidence has been produced by the defendant as to the 
source of the above monies then in accordance with Section 4(3)(b) Drug 
Trafficking Act 1994 the Court shall assume the money has come from Drug 
Trafficking unless 
- the assumption is found to be incorrect 
Ot 
- there would be serious risk of injustice to the defendant 
If the Court rules that the assumptions are incorrect then the Court should state 
its reasons. 
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6. PROCEEDS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING 
Paragraph 
Ref 
Details Amount 
5A Benefit admitted by defendant £82,710.00 
5B Assumptions 
a. Property held by the defendant at any time since 
conviction 
i) Cash in safety deposit box £1,000.00 
ii) Cash found in handbag £850.00 
iii) Cash found in bedroom £7,860.02 
b. Transfers 
i) Lodgements into the Midland account £ 120,000.00 
c. Expenditure 
i) Cost of holiday £4,000.00 
ii) Cost of Renovations to property £15,000.00 
iii) Vauxhall Cavalier £2,800.00 
iv) Drugs found in defendant's possession £450.00 
Total Benefit £234,670.02 
7. RESTRAINT ORDERS 
On 3rd October 1995 in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, 
Mr Justice Popple well made a Restraint Order against the defendant which 
prohibited him from dealing with his assets save as authorised by the High 
Court. 
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8. AMOUNT THAT MIGHT BE REALISED 
The onus is on the defendant to provide the Court with full details of all his 
realisable property, including full internal valuations (carried out by a 
professional valuer) for the various houses he has an interest in. He will also 
need to supply the Court with details of the likely costs that will be incurred in 
realising the property. 
The realisable assets that I have traced are as follows: 
Cash in bedroom 7,860.0? 
Cash in safety deposit box 20,985.00 
Balance of Building Society Accounts 16,798.75 
Life Assurance Policy (Surrender Value) 1,714.90 
Cavalier EI TAB 2,000.00 
Jewellery (gift provision) 17,500.00 
Interest in home 23,000.00 
Interest in other property 45,000.00 
Minimum value of known realisable assets 134,858.67 
9. CONFISCATION. ORDER 
If the Court accepts that the defendant has benefited from his drug trafficking 
to the extent of ( 234,670.02 then the court should declare the benefit in that 
amount or in any other amount in respect of which the court finds the 
defendant has benefited. 
Unless the defendant satisfies the Court that the amount that might be realised 
is less than the amount it declares as his benefit from Drug Trafficking then, 
the court should make a confiscation order in that amount. 
Any reply made to this statement made under the Drug Trafficking Act should be 
served on the Maidstone Crown Court and a copy sent to the Crown Prosecution 
Service, Maidstone Branch at Priory Gate, 29 Union Street, Maidstone, Kent ME14 
1PT. 
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WC 274 
15.93) 
Ii 
West Midlands Police 
Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986/Criminal Justice Act, 1988 
. -, 
The investigating Officer should complete as eparate Financial Information Report for each defendant, when charged 
with an offence within the provisions of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986, or the Criminal Justice Act, 1988. 
PLEASE ATTACH COPY WC 208 - MG 5- RECORD OF INTERVIEW 
For Financial Investigation Unit Use Only: Ref No . .................... 
Date Received ..................... 
Report completed by ... ....... ...... .. ........ ....... 
Date 
........ ......... ..... .......... 
DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENCES ACT. 1986 
L_ 
OR, 
CRIMINAL. JUSTICE ACT, 1988 
DEFENDANT DETAILS 
Surname .... . .......... .... . .. ....... Forenamelsl.... ................ .............. 
Address ... .. ...... ......... ........ ... .................. 
........ ...... .... .... .. 
Occupation 
.... ...... .... . ............... ...... 
Date of Birth ................... 
National Insurance No.. .. ... 
Date of Arrest . ... ....... .... ...... ... ... 
Date of Charge .... ... ... 
In Custody Sail 
OTHER DEFENDANTS 
Surname . ...... ...... ...... ... ... . Forename(s) ..................................... 
Surname . ...... ....... ....... ....... Forenemefsl .... ........ ....................... 
Surname ... ....... ..... .... ..... ....... Forenamelsl. ........... ...... ................. 
Surname ...... .... .............. .. ....... Forenamelsl........ ... ........................ 
Surname .............. ... ...... .. ........ Forenarnelsl ... ... ............................ 
Surname .... .... . Forenan elsl ..... ...... ...... ................ 
Surname .......... ..... .... .... . . .... Forenarnelsl ....... ... ...................... 
356 
Appendix IV' 
I 91.1114h CT-1 9; 1 lei 14 1 01exell 1 -1 
Offencetsl Charged ........ . ....... ...... ............ 
. ................. ...... ...... ...... ........ ............. .... ... ........ ... 
....... ..................... ...................................... ...... ................. 
....... .............. ....... ............................................................ 
................................................. ......................... ................. 
....................... ....... .... ............ ............................................ 
...... . ....... .... ....... ................ . ...... ....... ... ...... ............... 
................. ....... ....... ......... ....... ......................................... 
........... ................ ... ..... .............. .................. ................... 
....... ...... 
......... ... ...... ...... ...... ......... ....... . ................... ....... 
...... ..... ..... ...... ....... ...... ....... 
. ... ........ . .......... ...... . ...... ...... ... ..... .... ......... 
. ...... ...... .... .... ............... 
. .... ......... ..... .... ...... ...... . .... ... ................... 
Identify and Amount of Dru; s Street Value of Drugs 
... ...... ........ ...... .... . ............., 
...... .... ....... ...... . .... ....... ........ ... ... ................ 
...... ...... . ...... ..... .......... ........ ............... 
...... ...... ......... ........................ 
....... ............ ... ................ 
... ...... ...... ..... ..... ..... ............................ 
. .... ..... . ........ .... ............. 
..... ..... ...... . ..... ................ 
...... ..... ...... .... .... ...... . ........ ... .............. 
. ...... ......... . ...... ........ ....... ...... ......... ..,............... 
. ...... .... ..... ... .... ....... ..........,....................... 
Admits Trafficking YES i NO 
if YES, how long ... ...... . .... ......... ...... ...... ........ ..................... 
Average Value of Benefit (per month) E ........... ....... 
Cost of Own Habit E ..... ...... ...... 
Duration of Habit ......... .... .... . .... ...... ...... .... ........ ...................... 
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INCOME 
EMPLOYMENT: 
?. erne of employer OR state if self-employed: . .......... ........... ... .. .............................. 
Address ... ..... .......... ... ....... ...... .. 
........ ................... . .............. .................. 
Occupation 
....................... ...... 
Net income (per week/month") 
... ......... ........... ... 
.............................. 
STATE BENEFITS: 
Amount received; Period for which claimed: 
Type: (per week/month') (relevant to the offence) 
. ... .... ....... ..... .......... E............... ....... ............................. 
.................................... f ................ ....... ............................ 
.................................... f ................ ....... ............................. 
. ............. .................... E ............... ... ... ............................. 
...... . .......... ....... ...... E ........... .......... .... ... .... ............. 
.... ....... .... ... ... . f .... ....... . ..... ................... 
OTHER INCOME: 
Amount received. 
Source of Income: (per week/month') To whom payable: 
....... ..... .... .... .......... C... ........ ...... .. ............................. 
.... ....... ....... ... ... .. f ............... ....... .................. ........... 
. ............. ........ 
. 
... 
f 
... ..... 
...... 
.. ....... ........... 
.. ... .... 
. 
f ... .. .. . . ...... .................. 
. E 
...... ......... .................. 
E ...... ......... ...... . ... ........................ 
OTHER FAMILY INCOME: 
Amount received: 
Source of Income: {per week/month'l To whom peyebk: 
....... .... . ....... . .... E ........... ... ..... . . ........................... 
.... ............ ...... ........ . E .......... ... ....... . .... ...................... 
... ............. ......... .... E ............... ....... ............................ 
.... ..... . ...... f ..... . .... ..... .. .... ... ................ 
r... .... .... ........ ........ .............. .... 
.......... .... . ...... .... ... ... .... ............. 
CONTINUATIONS OR COMMENTS; 
............ .... ..... ....... .... 
............ .... ......... ..... 
............ ..... ... ....... ..... 
. ....... ..... . .... ... 
......... ....... ......... 
.......... ................. 
............................ 
............................ 
............................ 
....................... ............. 
... ..... ........................... 
......... ............ .... ....... 
" Delete as applicable 
............... ........... 
..................... ...... 
...... ............. ..... . 
... ........................ 
............................ 
.... ...................... 
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ASSETS - PROPERTY 
Main Residence Other Residence 
Domestic Premises: 
House. Bungalow. Flat. Other* .... ....... ............. ..... .......... ...............,...... 
.... 
Name in which held ..... 
................ ....... .. 
............... ........... 
........ . ........... ........... 
..,.. ..................,.,...... 
Freehold/LeaseholdtRented 
..... ................. ..... .... ............ , ................... . 
How long at premises ..... ................ ....... .. ...... ..................... ..... 
RENT (Leasehold/Rented Property 
Name and Address of Landlord ..... 
.... 
........... ............ . 
..... ...................... ...... ........................... 
Amount of Rent Iper week/month 'I E .... ............... 
E 
When due ..... . ....... .... .... ... ... ................................ 
Method of Payment ..... .................. ...... ,.. ................................ 
GROUND RENT lit Leasehold( 
Name of Address of Landlord ..... ... .... ........ ...... ...... . 
Amount of Rent C ...... ....... E 
When due ... ..... ....... ..... ... 
Method of Payment .... ...... ..... ........... ......... ,............,...... 
Any other occupants paying rent 
Length ofTrme .... .... ....... ................... 
Name ..... ....... .... ........... 
Amount E......... ....... .... f ....................... 
If Owner Occupier estimated value of Pr operty 
E ....... . .... ...... E ........................ 
MORTGAGE DETAILS 
Name and Address .... ....... ... ...... 
of Mortgage Company 
.... ...... . ..... ........... ........ ............ 
.................................. 
Amount Paid (per month) ....... ....... ..... f 
When Due ..... .... ... .... .... .... 
Method of Payment ..... ............................ 
Deposit Paid when purchasing house E............... ....... 
Delete as applicable 
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LIABILITIES 
Main Residence Other Residence 
PROPERTY TAX 
Amount 
When Due 
Method of Payment 
Amount of Arrears 
WATER RATES 
Amount Annual 
When Due 
Method of Payment 
Amount of Arrears 
ELECTRICITY 
Arnourt CMonthIyl 
Method of Payment 
Amount of Arrears 
E .... ... ............. 
... ........................ 
e ............ .......... 
f ... .... ........ ... 
.......... 
. ........ ..... . ........ ... 
f ..... ........ ...... 
c ........... ... ...... 
. ....... ....... .......... ... 
E .......... ............. 
f ..... .... ........... 
................... ............. 
.......... ...................... 
£ ........................ 
f ........................ 
............. .................. 
................................. 
E ........ ............... 
f ....... ....... ....... 
................ ................ 
f....................... 
GAS 
Amount (Monthly; 
Metnod of Payment 
Amount of Arrears 
E ... 
£ 
.... ...... . .... . 
£ 
................... 
....... ...................... 
E ....................... 
TELEPHONE 
Amount (Annual) £ .... .... 
£...................... 
Method of Payment ...... ... . ... .... ..... ....... 
Amount of Arrears C ..... .......... 
£ 
...................... . 
MOBILE TELEPHONE 
Name of Holder . .... ......... . .... . . .......... ...... ...... ...... .................. 
Tel. No ... 
Monthly Rental £ ............. ................... 
Name of Company Supplying Air Time ... .... ......... . ........ ........ ................. . 
Date of Purchase .... .... ...... ... ..... . 
Where Pwcnased ... 
Cost of Purchase E ............ 
BUILDING INSURANCE Main Retidenee Other Residence 
Name and Address of Insurers ....... .................. ......... ........................ 
. ....... ..... ......... ........................ 
. ...... . ............... ... . ...... ........................ 
..... ... ... . ............................... 
Amount Insured £ ......... ...... 
E..................... 
Premium E .... .. 
f........................ 
Method of Payment . ....... ...... ...... ................................. 
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CONTENTS INSURANCE Main Residence Other Residence 
Name and address of Insurers: ................................. ................................. 
........ ........................ ................................. 
................................. ................................. 
Amount insured: f ........................ £ ........................ 
Premium: E ........................ E ........................ 
Method of payment: ................................. ................................. 
PERSONAL EXPENDITURE OTHER PERSONAL EXPENDITURE 
(Not previously fisted i. e. TV Rental etc) 
Food lper monthI E ................. .. ...................... E .................. 
Socialising lper month) £ .... ........... ...................... E .................. 
Clothing foer month! £ .................... ...................... £ .................. 
Gambling (per month) E .......... ......... ...................... 
E 
....... ........ . 
CREDIT CARDS 
Name of card: .................. .................. .................. .................. 
Amount owed: £ ................ 
E ................ E ................ £ ................ 
Data of account: ................ . .................. .................. .................. 
Average monthly ...... ...... ... .................. ........ ......... ................ 
Payments: 
Name and address ... .............. .... ............. ............. .... .................. 
of holder: 
.... ............. 
............. .... 
.... ............ 
.................. 
...... .... ...... 
.................. 
............. 
.................. 
CREDIT AGREEMENTS: 
Name of company: ....... ...... .. .................. ..... ......... ................. 
Branch address: . ........ ...... 
........... ...... 
.................. 
..... ........ .. 
.... .... ....... 
... .............. 
.................. 
.................. 
....... .... ..... 
Purpose of loon: ... .... ...... 
............... .. 
..... ......... .. 
... .... ........ 
.................. 
.................. 
.................. 
Amount owed: £.... ..... E.. f ... ..... 
Monthly payments: £ ................ E ..... .......... E ................. E ................ 
Method of payment: .................. .................. .................. .................. 
Amount of arrears: ........... ...... .................. .................. .................. 
DIRECT DEBITS OR STANDING ORDERS: 
Account number". .................. .................. .................. .................. 
Name and address .................. .................. .................. .................. 
of Bank: (where 
accountheidl ............ 
.................. 
...... ........... 
...... 
.................. .................. 
Purpose .... ............. 
............ 
.................. 
.................. 
..... ............ 
.................. 
.................. 
Amount of order E ............ ... E ................ E ................ E ................ 
When payable .................. ......... ...... .................. .................. 
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MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS: 
Court Order Date: ...... ...... ... ... .................... 
Name and address of beneficiary: . ... ... . .......................................................... 
....................... ..... . 
Amount of order E .............. 
... 
... 
.................................... ...................... 
............... 
When payable............. .................. 
Method of payment ............... .. ......................................... .................. 
INCOME TAX: 
District: ........................ .... . ..... Tax Reference: ..................................... 
Name and address of inspector: ....... ... ..... ......... .................. ........................ 
.............................. 
Amount owed: C ............... 
.. 
... 
........................ ........... ...................... 
When payable ......... .......... ... ...................... 
PERSONAL ASSETS 
CASH 
Seized by police: Amount E. ..... ........... Person Holding: ......... ................ 
Held by Defendant: Amount C. ................. Person Holding: ......................... . 
With Other Person: Amount C. ................. Person Holding:.... . .................... 
BANK ACCOUNTIS) lCurrent) 
Name and address of bank: ...... .... ................. ..... ... . ... .... ................. 
(where accou't held) 
.... 
Account No. ...... 
.... 
.... 
............... ... 
...... ....... 
...... ....................... 
........ ........................ 
Name of account: .... . ... .... ... ...... ..... ........................ 
Balance. f ...... ............. 
E 
... ............... 
BUILDING SOCIETY ACCOUNT(S) 
Name and address of society: ...... .... ............... ....... ... ............................ 
(where account held) 
...... .... ............... . ..... ... ..... ................ 
.... 
Account No. ... 
... 
.. 
........ .... ..... 
..... . .... 
... .... ....................... 
Name of account. ...... .... ..... ................ . ...... ..... ........ ..... .. 
Balance: E ......... ...... ....... E .................. .... 
SAFETY DEPOSIT BOX(ES) 
Name and address where held: ... 
...... 
... 
.... 
.................. .. 
....................... 
..................... , 
......... .................. 
..... 
Contents. ...... 
.... 
.... 
....................... 
....................... 
............ .................. 
............ ................... 
NATIONAL SAVINGS 
Cert, ficate Numbers: . .... . .... .. .... ............................. .................... ... 
Amount held: C ....... ........... Where held: ......................................... ..... . 
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PREMIUM BONDS: 
Certificate Numbers: .... ..... .... ...................................... ................ 
Amount Held: £ ................. 
Name and address of person holding: , ..... ,,.... . 
SHARES 
Name of Company: ...................  ,,.....,,...,...... ,,,....,.,,,..,,,,.... 
Amount holding: E ...,.. . ...,.. 
E .................... £ ........ ........... 
Vale of Polding: E ..... . ...... . .. 
E..... 
.............. 
f................... 
UNIT TRUSTS: 
Name and description ..... ... . ...... ......... .... ...... ............... 
of Trust: 
................... .,............... ... ,.,................... 
No. of Und Trusts held ................ . ... . .... ...... .. .... ............ 
Value of holding: E., £............... E 
LIFE POLICY: 
Eiranch address: 
Detau's cl DOIIcV: 
Surrender value E ... ... 
Premium a 1Oufl1 due. £ .... 
When due* """"...... ".. ". 
Method of payment: . 
Linked with mortgage: YES NO 
Details. . ...... . ...... . 
MOTOR VEHICLE(S). CARAVANS etc: 
Make- 
Type; 
Registration numbe,. 
Vaiuo E ... . ........ 
Date of valuation: 
Registered holder 
for name and address 
of person holding) 
........ ...... 
£. £ 
£. ...... . ..... £. . 
....... .... ... 
. .... 
...... 
...... 
..... 
....... 
........ 
YES I,. NO YES LJ NO 
.... 
E 
............... ..... 
Htre purchase agreement: YES . NO _.: YES NO . -j YES _J NO 
Lease agreement- YES 
I 
NO I YES NO + YES 
U 
NO 
Name and address of ...... ............. . ................ 
company: 
Details of agreement: ...... .... ... .... ...................... 
DeAositi'ayments: .... . ...... ..... ...................... ...................... 
Length of agreement: ...................... ...................... 
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VEHICLE INSURANCE DETAILS: 
Narne and address of Insurance Company: ...................... . ....................................... 
Cost of Premium: E ................... Method of payment:....................................... . 
OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY, IN UK OR WORLDWIDE: 
Note: List all valuable personal property including jewellery 1£100 or morel, aircraft, boats and yachts. works of art etc. 
Current Data of Name & address of 
Description: Make/Type: market value: valuation: Location: person holding: 
................... ........... 
£ ......... ........... ............... ............... 
.......... ........ ........... £ ......... ........... ............... ............... 
................... ........... £ ......... ........... ...... ........ ............... 
................... ........... 
£ 
......... ........... ............... ............... 
........ ..... ........... 
£ 
......... ........... ............... ............... 
..... ........... £ ......... .... ...... ....... ....... ............... 
............ .......... E... ... .... ..... .... ........ . ............... 
... . ........... ........... F ........ ........... ............... ............... 
.... .... ....... ........... £ ......... .... . ... ............... ............... 
............. ..... ........... £ ......... ........... ............... ............... 
.................. ........... £ .... ... ........ ............... ............... 
.......... ....... ........... 
F 
......... ........... ............... ............... 
.... ..... ....... ........... E ......... ........... ............... ............... 
...... .,... £...... ......... ............... ............... 
........... £ ...... ......... ............... ............... 
GIFTS TO OTHER PERSONSIGIFTS HELD BY OTHER PERSONS: 
Data of gift and 
Date of name & address of 
Description: Make/Type: Value valuation: Location; parson holdin : 
................... ...... .... 
£ 
........ ..... ..... ............... ........... ... 
................... ........... 
f ......... .... .... ............... ............... 
................... ..... ..... 
£ ...,.... ........... ............... ............... 
.......... ........ ........... C ......... ......... . ............... ............... 
................... ........... £ ..... ... ........... ........ ...... ............... 
................... ........... f ......... ........... ............... ............... 
................... ........... £ ......... ........... ............... ............... 
................... ........... C ......... .......... ............... ............... 
................... ..... .... 
£ 
......... ........... ... ........ ............... 
................... ........... £ ......... ........... ............... ............... 
................... ......... .C......... ........... ............... ............... 
................. . ........... C ......... ........... ............... ............... 
.... .............. ........... E ......... ........... ............... ............... 
............. ..... .......... E ......... ...... . ... ........... ............... 
........... ........... C ......... ......... ............... ............... 
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VALUE ADDED TAX: YES ý_. J NO 
rI 
District ......... ...................... ...... Reference: ....................................... 
Customs & Excise VAT office address: . ....... ............. .... . ................................. 
........ .............. .... ........... ........... ............ . .................... 
Registration number: . .................. ....... 
Amount due: E ............ 
COURT JUDGEMENTS le. g. Fine - County Court Orders) 
Court order date: ... ...... . ........ .................... ...................... 
Name & address of plaintiff . ........ ............. ...................... ...................... 
Amount of order: £ ......... . ........ 
£ 
................... 
E 
.................... 
When payable: ...................... ...................... ...................... 
Method of payment: ................... ........................ ...................... 
CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS: ie. g. School Fees etc) 
Subject: ............. .... . ................ .. ..... ................ 
Name & address of payee: ........... ......... 
...... ............. 
.................. . 
............ ......... ... ..... ....... ... 
...... ............ 
Amount: £ ..... .............. 
........ ............. 
E ................... 
. ................. 
E .................... 
When payable: . .. ... ..... .......... ..................... 
Method of payment: ...................... ....... ............. ...................... 
OTHER SIGNIFICANT LIABILITIES OR DEBTS: 
(Not already dealt with) 
Name & address of creditor' ................ ... ...................... ...................... 
.......... ........ 
Particulars of liability/debt: ........... ..... 
...... ............. 
........ .... . ...... 
...................... 
...................... 
........... ...... 
Amount due: £ ......... ....... 
...... ............... 
E ............... .... 
...................... 
£ 
....... ........... 
PERSONAL SOLVENCY 
Has a Bankruptcy Order been made against the defendant: 
YES " NO Date of order: ......... ....................... 
Name & address of Trustee/Cfficial Receiver: .... ...... . ...... .... ... . ................. . 
... . .... .... .......... ...................... .................................. 
Has an Interim Receiver been appointed under Section 286. Insolvency Act 1986: 
11 ' 
. NC YES 
Details: ............ ............ .......... ......... ... ..................................... 
........... .... ...... ......... ...... .................................................. 
............ ............ ....... . ...... .................................................. 
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BUSINESS DETAILS 
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT: 
Is this section being completed because: 
fal The defendant carried on the business of a sole trader and property used for the 
business is realisable property? YES NO L 
lbi The defendant holds a substantial interest in a partnership or limited liability company 
and such interest is in itself realisable property? YES NO 
(cl A partnership or limited liability company holds realisable property? 
YES NO C 
COMPANY/PARTNERSHIP NAME OR TRADING STYLE: 
Name: ....................................... 
Address: ............................................................................. 
.............................................................................. 
NAMES OF DIRECTORS/PARTNERS: (indicate whichl 
Name: DM: Address: 
.......... ....... ..... .................................................... 
.... .............. .......... ...... ................. .......... ...................... 
.......... ...... ......... ...... ...................... ................... ........ 
.......... ...... ........ ........ ................................................... 
.......... . .... . ........ ...... .................................................... 
DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IN BUSINESS: 
.......... ....... ... ...... .......... .......... ................................. 
. ........ ...... ....... . ....... ............ ........ ................................. 
................. ... .......... ....... .............. ................................. 
........................ . ........ ................ ...... ................................. 
........................ .......... .......................................................... 
............................... ........... .................................................. 
........................ . ........ ......................................................... 
.......... ...... ....... ........ ......................................................... 
REALISABLE ASSETS HELD BY BUSINESS: See also Schedule 7 
... ...... ..... ..... ...... ........................................................ 
..... ...... ...... .................................................................... 
............... .............................................................................. 
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ACCOUNTANT: 
Name ,& address: .............................................................................. 
.............................................................................. 
Person dealing: .................................................... ......................... 
SOLICITOR: 
Name & address: .................... ................. ............. ........................ 
............................................ ........... ..................... 
Person dealing: ..... ............................. .......................................... 
BOOKS OF ACCOUNT: 
Location: ............. ............................. .................................. 
.............. .................... ...... ................................... 
OTHER FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
The confiscation officer should record here any other financial information which would be relevant to preliminary High Court orders 
with a view to the Prosecutor seeking a confiscation order against the defendant. 
. .............................. .................................... ..... ................. 
............ ........ ......... .................................... ....................... 
...... .............. ....... . ........ ....... ........ ............................... 
... ............... .... ..... . ...... ........ .... ..................... 
......... ..... ..... .... .... .... .... ..................... 
.... ....... ....... . ...... ....... . ...... ................................. 
............................... ........ ........ ......................................... 
..................... . ....... ....... ................................................... 
............ ....... ......... . ................. ............................... 
............................... ........... ....................... .......................... 
..................... ....... . ......... ........ ...... .... ............................ 
............... . ...... .................. ........................................... 
............... ........ .................... ...... ............... .................... 
... ......... ..... . .... ........ ......... ....... .................................... 
............. ........ ............. . ...... ............... .................... 
..................... ....... ........ .... ...............................,.... 
..................... . ....... ...... ........ .... ......... ...... ... .............. 
..................... . ....... ...... ........ ...... .................................... 
...................... ..... . ...... ...... ...... ..................................... 
............................... ........ ....... ....... ..................................... 
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APPENDIX V 
ian Criminal Confiscati 
iminal law) 
Law (Aspects of similarities with the 
The Egyptian Narcotics Drugs Act No. 182 of 1960, amended by Act No. 122 
of 1989 
Section 42 of this amended Act provides that: 
'Without prejudice to the bona fide third party's right, in all cases the 
Court shall prescribe the confiscation of narcotising substances and 
impounded plants stated in schedule NO. (5) and their seeds, as well 
as the properties yielded from the crime and the impounded 
instruments and means of transportation used in commitment 
thereof. 
The Court shall also prescribes the confiscation of land cultivated by 
the mentioned plants if such land is owned by the offender or belongs 
to him by unregistered deed. But if he is just a possessor, the decision 
shall be terminating the deed of his possession. 
Instruments and means of transportation decided to be confiscated 
shall be allocated for the General Administration of Combating Drugs 
Crimes under the Ministry of Interior, and only when the Interior 
Minister decides that they are necessary for performing its activity' 
In accordance with this provision, the confiscation of the seized instruments 
and the means of transportation used in committing the offence, as well as 
the properties yielded from it, are obligatory (see appendix 4). According to 
this section, Al-Ghamaz (1994) indicates that the court can confiscate all 
properties that proved to be assets or proceeds of crime. Here 'properties' 
refers to everything or anything which has a value (p. 157). 
One of the main rules upon which the provision of this section is based, is 
that the items required to be confiscated must be owned by the convicted 
person. The mere possession is not a sufficient evident for ownership. And in 
the case of an acquittal, confiscation order will not be imposed as long as 
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possession or owning certain properties is legale. 
Furthermore, if such items are owned by a bona fide party and he/she did not 
appear before the court, then confiscation shall be impermissible with greater 
reason that the vehicle of third party, for example, is used in drug 
transportation without his or her knowledge. This is based on the precept 
that punishment is in person ain which is provided under article 66 of the 
State's Constitution2. 
The law's stipulation of the necessity and inevitability of confiscation does 
not mean its subordination to the original sanction. It cannot be executed if 
the provision overlooks mentioning it in the final sentence (Moheb Al-deen 
1995, p. 181). This means that if the court overlooks taking a decision for 
confiscating located instruments, the means of transportation or vehicles used 
in smuggling incidents, then there will be no reason for confiscating them in 
relation to any legal or administrative proceedings. However, if possession of 
the seized items is regarded as a crime per se , confiscation will be obligatory 
even though the court unintentionally overlooked issuing a judgement of 
confiscation. 
Regarding the proceeds of drug trafficking offences, there is a consensus that 
section 42 empowers the court to order confiscation of all kinds of assets and 
proceeds. Moheb Al-deen (Ibid. ) pointed out that earlier opinions considered 
the items mentioned in the law as an object of confiscation which were not 
restricted to movables, but included immovables as well (p. 182). 
This confiscation system under this Act is supported with pre-trial provisions 
including production orders, seizure orders, search orders, and restraint 
orders. The prosecution carries the burden of proof namely the proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. This means that the prosecution has to prove that both the 
defendant has benefited, and the assets were obtained from drug trafficking 
offences. 
lIn a case where a person is acquitted but the possession or even the ownership of seized 
properties is illegal, the court will be obliged in most cases to order the confiscation. 
2Article 66 of Egypt's permanent Constitution for 1970, amended by People's Assembly's 
resolution 1980 that "penalty is personal, no crime without a law, no penalty is to be executed 
without legal judgement and no punishment on acts other than those subsequent to law's 
effective date". Accordingly, the term 'In personam' here means that penalty is personal. 
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As has been observed earlier in the British and the American confiscation 
systems criminal confiscation laws always encounter strict rules and 
restrictions in their application. One of the common rules on which most 
criminal laws are based is the burden of proof in dealing with individual 
rights, privacy, ownership, property rights and certain privileges. The 
situation with the Egyptian criminal confiscation system is not quite like that 
(an interview with Mr. Solaiman, Ministry of Justice, Cairo 1996). Providing 
evidence and proving the benefit and the relation between this benefit and 
the crime are accompanied by prolonged procedures and routine that always 
frustrate the prosecution. A close look at the percentages of the disposed and 
non-disposed drugs cases of 1995 illustrates this point. In 1995 the number of 
drugs cases is 13,078.85% of these cases are non-disposed. Only 1062 cases 
were convicted (8%), 917 cases were acquittal (7%), and 60 cases were 
preserved3 (see Table 7.1). 
This table shows the number of disposed and non-disposed drugs cases, number of 
cases and suspects preserved, acquittals, and convictions (Year 1995). Source: 
Ministry of Interior, Egypt. 
Total Number Number of disposed Cases (Total: Cases 2039; 
Defendants 2182) 
Number of non- 
disposed cases 
Preservation Ac uittal Convicted 
Cases Def Cases Def Cases Def Cases Def Cases Def 
13078 14602 60 42 917 1013 1062 1127 11039 12420 
3There was a lot of efforts made in order to collect more precise data for the study, but 
unfortunately the information needed was not available to the researcher. Obtaining 
information and statistics about the drug trafficking offence was not possible. 
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The percentages of disposed and non-disposed drugs cases. 
In addition to such legal burdens in the criminal confiscation system and 
administrative obstacles and defects encountering application, the Egyptian 
Constitutional Supreme Court4 issued a decision on the 5th of October 1996 
stating that section 208 of the Criminal Penal Procedure Act 1950, which 
provides the confisLLation law with an essential pre-trial restraint power, is 
unconstitutional. 
Section 208 provides two important paragraphs. The first states that: 
'the attorney general may, if investigation revealed sufficient evidence 
about the seriousness of indictment in the crimes listed in...., to order 
-as a guarantee for executing whatever fine decided or money 
returning, the value of item,, subject matter of the crime, or 
compensating the victim- restraining the accused from dispersing hi" 
properties or administering them or in regard to other preventive 
measures. 
While the second paragraph states that: 
He also may order such measures regarding the properties, of the 
accused spouse or minor children as a guarantee for what he might 
decide unless it is proved that such properties are vested in them 
from anywhere other than the properties of the accused'. 
Based upon the Constitutional Supreme Court's decision, section 208 was 
4A juridical independent panel assuming judicial control on the constitutionality of laws and 
rules as well as on the interpretation thereof. 
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repealed from the aforementioned Acts. Accordingly, the confiscation of 
proceeds of crime under the Egyptian Drugs Act (section 42) becomes 
restricted only to drugs, instruments, means of transportation and properties 
yielded from crime, which are seized at the time of arrest. This decision has 
widely affected the powers provided under this section to deal with the 
proceeds of drug trafficking offences. Without restraining power, the 
confiscation system will be lacking an important procedure in the attempt to 
trace, seize and confiscate the assets and proceeds of crime and drug 
trafficking offences in particular. 
It is worth reviewing here some of the main reasons behind the decision of 
the Constitutional Supreme Court to repeal these two essential paragraphs 
under section 208 of the Criminal Procedures Act 1950. The court held that 
the procedures under those two paragraphs are unconstitutional for the 
following reasons: 
1) The principle of innocence is presumed in every accused and such 
presumption may not be falsely destroyed but it should be challenged by 
evidence deduced from the documents. This cannot be done unless the 
person was convicted with a sentence that cannot be challenged and thereby 
becomes peremptory. 
2) The principle of innocence is related to the criminal charge through its 
proof, and it has nothing to do with the nature or seriousness of the crime, 
nor with its type or degree of penalty. This principle is inherent in every 
individual, warranting his protection whether in the various influential stages 
preceding or during his criminal trial and along its circuits. The provisions 
under these two paragraphs, accordingly, have sanctions imposing 
restrictions on individuals properties so as to prevent them from being 
administered or disposed. These kind of restrictions have no support from 
the Constitutional articles and provisions, thus discriminating between those 
and other citizens or other indictees. All of them are incorporated in one legal 
position, that is the assumption that all of them are equal. Neither accusation 
nor investigation can set aside the principle of their innocence or discriminate 
between them in the rights they enjoy. 
5This important and efficient judgement of the Constitutional Supreme Court was collected 
during the field work visit to Cairo/Egypt in December 1996. 
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3) Imposing restrictions according to the provision of section 208 is not 
associated even with issuing a specified accusation against a particular 
individual, but is mainly based upon sufficient evidence about the 
preponderant accusation with one of the crimes specified by the 
investigation. Such evidence is not to be confused with the adjudicated order 
and does not take its course with regard to other defendants. It is not 
accordingly considered as an absolute order. So discriminating between 
defendants with no constitutional ground, shall be in conflict with the 
judgement of reason and thus in conflict with the provision of article 40 of the 
constitution. 
4) Promoting the property rights by confirming its positive contribution in 
protecting the social security and the preservation of rights of the efforts of 
owners. The constitution ensures its protection of every individual, not to be 
trespassed other than by way of exception which is mainly confined to a 
inevitable legislative re-organisation. Accordingly, the legislator may no 
longer derogate its elements, the nge its nature, strip it from its essentials, 
separate its component parts, destroy its assets, or restrict exercise of rights 
stemming therefrom unless necessitated by its social function. Without this, 
ownership loses its fundamental securities. 
5) The restrictions imposed by the provision of the article on the properties of 
the defendants are not reached by convention, but derived from the provision 
of the law. Yet the defendants are not only deprived from administering their 
properties, they are also prevented from disposing them. Their minors 
(children) and spouse are not excluded from such restrictions. Such 
provisions derogate their ownership and destroy its most important 
characters. These restrictions operate as a form of guardianship or 
receivership far from common judicial decisions and in conflict with the 
provision of article 34 of the Constitution which states that: 
'private property is inviolable and it should not be subject to 
receivership without a judicial decision'. 
Based upon these reasons, the Constitutional Supreme Court decided the 
6Article 40 of the constitution stipulates that "Citizens are equal before the law, they are equal 
in common rights and obligations and no discrimination between them because of race, 
origin, language, religion or doctrine" 
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unconstitutionality of the restraint orders upon which confiscation 
procedures provided under section 42 of the Drugs Act are based. Thus, 
confiscation under this section was perceived to be counter-productive and 
would not achieve the aims of those interested in tracing the illicit gains and 
profits of even the. major drug traffickers. 
On the other hand, the second paragraph of section 42 of this Act permits the 
confiscation of land planted by drugs. Despite the fact that land confiscation 
requires only prevention of sale or exchange, arguments were raised 
concerning the legality of land confiscation and its consistency with article 
(36) of the Constitution which indicates that private ownership is protected 
and the public confiscation of properties is prohibited. 
Moheb Al-deen (Ibid. ) responded by saying that this is a common 
misunderstanding. Confiscation of agricultural land is a private and not a 
public confiscation. The confiscation procedure is confined only upon a 
specific land(s). He asserted that this provision is in agreement with article 
(31) of the Constitution which states that 'private ownership is represented in 
unemployed capital where the law organises its social function within the 
framework of development plan without deviation or exploitation and it 
should not, in its ways of utilisation, be in conflict with the public good of the 
people' (p. 183). 
The perceptions of those who are against such criminal confiscation 
provisions are based upon the belief that: 
1) Criminal legislation, which although it has permitted confiscation as a 
complementary or a supplementary punishment, has exhaustively restricted 
it to seized items that could be confiscated as proceeds to crime, such as 
instruments and weapons used in crime. 
2) Seizure is an important element in the criminal confiscation. Seizure can be 
used only for movable properties. Lands are not intended to be included. 
3) The constitutional general precept provides immunity and sanctity for 
ownership that should not be violated or squandered under any 
circumstance. The state always has its ways of deterrence and punishment 
that spare it from resorting to confiscate particular property that might or 
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might not be available to those who have committed the crime (Ibid., p. 185). 
Moheb Al-deen responded by indicating that the Constitutional provisions 
do not prevent the confiscation of agricultural land. On the contrary, 
confiscation conforms with the provision of article (32) of the Constitution 
which prevents the utilisation of ownership in purposes contradicting with 
the people's public interest. Moheb Al-deen adds that it is not true that the 
legislator prevents confiscation of immovables relying thereby upon the law 
of Organising the Imposition of Receivership Act 1971 which permits all kind 
of confiscation. Also, judiciary decisions, decisions of Court of Ethics, and the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Ethics always have supported this trend 
(p. 186). Moheb Al-deen here in resorting to Act 1971 is revealing that the 
criminal confiscation law in dealing with immovable properties is not 
sufficient enough to deal with such confiscations. He indicates that the state 
always selects the more preventive alternatives in such a way so as to agree 
with the nature and type of each crime and criminal. (p. 190). 
The decision of the Constitutional Supreme Court in repealing the most 
important pre-trial procedures such as the pre-conviction seizures and 
restraints is the only reason why the Drugs Department of the Ministry of 
Interior (the police force) has resort to a different law, and to a different 
system under the Socialist General Prosecutor Office (Act No. 34 of 1971). 
This situation is quite similar to the American confiscation system where law 
enforcement agencies are allowed to resort to civil confiscation which is 
provided under different statute. 
Criminal Confiscation as a Penalty or a Pre-Cautionary Provision 
Where the British confiscation system is struggling to clarify the destination 
between penalty and reparation, the Egyptian and the Kuwaiti confiscation 
systems are classified as a punishment or a precautionary as obligatory or 
discretionary. 
The Egyptian and the Kuwaiti legal systems also consider confiscation 
provisions as a complementary procedures7. The rules and characters of 
7The terms 'ancillary', 'complementary', and 'supplementary' can be defined in a variety of 
ways. The Kuwaiti and originally the Egyptian law differentiated between the supplementary 
and the complementary procedures. More details about the differences will be reviewed later 
in this chapter. 
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complementary sanctions and the definitions, extent, and the difference 
between punitive confiscation and the precautionary provisions will be 
examined in details later under the study of the Kuwaiti confiscation system. 
However, Dr. Gannam (1996)8, a senior lecturer at the Law Faculty in Kuwait 
University, points out that the origin of the Egyptian and the Kuwaiti 
Constitutions and most of the laws and regulations (the Penal Code, the 
Procedural Code) are extracted from the French legal system. The historical 
relations between Egypt and France have its own effects upon the formation 
of the legal system in Egypt, which subsequently, extended to other Arab 
countries in the region. The most distinctive feature of the legal system 
which has been adopted by the Egyptian and the Kuwaiti governments is that 
it is a 'written law'. This feature is the common of Continental or the Latin 
legal family, and is unlike the situation with Common law systems (the 
Anglo-Saxon legal family). 
Zweigert & Kotz's (1977) indicate that the tradition of English Common law 
has been one of gradual development from decision to decision; historically 
speaking, it is case-law, not enacted law. Common law comes from the court, 
unlike Continental law9 which it comes from the study. The great jurists of 
England were judges, on the Continent they were professors. Lawyers of the 
Latin systems when faced with a problem, even a new and unforeseen one, 
inquire about what solutions the law provides unlike Anglo-Saxon legal 
systems in England and the United States where lawyers predict how the 
judge would deal with the problem, given existing decisions. These 
differences in style run through the whole legal system' (p. 63-75). 
Moreover, Zweigert & Kotz state that 'as far as to family and inheritance law 
concerned, the Arab countries unquestionably belong to Islamic law, but the 
8This statement is part of a telephone interview with Dr. Gannam (2nd of October, 1996), who 
explained the recent relevant amendments and interpretations of the Kuwaiti confiscation 
laws. 
91n summing up the comprehensive examination of the world wide law systems and the 
origin of grouping the legal systems Zweigert & Kotz stated that'these groupings primarily 
for taxonomic purposes, so as to arrange the mass of legal systems in a comprehensible 
order'. They indicated that many attempts tried to devise grouping those mass legal systems 
(Arminjon; Nolde; Wolf and many others). The legal ideologies of the Anglo-Saxon, 
Germanic, Romanistic, and Nordic families are essentially similar, and it is because of other 
elements in their styles that they must be distinguished. But in general, the world today 
knows two different'law types': Latin or Continental legal system which stem from Roman 
and Germanic law (combine the legal system of most countries of Europe, Latin America, 
many countries in Middle East and Asia) on one side, and the Anglo-Saxon legal system 
which the United States, England and some other countries come under on the other side (p. 
63-75). 
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economic law of these countries (including commercial law and the law of 
contract and tort) is heavily impressed by the legal thinking of the colonial 
and mandatory powers. Accordingly, French law dominated most of the 
Arabs states' (p. 66). The authors conclude by saying that 'recently the 
attitudes of Common law and Continental law have been drawing closer' (p. 
71)'. 
The United Nation Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (Vienna) 
A report by the Ministry of Interior (1996) on 'Money Laundering Crimes', 
states: 
'Egypt has played an effective role in preparing for this Convention 
and ratified it in 1989 and its provisions became applicable and 
enforceable as a national legislation from the date of ratification by 
the People Assembly'. 
This is confirmed by the provision of section 151 of the Constitution of the 
state which provides that ratifying Conventions must have the power of law 
after being concluded, ratified and published according to the stated 
situations. 
Article 3 of the Convention provides that each party shall adopt such 
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its 
domestic law. In regard to confiscation, article 5 provides that each party 
shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of 
proceeds derived from offences established in accordance with article 3, or 
property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds. 
Confiscation can be made of narcotic drugs and psychtropic substances, 
materials and equipment or other instrumentalities used in or intended for 
use in any manner in offences established in accordance with article 3. 
Paragraph 2 of article 5 provides that each party shall also adopt such 
measures as may be necessary to enable its competent authorities to identify, 
trace, and freeze or seize proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other 
things referred to in last paragraph, for the purpose of eventual 
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confiscationlo. 
Moheb Al-deen (1995) comments by saying that it is the beginning of a new 
and more effective stage of serious confrontation. It make that legislator start 
establishing and developing new policies by reviewing the current dispersed 
confiscation laws and making them consistent with international law. 
In specifying the impact of international law on the national law in terms of 
considering new penalties, he adds: - 
'We noticed that the international Convention has followed an 
integral penal policy aiming at encompassing all incrimination acts 
and links. It followed the policy of imposing the conventional 
penalties beside the other consequential and complementary penalties 
and other remedial or preventive measures concerned itself with 
stipulating the penalty of confiscation of everything, on immovables, 
movables and properties acquired from drugs offences considering it 
as original and not consequential or complementary penalty and 
linked such penalty with the objective in unique harmony and 
integration; while the international Convention stipulated that the 
parties states should take the necessary measures for enabling the 
confiscation of proceeds obtained from the offences provided for or 
the money which value is equivalent to the value of the said proceeds 
(section 5), and confiscating the narcotics drugs, psychotropic 
substances, materials, equipment or other means, used or intended to 
be used somehow in committing the offences provided for; while the 
international Convention compelled its members to take the 
necessary measures for enabling its authorities to follow and trace the 
properties acquired from drug trafficking offences, freeze and attach 
them with the aim of confiscating them, and while the international 
Convention demanded that the properties and monies acquired from 
drug trafficking offences are to be deprived of the confidential 
guarantees for the financial, banking, and commercial transactions 
and dealings, we find no such provisions in the Drugs Act and its 
subsequent amendments' (p. 257). 
Moheb Al-deen indicates that Act No. 34 of 1971 is the only national 
provision which permits the confiscation of all properties which are 
considered (by Court of Ethics) as dirty money and proceeds of drug 
trafficking. The Court of Ethics is empowered to deal with any dirty money 
or a suspected illegal gains of certain crimes. The Act provide a general 
provision which empowered the Court of Ethics to deal with any situations 
which are in the interest of the public and the national security. The Common 
10T'hese articles are extracted from the final Act of the United Nations Conference for the 
Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (Compendium of International Anyi-Money Laundering Conventions & 
Agreements, United States Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network, the second edition, 1996). 
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law (criminal and civil law) may also resort to the provisions of this 
Convention in tracing and confiscating the illicit properties from drug 
traffickers even though this is difficult to be carried out under the current 
laws and the situation of the Supreme Constitutional Court toward the pre- 
trial seizure and restraint procedures11. 
Moheb Al-deen concludes his commentary on Egyptian legislation related to 
confiscation procedures by saying that in a general sense, if the existing 
Egyptian legislation has been affected by the provisions of the international 
Convention, it has not integrated it in the new policies of incrimination 
despite the synchronism of the law and the Convention. And if the existing 
Egyptian law is the most sophisticated means in combating drugs misuse, the 
contemporary international Convention is considered the start of a new and a 
more effective stage for serious confrontation. Accordingly, the Egyptian 
Government must introduce new criminal legislation that is able to deal with 
local drug trafficking related proceeds and capable to co-operate with 
relevant international laws and Conventions (p. 262). 
The Arabic Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1994 (Tunisia) 
This Convention was ratified by the Egyptian Government in November 
1994. It includes provisions related to the confiscation of drug traffickers' 
proceeds and profits quite similar to the aforementioned Convention. It has 
recommended the necessity of tracing and seizing the properties resulting 
from drugs offences with the aim of confiscation thereof linked to of the other 
recommendations stipulated in the 1988 Convention. 
In spite of the appeals of these two Conventions for member states to take the 
necessary measures to establish special legislations that enable their 
competent authorities to identify the proceeds and properties resulting from 
the offences and attaching the same with the aim of confiscation thereof, the 
Egyptian legislator seems satisfied with the available national laws and 
particularly with Act No. 34 of 1971. Neither the public prosecution nor the 
11In addition to the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Government enacted a new 
regulation which added more guarantees and facilities for investments by protecting the law 
of confidentiality of transactions in the Egyptian Banks (Regulation No. 568 of 1990). This 
regulation is a more restriction which makes the enforcement of the criminal confiscation 
proceedings (e. g. bank disclosures and information) almost impossible. 
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socialist general prosecutor had used or relied upon the provisions of one of 
those two Conventions yet (till 30th of December 1996). Al-Gamaz (in an 
interview held in 1996) asserts that this does not means that the Egyptian 
prosecutors under the criminal system cannot utilise the provisions provided 
by these two ratified Conventions. 
A bilateral convention with the Indian Government on the 20th April 1995 is 
a clear indication that the provisions of these two international and regional 
Conventions are been seriously considered by the Egyptian Government. 
Section 4 of the bilateral convention with the Indian Government provides 
that: 
The two parties assist each other, to such extent permitted by the 
national law, regarding drugs offences. Such assistance includes in 
particular: (a) searching for or collecting evidence and (b) freezing, 
restraining and confiscating the moneys and properties resulting from 
or used in the illicit trafficking'. 
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APPENDIX VI 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
RESEARCH METHODS 
There are various types of research methods used in this study. The choice of 
methodology is determined by a prior understanding of the type of 
information needed to be collected, the relationship between the information 
and the chosen resources which are expected to provide it. Accordingly, the 
practices involved must be pragmatic, strategic and self-reflexive. As such the 
methods cannot always be set in advance; the choice will sometimes depend 
upon the questions being asked, whilst the questions depend on their context, 
what is available to the researcher, and what the researcher can do within 
that setting. 
A combination of multiple methods, empirical materials, perspectives and 
observers in a single analysis is best understood as a strategy that adds 
rigour, breadth, and depth to the investigation. By incorporating different 
methods this allows a study of the performance of more than one task, 
ranging from interviewing to observing, to interpreting personal and 
historical documents, to intensive self reflections and introspection. The 
strategy adopted here is however interactive, working between and within 
competing and overlapping methods. 
Three research methods have been used in this study. There will be a brief 
review of each in turn. Additional explanations are provided in Appendix V. 
(a) Personal Interview: interviewing is one of the most common and powerful 
ways to understand the experiences of those participating in an event. It is an 
essential part of sociology because it involves interactions (Benney & Hughes, 
1956, p. 142). According to Operheim, interviews are essentially of two kinds: 
(i) Exploratory and (ii) Standardised12 (p. 63). 
12Such as those used in public opinion polls, market research and government surveys 
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Exploratory interviews specially in a semi-structured form, give the 
researcher an insight into the thinking process of the interviewee. They 
allows a spontaneous flow and exchange of questions, answers and other 
ideas to and from the interviewer. It is this spontaneity that gives an 
ambiguous feel to the information collected, which in turn allows the 
development of new ideas and hypotheses. It helps the interviewer 
understand the psyche of those being interviewed and their process of 
thinking, which, makes the subject of research more exciting and effective. It 
gives a true perspective on a specific area of study (a first hand account in 
some cases) to the researcher rather than a factual data feedback with yes and 
no answers. It also gives additional answers to the researcher and helps 
formulate and classify research problems. These interviews have been used 
with high ranking government officials where it is important to let the 
interview range over a number of different matters which could not always 
be determined in advance. 
Standardised interviews were used with more structured questionnaires. 
(b) Mail Questionnaire: open ended or semi-structured mail questionnaires 
were used where a personal interview was not possible. But keeping them 
open-ended and semi-structured means that the respondent is still able to 
answer all questions in a spontaneous and an impromptu manner. One of the 
advantages of the mail questionnaire is that large samples can be used and 
there is a reduction in the biases that might result from personal 
characteristics of the interviews. The disadvantage of such a system is the 
typical non-response rate. Whereas in personal interviews this is a 95%, 
response in the case of mailed questionnaire it falls to anything between 20% 
to 40%, although various methods can be used to get over this problem like 
sampling, follow-up etc. Mail questionnaires were used by the researcher to 
get data from all the financial investigators at the remaining forces. 
(c) Telephone Interview was used in a small number of interviewees, usually 
as an explanatory form of interviewing. Telephone surveys seems to be the 
medium method of interviewing. Although they allows personal voice 
communication and feedback, the social and personal viewpoints and 
characteristics of the interviewers are probably less pronounced. They offer a 
faster method of covering distant geographical areas (both within the 
national and international limits). The major disadvantage of such a method 
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can be, the problem of language (if the researcher is calling overseas or if 
researcher is not proficient with the native language), cultural problems (for 
example, in Kuwait where people might find telephone interviews 
impersonal) and the high telephone costs involved. 
THE RESEARCH PROJECT: INITIAL MAP OF EXECUTION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENT AMENDMENTS 
As said in chapter 1, one of the main objectives of this thesis is to examine the 
system of confiscation within the context of England and Wales' legislation. 
As said above semi-structured interviews and questionnaires and telephone 
interviews constituted the means of obtaining the data used in the research 
analysis although of course the more traditional library method was used for 
the other aims. However, regarding the information collected from the USA, 
Kuwait and Egypt, different methods were used. These were less structured 
and more suitable to personal visits made to each of these countries. This type 
of personal interview was seen as the most appropriate in order to deal with 
the many issues involved. More details of the visits and the conditions of the 
interviews are given later in this chapter. 
With respect to the British confiscation system, it was intended that three 
populations should be investigated. The first was from the police financial 
investigators; the second would include some judges and prosecutors; and 
the last one would include a number of drug traffickers in prisons who were 
ordered by court to pay a confiscation order. 
In the early stage detailed letters were sent explaining the purpose, aims and 
objectives of the study with copies of the relevant questionnaires attached to 
each letter. This initial letter was sent first to the Lord Chancellor's 
Department asking for permission to send questionnaires and to conduct 
interviews with some judges in Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and 
Derbyshire. Unfortunately, the Department replied in the negative. Another 
letter to HM Prison Service was met with the same response. Accordingly, 
and after discussing the situation with the supervisor, it was decided that the 
study should focus only on the financial investigation system conducted by 
the police in England and Wales. 
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Financial Investigation Officers 
In view of the research objectives, it was decided to use two survey methods 
for data collection. Each can be considered as a separated stage. For the first 
stage, the mail questionnaire method was chosen as the most appropriate 
data collection method. This decision was made primarily on practical 
grounds. From several personal visits to police forces and in particular to the 
Financial Investigation Units (FIUs) in ten districts, it was observed that eight 
forces had two 'financial investigator officers who specialised in drug 
trafficking offences and the remaining two forces had only one financial 
investigating officer13. This proves Levi & Osofsky's (1995) finding that half 
of the thirty five forces who replied to the letters had two officers or fewer in 
their financial investigation unit; only four had five or more officers. Five 
forces had one civilian employed full-time on asset confiscation duties in 
their FIUs, and two thirds did not have any (p. 29). 
The precise number of police financial investigation officers working on asset 
confiscation in regard only to drug trafficking offences is unknown and 
difficult to obtain due to several reasons: (a) some forces have no financial 
investigation unit. The execution of the confiscation provisions under the 
DTA 1994 is an additional task or duty to the main work of one of the Fraud's 
officers; (b) some forces vested the task to a civilian specialist accountant; and 
(c) some forces were sensitive in disclosing such information about the 
population of the police officers and their distribution in the Constabulary. 
However, it is thought there was a total of 87 -at least in 1993- which was 
calculated by Wright et al (1993)14 and is thought to reflect the numbers of all 
the police financial investigators of the FIUs. This figure has been validated 
by using data from other sources such as from a list of names and telephone 
numbers of all the financial investigators in UK obtained from NCIS; as well 
as some of the findings of the Levi & Osofsky's 1995 Report. 
As will be shown later there is a relatively small number of financial 
investigation officers specialising in drug trafficking offences whether 
1-31The Broome report on the implementation of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 (1985) 
recommended that regionally the DPC team should consist of two RCS Detective Sergeants 
attached to each of the regional headquarters of the Crime Squad (para. 2.23, p. 28). 
14Wright et al (1993) in their Report Drugs Squads: Law Enforcement Strategies and 
Intelligence in England & Wales, indicated that the number of DPC police officers is 87. This 
includes the number of police financial investigators in 43 police force, eight Metropolitan 
areas, the five Regional Crime Squads, and the NCIS (The Police Foundation Report, 
Appendix B, p. 115-122). 
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appointed by each police force or appointed by the Regional Crime Squads 
(RCSs) (concluded from those aggregate number of all the investigators in the 
UK). This made the use of the mail questionnaire more appropriate. At the 
beginning of the field work, a list of all the names of the financial 
investigators (Police and Customs & Excise) in the UK was obtained from 
NCIS. However, it was discovered later that the list is an old one, most of the 
names has been changed, or transferred to other tasks, or promoted to higher 
administrative ranks, or the telephone numbers were changed or wrong. 
Hence, the total number of respondents were thought to be no more than 47 
and the total number of the forces who responded was 39 (10 forces by 
personal visits and 29 forces by mail questionnaires). 
The second stage involved a series of interviews carried out in England and 
Wales, USA, Kuwait, and Egypt, with the main information provided by the 
respondents in the questionnaire survey. The decision to use the interview 
method was made on the basis that it was the most appropriate way of 
collecting comprehensive information from a limited number of specialised 
persons. Telephone interviews were also conducted with several lecturers 
from the Law Faculty, Kuwait University. These telephone interviews were 
mostly conducted to cover some points which were not fully covered during 
the face-to-face interviews. 
The Pilot Study 
To ensure the suitability and completion of the questionnaire, several steps 
have been followed. The first step was to conduct a small pilot study which in 
practice meant constructing a list of questions and inquiries relevant to the 
subject of the study. The second step in the questionnaire development 
involved submitting a draft list of questions and inquiries to several persons 
specialised in the area of study. They were asked to read the questionnaire 
critically, to give their reactions and suggestions, to make notes, and when 
necessary to eliminate, add, or rewrite certain questions. As a result of this, 
considerable improvements were made to the questionnaire contents and 
presentation. 
Every aspect of the questionnaire was now tried out beforehand to make sure 
that it worked as intended. The researcher allowed a substantial period of 
time for the construction, revision and refinement of the questionnaire. Due 
to the limited number of police financial investigators in the 43 
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Constabularies, it was not possible to use any member of the population for 
the pilot samples. Instead, the researcher managed to locate four personnel 
with comparable knowledge of the confiscation system and the financial 
investigations who could take part in this pilot study, and provide feedback 
about its suitability, clarity and any confusion that might occur. The aim was 
to eliminate any unnecessary questions or misunderstanding. 
Once all of the above processes were completed, the questionnaire was 
distributed to all the financial investigation units in England and Wales. 
The Mail Questionnaire Used 
To overcome the problem of a low response rate for the British police study it 
was decided to adopt Dillman's Total Design Method (TDM) for the 
development and use of a mail questionnaire (Dillman, 1978). According to 
Dillman, three steps must be taken to maximise the survey response: 
- Minimise the cost of responding; 
- Maximise the rewards for doing so; and 
- Establish trust that those rewards will be delivered. 
Dillman, also offers detailed advice on matters such as the use of envelopes, 
the covering letter, mailing dates, and so on. However, such matters as 
personalisation and reminder procedures, for example, are not always 
possible. Dillman advised the use of three reminders or more, where the third 
reminder should be sent by registered mail to all non-respondents. Following 
Dillman, for this study, only three reminders were sent to most of the non- 
respondents. 
Also, most of Dillman's other recommendations were used. The following 
methods were applied to increase the response rate: 
- An individual, one-page, dated covering letter printed on headed 
paper with a signature was sent along with the questionnaire; 
- Stamped, self-addressed envelopes giving a local address were 
provided; 
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- To maintain the confidentiality of respondents, survey data were 
treated as confidential, steps had been taken to ensure that no 
information will be published about identifiable persons without their 
permission; 
- It was explained in the covering letter that copies of the final report 
resulting from the research survey would be sent to the respondents 
upon request; and 
- In terms of reducing the effort for respondents, the package was kept 
as clear and simple as possible. 
In terms of this study every avenue and recommendation was used in order 
to maximise the response rate, additional copies of the questionnaires were 
sent to those places which have requested so. Also further interviews were 
held in order to compensate as much as possible the low rate of responses. 
Questionnaire Content for the Police Study 
The main objective of the questionnaire was to seek the police financial 
investigators' point of view, their perceptions and attitudes in terms of their 
awareness of confiscation philosophy, and the uses and practises of 
confiscation provisions under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1994, to 
determine also the adequacy of resources specially provided for the 
confiscation system. The intention was also to assess the level of resources 
devoted to financial investigation, to identify problems arising, and to 
determine the impact of the confiscation proceedings and provisions on the 
drug trafficking offences in each force. 
The questionnaire was sent to all financial investigation units in England and 
Wales. It constituted seventeen questions. These questions cover those issues 
and inquiries which would help determine and apprehend the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current confiscation system conceived by police financial 
investigators who are involved in practising the confiscation system on a 
daily basis. The questionnaire represented two main areas of discussion: the 
provisions and powers provided by the confiscation legislation, and certain 
controversial issues related to the applications and the enforcement strategies 
of the system. 
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As mentioned earlier, because the number of the police financial investigators 
specialised in the enforcement of the confiscation provisions under the Drug 
Trafficking Act 1994 was limited, a decision was made to send the 
questionnaire to all the financial investigators. Four questionnaires were sent 
to each of the 33 forces. A sum of 132 questionnaires were distributed by post 
and 40 questionnaires were handed in to the remaining ten units during the 
personal visits. 
A number of problems appeared during the data collection. One of the most 
difficult and time-consuming of these was associated with getting official 
permission from the Chief Constables offices themselves to distribute the 
questionnaire to their financial investigators. Leicestershire Constabulary and 
Staffordshire Constabulary preferred not to participate due to certain rules 
related to their own policies. 
On the other hand, one of the advantages the researcher had which helped in 
obtaining quick access to the financial investigation officers is being a police 
officer himself and a member in the International Police Association. The 
cover letter attached to the questionnaire addressed to 'Dear Colleague' was 
also an added advantage. The aim was to assure the Chief Inspectors and the 
financial investigators that the research and the information was also 
required for the interest of the Kuwaiti Police Force. 
The first mailing of the questionnaire took place on the 28th of August 1994. 
By the 2nd of March 1995, twenty seven replies were received. A follow-up 
letter (personal communication) and further questionnaire were sent to those 
who did not respond. By the end of May 1995, another 20 replies were 
received. Seven of the returned questionnaires were incomplete. Altogether, 
47 complete questionnaires were finally received. 
In what follows no claim are being made to suggest the data could be seen as 
providing a representative sample of a population studied. What it does 
show however is that some of the information provided is of considerable 
interest where when studying the British confiscation system. 
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The Interview Method For All Studies 
England and Wales 
By not including the views and attitudes of judges and drug traffickers, the 
researcher-had to collect data from institutions and subjects other than the 
police forces who could be considered as playing an essential role in 
confiscation proceedings. As well as the main subjects involved in the three 
stages of the confiscation proceedings (see chapter two), i. e. the prosecution, 
the defence, and the court, there are also others who could provide the police 
financial investigators with the help they need for a successful application of 
a confiscation order. The researcher was successful in gaining access to some 
of them. From the pilot study conducted with several forces, the researcher 
was informed of several people who could be useful in providing more 
information about the confiscation system. This, indeed, was one of the most 
distinctive advantages of pilot interviewing. 
Additional interviews were recorded with the following: 
-The first interview was with a principal prosecutor from the Central 
Confiscation Branch (CCB) Crown Prosecution Service Department in 
London. 
-The second interview was with an officer from the National Criminal 
Intelligence Services (NCIS) in London. 
-The third was with Mr. Jason Lloyd a lecturer at the Law School, University 
of Derby. He also lectured at the Midlands Centre for Criminology and 
Criminal justice at Loughborough University, and has been the subject leader 
in several disciplines like criminal law, public law, public order, criminal 
justice and the law on drug misuse. 
-The last was with a financial investigator from Customs & Excise 
Department, Financial Investigation Unit. 
Several interviews were also conducted at the ten police forces chosen for the 
personal visits. Ten interviews were accomplished with a variety of police 
officers (one chief inspector, two detective inspectors, and seven detective 
sergeants). Five forces were chosen first (Leicestershire Police Force, 
Nottinghamshire Police Force, Derbyshire Police Force, West-Midlands Police 
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Force, and South Wales (Gwent) Police Force). Because of the low rate of 
responses and the unwillingness of the Leicestershire Police Force to 
participate, another six forces were chosen (Lincolnshire, South-East Wales, 
South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester and Dyfed-Powys 
Police in south east Wales). The choice of these forces were mainly for the 
following reasons: 
-The distance from Loughborough (some were chosen because they are 
the closest forces to the residence of the researcher); . 
-West-Midlands Police Force in Birmingham and Greater Manchester 
were chosen because they are in two of the biggest cities in England; 
-The two Forces in Wales were the first respondents to the personal 
communication, and it also happened that the visits to these two forces 
in South and South West Wales coincided with a visit to South Wales 
University to meet Professor Michael Levi for relevant purposes; 
-Derbyshire Police Force was chosen because the statistical figures 
obtained from the Home Office indicate that Derbyshire Police Force 
had no registered confiscation cases in regard to drug trafficking 
offences, the situation provoked the curiosity of the researcher to 
determine to what extent this information was credible or reliable; and 
-Other forces were mainly selected because of their willingness to 
communicate with the researcher and of their appreciation of the 
purposes of the research. 
The main points of the interviews was to see and observe closely how the 
confiscation system was implemented, to understand the structure of the 
financial investigation system within the force, to determine the differences 
between forces with regard to resources and allocations devoted to the 
financial investigations and some other interesting points which could help to 
understand how to examine the system from within the existing differences 
and similarities. The researcher has used the interview guide approach which 
serves as a basic checklist during the interview to make sure that all relevant 
topics are covered. The advantage of an interview guide is that it makes sure 
that the interviewer has carefully decided how best to use the limited time 
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available. 
The interviews conducted in Britain took place between 1st of October 1994 
and 30th of May 1995. Interviews were also conducted in USA, Egypt and 
Kuwait during the period 1/ 10/ 1996 to 30/ 12/ 1996. 
United States of America 
The American Embassy in London helped make several appointments with 
professionals in the field of confiscation in the United States. Within a week, 
the Embassy received notice of these appointments, which included personal 
visits and interviews in different specialised institutions which dealt mainly 
with the confiscation (or as the American refers to as 'forfeiture') with regard 
to drug trafficking offences. 
Adding to this, and due to the insufficient data about the American forfeiture 
system available in England and the need to update most of the collected 
main laws and provisions, the researcher had to search for the missing and 
the updated information from its original source (Washington DC, USA). The 
aim of the visit was also to help in expanding the awareness of the researcher 
about the extent of limitations and restrictions of the system, the way it 
works, and identifying the real attitudes of some officials from the recent 
developments and serious arguments about the civil forfeiture system in the 
American Congress. 
Several interviews were conducted in Washington DC during the period 
13/ 10/ 1996 to 20/ 10/ 1996. These were as follows; 
1. An interview held with a senior Attorney from the Asset Forfeiture 
Section, Office of Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA). 
2. An interview which took place at the Office of General Counsel in 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a detective inspector who is 
the chief of the Forfeiture Counsel, Forfeiture Unit). 
3. An interview with two professionals from FinCEN (Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network) under the US Department of the Treasury. 
4. An interview with a trial attorney, the United States Department of 
Justice, Criminal Division, Asset Forfeiture Office, and with an officer 
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from the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section. 
5. An interview with the Director of the Criminal Justice Section, 
American Bar Association (ABA). 
During this research, the researcher took the chance to visit various libraries 
around the country in order to gather some relevant literature. These places 
were the libraries of George Washington University, American University, 
George Town University, and finally the Library of Congress. 
Kuwait 
A visit to Kuwait was vital to this study not only to collect information about 
laws and data relevant to the Kuwaiti confiscation system, but also to 
determine the procedures chosen for the application of the new confiscation 
provision which had been added to the Drugs Act No. 74 of 1983 (the 
amendments under Act No. 13 of 1995). Moreover, the researcher wanted to 
examine the attitudes of some Kuwaiti academic staff and some professionals 
in which the new confiscation provisions was part of their concern. 
Three interviews were held with three academics in the Faculty of Law, 
Kuwait University. Two interviews with the Head of Drugs Department, 
Ministry of Interior took place in different times. Another interview was 
conducted with a lecturer in Criminal Law with the Police Academy, 
Ministry of Interior. An interview also took place with one of the Kuwaiti 
lawyers who have a long experience with the application of the Drugs Act 
and the new confiscation provisions in specific. The value of this interview 
was appreciated in revealing the strengths and defects of the law and its 
enforcement by police and court. This information was not available from the 
other resources or interviewees. 
The researcher also interviewed the counsellor in the Kuwaiti Parliament. The 
aim of this particular interview was to determine the philosophy and 
principles behind the new confiscation legislation which is mainly about the 
profits and proceeds of drug trafficking offences (see chapter eight). In 
addition to the interviews, the researcher had also collected data from a 
variety of important resources. Most of these resources provided the research 
with few and limited but essential documented information and data about 
the sitution of confiscation laws and the new developments that accompanied 
the so called 'after liberation stage'. 
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a) The Ministry of Interior: The Information and Planning Centre, and The 
Drugs Department, The Public Relation Department, Police Academy (the 
main Library). 
b) The Ministry of Justice: Drugs Prosecution Department, Monies Protection 
Department, and The Conferences Division. 
c) Kuwait University: Law Library, Sociology Division, and Political Sciences 
Division15. 
Egypt 
In order to encompass the main aspects of the Egyptian Confiscation System, 
a visit to the country was required. It was very difficult to obtain all 
information needed. For instance, statistical data were not available for 
academic research purposes. However, there were some accessible 
information resources which made the visit worthwhile despite the 
difficulties mentioned above. 
The data collection processes mainly relied upon personal visits and 
prolonged interviews in Cairo the capital. The Interviews were confined to 
certain officials at two Governmental Departments: the Police College, and 
the Socialist Prosecution Office16. 
Two interviews were made with two professors from the Sociology 
Departments in Cairo University. 
The main interview in the study of the Egyptian system was with the Socialist 
General Prosecutor. It was held at his office and took more than five hours 
(10.00 am - 3.30 p. m. ). 
With the assistance of two Egyptian Lecturers17 at the Kuwaiti Police 
15Apart from libraries, all the governmental departments and the academic divisions open 
from 8 a. m. to 2 p. m. In two weeks (the period decided for the empirical work), all relevant 
documents, books, reports, and even offical letters were collected from the mentioned 
resources. 
16Three visits to the Drugs Prosecution Office at the Ministry of Justice in Cairo were 
conducted, but no interviews were held. A short conversations were the main features at 
those visits 
17Dr. Ibrahim Al-Gamaz (a previous police general at the Egyptian Police Force) and Dr. 
Hijazi jommah (a previous police general at the same force as well). 
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Academy who fortunately were in Cairo during the visit, the researcher 
managed to collect most of the literature relevant to the Egyptian confiscation 
system from the National Library, Police Academy's main library and from 
several specialised book shops. 
All the interviews mentioned above were recorded personally with the 
interviewees and then transcribed in papers. Some were recorded Arabic and 
then translated into English by the researcher. Several telephone calls were 
made with several authorised personnel at the Ministry of Interior and 
Kuwait University to provide the researcher with updated information. 
Method of Analysis 
The main method of analysis for the data in all studies is qualitative. This is 
due in part to the high non-response rate of the questionnaires, but also to the 
importance placed on the interviews with senior officers at different law 
enforcement agencies (FIUs, CCB, NCIS, DEA, FBI, or elsewhere). However, 
some of the data supplemented are considered quantitative. To start 
analysing all the data it is important to distinguish, in brief, between the 
definitions and the implications of those two different data types. The main 
differences and the possibility of combining them for analysis is also covered 
in this section. 
Denzin & Lincoln (1994) pointed out that the word 'qualitative' implies an 
emphasis on processes and meanings that are not rigorously examined, or 
measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency. Qualitative 
researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate 
relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational 
constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers seek answers to questions 
that stress how social experience is created and given meaning. In contrast, 
quantitative studies emphasise on the measurement and analysis of causal 
relationships between variables, not processes (p. 4). 
Dey (1993) distinguished between quantitative and qualitative data in terms 
of the difference between meanings and numbers. Qualitative data deal with 
meanings, whereas quantitative data deal with numbers. This has 
implications on this analysis, for the way we analyse meanings is through 
conceptualisations, whereas the way we analyse numbers is through statistics 
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and mathematics (p. 3). 
By articulating concepts through description and classification, and the 
analysis of relationships through the connections which we can establish 
between them, Dey asserts that one can conceptualise qualitative data 
accordingly (Ibid., p. 3). There are a variety of perspectives concerning the 
conceptualisation of meaning and the practical problems associated with it. 
For example, the interpretative approach discussed by Patton (1980) 
Qttalitative evaluation and research methods, emphasises the role of patterns, 
categories and basic descriptive units; the network approach discussed by 
Bliss and her colleagues (1983) Qualitative data analysis for educational research, 
focuses on categorisation; the quasi-statistical approach presented by Miles 
and Huberman (1984) Qualitative data analysis emphasises a procedure called 
'pattern coding'; and the 'grounded theory' approach of Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques, 
centres on a variety of different strategies for'coding' data. Dey believes that 
despite the differences in approaches and languages, the common emphasis 
is on how to categorise data and make connections between categories. These 
main two tasks constitute the core of qualitative analysis (p. 5-6). 
Qualitative analysis is essentially an iterative process (Dey. p. 231). It involves 
repeated returns to earlier phases of the analysis as evidence becomes more 
organised and ideas are clarified. 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) is the major means of 
quantitative analysis used to deal with part of the data. Eight of the questions 
included in the questionnaire which was used as one of two methods for 
collecting data in England and Wales (1,2,5,6,9,12,13,14) (see Appendix I) 
embrace nominal variables, like for instance, ('Yes', 'No', 'Don't Know', 'No 
Comment' and 'Others'). Upon this, SPSS has been used to determine the 
frequencies and percentages of certain views and trends of the respondents. 
The main purpose and great advantage of using this package is that it enables 
the researcher to analyse these data very quickly and in many different ways. 
Patton (1987), for instance, pointed out that it facilitates comparison and 
statistical aggregation of the data, which gives a broad and generalisable set 
of findings (p. 9). Many figures and tables were, therefore, produced and the 
most important ones were selected for analysis. 
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Triangulation 
The Analysis strategy is based upon implementing a comprehensive method 
of triangulation. Denzin (1978) has identified four basic types of 
triangulation: (1) data triangulation, which is the use of a variety of data 
sources in a study, for example, interviewing people in different status 
positions or with different point of views; (2) investigator triangulation, 
where several different evaluators or social scientists are used; (3) theory 
triangulation, multiple perspectives are used to interpret a single set of data; 
and finally (4) methodological triangulation, which involves using multiple 
methods to study a single problem or programme, such as interviews, 
questionnaires, observations, and documents (see Patton 1987, p. 60). For the 
purpose of our analysis, the last two types of triangulation were adopted. The 
analysis, therefore, embraces a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
data which are collected by questionnaires and interviews. 
The researcher has assumed that by utilising both the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, one can achieve the utmost benefit from the data. 
Bryman & Cramer (1988) indicate that 'many writers recognise that there is 
much to be gained from a fusion of the two research traditions' (p. 1). Patton 
(1990) pointed out also that one important way to strengthen a study design 
is through triangulation, or the combination of methodologies in the study of 
the same phenomena (p. 187). The logic of triangulation is based on the 
promise that 
'no single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival causal 
factors.... Because each method reveals different aspects of empirical 
reality, multiple methods of observations must be employed. This is 
termed triangulation. I now offer as a final methodological rule the 
principle that multiple methods should be used in every 
investigation' (Denzin, 1978, p. 28). 
The interview is the only common research method which has been used for 
data collection in the other three countries approached in this study. The 
researcher -had practised the exploratory interviewing method in all the 
interviews. The in-depth interview is the most common format for these 
interviews. By using the interview guide approach with a combination of 
unstructured and semi-structured (nominal) questions, this has provided the 
opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply to uncover new clues and to 
open up new dimensions of the subject matter. Many questions which were 
asked and led to a valuable recorded answers were not listed in the 
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researcher's guide of questions. The interviewees did not only answer the 
questions prepared by the researcher, they themselves formulated a dialogue 
giving their conceptions of their own world (experience). 
In regard to the strategy of analysis, there is a logical sequence in the steps 
and procedures, used from collecting the data to producing an account. This 
sequence reflects the logical relationship between different phases in the 
analytic process. We cannot categorise or link data unless we have first read 
and annotated it; we cannot connect categories unless we have first 
categorised and linked the data; we cannot produce an account without first 
categorising and linking the data. However, although qualitative analysis is 
sequential in this sense, in practice it rarely proceeds in a direct line from first 
encounters with the data to finally draw conclusions. Dey indicates that it is 
more realistic to imagine qualitative data analysis as a series of spirals as we 
loop back and forth through various phases within the broader progress of 
the analysis (p. 265). 
Finally, Dey points out that we are dealing with probabilities rather than 
certainties. No facts or explanations are incontrovertible, and the most we can 
hope for is to present the best possible account of our data. But when complex 
explanations emerge, which can suffer a 'credibility gap', the researcher will 
make choices in order to balance conflicting probabilities (p. 232). 
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